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Industrialized societies are undergoing dramatic demographic changes. As 
a result of growing life expectancy and low fertility rates, all countries are 
experiencing declines in the size of the working-age relative to the older popu-
lation: The so-called ‘elderly dependency ratio’ is increasing. The consequences 
of these demographic changes extend far beyond the economic realm, but one 
of their most serious and best understood implications is that they threaten 
the solvency of public pay-as-you-go (payg) pension schemes. Potential labor 
shortages are another scenario troubling policymakers and employers alike.
Across industrialized countries, policymakers are therefore seeking to 
raise employment levels, and older workers in their 50s and 60s are one 
population group that is receiving considerable attention in this context. 
This is especially true in many Continental European countries which even 
until the 1990s actively promoted early retirement as a means of reducing 
labor supply and thereby unemployment (Kohli et al. 1991; Ebbinghaus 
2006). While preventive policies such as health promotion and lifelong 
learning also have their place, at least in theory, cutbacks in (early) retire-
ment benefits are a straightforward way of improving the sustainability of 
payg schemes. Lower retirement benefits not only directly reduce pension 
outlays; they should also induce individuals to postpone retirement and 
remain in the labor force, thereby increasing labor supply, tax revenue, and 
contributions to public insurance schemes.
Reforms intended to raise employment levels have not been confined to 
public pension schemes. Other key welfare state programs such as unem-
ployment insurance and disability benefits also underwent major reforms 
in many advanced countries during recent decades, with the ‘activation’ 
of older workers and other groups such as single mothers and the long-
term unemployed being a top priority. Generally speaking, this goal has 
been pursued through a combination of ‘enabling’ and ‘demanding’ policy 
changes (Eichhorst et al. 2008; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidel 2008): Enabling 
reforms include the expansion of active labor market policies such as train-
ing measures, policies facilitating the reconciliation of paid and care work, 
and instruments that seek to raise the net gain from working such as wage 
subsidies or negative income taxation. Examples of demanding reforms are 
the tightening of readiness-to-work requirements and suitability criteria 
or cuts in the level and duration of benefits.
One possible interpretation of these changes is that they reflect neces-
sary and inevitable responses to demographic changes and other challenges 
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facing advanced economies. A second, less benign interpretation is that they 
form part of a more general trend toward a (re-)privatization of key life risks 
formerly covered by public provisions (Hacker 2006; Breen 1997; O’Rand 2011). 
In both the United States and Europe – and in academic circles as well as the 
general public – there is a widespread perception that workers and families 
are facing greater economic insecurity today than they did twenty or thirty 
years ago (Western et al. 2012; Lengfeld and Hirschle 2009) – and commenta-
tors on both sides of the Atlantic view changes in welfare state programs and 
their functional equivalents, in particular employer-based social protection, 
as one of the main causes of this increase in economic insecurity.
Especially in the United States, there is no shortage of bold and dis-
comforting claims about an alleged decline of social protection and its 
ramif ications for income security. For example, in The Great Risk Shift, his 
widely read book on rising economic insecurity in the United States, Yale 
political scientist Jacob Hacker (2006: 6ff.) writes:
Insecurity today reaches across the income spectrum, across the racial 
divide, across lines of geography and gender [...] By the early 1970s, it 
[America’s distinctive framework of economic protection, J.P.H.] worked 
tolerably well in insulating most middle-class Americans from the major 
f inancial risks of a capitalist economy. Today, however, it is falling apart 
under the weight of political attack and economic change [...] Through the 
cutback and restructuring of workplace benefits, employers are seeking 
to offload more and more of the risk once pooled under their auspices. 
Facing f iscal constraints and political opposition, public social programs 
have eroded even as the demands on them have risen.
Echoing that sentiment, Peter Gosselin (2009: 8) asserts:
[T]here is another more immediate cause for [...] insecurity [...]: an 
increase in the risk that Americans must bear as they provide for their 
families, pay for their houses, save for their retirement, and grab for the 
good life. The increased risk is the product of a shift of economic dangers 
from the broad shoulders of business and government [...] to the backs of 
working families. And the shift has not just affected the working poor 
and those in the great statistical middle, but has reached households long 
thought immune to dislocation [...].
Both passages contain at least three claims: First, economic insecurity 
has risen. Second, this rise in insecurity is not confined to lower strata or 
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low-income households but reaches well into the middle and perhaps even 
the upper classes. Third, the erosion of public and – particularly important 
in the American case – employer-provided income support and protection 
programs is a major cause of this trend towards heightened insecurity.
While there are no equally influential and widely read books describ-
ing such trends for Germany, similar claims are familiar from public as 
well as academic debates. Recently, Lengfeld and Hirschle (2009) noted 
a heightened sense of economic insecurity, especially among the middle 
classes, and a 2008 report by Grabka and Frick stirred considerable debate 
as to whether the German middle class was ‘shrinking’. In addition, there 
is a widespread perception that Germany’s system of social protection has 
become considerably less generous since the 1970s and 1980s, a perception 
that became even more prominent after the so-called ‘Hartz reforms’ of the 
early 2000s, but had been widely held already before that time. The following 
passage from Christoph Butterwegge’s (2006: 9) book on the German welfare 
state (translation J.P.H.) nicely illustrates this view:
A central thesis of this book is that the welfare state is being restructured 
and dismantled since the middle of the 1970s [...] the neoliberal turn 
brings with it the end of the welfare state known from the ‘old’ Federal 
Republic; however, a us-style society characterized by high performance 
and f ierce competition is not a desirable alternative for the majority of 
the population.1
Not only is this passage strikingly reminiscent of Hacker’s and Gosselin’s 
descriptions of welfare state change in the us, it also highlights the im-
portance of the United States as a (dystopian) reference point in German 
and European social policy discourse. Thus, the term ‘Americanization’ is 
frequently invoked as a synonym for welfare state retrenchment or a ‘race 
to the bottom’ (Starke et al. 2008: 981; see also Alber 2010).
Against this background, this study seeks to contribute to a well-founded 
empirical assessment of these claims about the direction and implications of 
welfare state change. It does so by focusing on the situation of workers above 
age 50 in Germany and the United States during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
1 ‘Eine zentrale These des Buchs lautet, dass der Sozialstaat seit Mitte der 1970er-Jahre 
restrukturiert und demontiert wird [...] die neoliberale Wende [bringt] zwar das Ende des 
Wohlfahrtsstaates, wie ihn die “alte” Bundesrepublik kannte, mit sich; eine Hochleistungs-, 
Konkurrenz- und Ellbogengesellschaft nach us-amerikanischem Muster bietet aber für die 
Mehrheit der Bevölkerung keine erstrebenswerte Alternative.’
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Older workers are a particularly interesting case because they are one of the 
groups who have arguably been most strongly affected by recent welfare 
state change: Besides changes in public payg pension schemes, reforms 
that have likely had a disproportionate effect on older workers include 
the retrenchment of long-term unemployment and disability benefits. In 
addition, the consequences of the shift from defined-benefit (db) to defined-
contribution (dc) plans as the predominant type of employer-provided 
pension plan in the us – a core element of the ‘Great Risk Shift’ according 
to Hacker and Gosselin – will be most directly felt by individuals near and 
beyond retirement age.
Recent decades have also seen rapid change in arenas other than social 
policy. Increasing mobility of capital and labor, rising internationalization 
of production, growing product market integration, and rapid technological 
progress are only some of the far-reaching changes that are sometimes 
subsumed under the umbrella term ‘globalization’ (Blossfeld et al. 2007a). 
In a comparative volume on Globalization, Uncertainty and Late Careers 
in Society Blossfeld et al. (2006) suggest that older workers are among the 
losers of accelerated structural change because employers may view ‘late-
career employees as an increasingly expensive and inflexible burden’ (p. 3). 
This suggests a gloomy scenario where the labor market prospects of older 
workers deteriorate, while welfare state provisions that would formerly have 
alleviated their lot are being scaled back to promote longer working lives.
To explore the actual implications of these (alleged) trends for older 
workers, I will combine a detailed analysis of German-American differences 
and trends in key welfare state programs with an analysis of ‘how real lives 
are really lived’, as Goodin et al. (1999: 1) put it in their seminal book on the 
Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. In a f irst step, I will provide a thorough 
account of relevant welfare state provisions and employer-based social 
protection. Subsequent parts of the study will then use longitudinal data 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (soep) and the American Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (psid) to investigate the f inancial consequences 
of two crucial ‘trigger events’ (DiPrete and McManus 2000): involuntary job 
loss and retirement in the sense of long-term exit from work.
In addition to current debates about economic insecurity and the 
direction of recent welfare state change, this study also speaks to broader 
questions about the relationship between (macro-level) institutions and 
individual life courses. Until the 1980s or even the 1990s, life course sociol-
ogy was preoccupied with identifying secular and universal trends in overall 
life course patterns, as captured by the distinction among traditional, 
industrial, Fordist, and Post-Fordist life courses (Mayer 2005). Since then, 
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and due in part to the growing availability of longitudinal micro data, 
research has increasingly focused on the extent and institutional sources of 
variability beyond these highly stylized distinctions (e.g., Mayer 1997, 2005; 
DiPrete 2002; Leisering 2003; Diewald 2010). Much of this research, however, 
has analyzed midlife or early career trajectories such as the transition from 
school to work. Comparative research on the later life course has so far 
predominantly focused on the timing of retirement (e.g., Kohli et al. 1991; 
Maltby et al. 2004; Blossfeld et al. 2006; Schils 2008; Radl 2010). There is 
much less comparative research on the income trajectories of older workers 
and retirees, even though household income mobility undoubtedly is a 
crucial life course outcome (DiPrete 2002; Mayer 2005). This study directly 
addresses this research gap.
On a very general level, the primary research questions of this study can 
thus be summarized as follows:
1. How do the f inancial consequences of exit from work and late-career 
job loss differ between the United States and Germany?
2. Have the f inancial consequences of these events changed over time? In 
particular: Are they increasingly associated with declines in economic 
well-being?
3. To what extent can country and period differences be attributed to 
differences in welfare state provisions?
The remainder of this introduction is divided into three sections. In the 
next section, I further elaborate why I selected Germany and the United 
States as country cases. In Section 1.2, I sketch the rationale for studying the 
real-life consequences of (changing) welfare state arrangements by focus-
ing on income mobility around potentially adverse life events. Section 1.3 
concludes with a brief overview of the study.
1.1 Why compare Germany and the United States?
A primary reason for selecting Germany and the United States is that they 
are important and paradigmatic reference points in two of the most influ-
ential accounts of institutional variability across industrialized countries: 
the welfare regimes approach associated with the work of Gøsta Esping-
Andersen (1990) and the varieties of capitalism (voc) approach set out in 
an edited volume by Peter Hall and David Soskice (Hall and Soskice 2001b).
Welfare state scholars consider Germany the prime example of a con-
servative (or corporatist) welfare state. Conservative welfare states feature 
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high contribution-based and earnings-related public benefits that serve the 
goal of status maintenance (Esping-Andersen 1990). Labor markets tend to 
be regulated with relatively strong employment protection, which reduces 
labor market turnover and stabilizes careers, possibly resulting in a marked 
divide between ‘labor market insiders’ with secure jobs and ‘outsiders’ such 
as low-skilled workers or labor-market entrants and re-entrants (Blossfeld 
et al. 2007b; Gießelmann 2009).
The us, by contrast, epitomize the so-called liberal (or residual) welfare 
state that emphasizes individual responsibility. Public benef its tend to 
be meagre and of limited duration. They are often means-tested and/or 
restricted to certain (‘deserving’) population subgroups such as families 
with children or the disabled and the elderly. The flip side of limited public 
benefits is a greater salience of private and employer-provided benefits in 
pensions and health care. The labor market is relatively unregulated and 
turnover is high. Social services are even less developed than in the ideal 
typical conservative welfare state, but the private service sector is larger 
due to (downwardly) f lexible wages and a large immigrant workforce.
While some authors have drawn on the voc approach to explain country 
differences in systems of social protection (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Iversen 
2005), it is primarily a typology of different production systems character-
ized by distinctive configurations of economic governance mechanisms, 
skill (and skill formation) regimes, and product market strategies. The basic 
distinction put forward by the voc approach is between ‘coordinated’ and 
‘liberal’ market economies – with Germany exemplifying the former and the 
us the latter type of economy. In fact, Germany and the United States are 
the two countries Hall and Soskice use to illustrate the coordinated-liberal 
distinction in their introduction to the 2001 volume (Hall and Soskice 2001a).
According to the voc account, German f irms pursue a strategy of incre-
mental innovation or ‘diversif ied quality production’ (Sorge and Streeck 
1988) that relies heavily on workers’ industry/occupation as well as f irm-
specif ic skills. In this ‘specif ic skills regime’ both f irms and workers have 
strong incentives to enter into long-term relationships: Because they are 
diff icult and costly to replace, employers want to hold on to workers who 
are equipped with the necessary industry-, occupation-, and f irm-specif ic 
skills. Well-matched workers, too, have high stakes in their jobs, as they 
allow them to reap the returns on their investment in non-portable skills. 
From this point of view, Germany’s more generous early retirement or 
‘welfare-sustaining employment exit policies’ (DiPrete et al. 1997: 328) are 
not simply the outcome of a stronger labor movement. They can also be 
seen as devices that ‘allow f irms that operate production regimes requiring 
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employee loyalty to release labor without violating implicit contracts’ (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 50).
The typical American f irm, by contrast, follows a strategy of ‘radical 
innovation’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39) that relies more on general skills 
which are portable across f irms and even industries. Labor market turnover 
is higher than in coordinated market economies. This may partly be due to 
lower levels of employment protection, but the voc approach argues that 
there will also be less demand for such protection on the part of workers 
in liberal market economies, because greater emphasis on portable general 
skills makes job loss less costly.
The welfare regimes and voc approaches have provided important cues 
for attempts to identify systematic cross-national variability in life course 
patterns (see, for example, Mayer 1997, 2005; DiPrete 2002; Diewald 2010) 
and according to Mayer (2005: 35) ‘a plausible argument can be made that 
major institutions and a series of life course outcomes do in fact cluster to a 
considerable extent’. This study contributes to these ongoing debates about 
the identif iability of distinct life course regimes by focusing on one aspect 
of the life course that has so far received only limited attention – changes 
in economic well-being during the late career and at the transition to retire-
ment – and by doing so in two countries that f igure as important reference 
points in both the welfare regimes and voc literatures.
Yet, while the f indings of this study are certainly relevant to these 
debates, I opt for an in-depth comparison of two countries rather than 
a broader comparison of multiple countries from different regimes. This 
approach is in the spirit of Mayer (2005: 36) who opines that regime-style 
typologies are too coarse for ‘establishing credible links’ between institu-
tions and individual life course outcomes and goes on to argue that there 
is ‘no alternative than to resort to the level of particular countries and 
particular institutions’ (ibid.). The implicit hope here is that intimate knowl-
edge of institutional configurations – as opposed to abstract and stylized 
regime-style classif ications – will shorten the ‘inferential leap’ involved in 
(causally) attributing country differences in life course outcomes to coun-
try differences in institutions. Equipped with such detailed institutional 
knowledge, a researcher may be able to rule out some explanations that are 
plausible from a welfare regimes perspective. In a related vein, Alber (2010) 
argues that at least some widely held beliefs about differences between the 
American and European welfare states turn out to be exaggerated when 
confronted with institutional realities.
It is also important to stress that in this study the country comparison is 
only one of two axes of comparison, the second being the within-country 
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comparison across time. As later parts of the study will show in more detail, 
Germany and the United States are interesting cases for such a within-
country comparison because both countries have seen considerable, albeit 
quite different, changes in their systems of social protection over the last 
three decades. As Chapter 3 will explore in greater detail, public pension 
replacement rates in both countries have fallen modestly over the course 
of observation period. In Germany, a perhaps even more consequential 
development has been the retrenchment of generous early retirement op-
tions in the public pension pillar and their functional equivalents in other 
welfare state programs. As noted above, such programs are often seen 
as a key functional requirement of a labor market that emphasizes non-
transferable skills and is characterized by marked occupational boundaries 
that constrain displaced older workers’ opportunities for reemployment. 
This suggests the possibility of an ‘institutional mismatch’ where displaced 
older workers are faced with increasing pressures to return to work, while 
other institutional factors restrict their opportunities for actually doing 
so. In the United States, the most consequential changes have arguably 
occurred in the sphere of employer-provided pensions, where db pension 
plans have increasingly been replaced by dc pension plans, which has 
shifted investment risks from employers to workers.
1.2 Why study income mobility around job loss and 
retirement?
There are many possible ways to study how the ‘real lives’ of citizens vary 
across countries and over time. The approach taken in this study is to 
examine how the income situation of workers and their families changes 
around two (potentially) adverse ‘trigger events’: late-career job loss and 
exit from work. This approach entails two general commitments: to focus 
on the income situation of individuals (as opposed to other outcomes such 
as subjective well-being) and to focus on changes around major life events 
(as opposed to, say, cross-sectional inequalities).
Disposable income is an interesting outcome because of its presum-
ably close relationship to individual (economic) well-being, particularly if 
certain corrections are made for differences in household needs. As I will 
further discuss at the beginning of Chapter 2, there is a long-standing debate 
in social philosophy and welfare economics about the nature of individual 
welfare (or well-being). Even though many authors convincingly argue that 
well-being must ultimately be conceptualized in terms of ends that are 
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valuable in themselves (such as ‘utility’ or ‘capabilities’), few would dispute 
the claim that, at least in advanced economies, income is a crucial resource 
for achieving such ends.
For good reasons, income maintenance and prevention of income poverty 
are therefore typically seen as important objectives of welfare state policy 
(Goodin et al. 1999). Welfare states broadly construed do many things 
other than promoting income security (e.g., provide social services), yet 
programs whose primary function is to provide (partial) protection against 
the adverse economic consequences of ‘life course risks’ (DiPrete 2002) 
arguably form the core of the welfare state. Thus, many of the major welfare 
state programs operate on the ‘principle of causality’ (Kausalprinzip; Alber 
1982: 27) whereby eligibility for a certain type of benefit is contingent on 
the occurrence of a specif ic life course risk. For example, unemployment 
benefits are intended to cover workers who have (involuntarily) lost their 
job. Other programs such as means-tested programs that provide basic 
income support are not clearly targeted at those who have experienced a 
specif ic event, but their contribution, too, may be most clearly visible after 
the occurrence of adverse events with the potential to trigger downward 
income mobility. In other words, welfare state programs are the prototypical 
set of ‘societal institutions’ that ‘mitigate the consequences of [...] events 
[with the potential to change a household’s life conditions]’ (DiPrete 2002: 
267).
Job loss is a paradigmatic life course risk: It often strikes unexpectedly 
and is usually accompanied by an episode of unemployment without any 
labor income. In addition, research on so-called ‘scar effects’ suggests that 
earnings losses may persist long after reemployment (Arulampalam 2001; 
Gangl 2004a; Farber 2005). Retirement (in the sense of exit from work) is 
a more ambiguous event. It also entails economic risks, as it is associated 
with a decline in labor income. However, it is often a long-anticipated transi-
tion that households f inancially prepare for in various ways, some of them 
mandatory such as participation in public payg schemes, some of them 
voluntary such as most forms of individual or employer-subsidized saving. 
Given that retirement is often anticipated, it might be considered an abuse 
of terminology to call it a ‘risk’. Yet, as I will argue in more detail in later 
chapters, there are many reasons why public pension schemes and (the 
regulation of) second- and third-pillar pensions can be expected to influence 
how well-prepared different kinds of workers are for their retirement – and 
thus how their income situation changes in the course of that transition.
In addition, not all late careers unfold as planned. In particular, previ-
ous research suggests that retirement often occurs rather unexpectedly: 
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A non-negligible number of workers retire earlier than planned due to 
unforeseen adverse events, with job displacement and health problems 
being the primary triggers of such ‘involuntary early retirement’ (Szinovacz 
and Davey 2005; Lachance and Seligman 2010). The two events examined in 
this study – job loss and retirement in the sense of exit from work – are thus 
interrelated. I take this interrelationship into account by making a basic 
distinction between involuntary retirees who retire after suffering an invol-
untary job loss or a sudden decline in health and voluntary retirees whose 
retirement choices are not immediately constrained by these events. More 
concretely, my analysis of retirement will focus on income dynamics among 
voluntary retirees. The analysis of late-career job loss then complements 
this analysis by looking at employment/retirement and income trajectories 
around one crucial trigger of involuntary early retirement. Accounting for 
differences in control over retirement is crucial when it comes to assessing 
the consequences of recent welfare state change: Workers whose late careers 
are interrupted by job loss or health problems likely f ind it more diff icult 
to comply with the new paradigm of late retirement than workers whose 
late careers run smoothly.
1.3 Overview of the study
The study consists of nine chapters, which are divided into four parts.
Part I places the study in the recent empirical literature on income mobility 
and develops a general analytical framework. It also provides a detailed 
account of relevant institutional differences between Germany and the 
United States and of recent changes in key welfare state programs. More 
specif ically, Part I contains three chapters in addition to this introduction.
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the study’s main outcome vari-
able: household income mobility. I then situate my approach within the 
context of recent mobility research. Following DiPrete (2002) and others, 
I argue that the analysis of household income mobility around ‘trigger 
events’ is a promising approach for understanding how (changes in) welfare 
state provisions and institutional context more generally affect the lives 
of ordinary citizens. My review of the trigger events framework suggests 
three general questions to be addressed in the subsequent analysis: What 
are the key welfare state programs for cushioning the impact of retirement 
and late-career job loss and how have these programs changed over time? 
How do institutions shape the rates of countermobility conditional on the 
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occurrence of an event – for example, how do displaced older workers’ 
reemployment chances differ between Germany and the us and over time? 
And: How does the scope for ‘family buffering’ through the incomes of 
other household members vary across countries and periods? The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the relationship between late-career job loss 
and exit from work. As discussed above, I argue that it is sensible to adopt a 
basic distinction between voluntary retirees whose retirement choices are 
not constrained by job loss or the onset of health problems and between 
workers whose late careers are interrupted by these events, as the latter may 
f ind it more diff icult to comply with the ‘new paradigm’ of late retirement.
Chapter 3 focuses on institutional factors that are relevant to the three 
questions identified in the previous chapter. I f irst discuss a set of interrelated 
factors (strength of labor market boundaries and employment protection 
legislation, continuing training participation, statistical age discrimination) 
that are often argued to influence the demand for older workers and the 
reemployment chances of displaced older workers in particular. My review 
suggests that the reemployment opportunities of displaced older workers are 
more limited in Germany. I then provide an in-depth analysis of German-
American differences and recent trends in relevant welfare state programs. 
In addition to public and complementary pensions (i.e., employer-sponsored 
and individual private pensions), I examine earnings-related unemployment 
benefits and disability benefits, which often serve as temporary bridges for 
early retirees who are not yet eligible for standard retirement benefits. I also 
briefly discuss means-tested assistance/welfare benefits and progressive 
income taxation. I then explore country and period differences in household 
earnings arrangements that are likely to influence the extent of family 
buffering. The chapter concludes with a summary of key differences and 
trends in the two systems of social protection.
In Chapter 4, I describe my empirical approach for investigating the 
consequences of late-career job loss and voluntary retirement. I introduce 
the so-called counterfactual account of causality and discuss when and 
why the construction of an appropriate control or comparison group is 
essential for identifying the effect of an event. I argue that comparisons 
to a control group are not required for voluntary retirees because the 
relevant counterfactual is not well-def ined, but that such comparisons 
are indispensable when investigating the impact of job loss. I also review 
difference-in-differences matching (did matching) as a promising em-
pirical strategy for identifying the effects of events and elaborate my own 
implementation of this approach. I conclude with a few essential technical 
details of empirical analysis.
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Part II contains the empirical analysis of income mobility around retire-
ment in the sense of exit from work.
Chapter 5 lays the ground for the empirical analysis of income dynamics 
around retirement. Drawing on research in psychology, behavioral econom-
ics, and sociology, I argue that – contrary to the predictions of neoclassical 
economics – even voluntary retirement may be associated with substantial 
declines in economic well-being. I then combine this account with the 
institutional information provided in Chapter 3 to formulate expectations 
for the empirical analysis. I conclude with a review of previous longitudinal 
research on income changes at retirement.
Chapter 6 confronts the hypotheses from Chapter 5 with an empirical 
analysis of income trajectories around exit from work. I examine aver-
age income changes relative to preretirement levels, the prevalence of 
poverty entries, and the proportion of workers with large declines in 
disposable income (i.e., declines of more than a third and more than 
half). I compare losses before and after taxes and transfer and changes in 
different income components to get a better sense of country and period 
differences in the importance of public and complementary pensions. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of differences by level of education 
and retirement age.
Part III presents the empirical analysis of employment/retirement and 
income trajectories around late-career job loss.
Chapter 7 again prepares the empirical analysis. Based on standard 
theories of job search I provide a stylized account of how supply- and 
demand-side factors influence the likelihood that displaced older workers 
return to work. I then draw on the institutional information provided in 
Chapter 3 to formulate a set of hypotheses and research questions for the 
empirical analysis. The chapter concludes with a brief review of relevant 
previous research.
Chapter 8 provides an empirical analysis of employment patterns, in-
come trajectories, and changes in spousal labor supply around late-career 
job loss. Throughout the chapter, I provide did matching estimates of the 
impact of late-career job loss as well as simple non-differenced estimates 
of employment/income trajectories among displaced workers. I begin with 
an analysis of employment and income changes for displaced workers as a 
whole. I then analyze changes in spousal labor supply around late-career job 
loss and conclude with a disaggregated analysis that differentiates between 
‘involuntary retirees’ who leave employment after late-career job loss and 
‘returners’ who become reemployed.
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Part IV consists of only one chapter, Chapter 9, which summarizes the 
main f indings of the study and relates them to the research questions and 
broader debates highlighted above. I close with a short discussion of open 
questions and directions for future research.

2 Welfare state change and income 
mobility: a framework
The present study explores how two crucial life events – job loss and long-
term exit from work or ‘retirement’ – affect the income situation of older 
workers ages 50 and above. One of my major goals is to understand how 
changing welfare state provisions in the us and Germany have cushioned (or 
failed to cushion) the f inancial consequences of these events. Like Goodin 
et al. (1999) in their seminal study on the Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 
I seek to provide a clearer picture of ‘how real lives are really lived’ (p. 1) in the 
United States and Germany – and of how real lives have changed over time.
The objective of this chapter is to provide the general theoretical and 
conceptual background for the analysis. Based on this discussion, the next 
chapter will then take an in-depth look at the changing institutional contexts 
in Germany and the us. Chapters 5 and 7 will then draw on this information 
to formulate concrete hypotheses and research questions for the empirical 
analysis of income changes around retirement and job loss, respectively.
The present chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2.1 discusses 
and specif ies the main outcome examined in this study: income mobility. 
I argue that needs-adjusted disposable income is a reasonable proxy for 
economic well-being, while also exploring a number of relevant limitations. 
Building on contributions by DiPrete (DiPrete and McManus 2000; DiPrete 
2002) and others (e.g., Western et al. 2012), Section 2.2 then sketches a general 
framework for studying country and period differences in the economic 
consequences of life events. I argue that the study of income mobility around 
‘trigger events’ is particularly well-suited for investigating the contribution 
of welfare state provisions to country and period differences in economic 
insecurity. This is because cushioning the impact of such events is the 
primary function of some of the most prominent welfare state programs 
and of their employer-based functional equivalents. However, the review 
also suggests two crucial additional factors that influence the (longer-term) 
consequences of trigger events: the opportunity structure for compensatory 
counter mobility and affected workers’ access to other private income sources 
including spousal earnings. Section 2.3 explores interrelationships between 
the two events examined in the study. I review research on involuntary early 
retirement and ‘pathways to retirement’ that has shown job loss and health 
problems to be important triggers of early retirement. I explain how these 
f indings influence the design of the present study.
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2.1 Income mobility: relevance, limitations, and empirical 
approaches
This section gives a brief discussion of the term ‘income mobility’. It estab-
lishes the overall relevance of this outcome, clarif ies certain conceptual 
ambiguities and highlights a few crucial complications. The term ‘income’ 
refers to the amount of money received by a given unit (e.g., individual, 
household) over a f ixed period of time (e.g., month, year). The term ‘income 
mobility’ simply refers to changes in the amount of money received by a 
given unit from one period  t to another period  t + a (Fields and Ok 1999).1
Individuals and households often receive income from multiple sources. 
For example, they may collect earnings from their own employment, income 
from assets (e.g., dividends), and public transfers such as old-age pensions or 
unemployment benefits. It is sometimes useful to disaggregate total income 
into its component parts, for example, in order to gauge the importance of 
welfare state transfers for individual income or to see how quickly the earn-
ings of displaced workers recover. However, disposable (or post-government) 
income, that is, total income after taxes and transfers, occupies a special place 
in that it is arguably more closely related to individual economic welfare (or 
economic well-being2) than other income aggregates. In fact, a key assump-
tion underlying this study is that a person’s level of needs-adjusted disposable 
income is a reasonable proxy for that person’s level of economic welfare.
This assumption entails, a), a restriction to economic (as opposed to 
overall) welfare and, b), the concession that income is only a proxy for, rather 
than a direct measure of, economic welfare. As for a), the question how 
overall well-being should be conceptualized is the subject of long-standing 
discussions in such diverse disciplines as philosophy, sociology, psychology, 
and economics, and it is beyond the scope of this study to review or enter 
this debate at length (see Nussbaum and Sen [1993] for a classic volume 
that offers a variety of perspectives). It is worth noting, however, that many 
influential positions in this debate assert that overall well-being cannot be 
def ined solely in economic terms. For example, Allardt (1993) makes the 
famous claim that a satisfactory conceptualization of overall well-being 
must account for three fundamental and irreducible human needs that he 
1 Throughout this study, I will focus on intragenerational income mobility where the receiving 
individual is the same in both  t and  t + a . I do not deal with intergenerational income mobility 
(see, e.g., Solon 2002), that is, changes in income from one (parental) generation to the next 
(f ilial) generation. For a recent comparison of intergenerational income mobility in Germany 
and the United States, see Schnitzlein (2012).
2 I will use the terms ‘welfare’ and ‘well-being’ interchangeably throughout this study.
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refers to as ‘Having, Loving, and Being’. Only the f irst dimension, Having, 
refers to economic welfare or ‘material conditions’ (Allardt 1993: 89), while 
‘Loving stands for the need to relate to other people and to form social 
identities [… and …] Being stands for the need for integration into society 
and to live in harmony with nature’ (Allardt 1993: 91; emphasis in original). 
Income may help buy food, shelter, and other goods, but may be of little 
use when it comes to forming true friendships or developing a sense of 
purpose in life.
However, even if we restrict our attention to the sphere of economic 
well-being, a person’s level of income can probably not be equated with that 
person’s level of economic well-being. This is the second issue identif ied 
above: Rather than being an end in itself, income is only a resource, though 
perhaps a crucial one, that helps people realize (economic) goals that are 
valuable in themselves. This is why a focus on income is sometimes referred 
to as a ‘resource approach’ to measuring economic well-being or poverty 
(Hauser 2008; Zaidi 2008).
Questions of income inequality and mobility receive considerable at-
tention in both the academic and in the broader public sphere, suggesting 
that income is widely accepted as a crucial resource. At the same time, 
it is important to be aware of some issues that may complicate the link 
between disposable income and economic welfare, because this will be 
helpful in gauging potential limitations of the results reported in later 
chapters and in identifying questions to be addressed in complementary 
research. The following discussion therefore explores a few complications 
that are particularly relevant in the context of the present study.
It is useful to begin with the common view that the link between 
consumption and economic welfare is more direct than the link between 
income and economic welfare (while noting that consumption may still 
not be the same as economic welfare). Accepting this premise is suff icient 
for illustrating the issues that I have in mind, while allowing me to remain 
agnostic toward the question how economic well-being should ultimately 
be construed, a question that is no less contested than the def inition of 
overall well-being. The idea that income is related to economic well-being 
via consumption is emphasized by Champernowne and Cowell (1999: 5) 
who conceptualize the relationship as follows:
income → consumption → economic welfare
In a related passage, Ringen (1991: 2) argues that to ‘measure welfare by 
income, we should measure the consumption people could have given 
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their income (potential consumption)’. The emphasis on potential rather 
than actual consumption can be rationalized as follows: If two people have 
identical opportunities for consumption, yet one of them freely chooses 
not to fully realize that potential, their level of economic welfare should 
nevertheless be considered equal.3
This perspective on the (indirect) relationship between income and 
economic welfare suggests that income is a better proxy for economic well-
being when it is tightly coupled to (potential) consumption. Conversely, 
the relationship between income and economic welfare becomes more 
problematic when the income-consumption link is weak or when its 
strength varies across different types of individuals, across countries, or over 
time. I now address three specif ic issues that complicate the link between 
income and (potential) consumption: the unknown extent of income pool-
ing within the household, differences in individual/household needs and 
non-discretionary expenses, and the possibility to f inance consumption 
from savings.
The unknown extent of income pooling. A f irst issue has to do with the ap-
propriate unit of analysis. In most cases, income mobility is analyzed on the 
level of the individual, because households are often not stable over time 
(Duncan and Hill 1985; Fachinger and Himmelreicher 2012). In addition, 
economic welfare is fundamentally an attribute of individuals. Yet compli-
cations arise because most individuals live in multi-person households and 
because the members of a given household can be expected to share their 
resources to some extent. The precise extent of sharing, however, is usually 
unknown. Empirical research almost uniformly makes the ‘full income 
pooling assumption’ according to which members of multi-person house-
holds fully pool their income or, equivalently, total household income is 
divided equally among all household members. Potential within-household 
differences in consumption chances are ignored.
Some empirical studies (e.g., Thomas 1990; Lundberg et al. 1997) have 
tested the pooling assumption empirically and found compelling evidence 
against it. For example, Lundberg et al. (1997) study changes in household 
demand after a reform of uk child allowances in the late 1970s which made 
‘the mother [...] the sole direct recipient of the payment’ (p.467). Before the 
reform, fathers had usually received at least a portion of total child benefits. 
Changing the transfer recipient should have no effect on household demand 
3 This emphasis on potential as opposed to actual outcomes is also prominent in the influen-
tial capability approach developed by Nussbaum and Sen (Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Sen 1999).
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if the pooling assumption is correct, yet as Lundberg et al. (1997) show, 
household expenditure on women’s and children’s clothes rose relative to 
spending on men’s clothes after the reform. While these and other studies 
convincingly refute full income pooling, they do, unfortunately, provide 
little guidance on how to improve on this assumption with the information 
available in typical survey data sets. This leaves applied researchers with 
little choice but to note the problem and continue to use the pooling assump-
tion nonetheless. This study will be no exception in this regard. Fortunately, 
however, violations of the assumption are unlikely to introduce strong 
systematic biases into my analysis, because the majority of households can 
be expected to remain stable around my focal events. Violations of income 
pooling are a more pressing concern when events directly involve changes 
in household composition, as is the case with events such as separation/
divorce (McManus and DiPrete 2001; Andreß et al. 2006; Radenacker 2011) 
or widowhood (Burkhauser et al. 2005).
Differences in needs and non-discretionary expenses. Another complication 
arises because individuals and households differ in their f inancial needs. 
Like most applied research, this study will use an ‘equivalence scale’ to 
adjust incomes for basic differences in household needs: By virtue of the 
income pooling assumption, members of the same household are treated 
as having the same effective level of income. The purpose of equivalence 
scales is to render comparisons more meaningful across households of 
different sizes and with different age structures. This is usually achieved 
by dividing total household income by a weight that depends on household 
size and frequently also on the age composition of household members. 
The f irst adult person in a household receives a weight of 1. For additional 
household members, the weight is increased (because feeding another 
mouth requires additional resources), but usually by a value smaller than 1 
(to reflect household economies of scale, e.g., from sharing space or durables) 
(Ringen 1991, 1996). The ‘equivalized’ or ‘needs-adjusted’ household income 
of individuals living in multi-person households is therefore smaller than 
total household income, but greater than household income per capita, that 
is, per household member.
Typical equivalence scales are an effective step towards making com-
parisons of income more meaningful, but they ignore heterogeneity beyond 
household size and age composition. However, individual and household 
needs likely depend on numerous other characteristics. At least two factors 
with potentially important implications for household needs, health and 
employment status, are worth some discussion in the context of this study.
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As for health status, health likely has an independent effect on well-
being, but it also affects the level of income needed to achieve a given level 
of consumption or economic welfare (Zaidi 2008). Individuals suffering 
from medical conditions or disabilities will often incur disease-related 
expenses that leave them with less freely disposable income than healthier 
individuals (Zaidi and Burchardt 2005; Morciano et al. 2012). These individu-
als will therefore require a higher level of income to achieve the same level 
of economic welfare as an otherwise comparable non-disabled individual. 
The additional costs incurred by ill or disabled individuals likely not only 
depend on the severity of their condition (Morciano et al. 2012), but can also 
be expected to differ across countries and among population groups within 
one country, due to differences in the availability of compensatory cash or 
in-kind transfers. In particular, health care coverage is nearly universal 
in Germany and out-of-pocket expenditures are relatively low, whereas 
in the us coverage is incomplete and stratif ied by socioeconomic status, 
both in terms of coverage and quality of healthcare plans (Fronstin 2012). 
Americans with recognized disabilities and those aged 65 and older are 
eligible for the public health insurance program Medicare which certainly 
reduces German-American disparities compared to younger age groups; but 
Medicare deductibles and co-payments are comparatively high compared 
to German standards (Schulenburg and Greiner 2007).
Crystal et al. (2000) estimate that in 1995 the average Medicare beneficiary 
aged 65 or older spent 8.4% of total income on out-of-pocket expenditures 
(excluding expenses for external long-term care) and another 10.6% of 
total income on insurance premiums for (supplemental) health insurance. 
Importantly, they also f ind that these shares are substantially larger (at, 
respectively, 14.3 and 17.2%) for benef iciaries in the bottom quintile of 
the income distribution. For comparison, in Germany, maximum annual 
co-payments are capped at 2% of gross annual income (1% for persons with 
chronic conditions) for members of statutory health insurance (Gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung) which covers between 80 and 90% of the population 
(Wörz 2011a). Expenditures exceeding this cap are fully covered by the 
insurer. The typical older worker or retiree in the us will thus spend a 
substantially larger portion of his/her income on health-related needs. 
Particularly for Americans with low incomes, health care costs may pose a 
substantial f inancial burden that is not captured by the income measures 
considered in this study.
Employment status is related to f inancial needs because employed 
individuals incur non-discretionary expenses that are more or less directly 
work-related. Important examples are expenses for travel, clothing, training, 
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restaurant meals, increased calorie intake because of physical activity, or 
domestic services such as daycare and cleaning (Hurst 2008; Battistin et al. 
2009). Typically, retiring workers – as well as displaced workers reducing 
their labor supply – will therefore not only experience a decline in income, 
but also a concomitant drop of work-related expenses that partly offsets the 
former. Income losses around retirement (or job loss if the latter is followed 
by non-employment) may thus overstate its impact on economic welfare, 
as retirement goes hand in hand with a decline in work-related expenses. 
Unfortunately, few data sets contain enough information to obtain good 
estimates of the level of work-related expenses, and the ones used in this 
study are not among them. However, it seems unlikely that work-related 
expenses should differ strongly between the us and Germany.4
Many employees of course also enjoy work-related in-kind benef its 
such as a car or frequent flyer miles and, more importantly, classical fringe 
benefits such as health care or pension plan coverage. These fringe benefits 
are an important component of total compensation, especially in the United 
States. They are strongly positively correlated with monetary compensa-
tion so that inequality of total compensation is greater than inequality 
of earnings (Pierce 2001). This suggests that the loss of employer fringe 
benefits is an important element of the overall economic risks associated 
with job displacement in the American labor market, above and beyond 
direct earnings losses (see Gruber and Madrian [1997] for an empirical study 
of changes in health care coverage after job loss). In the case of retirement, 
loss of fringe benefits is less of an issue because individuals aged 65 (and 
permanently disabled persons below this age) are covered by the Medicare 
program and because retirees have reached the pay-out phase of their 
retirement plans. For Americans retiring before age 65, loss of fringe benefits 
may be an important economic factor, however.
Financing consumption from assets and savings. A third reason why the 
link between income and consumption chances may be imperfect is that 
individuals may draw on savings (or take-up debt) to finance their consump-
tion. Thus, Milton Friedman’s (1957) famous ‘permanent income hypothesis’ 
claims that consumption is only determined by long-term ‘permanent’ 
income and that the influence of short-term income f luctuations is es-
sentially zero. In a Friedmanian world, individuals would save (or pay back 
debt) during periods with incomes above their long-term average and would 
4 Childcare costs are higher in the United States due to lower levels of public involvement in 
pre-school daycare (Immervoll and Barber 2006), but they play a marginal role for older workers.
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deplete their savings (or take-up debt) during periods of below-average 
income so as to smooth their level of consumption over the life cycle (see 
also Ando and Modigliani 1963).
While the idea of perfect consumption smoothing may seem suspect, 
savings from high-income episodes undoubtedly play an important role 
in maintaining consumption levels during low-income episodes. This is 
particularly obvious in the case of older workers, many of whom will possess 
considerable assets, which in turn will often have been accumulated, at 
least in part, with the explicit purpose of f inancing consumption in old 
age, that is, for planned retirement. Income changes around retirement may 
thus overstate the actual decline in economic well-being, as newly retired 
workers can often draw on savings to top up their retirement income.
Not taking household wealth into account may be more problematic 
in the United States, where private savings and housing wealth are more 
important for retirement preparation. A rare comparative study on house-
hold wealth after retirement age by Sierminska et al. (2007) confirms this 
intuition. Analyzing data from the Luxembourg Wealth Study, Sierminska 
et al. (2007) f ind that, compared to their German counterparts, American 
households with an elderly (65+) person as head or spouse are more likely 
to own their primary residence or to have liquid f inancial assets. However, 
the importance of liquid assets appears to be quite limited for the majority 
of households in both countries.5 Housing wealth is substantially greater 
than liquid assets in both countries, and as just noted it is greater in the 
United States where 83.3% of elderly households are homeowners, compared 
to only 53.6% in Germany. Conditional on owning their home, however, 
Germans are more likely to own it ‘outright’ (i.e., without associated debt) 
and the median worth of their homes is also higher.
A common empirical strategy for accounting for the shadow value of 
owning one’s home, is to include ‘imputed rent’ – the rental value of owner-
occupied housing minus ownership costs (including interest payments) – in 
the income measures (Frick and Grabka 2003). In theory, including imputed 
5 According to Table 5 on p. 34 of their paper, 94.9% of American households with an elderly 
head/spouse have positive f inancial assets, compared to only 61.8% in Germany – a difference 
that is somewhat inflated because the German data do not record small wealth holdings. More 
importantly, Sierminska et al. (2007) estimate median f inancial wealth among those with 
positive assets (in $ 2002) at a mere $22,000 in both countries. Even though asset holdings just 
after retirement may be noticeably higher – because the sample of all elderly includes individuals 
who have been retired for many years and have already consumed a substantial portion of their 
savings – these f igures suggest that liquid assets are of limited importance for the majority of 
households in both countries.
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rent renders income comparisons between homeowners and non-owners 
more meaningful (Canberra Group 2001). In practice, much depends on 
the quality of the imputation. Unfortunately, exploratory analysis revealed 
that imputed rental values provided in the data sets used in this study show 
implausibly large year-to-year within-person variability.6 I therefore decided 
not to include them in the income measure.
To summarize, it is important to keep in mind that income-based esti-
mates of changes in economic well-being may be exaggerated for workers 
with signif icant non-annuitized wealth, and that the omission of wealth 
may be somewhat more of a problem in the United States. At the same 
time, the results of Sierminska et al. (2007) suggest that liquid assets play 
a rather limited role in maintaining economic well-being for the majority 
of retirees in both countries (which is of course compatible with wealth 
playing a major role for a non-negligible minority).
The upshot of the above discussion may seem to be that focusing on 
consumption would, in principle, always be preferable to focusing on 
disposable income and that the latter approach is merely a second best 
that is dictated by the practical diff iculty of ascertaining consumption 
levels.7 The rationale for analyzing consumption more directly may appear 
particularly compelling when dealing with the transition to retirement 
because of the potentially important role of non-annuitized retirement 
savings for maintaining consumption in old age. Recent research on the 
consequences of retirement in economics has indeed concentrated on 
changes in expenditure, which is usually considered to be a more immediate 
proxy for consumption than income (Hausman and Paquette 1987; Banks 
et al. 1998; Smith 2006; Battistin et al. 2009).
Yet, even ignoring practical issues of measurement, there are also reasons 
why changes in income around retirement may ultimately be as or even 
6 For example, the standard deviation of two-year changes (i.e., between a given year  t and 
another year  t + 2 ) in log imputed rental value is 0.97 in the German and 0.70 in the American 
data. For comparison, the standard deviations of two-year changes in log individual labor 
income among workers aged 25-55 (which one would expect to be much larger) are 0.60 and 
0.79, respectively. In both cases, I computed changes only for individuals with positive imputed 
rental value/labor earnings.
7 Take the example of food consumption. It certainly is a daunting task to elicit reliable 
information on the quality and quantity of food consumed during a given period. Research-
ers eager to capture levels of consumption more directly therefore usually have to rely on 
expenditure data (e.g., Banks et al. 1998; Smith 2006), which – while perhaps being a better proxy 
than disposable income – is clearly not the same as a direct measure of consumption (Aguiar 
and Hurst 2005).
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more interesting than changes in consumption. As Burkhauser et al. (2009: 
57) note with respect to the American context: ‘The possibility of outliv-
ing one’s assets is perhaps the most prominent risk affecting retirees’. A 
related concern is that many American retirees may be ‘underannuitized’, 
that is, too small a portion of their wealth is converted into annuities that 
provide annuitants (and often also potential survivors) with a reliable flow 
of income until their death, thereby providing insurance against the ‘risk’ 
of longevity (Diamond 2004; Diamond and Orszag 2005).
These considerations suggest two important points. First, they draw 
attention to the possibility that retirees may overconsume in the sense 
of depleting their assets faster than they can afford in the long run. Such 
overconsumption would seem to be most likely during the early years of 
retirement, because this is when anticipating one’s future income needs is 
most diff icult and perhaps also because of inertia in consumption patterns. 
Second, income changes around retirement can be expected to be a good 
proxy of how retirees’ annuitized income, that is, those resources that are 
most secure in the longer run, compare to their preretirement income.
Of course, the most comprehensive approach to studying the short- and 
long-term consequences of retirement for economic well-being would be 
to jointly analyze changes in income and expenditure/consumption, while 
also accounting for housing wealth and other f inancial assets as well as dif-
ferences in longevity. Unfortunately, such an approach is usually not feasible 
due to data restrictions and its sheer complexity. Changes in income, the 
subject of this study, may then ultimately be at least as relevant as changes 
in expenditure, despite the tendency of recent economic literature to focus 
on the latter outcome. At the same time, it is important to be aware of 
the above complications in order to identify potential biases and fruitful 
directions for complementary research.
So far, I have concentrated on the f irst component of the composite 
term ‘income mobility’, that is, I have discussed the rationale for, and 
potential pitfalls of, using income as a proxy for economic welfare. While 
I have sometimes used longitudinal examples for illustration, the aspect of 
mobility has not really been integral in the sense that most of the problems 
noted above are also relevant to cross-sectional analyses. For example, 
the question of health-related expenses is as relevant to cross-sectional 
comparisons between disabled and non-disabled persons as it is to studies 
that explore the consequences of becoming disabled. In the remainder 
of the section, I now focus more explicitly on the aspect of mobility and 
situate the present study within recent literature on intragenerational 
income mobility.
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Different perspectives on income mobility
With the advent of large-scale household panel studies, research on income 
mobility has flourished. On a general level, one can distinguish between 
two major approaches to the analysis of income mobility (Western et al. 
2012). The f irst seeks to quantify the overall level of income mobility (or 
‘volatility’)8 in a population. This line of research is concerned with aggre-
gate or ‘macro’ (Fields 2005) mobility. It addresses questions of the following 
kind: Does the overall extent of income mobility vary across countries or 
has it increased over time?
Just like cross-sectional inequality research uses Gini coeff icients, 
decile ratios, or other indices to quantify inequality at a point in time, this 
literature uses transition matrices and derivative indices (Burkhauser and 
Poupore 1997), Shorrocks’ R (Shorrocks 1978), the Fields-Ok-index (Fields 
and Ok 1999), or yet other measures to quantify overall mobility levels. 
Fields (2005, 2010) provides insightful discussions of the macro mobility 
literature: He observes that different mobility measures operationalize 
different conceptions of income mobility, identifying a total of six alterna-
tive and irreducible mobility concepts. A systematic review of empirical 
research on aggregate income mobility is beyond the scope of this study. 
It is worth noting, however, that many studies conclude that the United 
States – albeit frequently characterized as the ‘land of opportunity’ – do not 
exhibit exceptional levels of (disposable) income mobility when compared 
with other developed countries, including Germany (Ayala and Sastre 
2004; Gangl 2005). Other studies, however, seem to confirm the intuition 
that income mobility after taxes and transfers is greater in the us than in 
Germany (Fabig 1999; Rohde et al. 2010). Differences in underlying mobility 
concepts are one plausible explanation for these divergent results.
Research on aggregate mobility has undoubtedly produced important 
insights, but a thorough understanding of mobility patterns arguably re-
quires that researchers more explicitly address the underlying micro-level 
processes. A second line of research therefore relates changes in income 
and economic well-being to ‘trigger events’ (DiPrete and McManus 2000; 
8 These two commonly used terms – mobility and volatility – hint at a fundamental ambiguity 
characterizing the literature on (aggregate) income mobility. On the one hand, income mobility 
appears desirable because it reduces income inequality: Given similar levels of short-term 
income inequality, long-term income inequality will be lower when income mobility is higher 
(Shorrocks 1978). The term ‘volatility’, on the other hand, captures the negative perspective 
on income mobility: More mobility may also be experienced as greater economic insecurity. 
Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) provide an illuminating formal discussion of this trade-off.
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DiPrete 2002), supposedly influential changes in labor market position, 
household structure, or other life domains (Western et al. 2012). Studies 
commonly differentiate between positive life events such as taking up 
employment or being promoted and negative, adverse life events such as job 
loss or union dissolution. Motivated by a concern for social problems, many 
authors restrict their attention to the latter class of events. By analyzing 
income trajectories around retirement and late-career job loss, this study 
adopts this second event-focused approach to the study of income mobility.
The trigger events approach has been especially prominent in longitudi-
nal poverty research (Western et al. 2012). Since Bane and Ellwood’s (1986) 
landmark analysis of poverty dynamics in the us, numerous studies have 
investigated the events associated with poverty entries and exits, usually 
f inding that employment-related events such as job loss and reemploy-
ment and family-related events such as separation and union formation 
are among the primary triggers of upward and downward mobility (see, 
for example, Stevens 1999; Oxley et al. 2000; Fouarge and Layte 2005; Val-
letta 2006; Vandecasteele 2010). Insofar as they are relevant to my research 
questions, I will review the substantive f indings of these and similar studies 
in Chapters 5 and 7 where I summarize previous research on the f inancial 
consequences of late-career job loss and retirement. At this point, I simply 
want to contrast research on poverty dynamics which examines transitions 
with respect to a threshold value, the poverty line9, with another line of 
research that examines relative (and sometimes also absolute) changes 
with respect to the level of income before an event (DiPrete and McManus 
2000; McManus and DiPrete 2001; Andreß et al. 2006). Many individuals 
experiencing an adverse life event such as job loss may incur substantial 
income losses yet remain above the poverty line, for example, because 
their pre-event income was relatively high and because earnings-related 
unemployment benefits are therefore suff icient to avoid poverty.
These two general approaches are evidently complementary in that they 
speak to different questions. I will take up both of them in the present 
study, that is, I will investigate both income changes relative to pre-event 
levels and risks of poverty entry. These two outcomes – relative income 
change and poverty risks – correspond to two different goals of social policy, 
namely, the goals of status maintenance and of poverty prevention. These 
outcomes would thus appear to be a particularly well-chosen pair for the 
9 A few studies also def ine poverty in terms of receipt of means-tested assistance benef its 
which in some countries provide a (nearly) universal income f loor (e.g., Leisering and Leibfried 
2001).
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present investigation: Comparative literature on welfare regimes views 
Germany as a paradigmatic example of the conservative-corporatist regime, 
which is often characterized as putting great emphasis on the goal of status 
maintenance (Esping-Andersen 1990: 75). In the words of Goodin et al. (1999: 
55, emphasis in original): ‘The basic goal of corporatist welfare policy is 
security and stability.’ By contrast, the United States exemplify the liberal 
welfare regime which, having roots in pre-modern poor laws, concentrates 
on poverty alleviation: ‘[L]iberal social welfare policy aims merely to allevi-
ate undeserved distress [...] The way that goal is operationalized in liberal 
welfare regimes is as the “alleviation of poverty”, at least for the “deserving 
poor”’ (Goodin et al. 1999: 45).
2.2 Income mobility around adverse life events – a framework
By focusing on the economic consequences of job loss and retirement this 
study adopts the ‘trigger events approach’ to studying income mobility. This 
decision is not accidental. It is based on the assumption that this approach 
carries great potential for illuminating how welfare state arrangements 
affect the economic well-being of citizens. This is because many, albeit 
not all, of the major welfare state programs operate on the ‘principle of 
causality’ (Kausalprinzip; Alber 1982: 27), whereby eligibility for a certain 
type of benefit is contingent on the occurrence of a specif ic ‘life course risk’ 
(Kohler et al. 2012a). For example, eligibility for (f irst-tier) unemployment 
benefits is generally restricted to workers who have (involuntarily) lost their 
job (and who meet further eligibility criteria; see Chapter 3). Other programs 
such as means-tested programs providing basic income support are less 
clearly targeted at those who have experienced a specif ic event, but their 
contribution, too, may be most clearly visible when adverse events trigger 
an unforeseen downward change in income trajectories.
Thomas DiPrete (2002) has perhaps made the most elaborate case that 
comparative stratif ication and life course research have much to gain from 
adopting the trigger events approach.10 DiPrete argues that comparative 
research on intragenerational mobility should analyze ‘cross-national 
variation in the extent to which societal institutions influence the rate of 
events with the potential to change a household’s life conditions [...], and 
10 DiPrete’s arguments were partly already developed and applied in a joint paper with Patricia 
McManus (DiPrete and McManus 2000). For simplicity I will nevertheless refer to the framework 
as DiPrete’s throughout this study.
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the extent to which they mitigate the consequences of these events through 
social insurance’ (2002: 267).
On a general level, the question how ‘the state’, and institutions more 
broadly, shape individual life courses has certainly been a core theme of 
life course research for much longer (see Mayer and Schoepflin [1989] for a 
review of early research). However, much of the earlier literature focused on 
the role of the state in influencing the timing of events (e.g., by setting more 
or less binding age norms for transitions such as school entry or retirement) 
or, even more fundamentally, in def ining social categories such as being a 
student, worker, or retiree (Mayer and Müller 1986; Mayer and Schoepflin 
1989). Relatedly, Kohli (1985) emphasized the role of the state in shaping the 
modern tripartite life course with its characteristic sequence of full-time 
education (or ‘preparation’), employment (or ‘activity’), and retirement. 
The role of the welfare state in shaping household income mobility played 
practically no role in the research reviewed by Mayer and Schoepflin (1989), 
although they note towards the end of their article that ‘the welfare state 
provides continuity over the life course by preventing sudden and steep 
income losses through health and unemployment’ (Mayer and Schoepflin 
1989: 203).11
DiPrete is not the only scholar who has recently sought to direct attention 
towards this function of the welfare state: In a book chapter on ‘Government 
and the Life Course’, Leisering (2003: 211) identifies three ‘core fields’ of social 
policy: education, old-age pensions, and what he refers to as the ‘system 
of risk management’ by which he primarily means social insurance and 
assistance programs, but also in-kind transfers and publicly provided social 
and personal services. According to Leisering (2003: 213), ‘[t]he systems of 
risk management deserve close attention since this aspect of the welfare 
state has until recently been almost totally overlooked by students of the 
life course’. In his more recent writings on the possibility of identifying a 
small number of distinct life course regimes, Mayer (1997, 2001, 2005), too, 
assigns a central role to issues of income trajectories and income stability.
DiPrete’s crucial contention is that it is possible to characterize national 
mobility regimes ‘in terms of societal mechanisms that control the rate 
of potentially class-altering events [...] and those that mitigate their 
11 Data availability likely was an important reason for the neglect of income dynamics, as 
longitudinal data available in the 1970s and 1980s were mostly based on retrospective interviews 
and due to recall problems contained no or only questionable information on income trajectories. 
Prospective panel data with high-quality income measures only became more widely available 
from the 1980s onwards.
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socioeconomic consequences through some form of social insurance’ 
(DiPrete 2002: 268). Employment protection legislation which affects 
overall levels of labor market turnover (oecd 1999) would be a paradigmatic 
example of a ‘societal mechanism’ or ‘societal institution’12 that primarily af-
fects the incidence of events. Public transfer programs for the unemployed, 
disabled, or retired, on the other hand, epitomize the class of institutions 
whose primary function is to mitigate the consequences of trigger events. 
It is this hypothesized tight linkage between welfare state provisions and 
income mobility after (adverse) trigger events that motivates the design of 
the present study.
In practice, the distinction between rate-influencing and consequences-
influencing institutions may be somewhat blurry, as the (expected) conse-
quences of an event will influence the incentives for avoiding that event and 
for seeking compensatory countermobility conditional on its occurrence (cf. 
DiPrete 2002: 277f.). In particular, programs mitigating the consequences 
of adverse events might discourage individuals from avoiding them or from 
pursuing countermobility after their actual occurrence. It is this alleged 
‘incentive’ or ‘moral hazard’ effect of social insurance programs (Barr 1992) 
that is at the root of long-standing criticisms of the welfare state as wasteful 
and ineff icient (e.g., Feldstein 2005): Generous early retirement options 
may discourage older workers from participating in training to maintain 
their employability, provide incentives for leaving employment before the 
statutory retirement age (Gruber and Wise 1999), and can also be expected 
to influence job search and retirement decisions after late-career job loss 
(Maestas and Li 2006). The process of countermobility immediately suggests 
a differentiation between the short- and longer-term consequences of an 
event. The longer-term effects of an adverse event, while presumably still 
depending on social insurance and welfare state benefits, are also crucially 
influenced by ‘a society’s structure of conditional mobility, given a prior trig-
ger event’ (DiPrete and McManus 2000: 345; emphasis in original), that is, by 
the opportunities for countermobility, for example, through reemployment 
or remarriage.13 On average, subsequent (counter)mobility can be expected 
to reduce the immediate negative effects of an initial adverse life event, but 
12 DiPrete uses the terms ‘societal institutions’ and ‘societal mechanisms’ interchangeably 
and so do I in this study.
13 DiPrete also conjectures that country differences in patterns of countermobility after the 
occurrence of an event might often be smaller than differences in the incidence of the original 
trigger event. For example, while rates of union dissolution are substantially lower in Germany 
than in the United States, rates of re-partnering conditional on having undergone a separation 
appear to be more similar (see DiPrete and McManus 2000: 365, Table 8).
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it also seems possible that such an event sets in train a process of cumulative 
disadvantage (DiPrete and McManus 2000: 345; see also DiPrete and Eirich 
2006). For example, one partner’s job loss might create psychological stress 
that eventually results in union dissolution.
It is instructive to briefly review the critical assessment of traditional 
stratif ication research that motivates DiPrete’s framework: ‘[S]tratif ication 
theory generally assumed that the family was the appropriate conceptual 
unit of stratif ication and that the class or status position of the family could 
be identif ied with the class position of the male breadwinner’ (DiPrete 
2002: 268f.). He identif ies at least four problems with this approach: First, 
growing instability of households casts doubt on the practice of using the 
family or household as the unit of analysis. Individuals can no longer be 
expected to spend all or most of their lives with the same partner and 
changes in partnership status have become important trigger events in 
their own right. Researchers therefore should make the individual rather 
than the household their unit of analysis – although at any given point in 
time an individual’s level of welfare will depend on his/her current family 
situation (cf. the discussion of income pooling in Section 2.1 above). Second, 
various developments such as economic globalization and technological 
change have weakened the link between occupational position and eco-
nomic resources, thus undermining the argument that the former is a good 
proxy for long-term or ‘permanent’ income (for recent analyses of American 
trends in within- and between-occupation earnings inequality, see Kim and 
Sakamoto [2008] and Mouw and Kalleberg [2010]). Third, many households 
receive large parts of their income from public transfers, whose level, albeit 
sometimes related to former earnings, is less tightly coupled to occupational 
status than earnings. Fourth and last, increasing female labor force partici-
pation has resulted in a great diversity of earnings arrangements, ranging 
from traditional families with a single male breadwinner to dual career 
couples with two full-time earners. The presence of additional incomes 
in households with more than one earner has important consequences 
for the well-being of household members that cannot be captured by an 
approach that treats well-being as derivative of the main breadwinner’s 
economic status.
The relationship between earnings arrangements and household income 
mobility warrants some further discussion. Hacker (2006) and others have 
suggested that the growing prevalence of multi-earner arrangements has 
ambiguous implications for overall levels of income volatility. On the 
one hand, households comprising a greater number of earners are more 
likely to experience any kind of income mobility due to an (adverse) 
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employment-related event such as job loss or a health-related reduction 
in work hours. It simply is more likely that at least one household member 
experiences job displacement when more household members work and 
are therefore ‘at risk’ of losing their job. This ‘incidence effect’ tends to 
raise income volatility. It is, however, counterbalanced by an ‘insurance’ or 
‘risk spreading effect’: When the single breadwinner in a household with a 
traditional earnings arrangement becomes unemployed, total household 
earnings will temporarily drop to zero. In a dual-earner household where 
both partners have identical earnings, unemployment of one of the partners 
will result in a decrease of total household earnings by only 50 per cent. In 
direct analogy to the ‘buffering’ of income losses by welfare state transfers 
(DiPrete and McManus 2000), the presence of additional earners thus works 
as a type of ‘family buffer’ (Ehlert 2012). This is also recognized by Western 
et al. (2012: 352) who argue that ‘the family itself should also be viewed as 
an informal risk-pooling organization that stabilizes welfare in the face of 
adverse events’.
The presence of additional household members also creates possibilities 
for a special form of countermobility that has been described as an ‘added 
worker effect’ (awe) (Cullen and Gruber 2000; Stephens 2002; Coile 2004; 
McGinnity 2004). The simple idea of the awe is that adverse events may be 
offset by increases in spousal labor supply. The awe story emphasizes that 
besides spouses’ actual earnings, further potential for family buffering 
stems from their not-yet-realized earnings capacities. Consider the wife of 
a man who suffers late-career job loss. A non-employed wife might take up 
employment, a part-time working wife might switch to full-time work, and 
a full-time working wife might take up a second job or delay retirement. 
All these scenarios are conceivable and should be considered instances of 
an awe, even though empirically some may of course be more common 
than others.
The long-run risk of experiencing downward earnings mobility may 
also influence basic labor supply decisions in a more fundamental way. In 
a country with high risks of job displacement and/or low levels of income 
replacement for displaced workers the insurance function of multi-earner 
arrangements is more salient. Especially if opportunities for short-run 
awe-type responses depend on the employment record of potential added 
workers – a long-term housewife may find it very difficult to f ind (well-paid) 
employment – couples would be well-advised not to opt for single-earner ar-
rangements under such circumstances. By the same token, higher expected 
risks of divorce should also discourage specialization in unpaid domestic 
work (Mayer 1997).
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As noted above, a substantial number of (comparative) empirical studies 
have applied the trigger events approach to the study of income mobility 
in recent years. This study contributes to this growing literature by tak-
ing a closer look at the special situation of older workers, who have so far 
received very little attention (for a similar assessment, see Buchholz et al. 
2009: 4-5).14 Like most previous studies using the trigger events framework, 
I will primarily focus on the f inancial consequences of two key late-career 
events – job displacement and retirement in the sense of long-term labor 
force exit. I will not attempt to provide a systematic account of country 
and period differences in the incidence of these events. The focus on their 
consequences follows naturally from my interest in the changing influence 
of the welfare state on economic insecurity.
Compositional changes as a source of changes in the effects of events
While the overall or group-specif ic incidence of ‘trigger events’ is not a 
central concern of this study, this issue does warrant some further discus-
sion. First, it is simply worth noting that, besides welfare state change, 
scholarly and public debates also mention the growing incidence of (adverse) 
life events as an important source of the purported trend toward greater 
economic insecurity: Alleged secular and pervasive increases in job and 
family instability are frequently seen as major causes of growing income 
volatility (Western et al. 2012). In many cases empirical research suggests 
that these trends are not as clear-cut and pervasive as many believe, often 
being conf ined to certain population subgroups (see, e.g., Martin [2011] 
for a study of family instability in the us and Giesecke and Heisig [2010] 
for an analysis of employment instability in Germany). Nevertheless, the 
contribution of changes in the incidence of trigger events to economic 
insecurity, while being beyond the scope of this analysis, is certainly worthy 
of further exploration.
A related issue that is directly relevant to the present study is that the 
typical consequences of a given trigger event may depend on who is exposed 
to it, that is, on the composition of affected individuals. Thus, Giesecke 
and Heisig (2010) f ind that, among (West) German prime-age workers, 
the risk of leaving employment has primarily risen for the low-skilled, 
14 Many studies deliberately restrict their attention to mobility among prime age adults, that 
is, roughly to the age range 25 to 50 (DiPrete and McManus 2000; Ehlert 2012). Other studies do 
include older workers, but generally do not analyze older individuals separately (e.g., McManus 
and DiPrete 2001; Andreß et al. 2006; Dewilde and Uunk 2008; Vandecasteele 2010).
WeLfaRe State Change and inCome mobiLit y: a fRameWoRk 47
while American studies show no such polarization of job displacement 
(Boisjoly et al. 1998; Farber 2010).15 This suggests that in Germany rates of 
poverty entry after (late-career) job loss might have risen simply because 
job loss is increasingly concentrated among workers with low (near-poor) 
levels of income prior to job loss – and not because welfare state programs 
cushioning the effects of job loss have been dismantled. As another im-
portant example, secular increases in women’s labor force participation 
have likely resulted in recent female retirees having accumulated higher 
individual pension claims than earlier cohorts (Butrica et al. 2003; Isaacs 
2010). For women, a (hypothetical) trend toward lower retirement income, 
for example, because of declining public replacement rates, might thus 
have been counteracted by increases in the continuity of women’s employ-
ment biographies.
As a robustness check on my f indings and to better understand the 
processes behind actual trends, I will therefore generally compare actual 
trends in the consequences of my focal events with adjusted results that 
control for key compositional changes among affected workers. The techni-
cal details of my approach are explained in Chapter 4.
Returning to the primary focus of this study – how welfare state ar-
rangements and institutional context more broadly shape the economic 
consequences of late-career job loss and retirement – the discussion in this 
section suggests three crucial questions that need to be addressed by the 
institutional synopsis in the next chapter – and by the subsequent analysis 
more generally. The f irst and most prominent question is:
What are the key welfare state programs cushioning the impact of retire-
ment and late-career job loss on disposable income and how have these 
programs changed over time?
Given my interest in the implications of changing welfare state provisions 
for the lives of ordinary citizens, this question is clearly the most prominent. 
However, the above discussion also suggests that income mobility after 
15 As education/skill differentials in the risk of job loss tend to be greater during recessions, 
the American trend might partly ref lect more favorable macroeconomic conditions during the 
1990s and, before the Great Recession, also the 2000s. In Germany, macroeconomic conditions 
might also partly account for the educational polarization of displacement risks, as they were, 
on average, less favorable in the 1990s and 2000s than in the 1980s. However, Giesecke and Heisig 
(2010) f ind that their trend estimates are robust for controlling for GDP growth and the overall 
unemployment rate.
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an adverse event will not only depend on the availability of welfare state 
benefits, especially in the longer term. Particularly when dealing with an 
unexpected event such as involuntary job loss, the longer-term implications 
for economic well-being also depend on the opportunities for compensatory 
countermobility (while noting that welfare state benefits may also affect the 
incentives for actually pursuing such countermobility). As I discuss further 
in the next section, the importance of opportunities for countermobility 
is less clear when dealing with a foreseeable and often long-anticipated 
transition such as (voluntary) retirement. Ignoring these complications 
for the moment, another important question highlighted by the above 
discussion is:
How do institutions affect the opportunity structure for countermobil-
ity conditional on the occurrence of an event? For example, how do the 
reemployment prospects of displaced older workers differ between Germany 
and the us as well as over time?
In keeping with my main research questions, I will follow DiPrete (2002) 
as well as comparative life course research more broadly (e.g., Mayer 2005) 
and focus on the role of (relatively stable) institutional factors in shaping 
the ‘structure of countermobility’. However, it should not be overlooked 
that at any given point in time the opportunities for countermobility likely 
depend crucially on macroeconomic and labor market conditions, which 
I will therefore briefly discuss at the beginning of the next chapter.
Finally, the above discussion also draws attention to the potential sali-
ence of other household members’ incomes in alleviating the consequences 
of adverse late-career events. Again, this is more clearly relevant in the 
context of unexpected adverse events and – just like the responses of 
affected workers themselves – spousal labor supply responses are likely 
endogenous to institutional variables, including the availability of welfare 
state benefits. In any case, a f inal question to be addressed in the next and 
subsequent chapters is:
How do earnings arrangements (single vs. multiple earners) vary across 
countries and periods and what is the likely scope of added-worker-type 
processes conditional on the occurrence of a given life event?
Before addressing these questions, however, it is useful to say a few words 
about, and discuss possible interrelationships among, the two trigger events 
examined in this study.
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2.3 The focal events: job loss and retirement
In Parts II and III, I will investigate period and country differences in the 
economic consequences of retirement and job loss among workers aged 
50 and older. Details on operationalization are provided in later chapters, 
but a somewhat more precise def inition of these events is useful at this 
point: By ‘job loss’ – or ‘(job) displacement’ – I generally mean separations 
that are due to factors beyond a worker’s immediate control. In particular, 
I will look at separations due to business closure, being f ired, and the 
termination of a f ixed-term contract if the latter is accompanied by at 
least one month of unemployment. I def ine retirement as long-term exit 
from employment after age 50. It is also worth noting that I will focus on 
medium-term changes from 1 or 2 years before the event until 4 or 5 years 
after the event.16 As indicated by my deliberate use of the term ‘worker’, I will 
generally restrict the analysis to people who work a substantial number of 
hours before the occurrence of the focal events. This is because I concentrate 
on one important channel through which these events affect the economic 
situation of workers and their family members: the decline of labor income 
which they (may) bring about. As discussed in Section 2.1 above, job loss 
and retirement may also affect workers’ economic well-being through other 
channels but unfortunately my data are not well-suited for investigating 
these additional pathways.
Previous research shows that job loss and retirement are interrelated. 
In particular, job displacement is an important trigger of involuntary early 
retirement (Szinovacz and Davey 2005; Lachance and Seligman 2010). In an 
analysis of data from the Health and Retirement Survey (hrs), Lachance and 
Seligman (2010: 40) report that 10.7% of self-classif ied involuntary retirees 
say that their last job ended because the business closed and 20.3% say that 
they were ‘laid off’ or ‘let go’. Health problems are the second major factor 
mentioned by involuntary retirees: 43.1% cite poor health or disability 
as a reason for leaving their last job.17 Sociological research within the 
16 The main reason for not considering longer-term changes is that meaningful comparisons 
across different event periods would no longer be feasible because of sample attrition and 
the obvious fact that a given event must have occurred at least a year before the last year of 
data for a worker’s income a year after the event to be observed. See Hungerford (2003) for a 
German-American comparison of longer-term income trends after retirement.
17 Respondents could give multiple reasons so there may be some overlap among those catego-
ries. For comparison, ‘family care’, the next most important reason that captures a substantively 
interesting potential trigger of involuntary retirement, is mentioned by only 3.8% of involuntary 
retirees (26.3% say that they ‘retired’ and 7% that they ‘quit’).
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‘pathways to retirement’ paradigm further underlines the importance of 
unemployment and health for early retirement (see, for example, Kohli and 
Rein 1991; Ebbinghaus 2006; Fasang 2008; Radl 2010).
Given my interest in the economic consequences of retirement, an im-
portant result reached by several studies is that the impact of retirement on 
economic well-being is more severe if it can be characterized as involuntary, 
either on the basis of self-perceptions (Szinovacz and Davey 2005; Lachance 
and Seligman 2010; Chiang 2012) or the occurrence of unemployment, job 
loss, or health shocks before retirement (Hausman and Paquette 1987; 
Smith 2006; Barrett and Brzozowski 2010). In fact, neoclassical life-cycle 
and permanent income models (Friedman 1957; Ando and Modigliani 1963) 
even yield the result that voluntary or anticipated retirement should have no 
effect at all on economic well-being. In a similar vein, Western et al. (2012: 
345) suggest that when ‘changes in income are produced voluntarily, such as 
through planned retirement, they cannot be characterized as unexpected 
or a source of insecurity. To assess the extent of involuntary income losses, 
additional information must be enlisted on, say, layoffs, disability, or other 
shocks’. While Chapter 5 will discuss several reasons why even voluntary 
retirement may be associated with declines in economic welfare, these 
considerations do suggest that it is crucial to account for differences in 
the level of individual control over retirement. When analyzing income 
trajectories around retirement in Part II, I will therefore differentiate be-
tween voluntary and involuntary retirement on the basis of whether it was 
preceded by involuntary job loss and/or a ‘health shock’, that is, an abrupt 
decline in health (see Barrett and Brzozowski [2010] for a similar approach).
Importantly, workers with high and low levels of control over retirement 
are likely affected differently by country or period differences in welfare 
state arrangements. As an example, assume that public policy seeks to 
promote later retirement by raising the f inancial penalties for retiring 
early (which, as further explored in Chapter 3, has actually been the case in 
the us and particularly in Germany during the last two decades). It seems 
reasonable to expect that these reforms have been more consequential 
for workers whose late careers are interrupted by job displacement or the 
onset of health problems (cf. Bäcker et al. 2009; Kingson and Morrissey 
2012): Workers experiencing smooth and stable late careers can quite easily 
respond to changed f inancial incentives by delaying their retirement. By 
contrast, older workers who experience a job loss are faced with a decision 
between retiring earlier than planned and becoming reemployed, pos-
sibly at a much lower wage than they earned before displacement. Other 
things being equal, raising the costs of early retirement should have two 
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effects: First, fewer older workers should retire and more workers should 
seek reemployment. Second, conditional on each path (i.e., retirement vs. 
reemployment), displaced older workers should be worse off when early 
retirement is more costly – retirees because they receive lower benefits and 
reemployed workers because lower retirement benefits will induce them to 
accept lower wages. On average, however, displaced older workers may still 
be better off if reemployed workers fare better than retiring workers; and 
of course ceteris paribus conditions may fail to hold in practice. Workers’ 
opportunities for countermobility might improve because of changes in 
labor market conditions or because employers begin to view older workers 
more favorably as early retirement becomes less common.
This brief discussion of the decision facing displaced older workers high-
lights a simple, yet important fact: Involuntary retirement will usually not 
be inevitable. It certainly is appropriate to characterize an older worker who 
does not return to work after losing her job as having retired involuntarily, 
because she would presumably have retired at a later point in time if the 
job loss had not occurred. At the same time, most workers experiencing 
late-career job loss and, unless impairments are severe, also those suffer-
ing from health problems retain some degree of control over whether to 
retire or seek reemployment. In other words, they are faced with a basic 
choice between a retirement/benef it path and a work path (Burkhauser 
and Daly 2002). By affecting the demand for older workers and the f inancial 
attractiveness of early retirement, contextual factors will influence the 
likelihood that a given worker ends up on one path or the other: In a country 
where demand for older workers is low and where early retirement policies 
are generous, workers will be more likely to retire after late-career job loss 
than in a country where their labor market prospects are better and where 
income support programs are limited. More generally, retirement patterns 
after late-career job loss depend on the opportunities and incentives for 
returning to work. Simply looking at those who retire (involuntarily) after 
late-career job loss would thus be ‘unfair’ toward a country that provides 
meagre early retirement benef its, but is good at reintegrating displaced 
older workers into the labor market.
Rather than simply compare voluntary and involuntary retirees, I will 
therefore proceed as follows: In my analysis of income trajectories around 
retirement in Part II, I will focus on those exits that can be credibly charac-
terized as voluntary in the sense of not being preceded by job loss or declines 
in health (even though I will also provide key results for involuntary retir-
ees). In Part III of this study, I will then examine employment and income 
trajectories around one primary trigger of involuntary early retirement: 
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late-career job loss. An obvious extension would be to explore the impact of 
health problems on the retirement and income trajectories of older workers, 
but because of space limitations I will leave this to future research.
This discussion of voluntary and involuntary retirement may also have 
clarif ied why issues of countermobility, family buffering, and spousal labor 
supply responses are more salient in the context of late-career job loss. Job 
loss is an unexpected adverse event that will usually entail what economists 
refer to as a negative shock to lifetime income. It is reasonable to expect 
that affected workers and their families will try to cope with such a shock 
as best they can. By contrast, it is slightly odd to ask how families cope 
with the economic consequences of voluntary retirement. It is of course 
conceivable that some voluntary retirees quickly learn that their retirement 
income is lower or that their f inancial needs are greater than expected. 
These and other factors may eventually induce them to ‘unretire’ or trigger 
changes in the labor supply of spouses. Importantly, however, using the 
hrs, Maestas (2010) f inds that the majority of unretirement events in the 
us are anticipated prior to the initial retirement event, which she interprets 
as evidence that unanticipated f inancial problems cannot be the primary 
motivation for unretirement. In addition, f indings by Maestas and Li (2007) 
indicate that ‘burnout’ due to high levels of work-related stress may be an 
important trigger of temporary retirement, that is, retirement followed 
by (planned) unretirement. Unretirement thus seems to be more likely 
to occur when the initial retirement is involuntary in the sense outlined 
above, which further supports the idea that the issue of countermobility 
need not be a primary concern when dealing with voluntary retirement.
3 Institutional context and social policy 
change
In the last chapter, I highlighted the potential of the trigger events perspec-
tive for understanding the real-life implications of welfare state provisions. 
My review of recent mobility research suggests that three factors are crucial 
in shaping income trajectories around adverse trigger events: institutions 
that cushion the f inancial consequences of adverse events such as welfare 
state programs; the opportunity structure for compensatory countermobil-
ity; and family insurance provided by the actual income and earnings 
potential of other household members. So far, I have only discussed these 
three factors in very general terms. This chapter provides a more concrete 
account of relevant differences between the us and Germany and of changes 
between the 1980s and early 2000s.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 summarizes overall 
macroeconomic conditions during the observation period. Section 3.2 then 
sets the stage for the discussion of institutional factors by documenting 
marked and well-known German-American differences in the employment 
rates of people in their 50s and 60s: Previous research suggests that these 
divergent patterns cannot simply be attributed to overall labor market 
conditions. It convincingly argues that they are at least partly due to mutu-
ally reinforcing institutional differences that affect both the demand for and 
labor supply of older workers. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 take a closer look at these 
differences, Section 3.3 concentrates on differences that should primarily 
affect the demand for older workers such as differences in skill/production 
regimes and the strength of labor market boundaries, in continuing training 
participation, and in the prevalence of (statistical) age discrimination. The 
predominant supply-side factor stressed in the literature is the availability 
of early retirement benefits and other welfare state transfers that make early 
exit from work f inancially viable or even attractive. I discuss these arrange-
ments and their employer-based functional equivalents in Section 3.4. As 
my primary goal in this study is to better understand the implications of 
changing welfare state arrangements for ordinary citizens, I will examine 
these regulations in particular detail. Section 3.5 explores differences in 
earnings arrangements which influence the extent to which the impact 
of adverse events is buffered by spousal income. Section 3.6 summarizes 
and concludes.
54 Late- CaReeR RiSkS in Changing WeLfaRe StateS 
3.1 Macroeconomic context
As I will discuss below, Germany and the us are characterized by marked 
institutional differences that likely affect the (re)employment prospects 
of older workers in systematic ways. However, these prospects can also 
depend on overall labor market conditions. Macroeconomic conditions 
may influence the consequences of retirement or job loss also through other 
channels, for example, by affecting the growth rate of private retirement 
savings (Burtless 2003; Wolff 2011). It will not be possible to unambiguously 
disentangle the role of macroeconomic context from that of other (institu-
tional) variables in the empirical analysis. Some background information 
on macroeconomic conditions is nevertheless indispensable for an informed 
interpretation of the results presented in later chapters.
Figure 3.1 depicts annual gdp growth (upper graph) and harmonized un-
employment rates (middle graph) for the us and Germany (West Germany/
Federal Republic until 1990; all of Germany thereafter). The bottom graph 
shows off icial unemployment rates for East and West Germany, that is, 
the former German Democratic Republic and the former Federal Republic 
of Germany.
German-American differences are especially clear for the unemploy-
ment rate, which exhibits greater year-to-year stability (I will not discuss 
gdp growth explicitly, as this indicator leads to very similar conclusions). 
The (West) German unemployment rate was lower than the American 
through most of the 1980s. Toward the end of that decade, both countries 
had very similar unemployment rates in the neighborhood of 5%. In both 
countries, unemployment rose during the early 1990s. In the us the increase 
was the result of a ‘normal’ recession, and the unemployment declined 
steadily after 1992, remaining relatively low (and certainly far lower than 
in Germany) until the ‘Great Recession’ of the late 2000s. The German case 
looks very different. Here, 1990 marked the beginning of a more persistent 
increase in the unemployment rate that brought the latter up to a value of 
approximately 10% in 1997. After a noticeable decline around the year 2000, 
the unemployment rate climbed again, reaching a new high in 2005. Since 
then it has declined substantially and did not increase much during the 
economic crisis of the late 2000s, a fact that has received much attention 
recently (see, e.g., Burda and Hunt 2011). In fact, the years 2009 and 2010 
were the f irst years since 1992 when the German unemployment rate was 
lower than the American.
The bottom graph shows that the increase in the German unemploy-
ment rate during the 1990s is closely related to German reunif ication. 
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Unemployment in East Germany rose massively in the course of the transi-
tion and has remained far above West German levels ever since.
Over the observation period of this study, macroeconomic conditions 
were thus more favorable in the us, especially since the most recent reces-
sion is not covered by the American data which are only available until 
2004/05. Perhaps more importantly, trends over time differed between 
the two countries. In the us, the institutional changes discussed below 
occurred in a context of improving labor market conditions: The average 
American unemployment rate was 7.1% during the years 1981-1990 and 
only 5.6% during the years 1991-2000. By contrast, the average German 
unemployment rate during the 1980s was 5.2%, compared to an average rate 
of 8.1% in the 1990s. These differences in overall macroeconomic context 
are important to keep in mind when interpreting the results presented in 
later chapters.
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3.2 Differences and trends in the employment levels of older 
people
Figure 3.2 depicts overall and full-time employment rates of German and 
American men and women in their late 50s and 60s from 1970 to 2010. It 
illustrates three important ‘stylized facts’. First, employment rates of older 
American and German men fell substantially during the 1970s and 1980s, 
as in most other industrialized countries (e.g., Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999; 
Ebbinghaus 2006). This trend was more dramatic in Germany than in the 
us. Due to secular increases in labor market attachment, the picture is 
more ambiguous for women. However, once cohort differences in overall 
labor force participation are taken into account, women too can be shown 
to have left employment at ever younger ages during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Ebbinghaus 2006: 7-8).
Second, and relatedly, older Germans were much less likely to work than 
their American counterparts throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Among men, 
differences were noticeable at ages 55-59, yet even more pronounced at 
ages 60 and above. During the 1990s, barely more than a fourth of German 
men aged 60-64 worked for pay, compared to over 50% of their American 
counterparts. Despite slight increases in recent years (data are available 
only from the late 1990s onward), work after age 65 remains a marginal 
phenomenon among German men. The employment rate of American men 
ages 65-69 was considerably higher throughout the period from 1970 to 
2010, exceeding 20% in all years. It is worth noting that in 1970, before the 
trend toward earlier retirement took off, employment rates of German 
and American men had been quite similar. In that respect, the picture is 
different for women. As with older men, German women were less likely 
than American women to work during the 1980s and 1990s. A noticeable 
difference, however, existed already in 1970, attesting to long-standing 
German-American differences in female labor supply. It is beyond the scope 
of this study to explain these differences in female labor force participation 
(for further discussion, see Lewis [1992]; Jaumotte [2003]; Pettit and Hook 
[2005], among many others), but I will revisit them when discussing country 
differences in earnings arrangements in Section 3.5.
A third and last result apparent from Figure 3.2 is that the trend toward 
earlier retirement has recently been reversed in both countries and for 
women as well as for men. Among men, the reversal started in the mid-to late 
1990s. The increase in employment rates has been much more pronounced in 
Germany, where prior declines had also been stronger. However, American 
men’s employment rates have also increased noticeably, especially at ages 60 
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and above. Given broader trends toward increased labor market attachment, 
older women’s employment rates have risen more strongly, and for American 
women ages 55-59 employment rates began to trend upward already in the 
1980s. Finally, for German women, full-time employment rates (depicted by 
the lighter lines) have increased much less than overall employment rates.
How can these country and period differences in the labor supply of 
older people be explained? There is widespread agreement that they cannot 
simply be attributed to differences in overall labor market conditions. One 
tremendously influential perspective, articulated most forcefully in the 
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economic literature on early retirement, emphasizes f inancial incentives. 
According to this view, differences in the f inancial incentives provided 
by public pension programs go a long way toward explaining patterns in 
Figure 3.2 (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999; Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004b; Duval 
2003). This literature argues that public pension systems often impose 
an ‘implicit tax’ on the earnings of older workers: Most public pension 
programs grant workers some discretion concerning the age when they 
claim retirement benefits. Claiming benefits earlier will usually result in 
lower monthly benef its to account for the fact that benef its will be col-
lected for a longer period of time. Often, however, benefit adjustments are 
quite small so that delaying benef it take-up reduces expected lifetime 
benefits or, more precisely, so-called ‘Social Security Wealth’ (ssw), that is, 
‘the expected present discounted value of promised future social security 
benefits’ (Gruber and Wise 2004a: 6). It is this reduction in expected lifetime 
benefits due to delayed benefit take-up that can be considered an implicit 
tax. Benefit adjustments that are just large enough to preserve the value of 
expected benefits are referred to as ‘actuarially neutral’ or ‘actuarially fair’.
This literature has amassed considerable evidence that f inancial incen-
tives for early retirement in public pension programs and other public 
transfer programs are an important source of country and period differ-
ences in older workers’ labor supply (Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004b). Indeed, 
there can be little doubt that Germany sustained more generous early 
retirement provisions than the United States throughout the observation 
period, as I will explore in greater detail in Section 3.4.
Sociological and gerontological research on early retirement generally 
appears to have accepted that f inancial incentives are important in shaping 
retirement timing. Yet, research in these disciplines has also been crucial 
in developing richer accounts of retirement behavior, both on the micro 
level of decision-making and on the macro level of institutional context. 
On the micro level, one of the most crucial contributions has been to direct 
attention to the role of ‘push factors’ such as health problems or job loss in 
the process of retirement (see, e.g., Guillemard and Rein 1993; Shultz et al. 
1998; Szinovacz and Davey 2005; Radl 2007, 2012a), as already noted in the 
discussion voluntary vs. involuntary retirement at the end of Chapter 2.
As for the macro level of pension policy, a key insight is that early re-
tirement policies can be seen as distinct, path-dependent responses to 
common challenges (to macro-level push factors in a sense): the economic 
(oil) crises of the 1970s, accelerated sectoral and technological change, 
and economic globalization (Ebbinghaus 2001, 2006; Buchholz et al. 2006; 
Hofäcker 2010; Buchholz et al. 2011). An important motive for implementing 
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early retirement policies was to reduce overall labor supply during times of 
mass unemployment, in the hope that this would open up job opportunities 
for younger workers without endangering social peace (e.g., Ebbinghaus 
2001, 2006). The prevailing view now is that early retirement policies did 
not actually have this desired effect (Kalwij et al. 2009; Börsch-Supan and 
Schnabel 2010; Gruber and Wise 2010).
To a considerable extent, the economic and technological pressures noted 
above were and still are common to all industrialized countries. Why then 
did some countries (such as Germany) put much greater emphasis on early 
retirement in their responses to these challenges than others (such as the 
United States)? I will not attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to that 
question because my primary aim is not to explain country differences and 
changes in pension policy (see Ebbinghaus [2001, 2006] for a seminal effort 
that elucidates how complex interactions among public authorities, employ-
ers, and workers shape retirement policy). Given my overarching interest 
in the economic well-being of older workers, I will primarily focus on one 
general reason why there may be a greater need (and electoral demand) for 
early retirement policies in the German context: the relatively low demand 
for older workers.
3.3 Institutional context and the (re)employment prospects of 
older workers
This section discusses crucial institutional differences between the United 
States and Germany that are often argued to affect the demand for older 
workers. These differences are most obviously relevant to the present study 
because they affect the reemployment prospects of displaced older workers, 
that is, the prospects for compensatory countermobility after late-career job 
loss. This is not to say, however, that these factors are unrelated to the retire-
ment and income trajectories of workers who enjoy smooth late careers. 
For example, low rates of continuing training participation (see below) may 
exacerbate the problem that the skills of older workers are (perceived as) 
obsolescent. This in turn may induce employers to promote (voluntary) early 
retirement of their employees by offering ‘golden handshakes’ in the form 
of severance pay (Eichhorst 2008) and to advocate public early retirement 
policies in an effort to externalize the costs of workforce restructuring 
(Ebbinghaus 2006).
Buchholz et al. (2006, 2011) argue that economic globalization and ac-
celerated technological change have negatively affected the labor market 
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situation of older workers. Technological and sectoral change requires f irms 
to update the skill profiles of their work forces and lead to overall increases 
in labor market turnover. This may substantially lower the attractiveness of 
older workers as their skills and qualifications are more likely to be outdated 
and because retraining efforts may be too costly given their imminent 
retirement (Ebbinghaus 2006: 30f.). This problem may be exacerbated by 
the fact that older workers often receive comparatively high wages due to 
deferred-compensation policies that tie wages to seniority (Lazear 1979). 
Finally, older workers tend to be over-represented in the shrinking sectors 
and occupations and where the need to ‘shed’ labor is most pressing (Blöndal 
and Scarpetta 1999).
These challenges are more or less common to all industrialized countries, 
but their precise impact on older workers is likely conditioned by ‘institu-
tional f ilters’ (Buchholz et al. 2006; Hofäcker 2010; Buchholz et al. 2011). In 
other words, the precise implications of these macro level trends for the 
employment prospects of older workers depend on their interaction with 
a country’s institutional makeup. In the following, I focus on four crucial 
aspects: Skill regimes and labor market boundaries, continuing training 
participation and lifelong learning, employment protection legislation, 
and age discrimination.
‘Varieties of Capitalism’, skill regimes, and labor market boundaries
The literature on ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (voc; Hall and Soskice 2001b) 
famously contrasts two ideal typical systems of production – coordinated 
market economies (cmes) and liberal market economies (lmes) – with Ger-
many representing the former and the United States representing the latter 
type. This dichotomy seeks to capture the purported fact that industrialized 
countries exhibit distinctive institutional configurations across such diverse 
spheres as education and training systems, industrial relations, corporate 
governance, and social protection. In other words, institutions tend to 
cluster, presumably because of ‘institutional complementarities’ which 
arise when ‘the presence [...] of one [institution] increases the returns from 
[...] the other’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 7). Such complementarities in turn 
influence the preferences and optimal strategies of relevant actors such as 
f irms or workers, inducing them to behave in ways that are consistent with, 
and reinforce, existing arrangements.
For my purposes, one of the most important insights of the voc approach 
is that coordinated and liberal market economies tend to rely on differ-
ent skill mixes or ‘skill regimes’, which in turn are supplied by distinctive 
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systems of skill formation. A prime example is Germany’s characteristic 
system of vocational education and training (Mayer and Solga 2008; Ebner 
2013).
The German skill regime emphasizes specif ic skills, whereas the Ameri-
can relies primarily on general skills. The distinction between general and 
(various kinds of) specif ic skills originates from human capital theory 
(Becker 1964). By def inition, general skills are portable across – and will 
thus be rewarded in – all kinds of jobs, whereas portability of specif ic skills 
is limited. It is common to further differentiate specif ic skills into skills 
that are specif ic to certain industries, occupations, or f irms: As the labels 
suggest, industry-specif ic skills can be put to use in different jobs as long 
as they are in the same industry, while the use of f irm-specif ic (occupation-
specif ic) skills is restricted to jobs in one and the same f irm (occupation).
From the worker’s standpoint, investing in specif ic skills is risky because 
the investment will only pay off if she f inds the ‘right’ kind of job (Iversen 
2005). Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) argue that an important function of status-
maintaining social protection therefore is to promote workers’ readiness to 
invest in occupation, industry, and f irm-specif ic skills. Generous earnings-
related benefits lessen workers’ reluctance to invest in specif ic skills: They 
ensure that their investment will continue to be rewarded during periods of 
joblessness (because benefits are related to wages on the previous job) and 
that unemployed workers can afford longer job searches, which increases 
their chances of f inding a job that matches their skill prof ile (Gangl 2004b, 
2006). To the extent that employers rely on workers with specif ic skills, they 
should therefore be supportive of social protection (Mares 2001). According 
to this perspective, one reason why Germany sustains relatively generous, 
status-maintaining social policies is that the product market strategies of 
German f irms require higher levels of specif ic skills (Sorge and Streeck 
1988).1
A potential drawback of the German emphasis on non-portable specif ic 
skills is that it impedes worker mobility: Workers are faced with marked ‘la-
bor market boundaries’ that limit their opportunities for inter-occupational 
1 The literature is somewhat ambiguous as to what types of specif ic skills (industry, occupa-
tion, or f irm-specif ic) are most salient in the German system. Some authors (e.g,. Estevez-Abe et 
al. 2001) seem to suggest that all three kinds of specif ic skills are important in Germany. Others 
characterize Germany as an ‘occupational’ (and the United States as an ‘internal’ ) labor market, 
which suggests that Germany is distinguished by its reliance on occupation-specif ic skills 
(Marsden 1999; Gangl 2001). The general assumption that skills with limited portability play 
a larger role in the German than in the American context seems to be relatively uncontested, 
however.
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or inter-industry mobility and, more important in the present context, their 
opportunities for reemployment after late-career job loss (DiPrete et al. 
1997; Mayer 2005; Blossfeld et al. 2011). In the German case, labor market 
boundaries are further reinforced by a strong credentialism that ties access 
to skilled occupations to formal qualif ications (DiPrete et al. 1997; Shavit 
and Müller 1998; Kerckhoff 2004). In the us, by contrast, general education 
is less standardized and occupational skills tend to be acquired via informal 
on-the-job training. Formal credentials are less important for gaining access 
to occupations or individual jobs (Allmendinger 1989). Mobility prospects 
for German workers may be better when it comes to transitions that do 
not involve occupational mobility. In this case, standardized credentials 
may facilitate moves across f irms by reducing uncertainty about the skills 
a given worker has to offer (Gangl 2001). However, this may be of little help 
to older workers who are often displaced from declining industries and 
occupations (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999) and whose certif ied skills may 
be perceived as obsolescent (Buchholz et al. 2011).
Continuing training and lifelong learning
Participation in continuing training or ‘lifelong learning’ is often argued 
to be indispensable for keeping the skills of workers in tune with changing 
job requirements, especially in an environment characterized by rapid 
technological progress and sectoral restructuring (Buchholz et al. 2011; 
Eichhorst 2011). Hence, the (re)employment prospects of older workers can 
be expected to depend also on the prevalence of continuing education.
The predominant view is that participation in continuing training is 
relatively low in Germany (Eichhorst 2011) which likely further limits the 
(re)employment prospects of older workers. The relative neglect of lifelong 
learning may also be an important reason for why until recently German 
employers were rather supportive of early retirement policies: In the 
words of Buchholz et al. (2011: 16) it leads to a situation where ‘adaptation 
to structural and technological change is mainly achieved via generational 
replacement in the labor market’. Yet, causality likely runs both ways in 
that prospective early retirement also undercuts incentives for investing 
in the continuing training. Initially, training requires investments in the 
form of time and money from the worker, employer, or both. Older workers 
planning to retire soon, and employers expecting their employees to do so, 
have little incentive to undertake these investments, as the expected pay-off 
period of their investments will be relatively short. I return to this issue in 
my discussion of statistical age discrimination below.
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In the United States, rates of continuing training participation are 
higher. Especially for younger workers, on-the-job training is crucial for the 
acquisition of specif ic skills which play a relatively marginal role in formal 
educational institutions (Allmendinger 1989). With respect to older workers, 
Buchholz et al. (2011: 16) suggest that participation is higher in liberal than 
in conservative welfare states because low levels of social protection lead 
to a situation where ‘[o]lder workers have to undergo constant retraining 
in order to remain competitive on changing labor markets’. According to 
their reasoning, older workers in liberal welfare states can be expected 
to develop and maintain their skills simply because this is necessary to 
avoid downward job mobility, unemployment, or involuntary early retire-
ment – scenarios that are rather unattractive due to limited levels of public 
income support. They contrast this pattern of ‘market-induced employment 
maintenance’ with the ‘public-induced employment maintenance strategy’ 
of Scandinavian countries where the state pursues a more active role in 
maintaining and adapting the skills of the workforce (Buchholz et al. 2011: 
16-17).
The extent of participation in continuing education is difficult to measure 
because it is often short-term and less formalized than education in school, 
vocational training, or institutions of higher education. That said, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) data on adult 
participation in continuing training confirm that Americans were more 
likely to participate in continuing training than their German counterparts 
in the early 2000s (oecd 2005: 310ff.). While not being available for the United 
States, Eurostat data on levels of training participation in European countries 
underline this f inding by showing that participation levels of Germans aged 
25-64 are below the eu-27 average (Eichhorst 2011: Figure 3 on p.5).
Employment protection legislation
Another important difference between Germany and the United States is 
the extent of labor market regulation. In particular, Germany has consider-
ably stricter employment protection legislation (epl) than the United States 
(oecd 1999: Ch. 2; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). From the perspective of the voc 
approach, epl is yet another means of raising workers’ readiness to invest in 
non-transferable skills, because it reduces the likelihood of being dismissed 
from a well-matched job where those skills are remunerated (Estevez-Abe et 
al. 2001). It is worth noting, however, that Germany extended the possibilities 
for fixed-term employment and other forms of ‘non-standard’ or ‘atypical’ em-
ployment such as temporary agency work over the course of the observation 
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period, whereas protection for workers with permanent contracts did not 
change much (DiPrete et al. 2006; Giesecke 2006; Gebel and Giesecke 2011).
The prevailing view is that stricter epl has no clear effect on overall 
levels of employment or unemployment, but that it reduces labor market 
turnover and affects the composition of the unemployed (oecd 1999; Boeri 
et al. 2000; Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000; Gebel and Giesecke 2011). 
Under stricter epl, employers may be more likely to hold on to workers 
during episodes of low demand, yet they may also be more reluctant to hire 
workers on a permanent basis when demand increases. By the same token, 
employers will be more likely to respond to demand changes via internal 
f lexibility (e.g., changes in work hours) and by hiring workers on a f ixed-
term basis, if the latter is permissible (Bertola et al. 2000; Boeri et al. 2000). 
Previous studies indeed show that stricter epl is associated with lower 
rates of outflow from unemployment and thus with longer unemployment 
spells (e.g., oecd 1999; 2004). As for the composition of employment and 
unemployment, past research provides evidence that stricter epl promotes 
labor market segmentation or insider-outsider divides, with prime-age 
men enjoying greater job stability and marginal labor market groups such 
as young workers, low-skilled workers, or women facing greater risks of 
unemployment and atypical, unstable employment (Esping-Andersen and 
Regini 2000; oecd 2004; Gebel and Giesecke 2011).
As for older workers, Germany’s stricter epl likely reduces the risk of 
involuntary job loss for those who are employed on permanent contracts. 
In fact, German regulation of dismissal procedures explicitly requires that a 
worker’s age be considered in dismissal decisions when jobs are terminated 
for business reasons (betriebsbedingte Kündigung) (Eichhorst 2006). While 
older workers with permanent contracts may thus benefit from Germany’s 
stricter epl, those who have lost their job may encounter greater diff iculties 
in f inding reemployment, as employers may be reluctant to hire older work-
ers (who enjoy special protection) on a permanent basis. For similar reasons, 
Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010) expect stricter epl to increase the proportion 
of retirements that are involuntary, a prediction that is supported by their 
empirical analysis of 19 industrialized countries. To mitigate this potential 
problem, legislation restricting the use of temporary contracts ‘without 
substantive cause’ (sachgrundlose Befristung) has long included exemp-
tions for workers above a certain age threshold – 58 until 2002 and 52 from 
2003 onward (Eichhorst 2006).2 Nevertheless, it does seem plausible that 
2 In 2005, the European Court of Justice ruled that these exemption clauses constitute a 
form of age discrimination. To counter this objection, the exemption clause now requires that 
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Germany’s stricter epl diminishes the reemployment prospects of older 
German workers compared to their American counterparts, or at least 
their chances of securing (more attractive) jobs with permanent contracts.
Age discrimination and feedback effects of retirement patterns
Age discrimination or ‘ageism’ (Bytheway 2005; oecd 2011) is another pos-
sible factor influencing the employment chances of older workers. The term 
‘discrimination’ refers to the differential treatment of individuals on the 
basis of ascriptive characteristics such as race, gender, class background, 
or age, rather than on the basis of differences that are inherently relevant 
in a given setting. Discrimination can occur in various settings (e.g., on 
labor, housing, or marriage markets) and the meaning of ‘inherently rel-
evant differences’ will differ accordingly. In the context of labor markets, 
it is common to think of ‘worker productivity’ as the inherently relevant 
characteristic (see, for example, Aigner and Cain 1977).
Discrimination can take two basic forms: taste-based and statistical. 
Taste-based discrimination against older workers would occur if an em-
ployer favored younger workers simply because of their being younger and 
not because of characteristics that are related to the worker’s productivity. 
In addition to employers’ preferences, tastes of co-workers and customers 
are further potential sources of discrimination (Becker 1957). For example, 
if customers have a preference for being served by younger workers, a profit-
maximizing employer would be inclined to prefer younger workers even if 
she entertained no age-related tastes herself.
Statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973; Aigner and Cain 
1977) is a form of discrimination that may occur even in the absence of 
discriminatory tastes. It arises because employers cannot directly observe 
the productivity of prospective employees and therefore have to form beliefs 
about their expected productivity on the basis of observable characteristics. 
For example, higher age may signal lower average computer skills. Other 
things being equal, employers screening applicants for a job requiring 
computer use can then be expected to treat older workers less favorably and 
thus fail to reward the competencies of computer-proficient older workers. 
If employers’ beliefs about average productivity levels – or, more generally, 
conditional productivity distributions – of different groups are correct 
and if more cost-eff icient ways of assessing worker productivity do not 
workers are above age 52 and have been non-employed for at least four months, thus explicitly 
targeting older people with labor market diff iculties.
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exist, then statistical discrimination is eff icient in the sense of being profit-
maximizing.3 This does not hold, however, for statistical discrimination 
based on erroneous beliefs about group-specif ic productivity distributions 
(Blau et al. 2006).4
Do older workers really face discrimination? Perhaps the most compelling 
empirical evidence on labor market discrimination comes from so-called 
audit studies which compare job search outcomes of f ictitious applicants. 
The crucial advantage of audit designs over studies based on standard 
observational data is that they allow for controlled manipulation of worker 
characteristics, thus keeping omitted variable problems to a minimum (La-
hey 2008). The audit approach is somewhat diff icult to apply in the study of 
age discrimination, because resumes of workers of different ages cannot be 
rendered identical in terms of key productivity-related characteristics such 
as work experience or year of graduation (which may signal currentness 
of skills). Another potential limitation is that audit studies focus on entry-
level jobs (where employers are unlikely to conduct extensive background 
checks on applicants): An older worker who is (still) applying for low-level 
jobs may be considered as having revealed low potential, whereas applica-
tions by younger workers may be regarded as typical of early career stages 
(Lahey 2008). Despite these complications, several studies have studied age 
discrimination using audit designs and practically all of them conclude that 
older workers face substantial discrimination in the hiring process (Bendick 
et al. 1997, 1999; Riach and Rich 2006, 2007a,b; Lahey 2008).
A potentially important source of statistical discrimination against older 
workers is their expected time until retirement. Employers may be reluctant 
to hire a worker whom they expect to leave sooner rather than later: Most jobs, 
and skilled ones in particular, require some ‘investment period’ during which 
workers acquire the job- and firm-specific skills needed for being maximally 
productive. Other things being equal, workers will therefore be more attractive 
when their expected tenure is longer, as this will leave more time for the initial 
‘investment period’ pay off. A similar argument can of course be made with 
3 Becker’s (1957) famous argument that discrimination is ineff icient and that discriminating 
employers could therefore not survive in competitive markets would thus not apply in this case 
where statistical discrimination is cost-eff icient (Blau et al. 2006). In any case, this argument 
crucially rests on the assumption of perfectly competitive markets (Heckman 1998), an assump-
tion whose empirical relevance is dubious (Ganßmann 2003).
4 Empirical evidence on age-productivity differentials suggests that overall the relationship 
between age and productivity is at most only slightly negative, at least up to age 65 (Börsch-Supan 
et al. 2005; Garibaldi et al. 2010). This literature also suggests that age-productivity prof iles 
depend on job tasks and therefore vary across f irms and industries (Garibaldi et al. 2010).
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respect to further training of workers who are already with an employer. 
The direct costs of replacing a worker (search costs) are another reason why 
expected tenure may often be a crucial criterion in hiring decisions.5 The 
potentially important role of expected tenure for hiring and training decisions 
suggests that prevailing retirement patterns have far-reaching implications for 
older workers’ labor market prospects via processes of statistical discrimina-
tion. If the majority of workers retire around age 60, workers in their late 50s 
will face great difficulties in finding jobs with ascending tenure-productivity 
profiles. By the same token, employers will be reluctant to invest in the skills 
of their older workers, suggesting that the prevalence of early retirement is a 
major reason for the rather steep negative age-training gradient in Germany 
(Eichhorst 2006). An ‘early-exit culture’ may thus be self-reinforcing, as those 
older workers who would prefer later retirement will have few job opportuni-
ties and will often be excluded from employer-supported training measures 
that would sustain and enhance their productivity.
I have elaborated four reasons why the employment prospects of older work-
ers are likely to be less favorable in Germany than in the us: an emphasis on 
specif ic skills that results in marked labor market boundaries, lower levels 
of participation in continuing education, stricter employment protection 
legislation, and the possibility that an ‘early exit culture’ (Hult and Edlund 
2008) exacerbates statistical discrimination on the basis of age. In the 
context of the present study, these factors are most immediately relevant 
because they affect the opportunities for compensatory countermobility 
after late-career job loss. Not only are displaced German workers prone 
to face greater diff iculties in f inding adequate reemployment than their 
American counterparts; it seems likely that differences in the demand for 
older workers also affect the scope for labor supply responses by potential 
spouses who will often be in their 50s or 60s as well.
From the perspective of displaced older workers, limited reemployment 
prospects create a greater need for ‘welfare-sustaining employment exit 
policies’ that limit the economic risks associated with late-career job loss 
(DiPrete et al. 1997: 328). Differences and recent trends in such policies 
are a central issue of the following section, where I provide an in-depth 
account of the main welfare state programs (and employer-based functional 
equivalents) that influence the f inancial consequences of late-career job 
loss and voluntary retirement.
5 Differences in expected tenure are also often cited as an important source of statistical 
discrimination against women (Bielby and Baron 1986).
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3.4 Differences and changes in public and employment-based 
protection
This section provides a comprehensive account of German-American 
differences, and recent changes, in several key welfare state programs: 
(means-tested) basic assistance programs, unemployment insurance, public 
and complementary pensions, disability benefits, and progressive income 
taxation. As noted above, economic literature on early retirement has pri-
marily studied the impact of welfare state programs on older workers’ labor 
supply and (early) retirement. The trigger events perspective developed in 
Chapter 2 offers a different take on these programs: They can be seen as 
societal institutions that cushion the economic consequences of mobility-
triggering life events. This is the primary perspective adopted in this study 
where I am interested in the contribution of welfare state arrangements to 
German-American differences and alleged recent increases in economic 
insecurity.
Before beginning with the in-depth review of individual programs, it 
is useful to provide some basic orientation. An obvious starting point for 
the country comparison is Esping-Andersen’s (1990) threefold distinction 
of the social-democratic, conservative-corporatist, and liberal-residual 
welfare regimes. Germany is widely considered as a prime example of the 
conservative regime, while the United States epitomize the liberal cluster.
The regimes identif ied by Esping-Andersen are ideal types and different 
welfare states may conform to these ideal types to varying extents. This 
has sparked considerable debate concerning the classif ication of particular 
countries and the overall usefulness of the typology (Arts and Gelissen 
2002). For example, several authors (e.g., Ferrera 1996) have argued that it 
is useful to distinguish a fourth ‘southern’ cluster exemplif ied by Mediter-
ranean countries such as Spain and Italy. Germany and the United States 
generally belong to the countries whose classif ication is less contested, but 
even in their cases some authors note considerable discrepancies between 
ideal typical descriptions and empirical reality (cf. Alber [2010] for the 
American case).
The stereotypical conservative welfare state features comparatively high 
contribution-based and earnings-related public benef its that serve the 
goal of status preservation for those who have earned claims via covered 
employment (Esping-Andersen 1990). Labor markets tend to be regulated 
with relatively strong employment protection, which reduces labor market 
turnover and stabilizes careers, possibly at the cost of ‘outsiders’ (women, la-
bor market entrants, or low-skilled workers) who do not succeed in securing 
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a well-protected ‘insider’ position (Blossfeld et al. 2007b). Conservative 
welfare states are heavily transfer-oriented and public provision of services 
such as childcare is limited, which goes hand in hand with a reliance on 
male breadwinning and women’s unpaid care work (Lewis 1992; Esping-
Andersen 1999).
The liberal welfare state, by contrast, relies on the market for the provi-
sion of welfare. The degree of ‘de-commodif ication’ which ‘occurs when a 
service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a 
livelihood without reliance on the market’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21-22) 
is lower than in the other welfare regimes. Earnings-related unemploy-
ment benefits are limited, both in terms of benefit duration and benefit 
levels. Long-term income support programs provide low benefit levels, are 
strictly means-tested and often restricted to certain ‘deserving’ population 
subgroups such as single mothers, the disabled, or the old. Employment is 
crucial for the f inancial well-being of non-disabled workers below retire-
ment age. The flip side of limited public benef its is a greater salience of 
private and employer-provided benefits, especially in pensions and health 
care. The labor market is relatively unregulated and turnover is high. Public 
social services are even less developed than in the ideal typical conservative 
welfare state, but the private service sector is large due, among other things, 
to downwardly flexible wages.
A few introductory remarks concerning the direction of recent welfare 
state change are also warranted. As noted in Chapter 1, concerns about 
f inancial sustainability have been an important motive for recent welfare 
state reforms in many Western countries. This is perhaps nowhere clearer 
than in the case of public pension programs whose long-term solvency is 
threatened by population aging. A second and partly related motivation 
has been a concern about the incentive effects of many welfare state 
programs. According to this view, transfer programs reduce incentives 
for economic self-suff iciency and encourage socially costly behaviors. 
Again, public pension programs are a case in point: As discussed above, 
Germany and many other countries long offered generous early retire-
ment options that had rather dramatic negative effects on the labor 
supply of able-bodied older workers in their 50s and early 60s (Blöndal 
and Scarpetta 1999; Gruber and Wise 1999). However, arguments about 
incentive effects have also been marshalled to justify reforms of many 
other welfare state programs, including unemployment insurance and 
basic assistance programs (which allegedly reduce job search and work 
effort) or health care (which allegedly promotes unhealthy behaviors by 
socializing their costs).
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While this two-item list of motivations for welfare state reform is cer-
tainly not exhaustive6, it may be suff icient for understanding many of the 
most crucial elements of recent welfare state change in Germany and the 
United States. In terms of specif ic regulations, welfare state reforms have 
been multidimensional and staggeringly complex. An important common 
denominator of many changes, however, has been to strengthen work incen-
tives for those who are considered capable. The diverse reforms undertaken 
toward this end are often referred to as ‘activation policies’ (e.g., Eichhorst 
and Konle-Seidel 2008).
In Germany and the us, as in many Western countries, one crucial ele-
ment of the activation paradigm has been to reform tax and benefit systems 
in order to raise the net gain from working (compared to transfer receipt), 
especially for low-wage workers. In the United States an important instru-
ment designed to ‘make work pay’ (Immervoll and Pearson 2009) has been 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (eitc), a tax credit awarded to households 
with positive labor earnings below a certain threshold, which has been 
expanded repeatedly over the course of the observation period. In Germany, 
possibilities for combining work and transfer income were expanded by the 
fourth so-called Hartz reform which became effective in 2005 (Eichhorst 
et al. 2010; Alber and Heisig 2011). Earlier reforms had already introduced 
(partial) exemptions from social security contributions for low-earning 
jobs (so-called Mini/Midi-Jobs), which grew rapidly afterwards, especially 
among women (ba 2007). Training and counseling measures as well as other 
types of active labor market policy have also been extended.
These ‘enabling’ policies were accompanied by ‘demanding’ measures 
that raised pressures on the unemployed to return to work (Eichhorst and 
Konle-Seidel 2008). These include reductions in benefit levels and duration, 
changes in suitability criteria, and the strengthening of workfare elements 
‘which require people to work in exchange for, or instead of, social assistance 
benefits’ (Lodemel [2000], as quoted in Koch et al. [2005: 421]).
With these stylized summaries in mind, I now take a closer look at the 
most important programs affecting the consequences of late-career job loss 
and (voluntary) exit from work. I begin with a brief description of means-
tested income support programs. I then describe earnings-related insurance 
6 For example, German debates in the 1990s and early 2000s also emphasized possible negative 
effects of non-wage labor costs (primarily social insurance contributions) on labor demand. In 
addition, concerns about persistently low fertility rates as well as ‘new social risks’ (Taylor-Gooby 
2004) arising from growing family instability have sparked various expansionary reforms in 
Germany (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004).
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benefits for the unemployed. Next, I chart the complex landscape of public 
and complementary pensions. I continue with a description of disability 
benefits and conclude with a brief discussion of progressive income taxation 
as another means of smoothing household income over time. I should note 
at the outset that the sections on means-tested benefits, unemployment 
insurance and old-age pensions draw heavily on excellent overview articles 
by Britta Grell (2011a,b) and Markus Wörz (2011b,c).
3.4.1 Means-tested income support programs
United States. In the us there is no universal cash-transfer assistance program 
for the population as a whole. Individuals aged 65 or older and younger workers 
qualifying as disabled are eligible for benefits from the federal Supplemen-
tal Security Income (ssi) program. ssi was introduced in 1974 as a federal 
replacement for various uncoordinated state-level programs that provided 
basic income support to disabled workers and older people (Grell 2011a). ssi 
claimants are subject to a relatively strict means test. In 2009, monthly ben-
efits were $674 for a single person and $1,011 for married couples, with many 
states offering some additional cash benefits (ssa 2009: 15). In most states, 
ssi recipients are automatically eligible for means-tested in-kind benefits 
such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, and housing benefits (Daly and Burkhauser 
2003). Federal ssi benefits on their own are insufficient for lifting recipients 
above the (absolute) federal poverty line. Like the poverty line, ssi benefits are 
adjusted annually to compensate for inflation and have therefore remained 
constant in real terms, while declining relative to median or average family 
income. When the program started, elderly people (65 or older) accounted 
for 60% of ssi recipients. Since then the role of ssi as a last safety net for the 
elderly in the us has declined (Elder and Powers 2006). In 2009, only 27% 
of all ssi beneficiaries were elderly (ssa 2009: 21). ssi receipt is increasingly 
concentrated among disabled people below retirement age.7
Older Americans below retirement age who do not meet the disability 
criterion for ssi eligibility have very limited access to long-term cash trans-
fers. The most important alternative sources of basic income support, Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (afdc) and, since July 1997, its succes-
sor program Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (tanf), are largely 
restricted to families with minor children. Only 3.3% of tanf recipients were 
7 Unlike benefit levels, thresholds used in means-testing have not been adjusted for increases 
in the cost of living, so the means test has effectively become more stringent, which likely is 
one important reason why fewer elderly people are claiming ssi (Nicholas and Wiseman 2009).
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older than 49 in 2006.8 Some states sustain ‘General Assistance’ (or ‘General 
Relief’) programs for childless adults, but these are a heterogeneous array 
of more or less voluntary state or county level programs that provide very 
meagre benefits. In addition, these programs have been further scaled back 
from the 1990s onward. According to Grell (2011b: 21), ‘[a]s of 2007, only two 
states paid cash welfare benefits to childless adults deemed “able-bodied”’. 
Childless older workers below retirement age may be eligible for food stamps 
and other in-kind benefits such as Medicaid or housing assistance, yet some 
of these programs, too, are effectively restricted to adults with children.
Germany. In Germany, a universal basic income floor was long provided by 
the means-tested ‘social assistance’ program (Sozialhilfe, sh). Many older 
people with low incomes, however, did not claim sh, mainly for fears that 
their children would be required to support them. In 2003, this led to the 
creation of a separate benefit scheme for older people over 65 and perma-
nently disabled adults over 18 years, the so-called Grundsicherung im Alter 
und bei Erwerbsminderung (gae). Under the new scheme, no recourse is made 
to children or parents of claimants if their annual income is below €100,000. 
Until 2005, gae benefit levels were slightly above social assistance rates. 
Since then, they have been equal to the standard rate of sh benefits and the 
new basic jobseeker’s allowance, ‘Unemployment Benefit II’ (Arbeitslosengeld 
II, algII) which was created by the fourth so-called Hartz Reform in 2005. 
In 2009, this rate was equal to €359 for a single person, plus allowances for 
housing and heating. Disabled people and individuals of retirement age are 
entitled to gae if their monthly income is below this standard rate and if they 
meet an additional asset test. Non-disabled older people below retirement 
age are entitled to the new algII (or to sh which has been continued as a 
much smaller program for those not considered capable of work).9
3.4.2 Earnings-related unemployment benefits
I now summarize key country differences and trends in insurance-type, 
earnings-related unemployment benef its. This endeavor is complicated 
by the fragmentation of American unemployment insurance: State-level 
8 http: //archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/FY2006/tab18.htm, access date Novem-
ber 22, 2012.
9 Technically, there is a third type of benef it, Sozialgeld, which is paid to persons not capable 
of work but living in a household with a recipient of algII. Persons not deemed capable of work 
may be entitled to sh rather than gae because the concept of ‘restricted earnings capacity’ used 
in assessing eligibility for gae requires health problems to be longer-term.
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programs form the backbone of America’s system and despite a few federal 
guidelines interstate variability in funding mechanisms, eligibility rules, 
and benef it levels is enormous (Grell 2011b). Concise summaries of the 
American context are therefore utterly diff icult. With this caveat in mind, 
I begin my review of earnings-related benefits with a discussion of maxi-
mum benefit duration, which is one of the few aspects that are relatively 
uniform across the 50 American states. I then turn to benefit levels and 
conclude with a discussion of eligibility criteria.
Benefit duration. In the us, practically all state-level programs provide unem-
ployment benefits for a maximum of 26 weeks. However, during periods of high 
unemployment, two types of measures routinely provide extended benefits to 
workers who have exhausted their state-level benefits. The first measure is a 
permanent program that provides benefits for another 13 weeks (20 weeks in 
some states with voluntary additional programs). Benefits are funded half from 
state budgets and half from federal funds. This ‘Federal-State Extended Benefit 
Program’ is generally triggered when the (seasonally adjusted) state insured 
and/or total unemployment rates exceed certain threshold values (Lake 2002; 
Grell 2011b).10 In addition to this permanent and automated supplementary 
program, further ad hoc extensions are often enacted during severe recessions 
(Grell 2011b). Table 3.1 lists the four instances of such extensions during the 
observation period, along with the total maximum duration of unemployment 
benefits, that is, the combined duration of benefits from state-level programs, 
automated federal extension programs, and ad hoc extensions.





federal Supplemental Compensation 9/1982 – 6/1985 40 weeks
emergency unemployment Compensation 11/1991 – 4/1994 59 weeks
temporary extended unemployment benefits 3/2002 – 12/2003 52 weeks
emergency unemployment Compensation of 2008 since 7/2008 99 weeks
Source: kohler et al. (2012b)
In Germany, maximum duration of f irst-tier benefits was set at 52 weeks 
for younger workers throughout the observation period. Older workers have 
10 See usdol (2008b: 4/14-15) for further details.
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been entitled to age-graded benefit extensions since 1985. The exact pattern 
of age-graded extensions changed several times during the observation 
period (Wörz 2011c). The initial reform in 1985 extended maximum duration 
to 18 months for workers ages 49 and over, but the next expansion followed 
already in 1986. The all-time high was a maximum duration of 32 months 
for workers aged 55 and older (57 and older from 1997 onwards) which 
was in effect from January 1987 to January 2006. A comparable system of 
age-graded benefit duration cannot be found in the us.
Second-tier benefits could in principle be claimed indefinitely, but they 
were abolished in 2005. Since then claimants who have exhausted their 
f irst-tier benef its (now labeled Arbeitslosengeld I) have to rely on algII, 
the flat-rate means-tested benefits described in Section 3.4.1. In addition, 
maximum duration of f irst-tier benefits was reduced considerably after a 
transitional period ending in January 2006. Initially, it was set to 12 months 
for workers below age 54 and to 18 months for workers ages 55 and above. For 
workers ages 57 and older maximum duration was thus cut by 14 months. 
However, maximum duration for workers ages 58 and older was reextended 
to 24 months in 2008. Additional detail on age-graded benefit durations is 
provided in Dietz et al. (2008) and Wörz (2011c).
Benefit levels. Subject to maximum benefit restrictions, German first-tier as 
well as former second-tier benefits replace a certain proportion of average 
net earnings in the year before unemployment. Workers with dependent 
children have been entitled to somewhat higher replacement rates since 
1984. Unlike with benefit duration, age plays no role for benefit levels. As 
shown in Table 3.2, f irst-tier (and, until their abolition, also second-tier) 
replacement rates declined noticeably over the past 30 years, at least for 
workers without dependent children.
Table 3.2  Replacement rates of German unemployment benefits since 1980
1980‑1983 1984‑1993 1994‑2004 since 2005
first tier (Arbeitslosengeld/Arbeitslosengeld I )
With dependent children 68 68 67 67
W/o dependent children 68 63 60 60
Second tier (Arbeitslosenhilfe)
With dependent children 58 58 57 -
W/o dependent children 58 56 53 -
Source: kohler et al. (2012b); Wörz (2011c)
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In the us benefit levels differ enormously from state to state. For example, in 
January 2011, maximum weekly benefits excluding dependents’ allowances, 
which are available in some states, were $625 in Massachusetts, but only 
$247 in Louisiana (Isaacs and Whittaker 2011: 7-8, Table 1). Partly due to this 
state-level heterogeneity, different sources reach different conclusions both 
with respect to benefits levels at a given point in time and with respect to 
changes over recent decades. For example, van Vliet and Caminada (2012) 
estimate that the replacement rate for a single, 40-year-old worker with aver-
age production worker earnings declined from 69% to 57% between 1980 
and 2008. The corresponding estimates for the same type of worker with 
a non-working spouse and two children are 61% and 52%.11 These f igures 
are substantially higher and show a clearer downward trend than off icial 
us replacement rates published in the Green Book (usdol 2008b), which 
declined from 38% to 35% between 1980 and 2008. However, these strik-
ingly lower replacement rates likely understate actual replacement rates 
for workers entering unemployment: They are based on a (cross-sectional) 
comparison of the average benef its received by benef it claimants with 
the average wages of covered workers, thus ignoring the fact that (former) 
low-wage workers are overrepresented among the unemployed (Grell 2011b).
Eligibility criteria. Earnings-related insurance-type unemployment benefits 
are generally restricted to workers meeting certain eligibility criteria. A 
f irst set of work history or ‘entitlement’ (Venn 2012) criteria relates to a 
(newly unemployed) worker’s recent employment history. As in most other 
countries with similar programs, German and American workers are re-
quired to have been covered by unemployment insurance for a certain 
amount of time during a certain reference period before the beginning of 
unemployment. Among other things, coverage requires that workers and/
or their employer made contributions to unemployment insurance. In both 
countries, coverage is mandatory for the vast majority of wage and salary 
workers, while the self-employed as well as certain other groups of workers 
(e.g., German civil servants) are not covered by unemployment insurance.12 
In both countries, earnings during reference periods also have to exceed 
certain thresholds. For example, workers in ‘Mini-Jobs’ earning less than 
11 For comparison, the corresponding estimates for a single worker in Germany are 68% 
(1980) and 60% (2009) and thus identical to the ‘legislated’ replacement rates in Table 3.2. Their 
estimates for the couple case are 70% and 71% which is slightly above legislated rates, presumably 
because van Vliet and Caminada (2012) also factor in child benef its (Kindergeld).
12 Under certain circumstances, self-employed workers can opt for coverage. In particular, 
they need to have been covered as wage and salary workers before becoming self-employed.
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€400 per month are not covered by unemployment insurance in Germany: 
They are not subject to contributions and workers do not earn entitlements 
to earnings-related unemployment benefits. Again, a summary of American 
work history criteria is diff icult due to considerable heterogeneity across 
the 50 states.
A second set of eligibility criteria can be characterized as ‘behavioral’. 
Violations of these criteria are usually punished with benefit reductions or 
even a (temporary) complete loss of benefits. Some behavioral requirements 
refer to the time before the actual onset of unemployment: For example, 
German workers with a f ixed-term contract are expected to notify the 
employment off ice up to three months before the actual termination of 
their job. In both countries, a common reason for benefit sanctions is that a 
job separation was initiated by the employee ‘without good cause’. A second 
important set of behavioral criteria relates to search behavior and readiness-
to-work during unemployment. Behavioral criteria are not restricted to 
recipients of earnings-related benefits, but are also applied to recipients of 
second-tier or means-tested benefits. In fact, behavioral criteria are usually 
stricter for these latter groups who tend to have been unemployed for longer 
periods of time. For example, German algII recipients are subject to much 
broader definitions of suitable job offers than recipients of earnings-related 
f irst-tier benefits (Clasen 2011).
Eligibility criteria are often defined using rather complex and idiosyn-
cratic institutional categories, so it is diff icult to compare their overall 
strictness across countries. That said, conventional wisdom suggests that 
eligibility criteria and especially behavioral requirements are stricter in the 
us. Recent attempts to quantify the overall strictness of eligibility criteria in 
oecd countries at least partly confirm this intuition (Hasselpflug 2005; Venn 
2012). Disaggregated results suggest that strictness of work history criteria 
is similar in the us and Germany. In terms of behavioral criteria, both 
Hasselpflug (2005) and Venn (2012) classify German regulation as noticeably 
more stringent with respect to job search and availability criteria, yet this 
counterintuitive difference is more than made up for by much harsher 
sanctions for noncompliance in the United States (Venn 2012: 21, Figure 6). 
For example, American workers considered to have quit their former job 
or refused a suitable job offer ‘without good cause’ will typically be denied 
benef its completely, while German regulation generally only allows for 
limited disqualif ication periods (Venn 2012).
Tracking changes in eligibility criteria over time is somewhat easier 
because these changes tend to occur within one consistent categorical 
framework. As for work history requirements, changes in Germany during 
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recent decades are probably best described as a limited and incremental 
trend towards tighter eligibility criteria. However, one of the most significant 
changes, which doubled the required number of months in covered employ-
ment during the so-called ‘reference period’ (Rahmenfrist) from six to twelve, 
already occurred in the early 1980s (Wörz 2011c). A description of American 
trends is again complicated by state-level variation. Overall, however, the 
literature reviewed by Grell (2011b) seems to suggest no clear trends.
Consistent with the increased focus on activation and workfare principles 
noted above, behavioral criteria were tightened in both countries during the 
last 20 to 30 years. This trend affected both claimants of f irst-tier benefits 
as well as recipients of second-tier or basic income support programs, with 
changes generally being more pronounced for the latter group. In Germany, 
definitions of suitable jobs were gradually liberalized and workfare elements 
such as the requirement to participate in training measures or community 
work were expanded. The most far-reaching changes were enacted by the 
‘Hartz Reforms’ in 2003-2005 (Eichhorst et al. 2010; Alber and Heisig 2011; 
Clasen 2011), but initial changes in this direction occurred already in the 
1980s and 1990s (Clasen et al. 2001). However, despite this increasing emphasis 
on activation, regulation that freed some older claimants of unemployment 
benefits from any job search requirements remained active until the end 
of 2007 (Eichhorst and Sproß 2005). More specif ically, unemployed workers 
aged 58 and older were not required to be available for work if they commit-
ted to claiming a deduction-free old-age pension at the earliest possible date 
(so-called 58er-Regelung). For most workers, this was the ‘old-age pension 
after long-term unemployment and old-age part-time work’ which could long 
be claimed by workers who were at least 60 years old and had been unem-
ployed for at least 52 weeks after age 58 and a half (for further details, see the 
discussion of early retirement options in Section 3.4.3 below). Introduced in 
1986, this regulation played an important role in facilitating early retirement 
during the observation period (Jacobs et al. 1991; Knuth and Kalina 2002).
In the us, demands on claimants of means-tested benefits have risen 
considerably, in particular after the 1996/1997 welfare reform (Blank and 
Haskins 2001). Welfare reform increased pressures to take up work for 
recipients of tanf compared to former benef iciaries of the predecessor 
program afdc (Blank 2009). For example, federal regulation requires that 
states limit the total lifetime duration of tanf receipt to 60 months13, but 
13 States can, however, exempt a limited proportion of the caseload from this lifetime maxi-
mum (Blank 2009). Thus ‘hardship cases’ are often eligible for benef it extensions beyond the 
60 month limit.
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as noted above this program plays a marginal role for older workers. afdc 
and tanf have received far more attention in the literature, but behavioral 
requirements have also become stricter for claimants of other types of 
welfare benefits such as ‘General Assistance’ (Ifcher 2007). Unfortunately, 
there seems to be no systematic account of trends in behavioral eligibility 
requirements for unemployment insurance benefits. However, given the 
overall trend toward activation it does seem likely that this group, too, has 
been facing increasingly stringent demands.
3.4.3 Public and complementary pensions
I now provide an overview of public and complementary pensions in Ger-
many and the us. For the vast majority of households, these programs are 
by far the most important sources of income after exit from work. In both 
the us and Germany, large public pay-as-you-go (payg) pension programs 
f inanced by payroll taxes form the backbone of the system of old-age 
income provision. I f irst discuss key general features of these programs 
and characterize the overall level of public retirement benefits in terms of 
the benefits received by a person retiring at the statutory or full retirement 
age. I then provide an overview of employer-provided and individual private 
pensions. Finally, I turn to the options for, and costs of, early pension take 
up, with the focus being on the public pension pillar.
It is important to note a crucial fact about pension policy: Many reforms 
take effect with considerable delay. Thus, the Social Security Amendments 
scheduling the gradual increase in full retirement age from 65 to 67 for 
Americans born 1938 and later were passed in 1983, yet it was only in the 
year 2000 that the f irst birth cohorts affected by these changes reached 
the minimum retirement age of 62. Similarly, while diffusion of def ined-
contribution plans among American employer-sponsored pensions acceler-
ated from the 1980s onwards, participation in these plans has grown more 
rapidly for younger cohorts that are still of working age.14 Another example 
are recent German reforms that seek to promote second and third-pillar 
pensions, most importantly the so-called Riester-Reform15 of 2001 which 
introduced subsidies and tax advantages for accredited private pension 
14 In 2001, according to Munnell and Sundén’s (2004: p.56, Table 3-1) estimates from the Survey 
of Consumer Finances, 44.2% of workers aged 40-49, but only 31.8% of workers aged 50-64 
participated in a 401(k) pension plan, the dominant type of employer-sponsored dc pension 
plan.
15 The reform is named after Walter Riester, the German Minister of Labor and Social Affairs 
from 1998 to 2002, who was one of the main architects of the reform.
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plans. As the primary aim of this chapter is to prepare and complement the 
empirical analysis of survey data in later chapters, I will largely concentrate 
on changes that affected recent retirement cohorts. Some of the changes 
that are currently most fervently debated (e.g., the increase of statutory 
retirement to 67 or the strengthening of private pensions in Germany) will 
play only a marginal role in my discussion, as they will primarily affect 
future retirement cohorts.
Public pension programs and overall benefit levels
For most of the observation period, the statutory retirement age was 65 in 
both countries. Americans born 1938 or later were affected by a gradual in-
crease in the full retirement age, which is set to increase further, to 67 years, 
for Americans born after 1959. In Germany, the scheduled gradual increase 
of the standard retirement age from 65 to 67 does not affect Germans born 
before 1947 (with 67 being the full retirement age for birth cohorts 1964 
and later).
Unlike unemployment compensation, ‘Social Security’ – as the American 
public pension scheme is often called – is a federal program with uniform 
rules determining coverage, eligibility, and benefit calculation. First intro-
duced in 1935, Social Security has been repeatedly expanded to new groups 
of workers and today covers more than 90% of the workforce, including the 
majority of the self-employed. Germany’s public pension program dates 
back to the late 19th century. It is somewhat less encompassing than Social 
Security, mainly because the self-employed (with some exceptions, e.g., for 
self-employed teachers or artists) and public employees with ‘civil servant’ 
status (Beamte) are not covered by the program.16 However, civil servants 
generally have lifetime employment contracts and receive retirement 
benefits that tend to be more generous than regular public benefits.
Benefit levels. In both countries, monthly retirement benefits are closely 
related to earnings histories. Under current regulations17, German workers 
are awarded so-called ‘earnings points’ (Entgeltpunkte) on the basis of their 
earnings during a given calendar year. To calculate the number of earn-
ings points, a worker’s earnings are divided by the average earnings of all 
16 Self-employed workers not belonging to the groups that are automatically covered can 
make voluntary contributions, however.
17 See Borgmann and Heidler (2007) for technical details on the ‘old pension formula’ applied 
before 1992.
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covered workers. A worker who earned only 50% of the average in a given 
calendar year would thus receive 0.5 earnings points and a worker earning 
150% of the average would receive 1.5. Monthly benefits are then calculated 
by multiplying all earnings points accumulated during the career with a 
constant, the so-called ‘current pension value’ (Aktueller Rentenwert)18 and 
two further factors that depend on age at pension take-up (Zugangsfaktor, 
see discussion of actuarial reductions for early retirement below) and the 
type of pension (Rentenartfaktor).19 The current pension value is adjusted 
annually according to a factor that depends on wage growth among the 
insured population and a few other variables. It is clear from this short sum-
mary of benefit calculation that pension benefits are roughly proportional 
to lifetime contributions, because the number of earnings points is more 
or less a linear function of covered earnings.
American Social Security benefits are calculated on the basis of a worker’s 
average indexed monthly earnings (aime). A worker’s aime value essentially 
is the average of past annual earnings divided by twelve and adjusted for 
average wage growth.20 Only the 35 years with the highest earnings are used 
in the calculation (years with zero earnings are included if a worker has 
fewer than 35 years with positive earnings). The worker’s aime then serves as 
the basis for calculating the so-called primary insurance amount (pia). For a 
worker claiming Social Security benefits at the full retirement age, monthly 
benefits are equal to the pia. Importantly, the formula for calculating the 
pia is quite progressive, that is, workers with low aime have a substantially 
larger proportion of their aime replaced by Social Security benefits: In 2013, 
the pia was calculated by summing 90% of the f irst $791 of aime, 32% of 
aime over $791 and through $4,768, and 15% of aime above $4,768, up to 
an upper limit given by maximum taxable earnings ($8,230 for a person 
retiring at age 65 in 2013).21 The threshold values or ‘bend points’ used in this 
formula are updated annually according to average wage growth.
Table 3.3 presents oecd (2007) estimates of net replacement rates – 
which are preferable to gross replacement rates because they account for 
18 The 2012 values were €24.92 for East and €28,07 for West Germany (http: //de.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Aktueller_Rentenwert, accessed December 18, 2012).
19 The Rentenartfaktor (‘type of pension factor’) is 1 for old-age pensions and full disability 
benef its and smaller than 1 for partial disability benef its and survivors’ pensions.
20 However, earnings are indexed to the year when the retiring worker turned 60 and not to 
the year of retirement.
21 For the calculation of the pia, see http: //www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html, accessed 
December 18, 2012. For information on maximum taxable earnings, see http: //www.ssa.gov/
oact/cola/examplemax.html, accessed December 18, 2012.
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differences in benefit taxation – for a worker who enters the labor market 
at age 20 and works without interruption until standard retirement age. 
According to Table 3.3, the replacement rate for an American worker who 
earned 50% of average earnings throughout his career is 67.4%. Workers 
with higher earnings have lower replacement rates. Consistent with the 
progressivity of the benefit formula, a typical worker earning 150% of the 
average wage had a much lower estimated replacement rate of 47.9% and 
a worker earning twice the average wage had a replacement rate of only 
43.2%.
Table 3.3  Net replacement rates for male workers at different earnings levels
Earnings, in % of average
50% 75% 100% 150% 200%
Germany
approximate replacement rate for recent 
retirement cohorts (pre-reform scenario)
66.3 73.4 79.5 86.9 65.2
impact of recent reforms on future replace-
ment rates (1984 birth cohort)
53.4 56.6 58.0 59.2 44.4
United States 67.4 58.0 52.4 47.9 43.2
pre-/post-reform comparison missing for us because no major changes took place (oecd 2007: 64ff.). 
Source: oecd (2007)
For German workers, Table 3.3 presents two sets of estimates. Estimates in 
the upper row are based on the so-called pre-reform scenario that does not 
account for legislative changes during the 1990s and 2000s. These f igures 
should provide reasonable approximations to the replacement rates received 
by recent retirement cohorts. According to these estimates, the net replace-
ment rate for a German worker with 45 years at 50, 150, and 200% of average 
earnings were 66.3, 86.9, and 65.2%, respectively. Except at the lower end 
of the earnings distribution, public pension replacement rates were thus 
considerably higher in Germany.22
I will discuss changes in pension generosity among recent retirement 
cohorts shortly. Before doing so, let me briefly highlight the dramatic impact 
22 Higher benef it levels are one major reason why the payroll tax levied to f inance public 
pensions is considerably higher in Germany than in the us. In 2012, the German payroll tax 
was equal to 19.6% of covered gross earnings. The American tax was only 10.4%, a temporary 
reduction (in response to the World Financial Crisis) from 12.4%. In both countries, contributions 
are paid half by employers and half by employees.
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of recent reforms on future retirement cohorts. The second set of f igures for 
Germany show the oecd’s (2007) projected replacement rates for the 1984 
birth cohort. For the us, no such projections are available, simply because 
no comparably far-reaching reforms have been passed (yet). The projections 
for Germany are striking, however. Depending on the earnings level, they 
imply declines from about 13 to over 20 percentage points compared to the 
replacement rates enjoyed by recent retirement cohorts. It is understandable 
that these changes have stirred considerable debate about the economic 
well-being of future retirement cohorts.
Even though the most dramatic changes are thus yet to come, there 
were also a number of small and incremental changes affecting overall 
(net) benefit levels for German workers who retired during the observation 
period of this study. For example, public pensions became subject to health 
insurance contributions in 1983 and the contribution rate was gradually 
increased to the full ‘employee contribution rate’ (Arbeitnehmeranteil)23 
until 1987 (Borgmann and Heidler 2007). Net pension levels were thus also 
affected by subsequent increases in health insurance contributions.24 There 
were also repeated and rather technical changes in benefit indexation (for 
further details, see Borgmann and Heidler 2007; Bäcker et al. 2009; Wörz 
2011b).
Borgmann and Heidler (2007) quantify the impact of changes in German 
pension legislation between 1970 and 2004 by calculating their impact on 
Social Security Wealth (see Section 3.2 above), a measure that is common 
in the economics literature and closely related to monthly benefit levels.25 
Unfortunately, their results are only presented in graphical form so it is 
not possible to reproduce their exact estimates here. For their prototypical 
pensioner, a single childless man retiring at the full retirement age of 65, 
Borgmann and Heidler (2007) calculate modest declines in ssw from the 
23 Like contributions to the public pension schemes, contributions to statutory health insur-
ance for wage and salary workers are paid partly by employees and partly by employers. For 
recipients of public old-age pensions, the public pension scheme pays the employer’s part of 
the contribution.
24 Between 1990 and 2010, the (average) employee contribution rate increased from 6.3% to 
7.9% (see http: //www.sozialpolitik-aktuell.de/tl_f iles/sozialpolitik-aktuell/_Politikfelder/Fi-
nanzierung/Datensammlung/PDF-Dateien/tabII6.pdf for full contribution rates, i.e., combined 
contributions of employee and employer; accessed March 17, 2014).
25 Social Security Wealth, introduced by Feldstein (1974), is equal to the discounted value of 
expected lifetime benef its, which means that, in addition to the level of monthly benef its, it 
also depends on remaining life expectancy at the time of pension take-up. ssw also depends 
on the chosen discount factor, but this is of minor importance if the goal is to compare levels 
of ssw across cohorts or point of time (rather than, for example, to other types of wealth).
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mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and somewhat stronger declines over the fol-
lowing ten years. Consistent with legislative changes discussed below, they 
calculate much larger reductions in ssw for two other types of workers: an 
early retiree and an early retiree with seven years of education after age 16. 
The results of this simulation study – limited, but noticeable across-the-
board decreases in benefit levels and stronger cuts for early retirees and 
for those with many years of education – are consistent with the results of 
more qualitative analyses (cf. Wörz 2011b).
Table 3.4  Changes in us social security net replacement rates (rr) by level of earnings
Replacement rate in % Change in rr
1980 1990 2000 2007 2007‑1980 2007‑1980
Low earnings 66.0 58.4 52.2 56.7 -9.3 -14.1
average earnings 48.9 43.5 38.8 42.0 -6.9 -14.1
high earnings 47.9 39.8 33.2 35.0 -12.9 -26.9
maximum earnings 40.6 35.7 28.6 28.8 -11.8 -29.1
Replacement rates for hypothetical workers retiring at the full retirement age (65 for years 1980, 
1990, 2000; 65 years and ten months for 2007) 
Source: ushor (2008a: table 1-49)
Like their German counterparts, American cohorts retiring during the 
observation period of this study experienced a gradual decline of Social 
Security benef it levels. Table 3.4 reproduces net replacement rates for 
retirement at age 65, as calculated by off icial us sources (usdol 2008a) 
and compiled by Grell (2011a: 12, Table 1). The decreases in replacement rates 
between 1980 and 2007 are noticeable, ranging from 6.9 percentage points 
for a worker with average earnings to 12.9 percentage points for a worker 
with high earnings. This is equivalent to declines of, respectively, 14.1 and 
29.1% of baseline replacement rates in 1980. Reductions were larger for 
higher-earning retirees, whose replacement rates had already been lower in 
the 1980s. Neither Grell (2011a) nor usdol (2008a) provide explanations for 
these trends in replacement rates. As there were no changes in the benefit 
formula (other than through wage indexation), changes in benefit taxation 
are a likely reason for the decline in replacement rates, especially for workers 
with high earnings (Social Security benefits f irst became taxable in 1984 
and taxation of high-income beneficiaries was increased further in 1993; 
cf. Burman and Saleem 2004; Scott 2013). Trends might differ by earnings 
level because of the growth of earnings inequality over recent decades 
(Katz and Autor 1999): Since indexation of past earnings (for the purpose 
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of calculating aime) is based on average earnings growth, low-earning 
workers would see their early-career earnings indexed at rates that exceed 
the rates of growth that they actually experienced over the course of their 
careers (in other words, indexed early career-earnings will be high relative 
to earnings just before retirement). Furthermore, because low-earning 
workers’ aime have grown at below-average rates, a larger portion of their 
aime will fall into the lower brackets where the replacement rate is higher 
(again, because the bend points of the benefit formula are tied to average 
wage growth; cf. Autor and Duggan 2003, who argue along these lines in 
the context of disability benefits).
Supplementary benefits. A major difference between American and Ger-
man public pensions concerns the availability of supplemental benef its 
for spouses and dependent (i.e, minor or disabled) children of living benefi-
ciaries.26 Whereas Germany provides no auxiliary benefits for dependents, 
spouses of Social Security recipients, who are disabled or aged 62 or older 
and who do not claim Social Security benefits on their own, are entitled 
to a supplement of 50% of the primary recipient’s benefits (Isaacs 2010). 
Supplements are also available for children below age 18 (19 if still in high 
school) and for older disabled children. However, total benefits are capped 
at 150 to 180% of the insured person’s benefits. Even divorced spouses are 
eligible for spousal benefits if they have not remarried, if the marriage lasted 
at least ten years, and if they meet the usual age/disability requirements. 
Availability of spousal benefits implies that Social Security replacement 
rates for single (male) breadwinner families are substantially higher than 
those shown in Table 3.3. Ignoring the impact of benefit taxation, these rates 
would have to be multiplied by a factor of about 1.5, lifting them near or even 
above German (pre-reform) replacement rates, especially for families with 
low preretirement earnings. Availability of spousal benefits thus subsidizes 
single breadwinner families – and it is therefore somewhat surprising to 
f ind them in the us, but not in Germany, the country usually considered to 
have a stronger male breadwinner orientation (Lewis 1992).
Pension credits for non-work periods. Differences between the us and Ger-
many also exist with regard to the crediting of certain non-work periods. 
In contrast to the us, where there are essentially no pension credits for 
non-work periods, the German system long awarded generous pension 
26 In both countries, there are survivor pensions for orphans and widow(er)s of deceased 
workers and benef iciaries.
inStitutionaL Contex t and SoCiaL poLiCy Change 85
credits for times spent in full-time education. Years in education (including 
higher education) after age 16 were credited at 75% of average earnings up to 
a maximum of 13 years until the early 1990s. Starting in 1992, the number of 
creditable years was gradually reduced, f irst to seven (1992 reform) and then 
to three years (1997 reform). Finally, between 2005 and 2009, educational 
credits were phased out completely for most types of education (Wörz 
2011b).27 Retirement benefits for workers with long educational records, in 
particular university graduates, have thus fallen substantially since the 
1980s. At current benefit levels, benefit reductions would be around €200 
per month for a person with 13 formerly creditable years of education after 
age 16. In contrast to education credits, pension credits for child rearing 
have been substantially expanded, from one year at 75% to three years at 
100% of average earnings per child. However, these extensions only apply to 
parents of children born after January 1, 1992, and hence are hardly relevant 
for recent retirement cohorts.28
Complementary pensions
Given Social Security’s modest replacement rates for workers with higher 
incomes, complementary pensions – that is, employer-provided (second-
pillar) and individual private (third-pillar) pensions – have long played a 
greater role for older Americans than for older Germans: According to oecd 
estimates for the mid-2000s (oecd 2009: 60, Figure 2.3), the average German 
household headed by a person aged 65 or older received roughly 73% of 
their disposable income from public pensions and transfers and 15% from 
private pension and other capital income. The corresponding f igures for 
the us are 36% and 30%, respectively. The remaining portion of disposable 
income, a mere 12% in Germany and a more significant 34% in the us, came 
from employment income, which was of course contributed by younger 
household members to some extent, but also reflects the greater propensity 
of Americans to work after statutory retirement age (see Figure 3.2 above).
I now give an overview of complementary pensions in the us and Ger-
many. I begin with a discussion of the (changing) American situation, which 
27 Up to a maximum of eight years in education are still credited towards ‘qualif ication 
periods’. While they no longer affect benef it levels directly, they may thus still be relevant with 
regard to eligibility for early retirement options that require a certain length of the contribution 
period (see discussion of early retirement options below).
28 The one-year credit was introduced in 1986 and, in contrast to the 1992 expansion, was 
applied retrospectively, that is, it was also granted to mothers whose children were born before 
1986 (Fasang 2008).
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also serves to introduce some general differences among different types of 
complementary pension plans. In a second step, I then review the role of 
complementary pensions in Germany.
Complementary pensions in the United States. Occupational and private 
pension plans come in various flavors and their heterogeneity is particularly 
large in the United States. Second-pillar employer-provided pension plans 
account for approximately two thirds of retirement savings. Another quarter 
is allocated to ‘Individual Retirement Accounts’ (iras), the most important 
form of third-pillar individual private pension plans (Grell 2011a: 20). To 
encourage saving, contributions to iras and employer-sponsored plans 
below certain contribution ceilings are usually exempt from taxation or 
subject to reduced tax rates. To receive such preferential treatment, both 
employer-provided plans and iras have to meet certain requirements. 
Benefits from employer-provided plans and withdrawals (or ‘distributions’) 
from iras are subject to income taxation. Early withdrawal (before age 
59 and a half) of savings from iras or other types of retirement savings 
accounts is possible but subject to an additional tax penalty of 10%.29
A crucial distinction in regard to complementary pension plans is be-
tween defined-benefit (db) and defined-contribution (dc) plans. These two 
broad classes of retirement plans are internally diverse and I cannot provide 
more than a stylized overview. db plans resemble public payg schemes 
in that retirement benefits are some (complicated) function of a worker’s 
contribution or earnings history. dc plans, by contrast, are similar to private 
savings accounts: The worker’s contributions (and potential employer sup-
plements) are invested in one way or another, with the worker usually 
having substantial discretion over portfolio decisions. From the worker’s 
perspective, an oft-cited advantage of dc plans is their portability: Savings 
in dc accounts are readily transferred into accounts with new employers, 
whereas many db plans punish changes of employer, for example, by tying 
benefits to length of service or f inal salary.
In the United States, dc plans have replaced db plans as the dominant 
type of employer-sponsored pension over the last decades. Wolff (2003: 
486, Table 4) estimates that the proportion of households aged 47-64 with 
positive dc pension wealth rose from 11.9% to 59.7% between 1983 and 1998. 
Over the same period, the share of households with positive db pension 
wealth (i.e., with db pension entitlements from previous and/or current 
jobs) declined from 87.0% to 52.7%.
29 This penalty can be waived in cases of f inancial hardship such as high medical expenses.
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Importantly, db and dc plans have different consequences for risk shar-
ing between worker and employer. Under a db plan, employers carry the 
lion’s share of investment risk: For a given earnings or contribution record, 
the plan guarantees participants a certain level of benefits, and employ-
ers are the ones who have to ensure that they can meet their payment 
obligations.30 Under a dc plan, workers are the primary carriers of risk: 
If their investment choices turn out poor, they may end up with limited 
resources for retirement. This potential problem can be exacerbated by the 
fact that the ‘administrative fees’ charged by providers of dc plans (or the 
providers of the mutual funds that dc wealth is often invested in) tend to 
be considerably higher than (implicit) fees for db plans or public pension 
schemes (Blackburn 2008).
It is because of this difference in the primary carrier of risks that Jacob 
Hacker (2006) considers the growing importance of dc plans as a core 
element of The Great Risk Shift. Of course, dc plans may also prove advanta-
geous, at least for some workers. If workers make good choices and stock 
market trends are favorable dc plans can yield much higher returns on 
savings than would be enjoyed under a db alternative. I will further explore 
these issues in Chapter 5. One thing that is worth noting at this point is that 
the overall economic climate and stock market trends in particular were 
rather favorable during the 1990s (Wolff 2011). The latest American retire-
ment cohort included in my data are workers who left employment in 2002, 
long before the Financial Crisis of the late 2000s, which has caused much 
concern about retirement income security (see, for example, VanDerhei 
2009; Maurer et al. 2011, Wolff 2011). In this study, the consequences of the 
shift toward dc pensions will thus be examined under ‘best-case’ conditions.
Another difference between db and dc plans is that they tend to dif-
fer in terms of (default) payment options. As noted in Chapter 2, many 
commentators argue that a considerable fraction of American retirees is 
‘underannuitized’ in the sense of consuming too little of their retirement 
savings in the form of annuities that guarantee monthly payments until 
the death of the primary recipient (or of the primary recipient’s survivors) 
(Brown et al. 2001; Diamond 2004; Diamond and Orszag 2005; Brown et al. 
2008). Annuitization is crucial because it provides protection against the 
risk of outliving one’s assets. Under db plans, the default payment option 
30 db plans are not completely risk-free for workers because plans may be only partially insured 
against bankruptcy of the provider. In the us, employer-sponsored db plans are insured by the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
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usually does involve some form of annuity payments31, although so-called 
cash-balance plans that allow workers to choose a lump-sum payment 
instead of an annuity are increasingly common (Blostin 2003). This trend 
notwithstanding and even though many dc plans do offer alternative op-
tions32, lump-sum payments are more common with dc plans. Even if a 
dc plan does not offer an annuity option, beneficiaries may of course use 
their lump-sum distribution to purchase an annuity on the general market, 
but many observers suggest that this is (too) rarely done and that annuity 
markets are not functioning well, perhaps due to adverse selection problems 
(Diamond 2004; Munnell and Sunden 2004). This suggests that the growing 
prevalence of dc plans may increase the number of retirees whose long-term 
f inancial well-being is precarious.
The difference in default payment options also suggests that the growing 
prevalence of dc plans has raised the importance of non-annuitized wealth 
– which is not captured by the income measures used in the empirical 
chapters of this study – for f inancing consumption in retirement. This 
issue must be kept in mind when interpreting changes over time in the 
us, but it should not be exaggerated. In a recent study based on the Health 
and Retirement Study (hrs), Poterba et al. (2011: 25) estimate that ‘[h]alf of 
all households headed by someone between the ages of 65 and 69 in 2008 
had total f inancial assets, including assets in iras and 401(k)s, of less than 
$52,000’ (401(k)s, named after the relevant section in the us tax code, are 
the most common form of employer-sponsored dc account). Even though 
401(k) balances may be somewhat underreported in the hrs (Venti 2011), this 
estimate suggests that the majority of us households headed by a just-retired 
or soon-to-retire person did not hold massive amounts of non-annuitized 
(non-housing) wealth even in the mid-2000s.
Coverage by, and actual participation in, employer-sponsored pension 
plans are highly stratified. In general, coverage is higher for male, white, full-
time, higher-educated and higher-earning workers as well as for workers in 
the public sector and in large private sector f irms (Copeland 2011). These 
differences are of course interrelated. For example, in 2010, women were 
31 Often several annuity options are available which differ, for example, with respect to the 
provision of survivor benef its. An important variant that facilitates early retirement is the level 
income option, which pays higher benef its until recipients become eligible for Social Security 
benef its (Blostin 2003).
32 According to the f igures reported in Blostin (2003: Table 2 on p.4), about one third of dc 
plans in private industry feature an annuity option and roughly half a so-called ‘installment 
option’ that provides monthly payments for a specif ied number of years – but not necessarily 
until the benef iciary’s death.
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more likely to participate than men when annual earnings were controlled 
(Copeland 2011: 15, Figure 5). Participation rates tend to rise during macro-
economic expansions. In part because of this relationship, participation 
rates rose during the late 1990s and declined somewhat thereafter.
Extant research also documents two important secular trends in 
group-specif ic coverage rates. The f irst is a convergence of coverage rates 
by gender. According to estimates by Copeland (2011: 30, Figure 22) the 
participation rate of female wage and salary workers ages 21-64 increased 
from 40.7% in 1987 to 44.4% in 2010, while the participation rate of their 
male counterparts fell from 51.0% to 45.3%. The second trend can be 
described as a trend towards increased inequalities in pension coverage, 
particularly among male workers. Wolff (2011: Ch.4) shows that, among 
current workers below age 65, differentials in coverage rates by race, 
income, and education grew considerably between 1980 and 2007. More 
importantly, he also shows that differentials in household complementary 
pension wealth by educational attainment grew considerably over the same 
period in practically all age groups (cf. Wolff 2011: Ch. 6). This trend also 
holds for households with heads aged 56-64 and 65+, which are the most 
relevant age groups in the context of the present study. He also f inds that 
the shift from dc to db pensions was a crucial factor behind these trends, 
as dc pensions are much more unequally distributed, both in terms of 
coverage and pension wealth.
Complementary pensions in Germany. According to Börsch-Supan et al. 
(2001: 173-174), ‘[a]lthough company pensions exist in Germany, their role is 
subsidiary’ and ‘the average [company] pension is [...] low’. In comparison to 
the us, the same can be said about private savings and individual retirement 
plans. Given this widespread perception, it is surprising to f ind that recent 
data on complementary pension coverage suggest that the proportion of 
the working-age population who are covered by an occupational and/or 
individual private pension plan is similar in the us and Germany (Antolin 
and Whitehouse 2009; oecd 2011: 173), although there may of course still be 
substantial differences with respect to expected benefits from these plans. 
As noted above, oecd (2009: 60-61) data for the mid-2000s do confirm the 
conventional wisdom that American retirees draw a considerably larger 
portion of their income from ‘capital’, which includes complementary pen-
sion (as well as asset) income. In addition, German reform measures in 
the early 2000s, most importantly the Riester-Reform of 2001, sought to 
expand complementary pension coverage and recent f igures partly reflect 
90 Late- CaReeR RiSkS in Changing WeLfaRe StateS 
their impact. For the cohorts examined in this study, German-American 
differences in coverage rates have therefore likely been greater.
As in the us, complementary pension coverage in Germany is stratif ied 
by earnings (oecd 2012: Ch.4) and other (related) characteristics such 
as gender or occupation (tnsit 2008). For example, according to recent 
oecd (2012: 111-113) estimates, the average coverage rate (in % of the total 
labor force) was 39% for the lower half and 66% for the upper half of the 
income distribution. The corresponding f igures for the us are 37% and 
81%, respectively, suggesting that inequalities in complementary pension 
coverage may be somewhat smaller in Germany.33 However, this may again 
reflect the impact of recent reforms, as participation in Riester-type plans 
(which are eligible for quite progressive public subsidies) is distributed 
more equally across the income distribution than participation in other 
complementary pension plans (oecd 2012: 119-121).
It is also important to note that, in comparison to the us, second- and 
third-pillar pensions in Germany are predominantly low-risk. Pure defined-
contribution company pension plans where workers carry the full invest-
ment risk are not recognized as occupational pensions under German law 
and are therefore not eligible for exemptions from taxes and social security 
contributions: Employers or their contractors are required to guarantee a 
minimum pension to their employees (Beckstette and Zwiesler 2004; oecd 
2012: Ch.5). Similarly, third-pillar pension plans also need to guarantee a 
minimum pension to be eligible for Riester-type subsidization. Typically, 
German complementary pension plans will thus be either pure db plans 
or hybrid plans with a strong risk-hedging db component.
Presumably due to their limited importance for retirement income, em-
pirical research on complementary pensions in Germany is relatively scant, 
making it diff icult to draw definitive conclusions about changes over time. 
To assess changes in the relative importance of different income sources 
for recent retirees, I therefore used data from the American Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (psid) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (soep) to 
estimate trends in the relative importance of public pension income, private 
(i.e., complementary) pension income, and asset income for people aged 66 
to 70. More specif ically, I computed the average proportion of total pre-tax 
post-transfer income (household pre-tax income from all public and private 
sources) coming from each of these income sources (pre-tax post-transfer 
33 The original oecd publication presents decile-specif ic coverage rates. I obtained estimates 
for the lower (upper) half by averaging coverage rates across the bottom (top) f ive deciles. Data 
are available from http: //dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932598550 (accessed December 13, 2012).
inStitutionaL Contex t and SoCiaL poLiCy Change 91
income additionally includes labor earnings, private transfers, and public 
non-pension transfers, see Chapter 4).
Figure 3.3 confirms that public retirement income is much more impor-
tant for Germans than for Americans and vice versa for private income 
sources. During the observation period, Germans aged 66-70 derived 
between 70 and 80% of their income from the public pension system, 
while this proportion was between 40 and 50% for Americans in this age 
group. As for trends over time, American results show a modest decline in 
the importance of public pensions as well as a more substantial decline 
in the importance of asset income. At the same time, the proportion of 
income coming from private pensions has risen considerably, suggesting 
a crowding-out relationship between private pension and asset income: 
As dc plans and iras have become more widespread, workers may have 
shifted general savings (i.e., savings not earmarked as retirement savings) 
into these explicit retirement savings devices.34
As for German trends over time, results suggest at most a very slight 
increase in the importance of private retirement income towards the end of 
the observation period. Between the late 1990s and late 2000s, the average 
share of income coming from private pensions rose from approximately 4 
to approximately 6%. Compared to the 1990s, the relative importance of 
private retirement income had already been somewhat greater in the 1980s, 
so the share has actually followed a rather flat U-shape over the course of 
the observation period. The dip is clearly attributable to East Germans 
joining the population in the early 1990s: For obvious reasons, this group 
had accumulated very limited occupational pension entitlements. In this 
context, it is somewhat surprising that I cannot f ind a similar pattern for the 
asset income share, which shows no clear trend over time (and in fact takes 
its highest values in the early 1990s, that is, immediately after reunification). 
Overall, the pattern of changes in Germany is thus rather complex, but it is 
clear that the relative importance of private sources for retirement income 
has risen very modestly at most and remained far below American levels 
throughout the observation period.
Early retirement options. I conclude my overview of public and complemen-
tary pensions with a discussion of early retirement options. I will concentrate 
on early retirement options in the public pension programs. Given the great 
34 However, Wolff (2011: 57) concludes that ‘previous studies that consider whether accumula-
tions in dc pension plans add to net household wealth or merely substitute for other forms of 
household savings have been inconclusive’.
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diversity of complementary pension plans, a review of early retirement ar-
rangements in second- and third pillar pension plans is not feasible. As a 
general rule, however, it can be stated that employer-based db plans often 
feature rather generous early retirement provisions once individuals have 
reached plan-specif ic early retirement ages (Stock and Wise 1990). Monthly 
benefits tend to be only mildly reduced as a consequence of early benefit take-
up and the reduction is generally less than would be required by actuarial 
neutrality. As noted above, actuarial neutrality holds when the present value 
of expected retirement benefits is independent of retirement age, that is, 
when the (monthly) benefit reduction for early retirement is just large enough 
to offset the fact that benefits will be collected for a longer period of time 
(see Clemens [2004] for a thorough discussion). Because they are essentially 
savings accounts, dc plans are actuarially neutral by construction: Retiring 
earlier means that accumulated savings will have to sustain the retiree for a 
longer period of time. Similarly, an early-retiring worker seeking to annuitize 
her dc savings will have fewer resources available than a later-retiring worker 







































































graphs depict the average proportion of household pre-tax post-transfer (hh ptpt) income from 
the income source given in the title. additional income components (not shown): labor earnings, 
private transfers, public (non-pension) transfers. See Chapter 4 for details. 
Sources: cnef, psid, soep, own calculations
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and will pay a higher price for a given level of (monthly) annuity income 
because of her longer remaining life expectancy. Early retirement thus tends 
to be more costly for dc than for db participants and the growing prevalence 
of dc plans presumably is an important driver of recent increases of the 
recent trend towards later retirement in the us (Munnell et al. 2003). By the 
same token, dc (rather than db) coverage can also be expected to raise the 
costs of (involuntary) early retirement after late-career job loss or declines 
in health, thereby creating incentives for returning to (or remaining in) 
employment after the occurrence of these events.
Turning to public retirement benef its, early take-up before the full 
retirement age can result in lower benefits for two main reasons (Clemens 
2004; Hoffmann 2007; Himmelreicher and Stuchlik 2008). The f irst is that 
early retirees forego future earnings and pension contributions that would 
have resulted in higher benefits. This factor tends to weigh more heavily in 
Germany where each additional earnings point raises pension claims by the 
same amount, that is, regardless of the number of earnings points a worker 
has already accumulated. A worker with average earnings who retires at 
age 60 rather than 65 will thus forego f ive additional earnings points, the 
equivalent of approximately €140 in monthly benefits in West Germany in 
2012. In the us, losses due to foregone earnings are limited by the fact that 
aime are calculated on the basis of the 35 years with the highest earnings 
(see above).35 Actuarial reductions are the second major reason why early 
benefit take-up usually entails lower benefits. Actuarial reductions ensure 
that an early-retiring worker will receive lower benefits than a late-retiring 
worker with the same contribution history (or, more precisely, the same 
number of earnings points or aime). Actuarial reductions thus (partly) 
compensate for the fact that early-retiring workers will on average collect 
their benefits for a longer period of time.
At what ages can (non-disabled) American and German workers start to 
collect public retirement benefits and what actuarial reductions do they 
incur? American regulations are simple to summarize and remained largely 
unchanged during the observation period: Early pension take-up is possible 
from 62 onwards, but it involves (relatively high) benef it reductions of 
5/9% per month of early retirement. Assuming a statutory retirement age 
35 To see this, consider a worker who ponders whether to claim pensions or work for another 
year: Because aime are calculated on the basis of the 35 highest-earning years, earnings during 
the next year must be higher than for at least one of what currently are her 35 highest-earning 
years to affect her aime. Even if this is the case, the net gain in Social Security benef its would 
be small unless earnings during the additional year are much higher than earnings during the 
lowest-earning of what previously were the 35 highest-earning years.
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of 65 years, this adds up to a total reduction of 20% for a person retiring at 
age 62. Non-disabled retirees under 65 are also ineligible for Medicare, the 
public health care program for the elderly, until reaching full retirement 
age. Despite these substantial disincentives, the proportion of American 
workers claiming Social Security benefits at age 62 has remained above 50% 
since the mid-1980s (usdol 2008a: 61, Table 1-27). The latest birth cohorts 
examined in this study were affected by the gradual increase of the full 
retirement age to 67. More specif ically, the statutory retirement is set at 
66 for birth cohorts 1943-1954 and was gradually increased in steps of two 
months per (birth) year for those born between 1938 and 1942. Retirement 
at age 62 remains possible for these cohorts, but triggers additional benefit 
reductions. For those retiring more than three years before their full retire-
ment age, a smaller reduction factor of 5/12 (as opposed to 5/9) % is applied 
for every month beyond the f irst 36 months. For example, pension take-up 
at age 62 entailed benefit reductions of 24.17% for workers born in 1942 and 
of 25% for birth cohorts 1943-1954.
German early retirement options are more diff icult to summarize, as 
they have long been based on an intricate system of group-specific pensions. 
Throughout the observation period, workers who did not meet the eligibility 
requirements of any of these group-specific pensions could not claim public 
old-age pensions before the full retirement age. The vast majority of workers, 
however, were eligible for at least one of several early retirement options. 
Before the changes introduced by the 1992 pension reform36 (see below), 
these workers could generally claim benefits before the full retirement age 
without incurring benefit adjustments.
Four early retirement options were by far the most important37: The 
old-age pension (oap) for women allowed women with 15 or more years of 
contributions, at least ten of which were acquired after age 40, to claim old-
age pensions at age 60. The oap for the long-term insured offered retirement 
at age 63 to workers with a contribution record of at least 35 years. Given 
the relatively favorable labor market conditions of the post-war decades and 
generous pension credits for times spent in military service and education, 
this requirement was met by most men38 from the cohorts studied here. 
36 The reform bill was actually passed in 1989, but is named after the year when its f irst 
regulations became effective.
37 There are a few more group-specif ic pensions of limited numerical importance which I do 
not cover here (e.g., the old-age pension for miners).
38 I deliberately refer to men here because this option has always played a marginal role for 
women. The simple reason is that women meeting the eligibility requirements for the oap for 
the long-term insured were usually eligible for the oap for women (Bäcker et al. 2009: 63).
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The oap for the severely disabled entitled people who were recognized as 
severely disabled to a regular old-age pension at age 60. Finally, the oap after 
long-term unemployment and old-age part-time work (hereafter: oap after 
long-term unemployment) provided early retirement benefits at age 60 if a 
worker was currently unemployed and had been unemployed for a total of 
at least 52 weeks after age 58 and a half (or had been in old-age part-time 
work for at least 24 months). In combination with the provision lifting 
job search requirements on older unemployed people who committed to 
claiming a deduction-free oap at the earliest possible date (58er-Regelung, 
see Section 3.4.2 above), this early retirement option was crucial in making 
the ‘unemployment pathway’ one of the major routes for (very) early exit 
from the labor force in Germany (Jacobs et al. 1991; Knuth and Kalina 2002; 
Ebbinghaus 2006).
The 1992 pension reform introduced major changes to these early 
retirement options. In the original bill, increases in the retirement ages 
for group-specif ic pensions were scheduled to start in 2001, but due to 
financial considerations and growing concerns about the prevalence of early 
retirement the reform was later preponed (Bäcker et al. 2009: 60; see Table 3 
for details). For all four group-specif ic pensions, ages for reduction-free 
pension take-up were gradually raised, usually in steps of one month per 
month of birth.39 Early retirement at the former age thresholds remained 
possible, but became subject to benefit reductions of 0.3% per month (which 
is still considerably lower than the American adjustment factor of 5/9% 
per month). Table 3.5 summarizes and provides further details on these 
changes. Straightforward calculation reveals that the f irst cohorts affected 
became eligible for early benefit take-up in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
For completeness, Table 3.5 also shows that, ignoring certain protective 
clauses (Vertrauensschutz), old-age pensions for the long-term unemployed 
and for women have been abolished completely for birth cohorts 1952 and 
later, while the other two types of pensions have been continued in modified 
form. However, this is not relevant for the birth cohorts retiring during the 
observation period of this study.
Taken together, these changes have raised the costs of early retirement 
considerably (Borgmann and Heidler 2007; Himmelreicher and Stuchlik 
2008; Bäcker et al. 2009), even though American provisions still seem to 
39 For example, the reduction-free retirement age for the oap after long-term unemployment 
was gradually increased for birth cohorts 1937 and later, with the retirement being raised to 
60 years and 1 month for workers born in January 1937, to 60 years and two months for workers 
born in February 1937, and so on.
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impose somewhat harsher penalties. Toward the very end of the observation 
period these changes in early retirement options proper became reinforced 
by reductions in the maximum duration of f irst-tier unemployment benefits 
and the abolition of the second earnings-related tier (see Section 3.4.2 
above), which lowered the attractiveness of using unemployment benefits 
as a bridge transfer on the path to early retirement. However, as noted above, 
the possibility to claim unemployment benef its without being available 
for work was maintained until the end of 2007, although the declining 
generosity of unemployment benefits had arguably rendered this option less 
appealing by then. In any case, the process of scaling back early retirement 
options and their functional equivalents is still ongoing and in particular 
was not completed before the end of this study’s observation period, even 
though considerable changes had clearly occurred by then.
3.4.4 Disability benefits
I now turn to one last type of transfer program: earnings-related disability 
benef its. Disability benef its are most immediately relevant for workers 
who experience a decline in health. This is because eligibility for disability 
benefits generally requires that a worker suffers from physical and/or men-
tal conditions that limit her earnings capacity. At the same time, there is 
convincing evidence that disability rolls are sensitive to changes in labor 
market conditions and that receipt of disability benefits may sometimes be 
a hidden form of long-term unemployment, especially in countries with few 
alternative options for long-term income support (Autor and Duggan 2003; 
Beatty et al. 2007; Koning and Van Vuuren 2007).40 In fact, regulations often 
explicitly require that award decisions take labor market conditions into ac-
count (Blöndal and Pearson 1995) – and Germany is a leading example where 
this is the case. Similarly, disability benefits may become more attractive 
when other options for early retirement are restricted (Ebbinghaus 2006: 
213ff; Duggan et al. 2007). Older workers may thus use disability benefits as 
early retirement benefits or as a means of long-term income support after 
late-career job loss. Yet, while the stringency of screening criteria might 
of course vary considerably across space and time, it can be expected that 
demonstrable health problems are indispensable for, or at least greatly 
40 Autor and Duggan (2003) argue convincingly that the relationship between local labor 
market conditions and disability rolls is driven by ‘conditional applicants’ who apply for dis-
ability benef its after (i.e., conditional on having experienced) job loss.
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improve an applicant’s chances of, gaining access to disability benef its 
(Bound and Waidmann 2000).
In both Germany and the us, the system of earnings-related disability 
benefits has a bipartite institutional structure: Disabilities that are related 
to injuries at work are covered by a different, employer-f inanced scheme 
(German Unfallversicherung and American Workers’ Compensation) than 
disabilities which are not – or at least not directly – work-related. Public cov-
erage of this general (as opposed to work-related) disability risk is provided 
by special benefits within the two countries’ public pension programs. Here, 
I will mainly focus on the latter programs for workers whose conditions 
are not work-related. This can be justif ied by their considerably greater 
size: In the us, wage replacement benefits paid by workers’ compensation 
totaled $29.5 billion in 2008, whereas 2009 public disability benefit pay-
ments summed to $118.3 billion (ssa 2011a: pp. 1 and 6). In Germany, there 
were over 1.63 million recipients of public disability benefits in 2011 (drv 
2012: 3, Table 1.00 G), compared with approximately 750,000 recipients of 
work-related disability pensions (dguv 2011: 74; this f igure includes pensions 
paid because of school-related injuries/disabilities which are administered 
by the same body). That said, benefits provided by the programs for work-
related disabilities are broadly similar in Germany and the us and replace 
approximately two thirds of predisability earnings for fully disabled workers 
(Aarts et al. 1998). In both countries, partial benefits are available for work-
ers with some remaining earnings capacity (which, as I discuss below, is 
not the case with public disability benefits in the us).
I now turn to the review of public disability benef its. I  f irst discuss 
eligibility criteria and availability of partial pensions and then provide an 
overview of benefit levels. I conclude with a few remarks on complementary 
disability insurance.
Eligibility criteria and availability of partial benefits. In both Germany and 
the us, disability benefits are insurance-type benefits intended as (partial) 
earnings replacements. In addition to medical criteria, workers therefore 
have to fulfill certain work history requirements to be eligible.41 As discussed 
in Section 3.4.1, disabled workers who do not qualify for earnings-related 
41 Currently, American workers must have at least one quarter of coverage for each year since 
age 21. They must also have at least 20 quarters of coverage in the ten-year period before the 
disability began (this reference period is shorter for very young workers) (ssa 2011b). German 
workers must have at least f ive years of coverage and at least 36 months of coverage in the last 
f ive years (ssa 2012).
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benefits (or whose earnings-related benefits are very low) may be eligible 
for long-term means-tested income support.
The distinguishing feature of disability benefits is that eligibility requires 
a worker to be considered as ‘disabled’. In most countries, including the 
us and Germany, disability is ultimately not def ined in terms of medical 
conditions, but in terms of a ‘performance criterion’ (Haveman and Wolfe 
2000: 998), that is, in terms of the capacity to earn a certain amount of 
money or to perform (certain types of) paid work.42 It is also generally 
required that reductions in earnings capacity can be expected to persist 
for a certain period of time (for a comparative review of short-term earn-
ings replacements, often referred to as sickness benefits, see Blöndal and 
Pearson 1995). Of course, the application of general performance criteria to 
concrete cases can be very diff icult and occasional misclassif ication will be 
inevitable. However, a detailed discussion of the medical screening process 
is beyond the scope of this study.
In the us, disability is defined in monetary terms: A person is considered 
disabled if she is ‘unable to engage in substantial gainful activity (sga)’, 
where ‘substantiveness’ is def ined by a monthly earnings threshold. The 
2013 threshold was $1,040.43 Benefits are awarded on an all-or-nothing basis, 
that is, applicants are either considered to meet the sga requirement or not. 
Partial benefits are not available.
Apart from annual adjustments of earnings thresholds for average wage 
growth, this definition of sga has not been modified during the observation 
period and there were few other important changes. However, ‘there have 
been signif icant changes in the interpretation of ssa [Social Security Ad-
ministration, J.P.H.] medical and vocational eligibility criteria’ (Burkhauser 
and Daly 2002: 216). Even when the nominal def inition of sga does not 
change, there is considerable scope for discretion in how strictly to interpret 
this standard. In particular, eligibility procedures became more restrictive 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, resulting in a strong decline in the number 
of pensions awarded and in many benef iciaries losing their claim after 
reevaluation (Burkhauser 2012). However, in response to court rulings and 
widespread dissatisfaction with the new practice, ‘eligibility was relaxed 
42 In practice, certain medical conditions may of course be codif ied as suff icient for assuming 
disability.
43 http: //www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/sga.html, accessed December 20, 2012. There is a higher 
threshold of $1,740 for blind applicants. These thresholds may appear relatively high. This is 
underscored by the following calculations by Dean (2005): In 2004, the sga threshold of $810 
was only slightly below the earnings of a person working full-time at the federal minimum wage 
($824).
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again in 1984, and the rolls have been increasing ever since’ (Burkhauser and 
Daly 2002: 216). Most of this increase in the number of recipients occurred in 
the 1990s and went hand in hand with declining employment rates among 
working-age adults with self-reported work limitations (Burkhauser and 
Daly 2002; Burkhauser and Schröder 2004).44
Under current German legislation, performance standards are def ined 
in terms of hours of work rather than earnings (Köhler-Rama 2003: 26-27): 
Workers are entitled to a ‘pension because of partially limited earnings 
capacity’ (Rente wegen teilweiser Erwebsminderung), if they are deemed 
capable of working between three and six hours per day. Workers whose 
earnings capacity is judged to be below three hours per day are entitled to 
a ‘pension because of fully limited earnings capacity’ (Rente wegen voller 
Erwerbsminderung). Workers capable of working six or more hours per day 
are not eligible for disability benefits. Partial pensions amount to 50% of 
full pensions (details of benefit calculation are discussed below) and are 
intended to be supplemented with earnings from part-time work. In this 
regard, an important feature of German award practice is the principle 
of ‘concrete assessment’ (konkrete Betrachtungsweise; cf. Schubert et al. 
2006). This principle requires that partial (rather than full) pensions can 
be paid only if a worker can realistically be expected to f ind a part-time 
job. If part-time jobs are unavailable, even partially disabled workers are 
entitled to a full pension.45 The practice of concrete assessment is widely 
regarded as the main reason why partial benefits accounted for less than 
a f ifth of men’s and less than a tenth of women’s newly awarded pensions 
after the 1970s (Viebrok 2003: Figure 1 on p.205).
Current legislation was introduced by a major reform of disability pen-
sions that was passed in December 2000 and became effective on January 
1, 2001 (hence the year used for labeling the reform differs across sources). 
Before the reform, there were two types of pensions as well, but the key 
distinction was between ‘occupational disability’ (Berufsunfähigkeit) and 
44 Autor and Duggan (2003) argue that this can largely be attributed to two factors: the 
growing implicit value of Medicare coverage due to rising medical costs and growing earnings 
inequality which resulted in rising effective replacement rates for low-skilled workers (due to 
the interaction of below-average wage growth for this group with indexing of benefits to average 
wages, see Section 3.4.3 above). As summarized in Burkhauser and Daly (2002), other proposed 
explanations include growing severity of impairments (Kaye 2003) and unintended effects of 
antidiscrimination legislation (in particular, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1992) which 
may have deterred employers from hiring workers with disabilities (Acemoglu and Angrist 
2001).
45 In practice, the unavailability criterion is routinely considered met if the federal employment 
agency cannot offer a suitable part-time job within one year (Bäcker et al. 2011).
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‘incapacity to work’ (Erwerbsunfähigkeit). Full incapacity to work pensions 
were granted if a worker’s remaining earnings capacity was less than one 
seventh of the average insured person’s income (€325 in 2002; see Viebrok 
2003: 201). Like the current pension because of partially limited earnings 
capacity, occupational disability benefits were intended as partial pensions 
to be topped up with earnings from own employment. They were, however, 
set at two thirds (rather than half) of full disability benefits. Importantly, 
only ‘suitable’ jobs were to be considered in assessing a worker’s eligibility 
for occupational disability benefits, with suitability being def ined on the 
basis of qualif ications and the previous main job.46 For younger cohorts, this 
element of status protection was abolished by the 2001 reform, that is, all 
types of jobs are now to be considered in assessing eligibility for disability 
benefits. For workers born before 1961, protective clauses ensure that they 
can still claim partial benefits on the basis of occupational disability (i.e., 
taking suitability of jobs into account). However, the rule that partial pen-
sions are now equal to half rather than two thirds of full pensions does 
apply to these older cohorts as well.
Occupational disability benefits were granted if a worker’s ‘ability to work 
had decreased to less than half of that of a physically, intellectually and 
mentally healthy person with similar training and equivalent knowledge 
and abilities’ (Viebrok 2003: 203, emphasis in original). Assuming a 5-day 
work week with a total of 40 work hours, this definition implies a threshold 
of 4 hours per day, which is stricter than the 6-hour threshold introduced 
by the 2001 reform (see Köhler-Rama 2003: 36, note 85). Crucially, however, 
the principle of concrete assessment was also applied in the context of 
occupational disability benefits. In particular, workers whose ability to work 
was greater than half that of a comparable worker could become eligible 
for occupational disability and in fact even for full disability benef its if 
suitable, that is, qualif ication-adequate, part-time jobs were not available 
(Köhler-Rama 2003: 27ff.; Schnapp and Schmitt 1992: 102). This included 
workers with relatively minor health problems as the law did not specify a 
minimum level of impairment for this principle to apply. In this respect, the 
new regulations are considerably more restrictive: The principle of concrete 
assessment is only applied if a worker’s remaining earnings capacity is below 
six hours per day. Workers who do not meet the six-hours requirement 
do not have access to disability pensions and are therefore treated like 
unimpaired workers even if they cannot f ind an appropriate part-time job 
(Köhler-Rama 2003; Bäcker et al. 2011).
46 See Viebrok (2006: 256) for further information on suitability standards.
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Benefit levels. In both Germany and the us, disability benefits are calculated 
on the basis of the formulas for old-age pensions described in Section 3.4.3. 
However, certain adjustments are made for the fact that disabled workers 
have shorter earnings histories than workers applying for old-age pensions. 
In the us, this means that aime are not calculated on the basis of the 35 
highest-earning years, but on the basis of all years after the year when the 
worker turned 21. As in the calculation of old-age pensions, a certain number 
of years (those with the lowest earnings) are excluded from the calculation 
of aime. The number of these so-called ‘dropout years’ rises with age.47
Benefit calculation in Germany is slightly more complicated, because 
pension benefits are calculated on the basis of total (rather than average) 
covered earnings. For purposes of benefit calculation, workers are therefore 
treated as if they had continued to work (and accumulate ‘earnings points’) 
until a certain age. The number of earnings points awarded per month of 
this ‘virtual’ (Viebrok 2003: 217) period of insurance (Zurechnungszeit) is 
closely related to the average number of earnings points acquired per month 
of work before the onset of disability (further details are given below and 
in Viebrok [2006] and Köhler-Rama et al. [2010]).
How have disability benefit levels changed over time? In Section 3.4.3, 
I documented a trend toward lower replacement rates for regular old-age 
pensions. Because of the close linkages between old-age and disability 
pensions, most of the underlying changes apply to disability benef its as 
well (Bäcker et al. 2011).
In the us, there seem to have been no important legislative changes that 
have affected the level of disability pensions beyond this overall trend in 
pension levels (but recall the possible implications of growing earnings 
inequality for group-specif ic replacement rates emphasized by Autor and 
Duggan 2003, cf. Section 3.4.3).
In Germany, the 2000/2001 reform did introduce further changes that re-
duced the level of disability benefits in addition to trends in overall pension 
generosity: First, as noted above, new partial benefits were set at 50% of the 
full pension – rather than the two thirds provided by the old occupational 
disability pension. Second, disability pensions claimed before the new full 
(i.e., reduction-free) retirement age for the oap for the severely disabled were 
now treated as cases of early pension take-up. More specif ically, benefits 
became subject to actuarial adjustments of 0.3% for every month until 
47 One additional dropout year is granted for every f ive years since turning 21, up to a maximum 
of f ive years. Thus, persons claiming disability benefits before age 27 are not granted any dropout 
years, while persons ages 47 and over are granted the maximum of f ive.
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the full retirement age (63 for birth cohorts 1944 and later, between 60 
and 63 for birth cohorts 1941-1943; see Table 3.5 above). Workers claiming 
disability benefits before age 60 are treated as having retired at age 60 for the 
purposes of calculating actuarial adjustments which are therefore capped 
at 10.8% (given a full retirement age of 63). This considerable decrease in 
generosity for workers claiming disability benefits before age 60 was partly 
offset by changes in the calculation of virtual insurance periods. Before 
the 2001 reform, workers received additional pension credits for all months 
remaining until age 55 and for a third of the months between ages 55 and 
60.48 Since the reform, months between ages 55 and 60 are fully counted 
(rather than only to a third). Köhler-Rama (2003: 37-38) cites estimates by 
Göhde (2000) according to which the combined effect of these changes was 
to reduce full disability benefits by 3-4%. Calculations by Viebrok (2003: 
219, Figure 3) suggest that losses were greatest for those claiming disability 
benefits in their late 50s, because these workers feel the full force of the 
newly introduced actuarial adjustments, while not or only partly benefitting 
from the more generous calculation of virtual insurance periods. Because of 
the reduction from two thirds to only half of full benefits, losses are greater 
for recipients of partial pensions.
Complementary disability insurance. A f inal issue that deserves brief dis-
cussion is the role of complementary insurance against disability-related 
earnings losses. In both the us and Germany, a worker who starts to claim 
public disability benef its in his 50s can typically collect benef its that are 
not much lower than the regular old-age pension that she would have 
received a few years later (i.e., if she had not become disabled). Thus, if 
public benef its are largely suff icient for maintaining one’s standard of 
living, there is little need for complementary disability insurance. However, 
if public pension replacement rates are rather low – as is the case in the 
us and increasingly also in Germany – disability benef its will have to be 
supplemented with additional income. One option for older (as opposed to 
younger) workers may be early take-up of complementary old-age pensions. 
In this regard, it is important to recall that early retirement tends to be 
more costly under dc than under db plans (see 3.4.3), suggesting that, 
other things being equal, the diffusion of dc plans in the us has reduced 
48 For example, a worker becoming disabled at age 50 would have received 80 months of 
additional credits (60 for the f ive years until age 55 and another twenty for the f ive years from 
ages 55 to 60). A person becoming disabled at age 58 would have received 8 months of additional 
credits (one third of the 24 months remaining until age 60).
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older workers’ capabilities for coping with disability via early retirement. 
A second option is to rely on complementary disability benef its. As with 
complementary old-age pensions, such complementary coverage can be 
employer-provided or individualized and technically it can be ‘built into’ 
old-age pension plans via special disability provisions or provided by 
separate insurance plans.
Unfortunately, consistent time series on the prevalence of employer-
based and individual disability insurance do not seem to exist for either 
Germany or us. However, in the American case, experts suggest that 
the decline of db pensions has gone hand in hand with a decline of 
employer-provided disability benef its, which were often provided via 
disability provisions in db retirement plans or as separate elements of 
traditional ‘benef it packages’ (Rappaport 2011; Shea 2012). As for Germany, 
the ongoing trend toward lower public replacement rates creates a need for 
complementary disability coverage that according to most observers has so 
far been only insuff iciently met by employer-provided and/or individual 
disability insurance (Gunkel 2008; Köhler-Rama et al. 2010; Bäcker et al. 
2011).
The growing need for complementary disability insurance likely poses 
particular problems for low-income households: A f irst reason is that, like 
access to other fringe benef its, access to employer-provided disability 
insurance is highly stratif ied (for recent American f igures, see usdol 2012: 
Table 16). Second, low-skilled and low-paid workers tend to face higher risks 
of becoming disabled, for example, because they work in more physically 
demanding or psychologically stressful jobs (Köhler-Rama et al. 2010; Bäcker 
et al. 2011). This drives up the price of individualized disability insurance 
for these workers, because premia are closely tied to individual disability 
risks (often ascertained through extensive background checks). The result 
is a situation where those most in need of complementary insurance are 
often unable to afford it. Köhler-Rama et al. (2010: 67; translation J.P.H.) 
therefore conclude that ‘the “three-pillar paradigm” is not a realistic model 
for the risk of invalidity’.49
3.4.5 Income taxation
In addition to transfer programs, progressive income taxation is another 
important means of cushioning the economic impact of trigger events. 
49 ‘[D]as “Drei-Säulen-Paradigma” [stellt] in Bezug auf das Invaliditätsrisiko kein realistisches 
Modell dar.‘
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The more progressive a tax system, the more income changes in pre-
government (or taxable) income will be attenuated through taxation 
(Fabig 1999; McManus and DiPrete 2000; Chen 2009).50 Overall, the Ger-
man system of income taxation appears to be more progressive than the 
American51 (Mendoza et al. 1993) – while noting that the precise degree 
of progressivity, def ined as the change in the average tax rate associated 
with a change in taxable income, may be very different at different levels 
of income.
As for changes in progressivity over recent decades, there appear to be 
no strong trends in Germany, but the American tax system has become 
dramatically less progressive at the very top of the income distribution 
(i.e., for the 0.5% and especially the 0.1% of households with the highest 
incomes, see Piketty and Saez 2007). Changes were much less pronounced, 
however, for the middle of the income distribution (Piketty and Saez 2007), 
which is more relevant to this study. In the lower part, the us tax system 
appears to have become more progressive due to repeated extensions of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (eitc, see Blank [2009]). The eitc is a key 
element of American ‘activation’ or ‘make work pay’ policies. It is a tax 
credit awarded to low-income families on the basis of their earned income. 
The award initially rises with earned income (‘phase-in range’) and thus 
is effectively a negative income tax. It then reaches a plateau where the 
credit is at its maximum and does not change with further increases in 
earned income as long as it remains below a threshold value that marks 
the beginning of the ‘phase-out range’. In the phase out-range, the credit is 
gradually reduced, that is, the marginal tax rate is positive, until the credit 
f inally reaches zero. The thresholds for the various stages, the maximum 
credit, and the (negative) marginal tax rates in the phase-in and phase-out 
ranges all depend on family composition.
In general, the credit is much more generous for households with 
children. In 2010 the maximum credit for a childless single person was 
50 This can be illustrated by a simple example. Consider a worker whose earnings fall from 
$4,000 to $2,000 after late-career job loss and who does not receive any other income. In a 
country with a f lat (proportional) income tax of 25%, that worker’s post-government income 
would fall from $3,000 to $1,500. Relative to predisplacement income, the worker would have 
experienced a decline of 50% before as well as after taxes (so there is no cushioning of losses 
through the tax system). By contrast, in a country with a strongly progressive tax system where 
a monthly income of $4,000 is taxed at 25% and an income of $2,000 is taxed at only 10%, the 
in post-government would fall from $3,000 to $1,800, a loss of only 40%.
51 However, consumption taxes, which tend to be regressive because lower-income households 
consume a larger portion of their income are higher in Germany (Mendoza et al. 1993).
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only $457, compared to a maximum credit of $5,036 for a single person 
with two children.52 Households must not have investment income (e.g., 
dividends, interest, or rental income) above a threshold value to be eligi-
ble.53 The eitc is intended to reward paid work and therefore only earned 
income is counted in determining its size. However, disability benef its 
are considered earned income before the minimum retirement age and 
may be supplemented by the tax credit. Non-disability pensions are not 
considered earned income, but neither are they treated as investment 
income, so it is possible to supplement early retirement pensions with 
limited earned income and an eitc. However, as the credit to childless 
household is restricted to persons between ages 25 to 64 (or couples where 
at least one spouse falls into this age range), it is generally not possible to 
draw on the credit for income support after reaching the full retirement 
age. For older workers below age 65 it must also be kept in mind that 
the credit awarded to childless household has always been very modest.
3.5 Female labor force participation and earnings 
arrangements
A central tenet of life course sociology is that individual life courses are 
shaped by their multiple interdependencies with other individuals’ lives. 
This very general idea of ‘linked lives’ – that ‘[l]ives are lived interdepend-
ently and social-historical influences are expressed through this network 
of shared relations[h]ips’ (Elder 1999: 10) – has been applied to a broad 
range of questions. Several studies have analyzed the extent of retirement 
coordination among spouses, with most studies f inding that a retired 
spouse – or the spouse’s f inancial incentives for retirement54 – indeed 
raises the likelihood of retirement (e.g., Allmendinger 1990; Gustman and 
Steinmeier 2002; Coile 2003; Radl 2010). More recently, studies have begun 
to explore the impact of family biographies (widowhood, divorce, fertility) 
for retirement timing (Fasang 2008) and retirement income (Fasang et al. 
2013).
52 http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earned_income_tax_credit (access date: November 22, 2012).
53 $3,150 for tax year 2011 (http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earned_income_tax_credit, access-
date November 22, 2012).
54 The economic literature prefers this measure because of the potential endogeneity of spousal 
retirement status (Gustman and Steinmeier 2002; Coile 2003).
inStitutionaL Contex t and SoCiaL poLiCy Change 107
In this study, my main focus is on the role of spousal income as a poten-
tial buffer against the f inancial impact of adverse late-career events. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, labor income of an employed spouse (or pension 
income of a formerly working, retired spouse) reduces the relative decline 
in disposable household income after an adverse trigger event (‘insurance 
effect’). In addition, the presence of a partner opens up the possibility of 
an added worker effect where the earnings losses of the affected individual 
are (partly) offset by an increase in spousal labor supply. The actual scope 
for labor supply responses, however, may depend on the initial employ-
ment status of the spouse. A spouse working long hours already may have 
limited leeway for further increases in labor supply, but among older workers 
another important option may be to delay retirement (Coile 2004). For 
long-time non-employed spouses such as homemakers, on the other hand, 
a substantial added worker effect may be possible in theory, but their actual 
labor market opportunities may be very limited due to a (perceived) lack 
of skills (Allmendinger 2010).
These considerations suggest that country differences in prevailing 
earnings arrangements may lead to differences in the economic conse-
quences of late-career events. Table 3.6 reports employment to population 
ratios and the share of full-time workers (as a percentage of all workers) 
for men and women aged 50 to 54, that is, largely before the occurrence of 
retirement. I report estimates for 1985, 1995, and 2005 to highlight changes 
over time. Men’s employment rates are similar across the two countries, 
ranging between 81 and 88%, and very few men work part-time. Period 
differences are also rather small, although there are hints of a downward 
trend in men’s employment rates, especially in Germany. Clear country 
differences, however, emerge for women. In 1985, 58% of American women 
ages 50-54 worked for pay, compared to only 46% of their German counter-
parts. Over time, women’s employment rates have grown in both countries, 
but more rapidly in Germany. Thus, while there was still a substantial 
difference of roughly nine percentage points in the mid-1990s, the differ-
ence had declined to a mere two percentage points in 2005. However, this 
convergence in women’s overall employment rates conceals very different 
trends in the prevalence of part-time employment: 40% of working German 
women worked less than 30 hours per week in 2005, up from 33% in 1985. 
In the us, this share fell from 17% to 11% over the same period. In terms of 
the number of hours worked, German-American differences in women’s 
labor supply thus remained substantial even in the mid-2000s.
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Table 3.6  Employment to population ratio (epr) and prevalence of part-time work at 
ages 50-54
Germany United States
1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005
Men
epr 88 85 81 85 83 83
% working < 30 hrs/week 1 2 5 2 2 2
Women
epr 46 60 70 58 69 72
% working < 30 hrs/week 33 35 40 17 13 11
part-time share is the proportion of working men/women with less than 30 hours per week rather 
than the population share. 
Source: oecd Labour force Statistics (http: //stats.oecd.org/)
Table 3.7 more directly looks at earnings arrangements of individuals aged 
50-54. It confirms that, among the cohorts studied here, earnings arrange-
ments were more traditional in Germany than in the us. In 2004, 25% of 
Germans aged 50-54 lived in couples with two full-time earners, compared 
with almost 40% in the us. Traditional male breadwinner households were 
more common in Germany, where 46% lived in households with a man 
working full-time and a woman working between 10 and 30 hours (25%) or 
less than 10 hours (21%). In the United States, only 28% lived in households 
where the man worked substantially longer hours (in 13% of cases the 
woman worked part-time and in 15% she worked fewer than 10 hours). 
Less than 10% lived in female breadwinner households where the woman 
was the main earner (in terms of work hours). Over time, there has been a 
clear trend toward less traditional earnings arrangements and more dual-
earner couples in both countries, suggesting that the buffering capacity 
of families has grown. In both countries, most of the change occurred 
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s with ‘detraditionalization’ slowing 
down afterwards.
The German trends partly ref lect the impact of reunif ication. As is 
well known, earnings arrangements had been much less traditional in 
the German Democratic Republic and to some extent this difference 
persisted after reunif ication. The German changes between 1985 and 
1995 are therefore partly attributable to the inclusion of less traditional 
East German households into the population. The changes between 1995 
and 2005 conceal different trends in West and East Germany. In the West, 
there was a continuing trend towards more dual-earner and modified male 
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breadwinner couples where the woman works part-time rather than not 
at all or only very short hours. In East Germany, the share of dual-earner 
couples declined substantially, presumably because of persistently diff icult 
labor market conditions.
Table 3.7  Earnings arrangements at ages 50-54 (column percentages)
Germany United States
1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005
dual ft earner 16 28 25 28 39 39
man ft, Woman pt 19 22 25 20 16 13
man ft, Woman nm 42 29 21 26 18 15
Woman ft, men pt 1 2 2 4 3 4
Woman ft, men nm 2 5 7 4 5 5
Single, ft 12 9 10 12 14 15
Single, pt 2 2 3 2 3 3
Single, nm 5 3 6 4 3 5
ft = full-time (30+ hours per week), pt = part-time (10-30 hours), nm = not/marginally employed 
(< 10 hours). 
Source: psid, soep, cnef, own calculations
These pronounced dif ferences in female labor force participation, 
particularly during the 1980s, are consistent with greater institutional 
support for traditional earnings arrangements in Germany (Lewis 1992; 
Sainsbury 1999). With respect to the questions of this study, these country 
and period differences in earnings arrangements in Table 3.7 suggest 
that there will be systematic variation in the extent of family buffer-
ing through the presence of additional earners and strength of added 
worker processes. Given the greater share of non-employed older women 
in Germany, particularly in the 1980s, married men suffering late-career 
job loss or health shocks will more often have been their household’s 
sole earner. Over time, the buffering potential of the family seems to 
have increased in both countries. Whether this also holds for the average 
worker experiencing late-career displacement or some other adverse 
event, however, depends on how the prof ile of these workers compares to 
that of older workers as a whole. For example, late-career job loss might 
be increasingly concentrated among low-skilled men who are more likely 
to be single.
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3.6 Summary
This chapter has mapped the changing institutional context of late-career 
job loss and exit from work in Germany and the us. In keeping with the 
overarching research questions of this study, my main focus has been on 
welfare state programs that play a crucial role in maintaining income after 
these events. However, I have also sought to broaden the picture beyond 
the welfare state narrowly construed. In particular, I have discussed how 
various contextual factors might affect the (re)employment prospects of 
older workers and how differences in family earnings arrangements might 
influence the potential for private income buffering.
What are the main insights to take away from the above discussion? 
In terms of older workers’ (re)employment prospects, there are several 
plausible explanations why Germany long used to be ‘No Country for Old 
Workers’ (Dietz and Walwei 2011). In particular, Section 3.3 emphasized the 
following factors: the existence of marked labor market boundaries; low 
levels of participation in continuing training and lifelong learning; high 
levels of employment protection that may shelter workers with permanent 
contracts, yet diminish the reemployment prospects of displaced older 
workers; and the possibility that the predominance of early retirement 
exacerbates statistical age discrimination. Some of these factors may be 
amenable to short-term change: Presumably, levels of continuing train-
ing participation could be boosted in the short or medium run, perhaps 
by emulating the model of ‘public-induced employment maintenance’ 
(Buchholz et al. 2011: 16) found in the Scandinavian countries. In addition, 
the very idea that an ‘early exit culture’ undermines incentives for skill 
development and reinforces (statistical) age discrimination suggests that 
the situation of older workers may improve as the recent trend toward 
later retirement (see Section 3.2) continues and stabilizes. Other factors 
depressing the demand for older workers, and the reemployment prospects 
of displaced older workers in particular, seem to be more deeply entrenched 
in Germany’s institutional structure. The most obvious one is an emphasis 
on specif ic skills that, in combination with a strong ‘credentialism’, results 
in marked labor market boundaries.
Compared to Germany, the (re)employment prospects of older workers 
appear to be much better in the us. The trend toward early retirement 
during the 1970s and 1980s was not nearly as strong as it was in Germany and 
impediments to worker mobility are widely considered to be lower in the 
American context where portable ‘general’ skills play a greater role. Partici-
pation in continuing training is also higher than in Germany, particularly 
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among older workers. At least in part, these differences are probably due 
to the stick of less generous (early) retirement benefits and lower overall 
levels of ‘decommodification’ rather than to the carrot of more attractive job 
opportunities. They may nevertheless greatly improve the reemployment 
prospects of displaced workers, compared with their German counterparts.
Against this background, I  then examined the main welfare state 
programs and employment-based functional equivalents that provide 
insurance against the economic consequences of job loss and contribute 
to income maintenance after exit from work. Here, the main differences 
between Germany and the us can be summarized as follows:
– Public pensions replace a greater portion of former earnings for German 
workers, except at the very bottom of the earnings distribution.
– Complementary pensions, that is, employer-sponsored and individual 
private pensions, play a much larger role for retirement income in the us. 
In addition, the typical complementary plan in the us is more risky in the 
sense that returns on savings are more uncertain. This difference appears 
to have grown in recent years as dc plans have diffused in the us.
– Access to and actual participation in complementary pensions are 
stratif ied in both countries: Higher-earning, more educated, male, and 
non-minority workers are more likely to have complementary pension 
wealth (which includes claims to annuity-type benefits).
– Early retirement options in the public pension program were much 
more generous in Germany than in the us, especially until the mid to 
late 1990s.
– Other public transfer programs that cushion the impact of late-career 
job loss and that may be used as bridge benefits on the way to early re-
tirement were also more generous in Germany. For example, maximum 
duration of earnings-related unemployment benefits was considerably 
longer in Germany throughout the observation period, even though 
differences have somewhat narrowed over time. Public disability 
benefits also tend to be higher in Germany, especially for workers with 
higher earnings, as their level is closely related to that of public old-age 
pensions. In addition, labor market considerations explicitly enter into 
award decisions for disability benefits in Germany. It is diff icult to tell 
whether and to what extent complementary disability insurance in the 
us made up for this gap.
In qualitative terms, these differences seem to have persisted throughout 
the observation period. At the same time, many of these programs have 
undergone major changes. The following trends are the most noteworthy ones:
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– In both countries, net replacement rates provided by the public pension 
pillar have declined over recent decades. At least in Germany, this trend 
is set to continue over the next decades.
– From the late 1990s onwards, the costs of early retirement – in terms of 
benefit adjustments for early take-up of public pensions – have risen 
markedly in Germany. By contrast, adjustments for early take-up of 
public benefits changed very little in the us.
– In Germany, reforms of early retirement options in the public pension 
pillar were accompanied by declines in the generosity of unemployment 
and disability benefits. The most far-reaching changes of unemploy-
ment benefits (cuts in maximum benefit durations for older workers 
and abolition of the earnings-related second tier) did not occur until 
the mid-2000s. However, a limited and incremental trend toward lower 
replacement rates and tightening of eligibility criteria occurred already 
during the late 1980s and 1990s. Disability benefits were reduced mod-
estly by the 2000/01 reform.
– In the us, changes in the sphere of employer-provided pensions have 
arguably been far more consequential than changes in the public 
pension pillar. In particular, low-risk def ined-benef it pension plans 
have increasingly been replaced by higher-risk def ined-contribution 
plans. dc plans not only also tend to raise the costs of early retirement 
compared to db plans. There is also considerable evidence that this 
‘Transformation of the American Pension System’ has gone hand in 
hand with increased social inequalities in complementary retirement 
wealth, especially by level of educational attainment (Wolff 2011).
Overall, German-American differences in welfare state arrangements thus 
accord with conventional wisdom, even though the American public pen-
sion pillar is perhaps larger and more redistributive than suggested by the 
stereotypical characterization of the American welfare state as ‘residual’ (cf. 
Alber 2010). In addition, the detailed analysis of recent trends in key welfare 
state programs also seems to conf irm widespread views that collective 
insurance mechanisms have diminished over recent decades. In Germany, 
more of the dynamic has occurred in welfare state programs proper, that 
is, in the public pension scheme and in other public programs that cover 
the majority of the workforce. In the us, at least with respect to late-career 
risks, the most striking and consequential changes have arguably occurred 
in the realm of employer-provided pensions.
But do these German-American differences add up to distinctive social 
models that result in distinctive life course trajectories? And do recent 
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trends really justify the pessimistic conclusions of authors such as Hacker 
(2006) and Butterwegge (2006)? Even though the answers to these questions 
may always contain some element of arbitrariness, taking a closer look at 
‘how real lives are really lived’ (Goodin et al. 1999: 1) seems indispensable 
for providing well-grounded answers to these questions. Section 3.2 showed 
that the employment rates of older workers have risen noticeably in recent 
years. Perhaps then older workers have been able to compensate for lower 
public replacement rates by delaying their retirement? Perhaps the invest-
ment choices of American workers have been good enough so that they 
are faring as well under the new dc regime as they did in the old db world, 
perhaps they are even faring better? Perhaps the impact of declining public 
transfers for displaced older workers in Germany has been limited by im-
proved opportunities for reemployment, or by increased ‘family buffering’?
In order to address these and related questions, the following chapters 
provide an analysis of income trajectories around exit from work and late-
career job loss. More concretely, the next chapter discusses the general 
empirical strategy and essential technical aspects of the analysis. It is 
followed by the two main empirical parts that deal with the consequences 
of exit from work and job loss, respectively. For each of these events, I will 
f irst provide a shorter chapter that combines the institutional information 
in this chapter with microsociological considerations to formulate a set of 
concrete hypotheses and research questions for the empirical analysis. A 
longer empirical chapter then confronts these hypotheses and questions 
with empirical data.

4 Data and methods
The remaining parts of this study will investigate how two late-career trigger 
events – exit from work and job loss – affect the f inancial situation of older 
workers and their families. My broader aim is to better understand how 
observed income trajectories are brought about by the interplay of welfare 
state provisions with ‘family buffering’ and labor market trajectories.
This chapter outlines the empirical approach for identifying the impact of 
the focal trigger events. I f irst provide a general description of my conceptual 
framework and analytical strategy (Section 4.1). Building on the counter-
factual account of causality, I argue that simple before-after comparisons 
may provide a satisfactory picture of the impact of voluntary retirement, 
but that identifying the impact of late-career job loss requires comparison 
to an adequate control group. I  identify difference-in-differences (did) 
matching as a promising and increasingly popular empirical approach for 
constructing such a comparison group. Section 4.2 then discusses technical 
aspects of my implementation of did matching. It also describes a method 
to account for compositional changes in the treatment group. In Section 4.3, 
I then summarize essential details of the data sets used in the subsequent 
analysis and describe the main outcome and event variables. More specif ic 
aspects of the analysis are covered in the individual chapters.
4.1 Conceptual framework and analytic strategy
To explore the economic effects of retirement and job loss, I will use longi-
tudinal data that enable me to compare the situation of affected workers 
before and after the occurrence of an event. As just noted, I will describe 
technical aspects of the databases and key measures in Section 4.3 below. 
This section elaborates my general conceptual framework and analytical 
strategy.
Let  y represent an income-based measure of a worker’s economic situa-
tion, for example, an indicator for having low income below the poverty line 
or the level of income, perhaps expressed in percent of pre-event income 
(to focus on relative changes). Let  e  i  = 1 indicate that an individual  i 
experienced a given event  e such as late-career job loss between two time 
points  t = 0 and  t = 1 and let  e  i  = 0 indicate that an individual was not 
exposed to the event. Further, let  y  i1 and  y  i0 stand for  i ’s value of  y at  t = 1 
and  t = 0 , respectively. A natural starting point for investigating the impact 
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of  e on  y then is to focus on changes in  y between  t = 0 and  t = 1 among 
those who experienced  e . For individual  i this difference is equal to  y  i1  −  y  i0 
and its expected value can be written as:
 E( y  i1  −  y  i0 | e  i  = 1) (4.1)
This quantity is readily estimated by computing the corresponding sample 
average. However, the change in  y among those who experienced  e may 
not be a satisfactory conceptualization of the effect of  e . More specif ically, 
the so-called counterfactual account of causality (Morgan and Winship 
2007) – sometimes also referred to as the ‘Neyman-Rubin causal model’ 
or the ‘potential outcomes approach’ – suggests that the treatment effect1 
of  e on  y for individual  i , say  T E  i , should be conceptualized as the differ-
ence between changes in  y under exposure and non-exposure (see, for 
example, Gangl 2010a: 23). To express this difference formally, it is necessary 
to def ine another variable  e  i  
* that is used to represent the two potential 
states of the world where  i experienced  e ( e  i  
*  = 1 ) and where  i did not 
experience  e ( e  i  
*  = 0 ). Then  T E  i can be def ined as follows:
 T E  i  º ( y  i1  −  y  i0 | e  i  
*  = 1) − ( y  i1  −  y  i0 | e  i  
*  = 0) º Δ y  1i  − Δ y  0i (4.2)
where  Δ y  1i  º ( y  i1  −  y  i0 | e  i  
*  = 1) and  Δ y  0i  º ( y  i1  −  y  i0 | e  i  
*  = 0) . Equation 4.2 
conceptualizes the effect of  e as the difference between two outcomes 
(each of which is itself a difference): The change in  y conditional on 
exposure to  e minus the change in  y conditional on non-exposure to  e . 
The ‘fundamental problem of casual inference’ (Holland 1986) is that only 
one of these outcomes is observed because individuals either experience 
e or not: For those exposed to  e , we only observe  Δ y  1i , but not  Δ y  0i , and 
vice versa for those not exposed to  e . If we are interested in the effect of  e 
on the ‘treated’, that is, on those who actually experienced it, inferences 
about their counterfactual trajectories under non-exposure will have to 
be based on the actual trajectories of individuals who were not exposed 
to  e . The crucial task is to exploit information on the actual trajectories of 
non-exposed workers in such a way as to obtain good approximations of 
the counterfactual trajectories exposed workers would have experienced 
1 The label ‘treatment effect’ alludes to experimental studies where subjects are randomly 
allocated to a group receiving a treatment (such as a newly developed medicine) and a control 
group receiving no or only a placebo treatment.
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under non-exposure.2 In analogy to experimental designs, this can be 
thought of as the task of f inding an adequate control (or comparison) group 
for the treated.
For most events, the (unobservable) difference defined in Equation 4.2 
will be a more convincing conceptualization of their effect than the simple 
(observable) within-person difference def ined in Equation 4.1. The case 
seems to be different, however, for voluntary retirement. One way to see 
this is to consider the analogy to the experimental situation and to ask 
oneself whether it is possible to conceive a suitable experiment for iden-
tifying the effect of an event. Even though such an experiment would be 
unethical, the idea of designing an experiment where we randomly assign 
workers to a treatment group who lose their job and a control group who 
do not is perfectly sensible. However, the idea of assigning workers to a 
treatment group who retire voluntarily appears inherently contradictory 
because assignment by a third person contradicts the very idea of voluntary 
retirement. For this reason, I will focus on the simple within-person differ-
ence from Equation 4.1 in my analysis of voluntary retirement and on the 
difference def ined in Equation 4.2 in my analysis of late-career job loss. 
The following discussion of how to conceptualize and estimate the effect 
def ined in Equation 4.2 is therefore primarily relevant to my analysis of 
income changes around job loss.3
Figure 4.1 illustrates the counterfactual conception of causality using a 
hypothetical example. The solid line represents the actual income trajec-
tory of a hypothetical person, say Mallory, who was exposed to an event, say 
late-career job loss, in year 0. Let us assume that Mallory’s reemployment 
prospects were not too bright and that she therefore retired immediately 
after job loss. The dashed line represents the counterfactual income trajec-
tory that Mallory would have experienced if she had not lost her job. Under 
that scenario, she would have enjoyed further earnings/income growth 
for another three years. She would then have retired (voluntarily) and her 
income would have declined, though to a lesser extent than it actually 
did when retiring after late-career job loss (perhaps because she incurred 
actuarial deductions for early retirement in the latter case). What are 
2 The same, of course, holds vice versa if one is interested in estimating the counterfactual 
trajectories non-exposed workers would have experienced under exposure.
3 This approach accords with extant research: Previous studies on the consequences of labor 
force exit have generally eschewed comparisons with non- or later-retiring workers (see, for 
example, Grad 1990; Bardasi and Jenkins 2002; Motel-Klingebiel and Engstler 2008), whereas 
studies on the consequences of job loss routinely make use of comparisons with non-displaced 
workers (e.g., Brand 2006; Schwerdt et al. 2010; Dieckhoff 2011; Ehlert 2013).
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Mallory’s total income losses six years after job loss? According to the 
simple within-person comparison (see equation 4.1), total losses are equal 
to the sum of rectangles I, III, and IV. According to the counterfactual 
account (see equation 4.2), losses are instead given by the sum of rectangles 
II, III, IV. During the f irst three years after job loss, losses are greater than 
suggested by the within-person comparison (because of foregone earn-
ings/income growth). During years four to six, they are smaller (because 
voluntary retirement would have led to a decline in income anyway). 
The counterfactual conception thus isolates the additional income loss 
attributable to job loss.
Figure 4.1 makes clear that country or period differences in the impact 
of events can stem from differences in trajectories after exposure and/or 
differences in trajectories after non-exposure. For example, a decline in 
income replacement rates should affect the costs of late-career job loss 
primarily by exacerbating the losses incurred by workers actually exposed 
to the event, that is, by changing the path of the solid line in Figure 4.1. 
A general trend toward later retirement, by contrast, can be expected to 
also and perhaps even primarily affect income trajectories under non-
exposure (although it may also affect the trajectories of those exposed to 
late-career job loss, for example, because they become more likely to reenter 
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employment). This suggests that it may often be illuminating to investigate 
treatment and control group trajectories separately rather than only their 
difference. In my empirical analysis of income mobility around job loss 
in Chapter 8, I will therefore often examine the actual ‘non-differenced’ 
trajectories of displaced workers in addition to did estimates (i.e., differ-
ences between displaced workers and a comparison group of non-displaced 
workers).
It is common to differentiate individuals with respect to their actual 
exposure to the treatment and to def ine conditional average treatment 
effects on that basis (Imbens 2004; Gangl 2010a,b). More specif ically, the 
Average Treatment on the Treated (att) and the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Non-treated (atn) can be def ined as follows:
 ATT º E(Δ y  1i  − Δ y  0i | e  i  = 1) (4.3)
 ATN º E(Δ y  1i  − Δ y  0i | e  i  = 0) (4.4)
Finally, the (unconditional) Average Treatment Effect (ate) can be ex-
pressed as a weighted average of att and atn. With  p(e = 1) denoting the 
(population) share of treated units, the ate is given by:
 ATE º  p(e = 1) × E(Δ y  1i  − Δ y  0i | e  i  = 1)   
+ (1 − p(e = 1)) × E(Δ y  1i  − Δ y  0i | e  i  = 0) (4.5)
It is common to differentiate between the population and sample versions 
of these quantities, that is, between patt, patn, and pate (with ‘P’ standing 
for ‘Population’) on the one and satt, satn, and sate (with ‘S’ for ‘sample’) 
on the other hand (Imbens 2004). Equations 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 def ine the popula-
tion versions (because they def ine average effects in terms of expectations 
rather than sample averages). The distinction between population and 
sample variants emphasizes the classical problem of drawing inferences 
about population parameters from a limited sample. However, there is an 
important difference here to the problem of estimating, say, population 
means on the basis of sample means: While no uncertainty is involved in 
calculating the sample mean of a given variable (at least if we ignore issues 
of measurement error), identif ication of sample (average) treatment effects 
does involve an important element of estimation as it requires identification 
of the unobserved potential outcomes. This second inferential problem – the 
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identif ication of counterfactual outcomes – is in fact the more vexing chal-
lenge in drawing inferences about the effect of  e .4
Like most applied research, my focus in this study will be on estimating 
the effect of job loss on those who were actually exposed to it, that is, the 
att or, more precisely, a feasible variant of this effect that is characterized 
in more detail below. What is required, therefore, is an estimation of the 
changes in  y that displaced workers would have experienced if they had 
not lost their job.5 As noted above, there is usually no other empirical basis 
for estimating these trajectories than the actual trajectories of individuals 
who were not exposed to job loss. However, there are two general reasons 
why in non-experimental settings the typical trajectory of a non-exposed 
individual (i.e.,  E(Δ y  0 | e  i  = 0) ), may be very different from the typical 
counterfactual trajectory of exposed workers (i.e., from  E(Δ y  0 | e  i  = 1) ) (cf. 
Gangl 2010a: 25): Outcomes of exposed and non-exposed workers might 
have differed even in the absence of exposure (Gangl refers to this as 
‘heterogeneity’) and the probability of exposure might be related to the 
size of  T E  i (Gangl refers to this as ‘endogeneity’).
There are different approaches to estimating treatment effects using 
non-experimental data (for recent overviews, see Morgan and Winship 
[2007] or Gangl [2010a]). A fundamental question is whether one can hope 
to fully account for heterogeneity and endogeneity by conditioning on 
observed characteristics (Morgan and Winship 2007). To ‘fully account 
for heterogeneity and endogeneity’ here means that the distribution of 
potential outcomes is independent of treatment status conditional on 
observed covariates. The assumption that this is the case is often referred 
to as the conditional independence, ignorability, or unconfoundedness 
assumption.6 While more or less convincing indirect tests may sometimes 
be available (cf. Imbens 2004: 21-22), direct tests of the unconfoundedness 
assumption are impossible because they would require knowledge of the 
counterfactual outcomes.
4 Because this is the key challenge, it is also generally the case that ‘a good estimator for one 
ate [i.e., pate or sate, J.P.H.] is automatically a good estimator for the other’ (Imbens 2004: 6).
5 Estimation of atn or ate would also require estimation of the trajectories non-exposed 
individuals would have experienced under exposure.
6 The classical and strongest form of this assumption is that  ( y  0 ,  y  1 ) ^ e|X (Imbens 2004: 
7), with ‘ ̂  ’ denoting statistical independence. A weaker form that is suff icient for estimating 
the effect of treatment on the treated is  y  0  ^ e|X , that is, conditional on  X , the distribution of 
outcomes under non-exposure should be the same for treated on control cases (Imbens 2004: 
8). Finally, if the focus is only on estimating average treatment effects the  y  0 ’s and  y  1 ’s in these 
equations can be replaced by the corresponding expected values, i.e.,  E( y  0 ) and  E( y  1 ) (Heckman 
et al. 1997; Imbens 2004).
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If unconfoundedness holds, causal effects can in principle be recovered 
through classical regression analysis (Imbens 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge 
2009). However, researchers embracing the counterfactual conception 
of causality often prefer non- or semi-parametric matching approaches. 
The most common matching procedure, propensity score matching (psm; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), proceeds by estimating a probability model 
of treatment assignment (or exposure to an event) and then matches treat-
ment and control cases on the basis of their propensity scores, that is, the 
predicted probabilities from the assignment model. Matching approaches 
have some key advantages over classical regression analysis. First, they 
require researchers to more explicitly address the process of selection into 
treatment (Gangl and DiPrete 2004). Second, by ‘pairing observationally 
close, if not identical, observations’ (Gangl 2010a: 31) matching procedures 
highlight common support problems, that is, situations where reasonably 
similar comparison cases are missing for some units. Finally, and relatedly, 
classical parametric regression analysis makes strong assumptions about 
the functional form of relationships. This may render results highly ‘model 
dependent’ in the sense of being sensitive to specification choices, especially 
when extrapolation is involved, that is, when treatment and control cases 
are very dissimilar and the region of common support is limited (King and 
Zeng 2006). Ho et al. (2007: 201) therefore describe matching as a form of 
‘preprocessing’ that ‘makes estimates based on the subsequent parametric 
analyses far less dependent on modeling choices and specif ications’.
If unconfoundedness does not hold, neither regression analysis nor 
matching can go all the way towards providing unbiased effect estimates, 
although they may substantially reduce bias compared to naive (unad-
justed) comparisons of treated and non-treated cases. Common methods 
for identifying causal effects in the absence of unconfoundedness which 
I will not discuss here are instrumental variables estimation or regression-
discontinuity designs (see the overviews mentioned above for further 
details). In the context of the present study it is more important to highlight 
an important strength of panel data: Panel data, which provide repeated 
measurements on individuals (or other units of analysis such as f irms or 
countries) enable researchers to estimate the impact of a variable solely 
on the basis of within-person (or, more generally, within-unit) variability. 
As is well known (see, for example, Halaby 2004), this eliminates any bias 
arising from time-invariant unobserved characteristics that would lead to 
violations of the unconfoundedness assumption in cross-sectional settings. 
To see this, consider the following outcome equation for individual  i , which 
is a slight modif ication of equation 20 in Gangl (2010a: 34):
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 y  it  =  α  i  +  x  it β +  w  i γ +  e  it τ +  λ  t  +  ϵ  it (4.6)
Here,  y  it represents the level of the outcome variable for individual  i at time 
t and  x  it is a (row) vector of time varying control variables with associated 
coeff icient (column) vector  β .  w  i is a vector of observed time-invariant 
covariates with associated coeff icient vector  γ .  e it is the variable of interest 
(e.g., an indicator for having recently experienced late-career job loss) with 
associated (treatment) effect  τ .  α  i is a time-invariant individual specif ic er-
ror term that captures the effects of all unobserved time-invariant variables. 
λ  t captures unobserved period effects that can be modeled by including 
appropriate dummy variables. Finally,  ϵ  it is a random individual- and period-
specif ic error term. Importantly, if  α  i is correlated with  e  it , cross-sectional 
estimates of  τ obtained by regressing  y  it on  x  it ,  w  i , and  e  it will be biased. For 
example, cross-sectional estimates of the consequences of late-career job 
loss based on comparisons between employed and unemployed individu-
als could be biased because the unemployed are negatively selected with 
respect to unobserved attributes such as health status, f ield of study, or 
cognitive skills. The so-called f irst-difference (fd) estimator addresses this 
potential source of bias by analyzing within-person differences:
 y  it  −  y  it−1  = ( x  it  −  x  it−1 )β + ( e  it  −  e  it−1 )τ + ( λ  t  −  λ  t−1 ) + ( ϵ  it  −  ϵ  it−1 ) (4.7)
In this equation  α  i , the person-specif ic error term capturing the combined 
impact of all unobserved time-invariant variables, drops out of the equation 
(and so does the combined impact of observed time-invariant variables 
whose effects can therefore not be estimated in the fd framework).7 This 
is the crucial advantage of within estimation over cross-sectional designs.
As noted above, the analysis of late-career job loss in Chapter 8 will use 
a special case of fd estimation that is often referred to as difference-in-
differences (did) estimation. The label ‘difference in differences’ comes 
from the fact that in applications with a binary treatment variable such 
as exposure to late-career job loss, the quantity of interest is a difference 
between two differences in the outcome variable  y , namely the difference 
between the (average) change in  y among the treated and the average 
change in  y among the non-treated. The analogy to the counterfactual 
effect of an event  e def ined in equation 4.2 is obvious.
7 Fixed-effects (fe) estimation, a common alternative to fd estimation, achieves the same 
thing through so-called demeaning, that is, by subtracting the unit-specif ic means of all vari-
ables from their unit- and period-specif ic values (cf. Halaby 2004; Gangl 2010a).
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did estimation is a powerful tool for identifying causal effects, but it still 
rests on non-trivial assumptions. The crucial assumption required for did 
estimation to yield unbiased estimates of the att is often referred to as the 
‘common trends assumption’ (e.g., Lechner 2011). This assumption requires 
that, conditional on covariates  X , the expected change in the outcome 
variable for the control group is equal to the expected (counterfactual) 
change that the treatment group would have experienced in the absence 
of treatment. Using the potential outcomes framework, this assumption 
can be expressed as follows (cf. Lechner 2011: 12):8
 E( y  i1 | e  i  = 1,  e  i  
*  = 0, X = x) − E( y  i0 | e  i  = 1,  e  i  
*  = 0, X = x)
= E( y  i1 | e  i  = 0,  e  i  
*  = 0, X = x) − E( y  i0 | e  i  = 0,  e  i  
*  = 0, X = x) (4.8)
This assumption is untestable because  ( y  i1 | e  i  = 1,  e  i  
*  = 0, X = x) and  ( y  i0 
| e  i  = 1,  e  i  
*  = 0,X = x) are unobservable. If  e does not affect the level of  y 
before its occurrence,  ( y  i0 | e  i  = 1,  e  i  
*  = 0, X = x) will be equal to  ( y  i0 | e  i  = 1,  
e  i  
*  = 1,X = x) (i.e., the pre-treatment level of  y for individuals who were 
exposed to  e ), which is observable. In general, the existence of pre-treatment 
effects of  e on  y constitutes a problem for did estimation (Lechner 2011).9 
If longer panels are available, a simple strategy for minimizing the impact 
of potential pre-treatment effects is to ensure that pre-treatment measures 
are not taken too shortly before the occurrence of the treatment. Thus, I will 
generally use income measures from one or two years before the occurrence 
of job loss as reference measures in my analysis of late-career job loss.
In my application, a simple comparison of displaced and non-displaced 
workers would probably not meet the common trends assumption: For 
example, displacement tends to be concentrated among less-educated 
workers whom previous research has shown to retire earlier than higher-
educated workers even in the absence of displacement. This in turn suggests 
that displaced and non-displaced workers differ in their overall retirement 
propensity and hence in their earnings trends under non-exposure. An 
8 Relatedly, Gangl (2010a: 34) notes that fd estimation requires exogeneity of the differenced 
error terms, that is, the differenced error term  ϵ  it  −  ϵ  it−1 needs to be uncorrelated with the dif-
ferenced causal variable  e  it  −  e  it−1 .
9 Such pre-treatment effects may occur because individuals anticipate the occurrence of 
and  e or because assignment to (or selection into) the treatment depends on the level of y. A 
prominent example is the assignment to training programs on the basis of earnings, which will 
result in program participants having exceptionally low earnings prior to the treatment: This 
phenomenon is known as ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’ (Ashenfelter 1978), and will lead to upward bias in 
estimated program effects (because of ‘regression to the mean’).
124 Late- CaReeR RiSkS in Changing WeLfaRe StateS 
obvious strategy for rendering the common trends assumption more plau-
sible is to control for differences between treated and comparison cases 
that are thought to be related to trends under non-exposure, that is, to 
condition on a rich set of variables  X . Hence, did designs are often combined 
with parametric regression methods or other approaches that adjust for 
(pre-treatment) differences between treated and comparison units. In the 
present study, I combine did estimation with a semiparametric matching 
technique, that is, I compare (within-person) changes among affected work-
ers to changes among a ‘matched’ control group of observationally similar 
workers (Gangl 2010b). The goal of matching is to render trends among 
comparison workers a better approximation to the counterfactual trends 
that workers exposed to  e would have experienced under non-exposure. did 
matching is no panacea: Estimated treatment effects will still be biased if 
there is systematic variation in income trends after accounting for the vari-
ables included in the matching procedure. In general, however, matching 
can be expected to reduce bias compared to naive unadjusted did estimates, 
while being sensitive to common support problems and avoiding restrictive 
functional form assumptions.
did matching is an increasingly popular approach for addressing 
problems of causal inference in non-experimental settings. Extensive 
discussions and comparisons with cross-sectional matching estimators 
are provided by Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998), and Smith 
and Todd (2005). Recent studies that use did matching to investigate the 
impact of job loss or unemployment on a variety of outcomes include Gangl 
(2006), Strauß and Hillmert (2011), and Dieckhoff (2011).
4.2 Implementation of did matching and compositional 
adjustments
Matching procedure
The crucial task in the application of did matching is the construction of an 
adequate control (or comparison) group. Most previous applications of did 
matching (and cross-sectional matching) use some variant of propensity 
score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). As discussed above, psm 
begins by estimating a probability model (usually a logit or probit model) 
of being treated. A unit’s propensity score is the predicted probability from 
this model. In the second step, a control group is constructed by matching 
treated units to non-treated units with similar propensity scores. Different 
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algorithms such as (k-)nearest-neighbor matching or kernel matching 
are used in practice. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide a thorough 
discussion of the most common algorithms and other crucial steps in the 
application of psm.
As with other matching methods, the ultimate goal of psm is to eliminate 
or at least greatly reduce differences between treatment and control cases 
with respect to the matching variables, that is, the variables used in the 
probability model (Ho et al. 2007). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) therefore 
refer to the propensity core as one member of a more general class of ‘balanc-
ing scores’ that ‘balance’ treated and control units with respect to a given 
set of covariates (ideally, these will be the variables necessary to achieve 
unconfoundedness). In practice, it has to be checked post hoc whether a 
particular psm solution effectively balances the data. If comparisons of 
treated and control cases reveal substantial differences with respect to one 
or more of the covariates, researchers will usually begin anew, running a 
different specif ication of the probability model and/or changing the match-
ing algorithm (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008: 47-49).
A classical alternative to psm is exact matching (em) which matches 
treated units with control units that are exactly identical with respect to 
the matching variables, that is, treated and control units are matched only 
if they fall into the same cell of the multidimensional table spanned by 
the matching variables  X . Exact matching has some attractive properties: 
Treatment and control groups will be perfectly balanced by construction. 
Exact matching also guarantees similarity of the higher-order moments of 
X across treatment and control groups whereas balance checks performed 
in the context of psm are often restricted to differences in means (Iacus et 
al. 2011, 2012). In practice, however, em is rarely feasible because most data 
sets will lack exact matches for a large number of treated units. Diff icul-
ties to f ind exact matches rise rapidly (exponentially) with the number of 
matching variables10, a problem that is sometimes referred to as the ‘curse 
of dimensionality’.
In this study, I use Coarsened Exact Matching (cem), a new match-
ing method introduced by Iacus et al. (2011, 2012).11 Like classical exact 
matching, cem exactly matches on observable variables in the sense that 
treated and control units are matched if and only if they belong to the 
10 For example, if matching is done on 4 dichotomous variables, there are a total of  16 =  2  4 
possible combinations. With 8 dichotomous variables, there are  256 =  2  8 combinations.
11 The Stata implementation used to obtain the results in this study is described in Blackwell 
et al. (2009).
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same cell – or ‘stratum’ – of the multidimensional table spanned by  X . 
This multidimensional table, however, is not based on the original metric 
of the variables in  X , but rather uses ‘coarsened’ versions of at least some 
of these variables. Thus, the analyst will typically ‘coarsen’ continuous 
measures like employer tenure into categorical variables, ideally in ways 
that are consistent with substantive knowledge about the variable in ques-
tion. Categorical variables can also be further collapsed. For example, an 
eleven-point happiness scale could be reduced to a four-category measure 
(very unhappy, unhappy, happy, very happy). While this procedure leads to 
somewhat greater dissimilarities between treated and control units than 
em, it greatly reduces curse-of-dimensionality-type problems. Within the 
imbalances permitted by the chosen coarsenings, cem by construction 
also balances treatment and control group with respect to ‘all multivariate 
nonlinearities, interactions, moments, quantiles, comoments, and other 
distributional differences’ (Iacus et al. 2012: 8).
cem inherits from em the property that some treated cases may not be 
successfully matched because the data include no control units sharing 
their combination of coarsened variables. There is a clear trade-off here 
in that wider coarsenings will reduce the number of treated units without 
matches, yet also permit greater covariate imbalance between treatment 
and control groups. However, it is worth stressing that problems to f ind 
matches for treated units may be more prominent with cem, but that ana-
lysts using psm also often discard cases without close matches (in terms 
of the propensity score) by enforcing so-called caliper or common support 
restrictions (Bryson et al. 2002; Crump et al. 2009).
To the extent that treated units cannot be matched, one will be estimat-
ing a restricted or feasible version of the population (or sample) average 
treatment effect on the treated, that is, one will be estimating fpatt (or 
fsatt ) (Iacus and King 2012). However, this restriction to a feasible subset 
of treated cases will often be rewarded with substantial bias reduction.
To limit the number of unmatched treated units one may often have to 
use somewhat wider coarsenings than would be desirable under ideal cir-
cumstances. Fortunately, it is possible to mitigate this problem by combin-
ing matching with conventional regression analysis to adjust for remaining 
differences between treated and control cases (Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus 
et al. 2012). As noted above, the ultimate goal of matching methods is to 
achieve covariate balance between treated and control units, and in practice 
this is achieved by applying a set of matching weights (see below). cem, 
psm and other matching methods are thus simply different approaches for 
obtaining a set of weights that improves covariate balance between treated 
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and control units.12 Additional adjustments for remaining differences can be 
carried out by applying conventional regression methods to the reweighted 
data, an approach that is sometimes also taken in applications of psm (e.g., 
Dehejia and Wahba 1999). Given that the matched and reweighted sample 
will be much better balanced than the unmatched sample, estimated 
treatment effects should be relatively robust to the inclusion of additional 
controls and to different specif ication choices – that is, they should exhibit 
substantially less ‘model dependence’ (Ho et al. 2007; Iacus et al. 2012). In 
my own analysis of the impact of job loss in Chapter 8, I will adopt this 
‘matching-plus-regression’ or ‘augmented matching’ approach.
As just noted, cem and other matching techniques can be viewed as 
reweighting approaches which seek to ensure that treatment and control 
groups are ‘balanced’ in the sense of being (reasonably) similar with respect 
to the matching variables. More specif ically, standard cem assigns the fol-
lowing weight  w  i to matched unit  i in stratum  s Î S – where  S denotes the 
(sub)set of matched strata that include both treated and control units, and 
T  s and  C  s denote the sets of matched treated and control units, respectively 
(cf. Iacus et al. 2012: equation 6 on p. 8):




i ∈  T  s 
  
  
 m  C  ___ m  T  
 m  T  
s 
 ___ m  C  s 
 ,
  
i ∈  C  s  (4.9)
Here,  m  T  
s  and  m  C  
s  denote, respectively, the number of treated and control 
cases in stratum  s .  m  T and  m  C denote the total number of matched treated 
and control units, that is,  m  T  =  Σ  sÎS m  T  
s  and  m  C  =  Σ  sÎS m  C  
s  . In this formula, 
the crucial expression for achieving comparability of treated and control 
units with respect to the coarsened matching variables is   
 m  T  
s 
 ___ m  C  s 
 . This factor 
ensures that the weight received by a given control unit equals the number 
of treated units it ‘represents’.   
 m  C  ___ m  T  is a scaling factor that ensures that the 
cem-weighted ratio of matched treated and control units equals their 
unweighted ratio. Unmatched treated and control units are pruned from 
the analysis.
12 A straightforward way of assessing the relative effectiveness of different matching methods 
therefore is to see how successful they actually are in reducing differences between treated and 
control units (King et al. 2011).
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Incorporation of survey weights
Like many observational data sets, the ones used in this study provide 
survey weights to correct for design effects (variable selection probabilities) 
and selective non-response. For example (see Section 4.3 below), low-income 
households were overrepresented in the original psid sample, as were recent 
immigrants in the original soep sample. In longitudinal applications it may 
also be necessary to account for differential attrition rates. This raises the 
question whether to account for sampling weights when applying cem. 
Generally speaking, if treatment effects are heterogeneous in such a way 
that size of treatment effect and size of sampling weight are correlated (e.g., 
because persons experiencing severe income losses have lower selection 
probabilities by design or are more likely to leave the panel), then unbiased 
estimation of (feasible) population average treatment effects seems to 
require that analysts take sampling weights into account.
For example, assume that we are interested in estimating the impact 
of job loss on the risk of entering poverty. If displaced workers have lower 
incomes than non-displaced workers they would presumably have a higher 
risk of entering poverty than the average non-displaced worker even in 
the absence of displacement (e.g., because of other events such as spousal 
job loss). Matching on predisplacement income addresses this problem 
by ensuring that displaced workers and comparison cases have similar 
incomes. However, low-income workers presumably face greater risks of 
becoming poor because of displacement than higher-income workers (e.g., 
because their earnings-related unemployment benefits are less likely to lift 
them above the poverty line). If, like the psid, the data set used to study the 
impact of displacement oversamples low-income households, they will be 
overrepresented among displaced workers in the sample, compared to their 
share in the ‘population’ of displaced workers. Ignoring survey weights (and 
thus failing to account for this oversampling), will result in exaggerated 
estimates of the poverty-triggering effect of displacement.
Despite the increasing popularity of matching approaches, and of psm 
in particular, for identifying treatment effects using survey data, there has 
been little systematic discussion of how to account for sampling weights. 
In the case of psm, there are two questions: whether to use weights when 
estimating the assignment model and whether to account for them in the 
subsequent estimation of treatment effects (Bryson et al. 2002). In cem, 
primarily the latter question arises. Here, researchers using psm with 
sampling weights seem to have mostly applied weights to treated cases 
only (cf. Bryson et al. 2002: 29-30; Dolton et al. 2006: 46). This is also what is 
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tentatively suggested by Leuven and Sianesi (2012) in the help f ile for their 
widely used Stata implementation of psm. The rationale for weighting only 
the treatment group presumably is as follows: As noted above, matching 
techniques themselves can be interpreted as reweighting approaches that 
aim to balance the composition of treated and non-treated units with 
respect to the matching variables. More specif ically, if the quantity of 
interest is a (feasible) patt13, the goal of matching is to reweight non-treated 
units in such a way that (certain moments of) the reweighted multivariate 
distribution of the matching variables in the control group approximate the 
distribution in the treatment group. In this sense, the weights applied to 
control cases in the f inal estimation of treatment effects are derivative of 
the covariate distribution in the treatment group. Sampling weights have 
to be applied to the treated to ensure that their composition corresponds 
to the composition of the ‘population’ of the treated. The balance-achieving 
weights for control units are then determined by applying the matching 
procedure and need not take sampling weights into account.
However, as Zanutto (2006: 73) notes, it may be the case ‘the weights [...] 
contain information that is not available in the covariates’. For example, 
in longitudinal settings, longitudinal weights may capture systematic 
differences in attrition rates beyond those accounted for by the matching 
variables. In principle, it may be more compelling to use a richer matching 
specif ication that explains these differences (for an analogous argument 
in the context of traditional regression analysis, see Winship and Radbill 
1994). In practice, however, such respecif ication may be diff icult due to 
missing information or curse-of-dimensionality problems. In this study, 
I will therefore take the longitudinal survey weights of both treated and 
control units into account. More specif ically, I construct the cem weights 
using a modif ication of Equation 4.09 that replaces the terms from that 
equation with their survey-weighted equivalents. Let  l  i denote the lon-
gitudinal survey weight for unit  i and let  T  m and  C  m denote the sets of 
all matched treated and control units, respectively. I then construct cem 
weights as follows:




 l  i ,
  
i ∈  T  s 
   
 l  i  
 Σ  i∈ C  m  l  i  _____
 Σ  i∈ T  m  l  i 
 
 Σ  i∈ T  s  l  i  _____
 Σ  i∈ C  s  l  i 
 ,
  
i ∈  C  s 
  (4.10)
13 If the goal is to estimate the pate, sampling weights must also be applied to control cases 
to ensure that they are representative of the population of interest.
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The weight of matched treated units is simply their longitudinal survey 
weight. As before, unmatched treated and control units are removed from 
the analysis. The weight assigned to matched control unit  i in stratum  s is 
the product of that unit’s longitudinal survey weight with two additional 
factors. The f irst of these factors is the weighted equivalent of the scaling 
factor in Equation 4.09, and the second is the ratio of the weighted number 
of treated units in  s to the weighted number of controls in  s .
Adjusting for compositional changes in the treatment group
A major goal of my analysis is to better understand the implications of 
recent welfare state change for citizens’ well-being by comparing the 
f inancial consequences of retirement and late-career job loss across 
historical time. But can the period differences emerging from such an 
analysis be attributed to country-period differences in welfare state 
arrangements? In Chapter 2, I noted one important alternative possibility, 
namely that such differences might also reflect the changing composition 
of those who experience an event: As a simple example, assume that rates 
of poverty entry after late-career displacement can be shown to have 
risen over time. Such a result could, for example, be due to displacement 
being increasingly concentrated among low-income workers near the 
poverty line – rather than to changes in welfare state provisions that raise 
the risk of entering poverty conditional on being a low- or high-income 
worker.
One straightforward way to address the possibility that period differences 
reflect such compositional changes is to adjust the composition of treated 
units from different periods so as to match a common reference distribution. 
Such an adjustment provides an answer to the question: What would period 
differences in the economic consequences retirement or displacement have 
looked like, if the composition of displaced workers had not changed? The 
difference between the unadjusted effects and the composition-adjusted 
effects is a measure of how important compositional trends have been in 
shaping observed trends in the effects of events. If a given trend in effects 
is reinforced after adjusting for compositional changes, one would conclude 
that compositional trends have attenuated the trend. Conversely, if a trend 
is attenuated by applying compositional adjustments, one would conclude 
that compositional trends (rather than welfare state change) have been 
an important source of observed changes in effects. Other examples of 
studies that use reweighting methods to adjust for compositional changes 
are DiNardo’s (1996) pioneering analysis of changes in the American wage 
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distribution and Giesecke et al.’s (2015) study of inequality trends among 
low-skilled workers in Germany.
To implement the compositional adjustments, I employ the entropy 
balancing (eb) method introduced by Hainmueller (2012). While using a 
different approach for obtaining the weights, eb serves the same aim as the 
matching methods discussed above, namely to construct a set of weights 
that balances two or more groups with respect to a set of covariates. eb is 
a powerful tool, but can run into convergence problems, particularly with 
small sample sizes, which is a practical reason why I prefer cem for matching 
treated to control units within periods. In addition and as noted above, cem 
automatically balances all possible interactions and higher-order moments 
within the constraints set by coarsening choices. eb does not have this 
desirable property (although it is of course possible to explicitly include 
appropriate terms in the eb procedure).
I will generally carry out compositional adjustments for all variables 
included in the cem procedure. As for the ‘reference distribution’, that is, 
the distribution to be approximated by the reweighted distribution of the 
period-specif ic treatment groups, I will use the average country-specif ic 
composition of treated units over the whole observation period. This differs 
from the approach taken by DiNardo et al. (1996) and Giesecke et al. (2015), 
who adjust the composition of workers from later subperiods to match the 
composition of workers during the earliest subperiod of their observation 
period. My reason for choosing the average composition instead is that the 
number of treated cases per period is sometimes quite small. Occasionally, 
sampling variability might therefore result in rather untypical period-
specif ic samples and I want to avoid using such samples as a benchmark 
for the compositional adjustments.
Let  E be the set of weights, obtained via entropy balancing, that balances 
the period-specif ic matched treatment groups with respect to a reference 
distribution. Technical details of the algorithm are described in Hainmueller 
(2012). Let  e  i  Î E denote the weight for treated unit  i . By straightforward 
modification of equation 4.10, the cem weights for the composition-adjusted 
analysis are then defined as:




 e  i ,
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  (4.11)
As the goal of the eb procedure is to balance the composition of the treat-
ment group, weights for control units are still based on their longitudinal 
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survey weight  l  i , as are the sums of weights calculated over control units.
14 
As discussed above, the (augmented) matching approach ensures compo-
sitional similarity of the composition-adjusted treatment group and the 
control group. I obtained weights for the treatment group using the Stata 
implementation of eb developed by Hainmueller and Xu (2012), employ-
ing the basewt option to preserve information contained in the original 
longitudinal survey weights of the treated units (see Hainmueller [2012] 
and Hainmueller and Xu [2012] for further details).
4.3 Data and key measures
4.3.1 Data and general sample restrictions
My empirical analysis is based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (psid, Hill 1992; Brown et al. 1996) and the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (soep, Wagner et al. 2007), two of the longest-running household panel 
studies in the world. The original psid sample was drawn in 1968 and the 
original soep sample in 1984. Several key variables, including the income 
measures used in this study, come from the Cross-National Equivalent File 
(cnef, Frick et al. 2007), which provides consistent and internationally 
comparable variables based on the original surveys. I use psid data from 
survey years 1980 to 2005 and soep data from survey years 1984 to 2010. As 
I further describe below, all income measures refer to the previous calendar 
year, so the most recent years for which I have income data are 2004 in the 
American and 2009 in the German case. psid/cnef data from the 2007 
wave (providing income data for 2006) were available at the time of writing. 
Unfortunately, exploratory analysis revealed severe problems with a crucial 
income component – household private pension income – in the 2007 psid/
cnef data set. Because I was not able to construct a consistent time series 
from the original psid variables, I had to exclude the latest wave of psid/
cnef data from the analysis.
A major difference between the two studies is that the soep conducts 
personal interviews with all adult household members, whereas the psid 
14 The sums of weights calculated over treated units are based on the eb weights. However, 
the sum over all treated units is normalized to equal the sum of the original survey weights 
(i.e.,  Σ  iÎ T  m  e  i  =  Σ  iÎ T  m  l  i ). This does not, of course, hold within individual strata: In general, for 
most or all Tse1 ≠ li which is necessary for eb to fulf il its function of holding the composition of 
(matched) treated units constant.
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obtains all information from a single interview with the so-called ‘head’ 
of the household. In opposite-sex couple households, it is usually the 
man who is assigned the status of head – except in a very small number 
of situations such as when the man is cognitively impaired. Informa-
tion on adult household members other than the household head or his 
partner is very limited. To ensure comparability, I therefore excluded 
persons other than the ‘head of household’ (Haushaltsvorstand) or his/
her partner from the German sample. However, income received by other 
household members is included in the household income measures from 
both surveys.
Both psid and soep are based on probability samples of the residential 
population with oversampling of certain groups (e.g., immigrants in the 
soep, low-income households in the psid), making the use of sampling 
weights imperative. New respondents can enter the studies in two principal 
ways: by moving into households with existing sample members or by being 
selected for inclusion in refreshment or enhancement samples. As for the 
f irst possibility, both soep and psid collect information on persons entering 
the panel by moving into an existing soep / psid household. However, the 
two surveys differ in their following rules, that is, in the extent to which 
persons who are not original sample members are followed when they no 
longer coreside with an original sample member, where an original sample 
member is a person that entered the sample through selection into the 
initial sample or an enhancement/refreshment sample (for details, see 
Schonlau et al. 2010).
As for the addition of new samples, the soep has been refreshed and 
enhanced repeatedly since the beginning of the study (Wagner et al. 2007). 
Despite panel attrition, the number of soep households roughly doubled 
from approximately 6,000 to approximately 12,000 households between 
1984 and the early 2000s. The psid did not draw new samples before 1990. As 
was widely recognized by then, this lack of enhancement samples compro-
mised the representativeness of the psid, as post-1968 immigration was not 
reflected in the panel. To alleviate this problem, a so-called ‘Latino sample’ 
of 2,000 Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican households was drawn in 1990. 
However, the Latino sample was discontinued completely after 1995, render-
ing available panels too short for the present study. A smaller ‘immigrant 
sample’ that included other immigrant groups in addition to Latinos was 
added to the study in 1997.15 Again, this sample is largely excluded because of 
short panel lengths. 1997 was also the year when funding constraints forced 
15 The 1997 sample included 441 households, another 70 households were added in 1999.
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the psid to switch to two-year interview intervals. From 1997 onwards, data 
were thus only collected in odd-numbered years. As explained below, this 
causes a number of complications.
Like any non-mandatory household panel study, soep and psid are 
subject to attrition of households and individual respondents from the 
panel. Attrition not only diminishes sample sizes. To the extent that it is 
selective it may also result in biased estimates of population parameters. 
However, two studies of the impact of attrition in the psid until the late 
1980s found no evidence that it had caused major distortions (Fitzgerald et 
al. 1998; Lillard and Panis 1998). In addition, longitudinal weights can be an 
effective means of correcting for selective attrition. In the present study, 
I use a generic set of ‘comparability optimized’ longitudinal weights whose 
construction is described in Kohler (2011). These weights are optimized for 
comparability in two respects. First, individual attrition probabilities used 
in the construction of longitudinal weights are estimated on the basis of 
comparable specif ications. Second, in the case of the psid, positive weights 
are assigned to individuals entering the panel by moving into core sample 
households, and these weights are constructed on the basis of the cor-
responding soep procedures. The psid does not provide sample weights 
for this group.
I generally restrict my analysis to individuals who were 50 or older at the 
time of the event in question. I also generally require that individuals have 
worked a non-negligible number of hours (10 or more per week) prior to the 
occurrence of the event. I focus on changes from one or two years before 
an event (the preretirement or predisplacement reference year) until four 
years later (‘four-year changes’) and six years later (‘six-year changes’). The 
reasons for taking the pre-event measurement one year before the event 
in some and two years before the event in other cases are related to the 
psid’s switch to biennial interviewing (see Section 4.3.2 below). My unit 
of analysis can be thought of as an episode. An individual  i contributes a 
treatment episode if she experienced  e during the observation period and 
if suff icient income measures from adjacent years are available, so that 
the income change of interest can be calculated. I def ine retirement as a 
singular, non-reversible transition, so a given individual can contribute at 
most one treatment episode. By contrast, my definition of job loss allows 
for multiple job losses, so one and the same person can contribute multiple 
treatment episodes. Further details on the event variables are provided in 
Section 4.3.2 below.
I include a given (treatment) episode in the sample if it contains sufficient 
information for computing at least one of the two changes of interest, that 
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is, a four-year change or a six-year change.16 The survey weight assigned to 
an episode (i.e., the term  l  i in equations 4.10 and 4.11 above) equals the lon-
gitudinal weight for the f inal year of that episode. Individuals with missing 
values on at least one of the variables used in the cem or eb procedures are 
excluded from the analysis. These variables are listed and further described 
in the empirical chapters.
In the analysis of job loss, treatment episodes are matched with control 
episodes to obtain did matching estimates of the impact of job loss. Poten-
tial control episodes must meet the following requirement: The contributing 
worker must have been ‘at risk’ of experiencing job loss at the relevant age 
(see below), but must not have actually experienced job loss in any of the 
years included in the potential control episode.
A concrete example may be helpful (for simplicity I focus on the case of 
four-year changes): I generally perform exact matching on age, because it 
plays a crucial role both for a displaced worker’s reemployment prospects 
and her (early) retirement options. Now, assume that individual  i expe-
rienced job loss at age 58, that suff icient income measures are available 
to compute four-year income changes (from age 56 to 60), and that no 
matching variables are missing. A second individual  j provides a potential 
comparison episode for  i ’s four-year episode if the following conditions are 
met:  j was observed from 56 to 60, was ‘at risk’ of experiencing job loss at 
age 58, (i.e., worked more than ten hours per week at age 56), but did not 
actually lose a job between ages 56 and 60, and no relevant data are missing. 
j is not required to have remained ‘at risk’ of job loss after age 58 in order to 
provide a potential comparison episode. For example,  j may have retired 
(voluntarily) at age 60, but she must have been ‘at risk’ at age 58. In reality, 
my dataset of course contains many  i ’s, that is, many episodes of workers 
who were displaced at age 58 and were observed long enough for four-year 
changes to be computed, and many  j ’s, that is, many episodes of workers 
who were at risk of experiencing job loss at age 58, but did not actually 
experience it during the relevant observation window. These episodes are 
then matched according to the cem algorithm outlined above. Details on 
the matching variables and coarsenings are provided in Chapter 8.
Finally,  j may also contribute potential control episodes for workers 
displaced at ages other than 58. Assume that  j was observed from age 52 
16 To ensure that I am comparing well-matched samples of treated and control units for both 
types of changes, I created separate sets of cem weights for four-year and six-year changes. 
Weights generated by simply matching units in the year of the event would become inaccurate 
as treated and control units drop out of the sample.
136 Late- CaReeR RiSkS in Changing WeLfaRe StateS 
until age 62. In that case,  j may also contribute a potential control episode 
for workers displaced at, say, age 54. Again, all that is required is that no 
relevant data are missing, that  j was at risk of experiencing job loss at age 
54, and that she did not actually experience it between ages 52 and 56. 
Under such circumstances,  j ’s level income at age 56 will be used multiple 
times. For example, it will be used in computing  j ’s four-year change from 
52 to 56 (a potential comparison change for estimating the impact of job 
loss at age 54) and it will also be used in computing the four-year change 
from age 56 to 60 (a potential comparison change for estimating the impact 
of job loss at age 54). To account for the non-independence of observations 
arising from this setup, I generally compute cluster-robust standard errors 
with clustering at the person level. I also obtain such standard errors in the 
analysis of income changes around retirement where I pool four-year and 
six-year changes, as they tend to be very similar.
4.3.2 Key measures
4.3.2.1 Income measures
The primary outcome variables examined in this study are different com-
ponents and aggregates of individual and household income. Both psid and 
soep collect detailed retrospective information on various types of income 
for the calendar year before the interview. On this basis, the cnef provides 
several cross-nationally comparable income measures. Table 4.1 lists the 
individual income components and provides def initions of key income ag-
gregates (preceded by an equality sign) such as household pre-government 
income. Obviously, the income components are not elementary in any 
fundamental sense, as they could in principle be further disaggregated (e.g., 
into different types of asset income or public transfers). Total household 
taxes are not elicited directly from respondents, but estimated using tax 
simulation programs that are based on relevant regulations and empirical 
information (e.g., average tax rates for different income brackets). Further 
details on the simulation of household taxes are provided in the cnef 
codebooks (Goebel et al. 2012; Lillard et al. 2012).17
17 For recent survey years, some of the income variables can take negative values in the us. 
To ensure consistency, I recoded negative values on these income components and aggregates 
to zero. The variable total household taxes can take negative values in both countries and at 
all time points and does so for a considerable and increasing number of households in the us, 
which attests to the (growing) importance of the eitc. I did not recode negative household 
taxes to zero in order to capture the income-smoothing effects of negative income taxation (cf. 
Chapter 3).
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Table 4.1  Income components and income aggregates
Individual labor earnings
+ earnings by other household members
+ household asset income
+ household private transfers
+ household private retirement income
= pre-government household income
+ household public transfers
+ household public retirement income
= pre-tax post-transfer household income
+ household (direct) taxes
= post-government household income
To account for differences in household needs (see Chapter 2), I adjust 
pre- and post-government household income according to the modif ied 
oecd scale (Hagenaars et al. 1994). More specif ically, I divide these income 
variables by an equivalence weight that is constructed as follows:
1 + 0 . 5  ×​ (HH M  15+  − 1) + 0 . 3  ×​ (HH M  0−14 )
where  HH M  15+ refers to the number of household members ages 15 and 
above and  HH M  0−14 refers to the number of household members ages 0 to 
14. Adults living on their own thus receive a weight of one, that is, incomes 
are expressed in terms of the needs of a single-person household.
As discussed in Chapter 2, needs-adjusted post-government (or dispos-
able) income occupies a central place in my analysis because of its presum-
ably close relationship with economic well-being. I also noted that I will 
focus on two aspects of changes in needs-adjusted disposable income: 
relative changes with respect to pre-event levels and changes with respect 
to the poverty line.
My approach for estimating relative changes in the various income 
measures is straightforward. Consider the case of a worker who experienced 
event  e in year  τ . One could now consider many different kinds of income 
changes. For example, one might be interested in the change from two years 
before until two years after the event, that is, from  τ − 2 to  τ + 2 , or in the 
change from one year before until f ive years after event, that is, from  τ − 1 
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to  τ + 5 . More generally, given annual income data, the set of potentially 
interesting changes can be characterized in terms of the distance between 
the two income measurements  α and the timing of the two measurements 
relative to  τ . More formally, let  y  t represent income in year  t . The set of 
possible  α -year changes given exposure to  e in  τ is then given by:
 Δ  [−a,b]  =  y  τ+b  −  y  τ−a , with a,b ≥ 0  Ù  a+b = α > 0 (4.12)
To analyze relative changes between  τ − a and  τ + b , I simply express  y  τ+b as 
a proportion of  y  τ−a and then calculate:
 Δ  [−a,b]  
rel   = (  
 y  τ+b  ___ y  τ−a   − 1) × 100 = (  
 y  τ+b  ___ y  τ−a   −   
 y  τ−a  ___ y  τ−a  ) × 100 (4.13)
The second equality shows that this is a ‘proper’ difference in that it is taken 
with respect to one and the same measure, namely income expressed as a 
multiple of income at  τ − a . This difference ranges between −100 and +∞. 
I cap this measure at +100 to limit the impact of positive outliers.
I examine several statistics that are based on  Δ  rel . In addition to averages, 
I will examine its standard deviation to gauge the variability of income 
changes after an event. I will also estimate the proportion of workers whose 
income declines by more than a third (‘large loss’) or more than half (‘very 
large loss’) of pre-event income (see Gosselin and Zimmerman [2008] for 
a similar approach).
I def ine poverty as relative income poverty using a threshold of 60% 
of median needs-adjusted post-government income. As is common in 
analyses of group-specif ic poverty risks, this threshold is calculated on 
the basis of the whole adult population (rather than only on the basis of 
older workers) and calculated separately by country and year. The 60% 
threshold is commonly used in European research (e.g., Vandecasteele 
2010) and is part of the so-called ‘Laeken indicators’ for social monitoring 
in the European Union (Atkinson et al. 2002; Krause and Ritz 2006). In the 
American literature, it is more common to use the federal poverty line (e.g., 
Johnson et al. 2010) which is an absolute poverty line based on a ‘basket of 
goods’ approach (Fisher 1992) Even if one believes that the term ‘poverty’ 
should be reserved for the latter type of measure, the measure used here 
can still be considered a useful indicator of having low income relative to 
the population at large. My analyses of poverty risks after the focal events 
are restricted to persons with pre-event incomes above the poverty line, 
that is, I examine the effect of the focal events on the likelihood of entering 
poverty.
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In addition to changes in needs-adjusted post-government income, that 
is, relative changes and poverty entries after taxes and transfers, I will often 
provide similar results for needs-adjusted pre-government income (i.e., 
income before public pensions, other public transfers, and direct taxes; see 
Table 4.1).18 The comparison of income trajectories before and after taxes and 
transfers can provide useful information concerning the extent of ‘welfare 
state buffering’ (e.g., Goodin et al. 1999; DiPrete and McManus 2000; Ehlert 
2012). This comparison will often be illuminating, but it is important to 
acknowledge that it is one piece of a complex puzzle rather than a clear 
and def initive answer to the question how effectively the welfare state 
cushions the effects of adverse life events. This is because pre-government 
trajectories are not independent of the system of taxes and transfers. For 
example, high public pension replacement rates can be expected to crowd 
out private retirement savings. Besides, a smaller difference between pre- 
and post-government income need not signal a ‘weaker’ welfare state, but 
may also reflect exogenous variation in problem pressures: There will be less 
need for welfare state buffering when displaced older workers are facing a 
strong labor market and can easily f ind well-paying reemployment.
Throughout the analysis I will focus on four- and six-year changes. That 
is, I will choose  a and  b such that  a + b = α Î {4, 6} . While longer-term 
changes would be interesting, panel attrition and the fact that income  b 
years after an event is only observed if that event occurred at least  b years 
before the end of the observation period severely restrict the possibilities for 
such an analysis. The focus on even-numbered intervals (i.e., four- and six-
year rather than three- or f ive-year changes) is not motivated by substantive 
considerations, nor by a whimsical preference of mine, but rather dictated 
by the psid’s biennial interview intervals after 1997.
Unfortunately, this is not the only complication arising from the change 
in the survey interval. This change also affects how accurately the timing 
of two of my focal events, exit from work and declines in health, can be 
ascertained (while I do not examine the impact of declines in health in 
this study, I do use an indicator of negative health shocks to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary retirement, see below). This is because 
information on the occurrence of these events is not elicited directly from 
respondents, but instead inferred from changes in ‘state’ variables (annual 
work hours in the year before the interview and health status at the time 
18 I apply the poverty threshold based on median post-government income when examining 
poverty entries for pre-government income, as this simplif ies the interpretation of differences 
in entry rates before and after transfers.
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of interview). For example, I treat a respondent as having retired in  t if she 
reported no or only marginal work hours for a given year  t and reported 
a substantial number of work hours for  t − 2 (I also require work hours to 
have been low in  t + 2 , but this is not relevant to the present discussion). My 
measure of job displacement is not subject to these inaccuracies because 
it is based on direct questions about the occurrence and timing of certain 
work-related events (however, as I elaborate below, the change to biennial 
interviewing leads to another set of problems in constructing the displace-
ment indicator).
Let  s  e be the state variable whose change signals the occurrence of event 
e , for example, an indicator of low work hours in the case of retirement19 
or a measure of health problems in the case of health shocks. If interviews 
are conducted annually, I can ascertain whether  s  e changed between the 
interviews in  t − 1 and  t , an interval that is usually about one year long. 
When interviews are conducted only every other year, I can only be sure that 
a change occurred between the interviews in  t − 2 and  t , an interval that is 
usually about two years long. For simplicity, let me adopt the convention of 
saying that  e occurred in  t , or that  τ = t , if  s  e changed between  t − 1 and 
t , noting that the change in  s  e may well have occurred after the interview 
in  t − 1 but before January 1 in  t .20 As just noted, in the case of biennial 
interviewing, we only know that the change in  s  e occurred between the 
interviews in  t − 2 and  t . Assuming that  e occurs with constant probability, 
we know that  τ = t − 1 for approximately half of respondents and  τ = t for 
the other half, but we cannot tell which of the two groups a given respondent 
belongs to.
Recall that Equation 4.12 defined a specific type of  α -year change in terms 
of  a and  b . Importantly, different types of  α -year changes will be very dif-
ferent if income trajectories follow systematic pre- and/or post-event trends, 
for example, because some workers reduce their hours before retirement 
or because ‘health-shocked’ workers recover and increase theirs. As long 
as we have annual data on both  s  e and income, nothing prevents us from 
calculating all possible  α -year changes for every individual. With biennial 
data, however, not only becomes the analysis confined to even-numbered 
intervals: The timing of  e now also inevitably affects the types of changes 
19 The retirement indicator is based on retrospective information about work hours in the 
previous calendar year (rather than work hours at the time of interview), but this does not 
substantively affect the problem described here.
20 Both psid and soep conduct the majority of interviews (approximately 90%) between 
January and July.
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that can be calculated. To see this, recall that  τ = t − 1 for some (perhaps 
about half) of the workers with a change in  s  e from  t − 2 to  t and that  τ = t 
for the remaining workers. If we now calculate (four-year) income changes 
from  t − 2 to  t + 2 for these respondents, we will be calculating  Δ  [−1,3] for the 
f irst and  Δ  [−2,2] for the second group. Again, without further information, 
there is no way of deciding which group an individual belongs to. When 
averaging these four year changes across all exposed (or treated) workers, 
we will be estimating the following (weighted) average:
  
p(τ = t − 1) ⋅  Δ  [−1,+3]  + p(τ = t) ⋅  Δ  [−2,+2]   _______________________ 
p(τ = t − 1) + p(τ = t)
    (4.14)
where  p(τ = t − 1) and  p(τ = t) denotes the proportions of workers for 
whom  τ = t − 1 and  τ = t , respectively. In the special case where the prob-
ability of  e is constant  p(τ = t − 1) = p(τ = t) .
In terms of practical implications, this discussion suggests that it is crucial 
to ensure that the same quantities are estimated when comparing income 
changes across countries and/or periods with different survey intervals. 
There are different strategies for achieving this goal. One of the simplest 
and the one that I will be using in this study is to estimate averages such 
as the one given in Equation 4.14 also during those periods where annually 
spaced interviews are available. I provide further details on my approach 
when describing the construction of the event variables below and in the 
individual empirical chapters.
4.3.2.2 Event variables
Part II of this study explores the economic consequences of retirement in 
the sense of exit from work and Part III the consequences of involuntary job 
loss. As noted in Chapter 2, these events are interrelated: Job loss has been 
shown to be an important trigger of involuntary early retirement. Moreover, 
there are reasons to suspect that country differences and recent changes 
in welfare state arrangements have different implications for workers who 
enjoy smooth late careers and for workers whose careers are interrupted 
by involuntary job loss or other unexpected events that limit their control 
over retirement. In my analysis of income trajectories around retirement, 
I will therefore make a basic distinction between involuntary and voluntary 
retirees and focus on the latter group of retirees. Consistent with previous 
research showing job loss and health problems to be the primary triggers 
of involuntary early retirement, I classify retirement as involuntary if it 
was preceded by job loss or the onset of health problems (see Barrett and 
Brzozowski [2010] for a similar approach). Even though I will not examine 
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the consequences of late-career health shocks explicitly, this event thus 
plays a crucial role in distinguishing voluntary from involuntary retirees. 
I now describe the construction of the three event indicators.
Retirement/Exit from work
Previous research has operationalized retirement in various ways, the three 
most prominent being self-reports (Drobnic 2002), pension take-up (Fasang 
2008), and exit from work or the labor force (Radl 2010). In this study, I define 
retirement as exit from work because I am interested in the economic risks 
associated with retirement and because the decline in earnings associated 
with leaving employment is the primary relevant process in that regard. 
I focus on exit from work (in the sense of actual employment or work hours) 
rather than exit from the labor force, which includes the unemployed, that 
is, older people who are not working, but looking for work. This is because 
unemployment benefits often serve as de facto early retirement benefits (see 
Chapter 3) and because distinguishing between ‘genuine’ unemployment 
and unemployment that really is early retirement is exceedingly diff icult.
I  def ine retirement as the f irst prolonged spell without substantial 
employment after age 50. The analysis is restricted to persons who worked 
a substantial number of hours around and/or after age 50; a person who has 
never worked a substantial number of hours for a longer period of time in 
her later years is hence not ‘at risk’ of retirement. More specif ically, to be 
‘at risk’ of retirement, a person must have worked at least 15 hours per week 
on average between ages 48 and 50 or during her f irst three years in the 
psid/soep if she entered the study at a higher age. The measure of weekly 
work hours is obtained by dividing annual work hours by 52. Annual work 
hours are based on retrospective questions about the previous calendar 
year and provided in the cnef (for further details, see Goebel et al. 2012; 
Lillard et al. 2012).
For persons meeting this criterion, retirement is then def ined as oc-
curring in the f irst year of the f irst prolonged spell without substantial 
employment after age 50. More specif ically, a person is treated as having 
retired in a given year  τ if she worked less than ten hours per week in  τ and 
worked less than ten hours per week two years later (i.e., in  τ + 2 ).21 Retire-
ment is classif ied as involuntary if the worker experienced involuntary job 
21 This def inition does not rule out that a retiree ‘unretires’ (Maestas 2010) in the sense of 
working a substantial number of hours in years  t + 4 and later, but such unretirements are rare 
in my data. In both countries, barely more than 5% of workers work ten hours or more in  t + 4 .
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loss or a negative health shock at any time between two years before and 
one year after retirement.22
As noted above, certain complications arise because the psid switched 
to biennial interviewing in 1997. Thus, work hours are available for the 
years 1996, 1998, 2000, and so on, but not for the odd-numbered years in 
between. The same holds for the income measures which are also collected 
retrospectively for the previous calendar year. Now consider all persons 
who belong to the sample at risk and reported ten or more work hours for 
1996, but fewer than 10 for 1998 and 2000. As discussed above, these persons 
may have worked fewer than ten hours already in 1997. Let  τ denote the 
(unknown) actual year of retirement (i.e., 1997 or 1998). If the probability 
of retiring did not change from 1997 to 199823, then the four-year income 
change from 1996 to 2000 will be the change from  τ − 1 to  τ + 3 for one half 
and the change from  τ − 2 to \tau + 2 for the other half of retirees. In order 
to ensure comparability across countries and periods, I therefore mimic 
this situation for the country/periods where annual information is in fact 
available. That is, I compute four-year changes from  τ − 1 to  τ + 3 for workers 
retiring in odd-numbered years and from  τ − 2 to  τ + 2 for those retiring in 
even-numbered years. A completely analogous argument applies to six-year 
changes.
Job loss
The analysis of late-career job loss is restricted to individuals who worked 
at least ten hours per week before losing their job and who were between 
ages 51 and 65 at the time of job loss. Involuntary job loss is defined as an 
involuntary separation for one of the following reasons: closure of a business or 
establishment, being fired, or the end of a fixed-term contract if the latter was 
accompanied by at least one month of unemployment, either in the year when 
the contract ended or in the following year. Information on the occurrence of 
job loss events is based on a set of broadly comparable questions concerning 
respondents’ recent job history that has been administered by both psid 
and soep in all of the years included in this study. Self-employed workers are 
excluded from the analysis because the event is not well-defined for them.
22 The possibility that one of these events occurred after the year of retirement is primarily 
relevant in the context of health shocks, because retirees are mostly no longer at risk of losing 
a job.
23 For a given pair of adjacent years this assumption may sometimes be violated, but in the long-
run retirement probabilities should not differ systematically between odd and even-numbered 
years.
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The psid ’s switch to two-year interview intervals in 1997 again creates 
diff iculties because some job events were no longer recorded after the 
change. The complications arise because the reference period of psid ’s 
job history questions was not changed after 1997: As before, respondents 
interviewed in  t were asked to report job events that had occurred in the 
year before the interview (i.e., in  t − 1 ) or before the interview in  t (i.e., 
between January 1 and the day of the interview). Before the switch to bien-
nial interviewing, information on job events occurring after the day of the 
interview in  t , but before January 1 of the following year ( t + 1 ) were thus 
recorded at the  t + 1 interview. After the switch, however, no interviews 
were conducted in  t + 1 . Information on job events that occurred after the 
day of the interview in a given interview year is therefore missing. Hence 
I partially imputed the job loss indicator for interview years from 1997 
onwards (i.e.,  t  int97+  Î {1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005} ).
Because I do not distinguish between workers with only one and workers 
with multiple displacements in a given year, imputation was not neces-
sary for those who reported having lost their job between January 1 and 
the day of the interview in  t  int97+ . To impute the displacement indicator 
for those who did not report having been displaced in the current year, 
I obtained a single imputation using the mi impute logit routine in Stata 12. 
The relevant outcome can be thought of as the likelihood of experiencing 
displacement in  t  int97+ conditional on not having experienced it before the 
interview in that year. I therefore estimated the imputation model over all 
observations (i.e., including those from years before 1997) who did not report 
having been displaced in  t at the interview in  t . The outcome variable in 
this model is whether respondents reported having been displaced in  t at 
the following interview in  t + 1 . This information is of course completely 
missing for observations from interview years 1997 and later. In addition 
to a large set of income- and employment-related variables, the imputation 
model includes dummies for the month of interview to account for the 
obvious relationship between interview timing and the likelihood of being 
displaced during the remainder of the year. To capture cyclical fluctuations 
as well as secular trends in displacement risks, I also included measures of 
overall displacement rates for adjacent years, that is, for  t − 1 and  t + 1 . Job 
events during these years were still completely recorded after the switch 
to biennial interviewing.
Unlike with the retirement indicator, it thus remains possible to identify 
the exact year when a job loss occurred even after the psid ’s switch to 
biennial interviewing (subject, of course, to the uncertainty of the imputa-
tion), but there is no real gain from this greater precision in event timing 
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because the income measures are available only for even-numbered years. 
Letting  τ denote the year of job loss, I can therefore only compute four-
year changes from  τ − 1 to  τ + 3 for workers displaced in odd-numbered 
years and from  τ − 2 to  τ + 2 for workers displaced in even-numbered years. 
The difference to the retirement case is that it is possible to tell, for each 
individual worker, which one of the two changes is calculated. For ease of 
presentation, however, I will proceed just as in the case of retirement and 
generally present averages of these two types of four-year changes. Again, as 
in the case of retirement, I will also do so for those country/periods where 
annual data are available in order to ensure comparability.
Health shocks
The indicator of negative health shocks captures relatively abrupt declines 
in health that show some persistence. I do not examine income or employ-
ment trajectories around health shocks in this study. However, as noted 
above, I do use information on health shocks to distinguish voluntary from 
involuntary retirees. Generally speaking, I def ine a health shock as having 
occurred in  τ if a respondent reported ‘bad health’ in  τ and  τ + 2 , but did 
not report bad health in  τ − 2 and  τ − 4 . The requirement that changes in 
health be persistent can be thought of as a proxy for severity (Schimmel 
and Stapleton 2012).
Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct the underlying measure of ‘bad 
health’ in a fully comparable fashion. In the American case, I use the disability 
variable provided by the cnef which classifies individuals as disabled if they 
report a physical or nervous condition that limits the amount of work they can 
do. The cnef treats German respondents as disabled if they report a legally 
recognized disability of at least 30%. However, in comparison to the us, this 
variable alone yields implausibly low shares of disabled persons. I therefore 
also classify German respondents as having bad health if they meet at least 
one of the following conditions (see Burkhauser and Daly [1998] for a similar 
approach and for empirical evidence suggesting that the resulting measure is 
broadly comparable to the American): They report very low health satisfac-
tion (0-3) on an eleven-point scale or they report that their overall health 
strongly limits their ability to perform everyday tasks.24 At the same time, 
I raise the threshold for the attested disability measure from 30 to 50%, which 
is the official German threshold for being considered as ‘severely disabled’.
24 Although not specif ically referring to (paid) work, this question is the one that is most 
similar to the psid’s. Unfortunately, it is missing for several waves.

Part II
Economic consequences of retirement

5 Literature review and research 
questions
‘Retirement’ is a multifaceted term that has been conceptualized in differ-
ent ways in previous research. In this study, I will operationalize retirement 
as exit from employment or ‘long-term labor force exit’ (Burkhauser et al. 
2001) because I am interested in the implications of the associated decline 
in earnings for retiring workers and their families. Exit from employment is 
one common way of defining retirement (see, for example, Burkhauser et al. 
2001; Radl 2010), but many authors use other definitions. The most frequent 
alternatives are individuals’ self-perceptions and self-reports (Bardasi and 
Jenkins 2002; Drobnic 2002) and def initions based on pension entrance 
(Fasang 2008). A possible criticism of equating retirement with exit from 
work is that this approach excludes a substantial number of (predominantly 
female) individuals (e.g., homemakers) who are not employed in their later 
years (Fasang 2008). To alleviate such concerns, I will briefly examine the 
economic situation of individuals without substantial late-life employment 
at the beginning of the next chapter.
As discussed above, an important tradition in sociological research 
stresses the heterogeneity of different pathways to retirement (Kohli et al. 
1991; Ebbinghaus 2006; Fasang 2008; Radl 2010). This line of research is com-
plemented by studies suggesting that differences in the level of individual 
control over retirement timing – as captured by the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary retirement – are crucial for understanding dif-
ferences in the impact of retirement on economic (Smith 2006; Lachance 
and Seligman 2010) and psychological well-being (Bonsang and Klein 2011). 
Both of these literatures support the view that health problems and job 
displacement are the primary triggers of involuntary early retirement. This 
is why these two events occupy a central place in this study: Part III will 
explore the employment and income trajectories of workers experiencing 
late-career job loss and it is only for reasons of space that I relegate a similar 
analysis of the consequences of late-career health shocks to future research.
In this part, I examine income dynamics around exit from employment, 
focusing primarily on workers whose exit is not preceded by job loss or the 
onset of health problems. I refer to these workers as ‘voluntary retirees’, 
while recognizing that this label is a simplif ication. On a conceptual level, 
it may be more convincing to think of workers as located on a continuum 
of control over retirement (Radl 2010). Moreover, some of the workers whom 
150 Late- CaReeR RiSkS in Changing WeLfaRe StateS 
I classify as voluntary retirees might presumably be better characterized as 
retiring involuntarily for reasons other than job loss or health problems (e.g., 
rising care demands). However, extant research suggests that the number 
of such cases is small compared to those whose retirement choices are 
relatively unconstrained (see, for example, Lachance and Seligman 2010).
The goal of this chapter is to prepare the empirical analysis of income 
trajectories around (voluntary) retirement in the next chapter. It is structured 
as follows. The next section discusses general reasons for expecting changes 
in economic well-being even when retirement is voluntary. In Section 5.2, 
I explore how the salience of these factors is conditioned by institutional 
context and formulate hypotheses concerning country and period differences 
in individual/household-level income trajectories around voluntary retire-
ment. Section 5.3 concludes with a brief review of previous empirical research.
5.1 Why should economic well-being change at retirement?
Why should we expect economic well-being to change around retirement? 
After all, retirement appears to be a foreseeable transition which individuals 
prepare for by contributing to public and complementary pension plans 
as well as through other forms of saving. Influential work in neoclassical 
economics on the life cycle theory of savings (Ando and Modigliani 1963) 
and the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957) indeed posits that 
individuals’ consumption is a function of long-term ‘permanent’ rather 
than current income. This is usually taken to imply an economic neutrality 
prediction according to which economic well-being should not drop at 
retirement. The common empirical f inding that levels of consumption – 
usually proxied by expenditure on food and other commodities – do fall at 
retirement has therefore been labeled the ‘retirement-consumption puzzle’ 
in the economics literature (see, e.g., Banks et al. 1998; Smith 2006; Hurst 
2008; Battistin et al. 2009).
One proposed solution to this puzzle is that drops in expenditure at 
retirement do not really signal a decline in economic well-being because 
they may reflect declines in work-related expenditure and/or be offset by 
the increased time available for home production. For example, retirees 
could maintain preretirement levels of food consumption despite lower 
expenditure by growing vegetables or spending more time shopping in 
order to purchase food at lower prices (Aguiar and Hurst 2005; Hurst 2008).
However, extant literature highlights at least two general reasons why 
the economic neutrality prediction may not hold in practice. First, as I have 
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discussed extensively above, retirement may sometimes be involuntary and 
occur earlier than planned due to unanticipated events such as job displace-
ment (Hausman and Paquette 1987; Smith 2006). The second reason is that 
people are ‘Humans’, not ‘Econs’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), that is, they 
differ from the sober calculators of neoclassical economics in numerous 
ways: by displaying inertia and procrastination, making idiosyncratic in-
vestment choices, and using biased heuristics when comparing alternatives. 
These deviations from the models of economic textbooks suggest several 
reasons why planned retirement, too, may trigger declines in economic 
well-being and the remainder of this section explores them in greater detail. 
The discussion owes a lot to the excellent literature reviews of Knoll (2010, 
2011), who suggests that two broad issues can be distinguished: the question 
of retirement preparation, that is, whether workers save enough for their 
retirement and whether they allocate their resources efficiently (Knoll 2010); 
and the question of retirement timing, that is, whether older workers choose 
their retirement age wisely within the constraints set by their earlier savings 
decisions, family context, health status, employment prospects, and other 
factors relevant to the retirement decision (Knoll 2011).
Saving too little. There seems to be widespread agreement that many 
Americans save too little for their retirement (VanDerhei 2012). Research 
in psychology and behavioral economics identif ies several reasons why this 
is the case (see Thaler and Sunstein [2008] and Knoll [2010] for literature 
reviews). Important and related reasons for inadequate savings behavior in-
clude limited self-control (Laibson et al. 1998), procrastination (O’Donoghue 
and Rabin 1999) and status quo bias which raises the salience of default 
options. Thus, Madrian and Shea (2001) f ind that automatic enrollment in 
a company pension plan results in substantially higher participation rates 
than an opt-in design where workers have to explicitly declare participation. 
In addition, default options for contribution rates and fund allocations 
also have rather dramatic impacts on investment choices of participating 
workers (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). This status quo bias is related to the 
issues of self-control and procrastination: Individuals may be aware that 
they should start saving (or save more) for their retirement, yet repeatedly 
defer making the necessary changes to the future (‘If I start next week, it 
will be soon enough’). In the case of saving for retirement these problems 
are exacerbated by the complexity of the task: Choosing the right level 
and allocation of retirement savings is a much more daunting task than 
choosing a loaf of bread. Indeed, studies of f inancial literacy show that 
many people are incapable of performing the basic calculations involved 
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in making retirement savings choices (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; O’Rand 
2011) and that workers with lower f inancial literacy are less likely to save 
(Lusardi and Mitchell 2007).
Making bad investment choices. Research also suggests that the investment 
decisions of saving workers are frequently suboptimal. For example, it is 
usually recommended that workers increasingly shift their assets towards 
low-risk investments (e.g., government bonds rather than equity) as they 
approach retirement. This is intended to reduce the vulnerability of their 
portfolio to short-term declines in stock prices because given their im-
minent retirement there may not be enough time left for recovery (Knoll 
2010). Yet, a recent study of American workers’ portfolio profiles at the time 
of the 2008 World Financial Crisis concludes that ‘workers between 56 
and 65 [...] have equity concentrations far beyond what are often thought 
to be appropriate at that age’ (VanDerhei 2009: 4). Workers also tend to 
overinvest in stocks of their own employer and of domestic companies, 
a phenomenon referred to as ‘home’ or ‘familiarity’ bias (Börsch-Supan 
2005; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). A related f inding is that portfolios tend 
to be under-diversif ied and, again, under-diversif ication has been shown 
to be inversely related to f inancial literacy (Guiso and Jappell 2008). As 
with the decision whether and how much to save, motivational problems 
such as self-control, procrastination, and status quo bias also appear to be 
important sources of suboptimal portfolio profiles, in particular the failure 
to adapt portfolio composition over the course of the life cycle (Knoll 2010).
These f indings have important implications for social inequalities in 
retirement outcomes, as f inancial literacy and motivational eff icacy differ 
by level of education and other dimensions of stratif ication. Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2007) show that more educated individuals have higher levels of 
f inancial literacy. Likewise, levels of self-control are higher among those 
with higher education. In fact, self-control during early childhood has been 
shown to be an important predictor of educational success later in life 
(Moff itt et al. 2011). In addition to socially stratif ied access to employer-
sponsored plans (cf. Chapter 3), another reason why greater emphasis 
on private (and occupational) pensions may raise inequalities in old age 
therefore is that individuals who are better off anyway are also more adept 
at undertaking f inancial preparations for their retirement.
Retiring too early. A further question concerning all workers who ap-
proach retirement, including those with only public pensions, is when to 
exit employment and start drawing benef its. In general, drawing public 
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retirement benefits early will result in lower monthly benefits (cf. Chapter 3 
for a detailed discussion of rules for benefit adjustment). Complementary 
pension plans, too, usually offer possibilities for early benefit take-up which 
involve actuarial reductions. At this point, my focus is not on the specif-
ics of benefit adjustment, but rather on the reasons why even ‘voluntary’ 
retirees who face no strong employment restrictions may choose to retire 
too early – at the cost of foregoing additional labor earnings and drawing 
lower retirement benefits until the ends of their lives. Again, Knoll (2011) 
provides a useful discussion of relevant research in behavioral economics 
and psychology.
One important explanation for premature pension take-up is that older 
workers overestimate the attractiveness of retirement because of systematic 
biases in ‘affective forecasting’ (Gilbert and Wilson 2007), that is, in antici-
pating the emotional qualities of different options – such as whether to work 
for another few years or leave employment. Workers facing this decision will 
try to forecast their level of well-being under these different scenarios using 
mental simulations. However, these simulations are necessarily abbreviated 
or ‘essentialized’ and research suggests that they will differ from the real 
experiential quality of the situations in systematic ways: Exceptional events 
with strong emotional content will be overemphasized at the cost of less 
vividly remembered everyday aspects, and major negative events are likely 
to be emphasized at the cost of major positive events due to ‘negativity bias’ 
(Knoll 2011: 21). A worker pondering whether to retire or work is therefore 
likely to construct unrepresentatively negative representations of what it is 
like to (continue to) work. Retirement, by contrast, is a situation that work-
ers do not (yet) know from their own experience. Therefore, they cannot 
draw on their own memories (among which major negative aspects would 
presumably be overrepresented) in constructing their mental simulation 
of retirement.
In addition to problems of affective forecasting, further likely reasons 
for retiring too early are, again, issues of self-control and the related 
phenomenon of ‘hyperbolic discounting’ (Laibson 1997) whereby people 
assign exaggerated weight to immediate compared to distant rewards (more 
leisure now vs. more income over the whole retirement period).
Following age norms. Sociological arguments about the influence of ‘age 
norms’ suggest another reason why many workers may retire too early, 
particularly in the context of institutional change. Kohli (2000) and Leiser-
ing (2003: 214) argue that legal retirement ages affect retirement timing not 
only via f inancial incentives, but also by shaping citizens’ beliefs about 
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appropriate ages for labor force withdrawal, that is, by establishing age 
norms. Taking up these ideas, Radl (2010, 2012b) analyzes answers to a 
set of questions concerning ideal, minimum, and maximum retirement 
ages for men and women from the European Social Survey. He f inds that 
most respondents answered these questions with f inite positive numbers, 
suggesting that the notion of age norms has empirical content. He also 
shows that prevailing age norms are positively correlated with country-level 
differences in legal and actual retirement ages.
One possible interpretation of age norms is that people have a prefer-
ence for retiring at certain, socially acceptable ages. According to a second 
interpretation individuals are overwhelmed by the complex task of making 
informed retirement choices and therefore resort to simple behavioral 
templates or ‘default behavior’ (Aaron 1999; Fasang 2008). As noted above, 
empirical studies of f inancial literacy in fact indicate that many people are 
incapable of performing the calculations required for informed retirement 
planning. Age norms could then be interpreted as behavioral templates 
that reduce complexity and help individuals make reasonable retirement 
decisions without incurring the information costs required for individually 
optimal decision-making. This interpretation becomes more convincing if 
we allow for the possibility of ‘local’ norms (Bicchieri 2005; Radl 2010) that 
are specif ic to population subgroups such as men and women, blue-collar 
versus white-collar workers, or even occupations.
In the context of institutional change, a key question then becomes how 
quickly age norms adapt to changes in f inancial incentives. If changes 
in age norms lag behind changes in f inancial incentives, this could be a 
potential source of changes in the economic consequences of retirement. 
For a potentially extended transitional period, age norms could prescribe 
what has become – due to institutional changes – suboptimal retirement 
behavior. As evidence accumulates that, say, early retirement is increas-
ingly associated with economic hardship, age norms should eventually 
change. This pattern of ‘lagged adaptation’ is supported by Axtell and 
Epstein’s (1999) simulations of retirement behavior. In their ‘agent-based 
model’ of a simple artif icial society, only a small fraction of the population 
responds rationally to retirement incentives in the sense of always retiring 
at the optimal age. The majority of the population, the ‘imitator agents’, are 
purely norm-following in that they do not respond to economic incentives 
at all, but retire once a certain fraction  τ of their network has retired.1 
1 A third and small group of actors, the ‘random actors’, retire with constant probability p in 
each period after reaching the minimum retirement age.
LiteRatuRe RevieW and ReSeaRCh queStionS 155
The optimal retirement age is the same for all actors. One of Axtell and 
Epstein’s simulations analyzes a policy change scenario: How quickly does 
the retirement behavior of imitators respond to a change in the optimal 
retirement age? Their f indings suggest that considerable time may elapse 
until all imitators retire at the new optimal retirement age. During the 
transitional period, many imitators display suboptimal retirement behavior.
5.2 Institutional context and income changes at retirement: 
research questions and hypotheses
The above considerations suggest several channels through which welfare 
state provisions might affect income mobility around voluntary retirement. 
Drawing on the institutional overview provided in Chapter 3, I now formulate 
a set of hypotheses and research questions to be addressed in the subsequent 
analysis. All of these hypotheses are meant to apply to voluntary retirees, even 
though I will also provide the main results for involuntary retirees who retire 
after a job loss or a decline in health. As noted above, I defer the systematic 
analysis of workers who are exposed to late-career job loss until Part III.
Average income changes
A f irst obvious set of expectations concerns the composition of retirees’ 
‘income packages’. More specif ically, lower public replacement rates and 
greater importance of private retirement savings in the us as well as the 
decline of public replacement rates in both countries suggest the following 
hypotheses (the label hvr signals that these hypotheses refer to income 
changes around voluntary retirement):
hvr 1: American retirees have a larger portion of their preretirement 
earnings replaced by private (pension and asset) income than German 
retirees.
hvr 2: German retirees have a larger portion of their preretirement earn-
ings replaced by income from public sources (public pensions and other 
transfers) than American retirees.
hvr 3: In both countries, the portion of preretirement earnings replaced 
by income from public sources (public pensions and other transfers) has 
declined over time.
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Predictions concerning trends in the proportion of earnings replaced by 
private income are more diff icult to make. Despite changes for future 
retirees, there seem to have been no strong trends in the salience of private 
pensions among recent German retirement cohorts (cf. Chapter 3). As for the 
us, it is diff icult to predict the impact of the shift from db to dc pensions 
on average replacement rates. Wolff (2011) f inds that the share of workers 
without private pension wealth grew as db plans were dismantled and dc 
plans diffused, yet average dc pension wealth grew substantially during 
the bull market of the 1990s. I therefore leave trends in the private income 
replacement rate as an open question.
In any case, with respect to retirees’ economic well-being, the crucial 
question is not which sources they draw their income from, but how their 
disposable income changes around retirement. The discussion of the previ-
ous section suggests that mandatory retirement preparation, whether in 
the form of a public payg program or mandatory funded plans, reduces 
the likelihood that individuals save too little for retirement.2 By the same 
token, greater reliance on voluntary complementary pensions raises the 
risk that some workers will not save enough. One intuitive interpretation 
of having saved ‘too little’ is having a low income below the poverty line. A 
second interpretation is that of experiencing large drops in income around 
retirement, which is likely to lead to declines in one’s standard of living. 
I will address the latter possibility when formulating hypotheses about 
the variability of income changes below. As for changes in poverty status 
around retirement, one would expect the following:
hvr 4: Americans are more likely than Germans to enter poverty upon 
retirement.
In addition, declining public replacement rates can be expected to have 
led to greater poverty risks for recent retirement cohorts. In the us, this 
trend may have been reinforced by the shift towards dc benef its: First, as 
noted in Chapter 3, this shift has gone hand in hand with an erosion of 
complementary pension coverage among low-skilled workers (and particu-
larly low-skilled men), that is, among those workers who are most likely to 
need complementary benefits to avoid poverty (Munnell and Sunden 2004; 
Wolff 2011). In addition, even those who have saved a considerable amount 
2 Of course, people are not saving in the literal sense under payg, but they acquire claims to 
retirement benefits that can be considered as retirement savings with mandatory annuitization 
(cf. also the concept of Social Security Wealth introduced in Chapter 3).
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of money may end up with small additional benef its if their portfolios 
evolve unfavorably. Based on these considerations, I posit the following 
hypothesis:
hvr 5: Over time, both German and American workers have become 
more likely to enter poverty upon retirement.
It is more diff icult to predict average changes in disposable income rela-
tive to preretirement levels (rather than with respect to the poverty line). 
However, the decline in public replacement rates in combination with 
no clear upward trend in complementary pension coverage suggests that 
average losses of German workers have increased during recent decades. 
Trends in American Social Security replacement rates as well as Hacker’s 
influential thesis of a ‘Great Risk Shift’ suggest a similar trend for the us, 
but the favorable economic climate and f inancial market trends of the 
1990s may have limited changes in this direction. As noted in Chapter 3, 
the consequences of the shift toward dc accounts for American workers 
are thus examined under best-case conditions in this study. Nevertheless 
I formulate the following hypothesis for both countries:
hvr 6: In both countries, average declines in disposable income – relative 
to preretirement levels – have risen over time.
Variability of income changes at retirement
I now turn to the variability of income changes at retirement. In the 
empirical analysis, I  will examine two aspects of variability: overall 
variability as captured by the standard deviation of relative income 
changes and the proportion of workers whose income drops by more than 
a third (‘large drop’) or more than half (‘very large drop’). I am primarily 
concerned with variability within a retirement cohort, that is, among 
workers retiring within a given year or a narrow band of adjacent years. 
However, I will also formulate one hypothesis concerning the variability of 
income changes across different retirement cohorts (i.e., between-cohort 
variability).
In addition to addressing the problem of saving too little, public pension 
programs can also be expected to increase the homogeneity of savings 
rates across workers by def ining a mandatory minimum and uniform level 
of savings. By applying uniform benef it formulae, public pensions will 
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typically also increase homogeneity of (implicit)3 returns on savings within 
a cohort. Progressive elements in benefit calculation lead to inter-individual 
differences in rates of return, but in ways that are often desirable from a 
social policy standpoint.
Greater emphasis on complementary pensions presumably raises 
variability of retirement outcomes within a retirement cohort. In addition, 
within-cohort variability can be expected to grow with the prevalence of dc 
(as opposed to db) plans because the former leave more room for individual 
discretion concerning savings rates and investment choices. As noted repeat-
edly, research indeed suggests that the growing prevalence of dc plans has 
increased inequalities in the distribution of pension wealth in the us (Wolff 
2011: 54 and Ch. 5). These considerations suggest the following hypotheses:
hvr 7: Variability of retirement-related income changes within a retire-
ment cohort is greater in the us than in Germany.
hvr 8: Variability of retirement-related income changes within a retire-
ment cohort has risen over time, particularly in the us.
hvr 9: Americans are more likely than Germans to experience large 
(post-government) income losses at retirement.
hvr 10: Over time, German and American workers have become more 
likely to experience large (post-government) income losses at retirement.
The relative importance of public vis-à-vis private pensions can also be 
expected to influence the variability of income changes across retirement 
cohorts. Again, emphasis on public insurance likely has a homogenizing 
effect. Cohort differences in the internal rate of return provided by a public 
payg system can be substantial and depend on political choices and demo-
graphic changes, but for mature payg systems they appear to have been 
limited during recent decades (see Leimer 2007 for the American case).4 
3 In a pure payg system, there are no savings (or returns on these savings) in any strict sense. These 
concepts are, however, readily extended to the payg case by relating lifetime benefits to lifetime 
contributions. To distinguish it from real returns under a funded plan, the payg rate of return is 
usually referred to as the implicit (or internal) rate of return (see, for example, Leimer 2007).
4 Early retiree cohorts typically enjoy exceptionally high rates of return, as they receive high 
benefits for little or even no lifetime contributions. Historically, this has often been an attractive 
feature when initial generations of retirees were left with few resources for retirement because 
of war or economic crisis.
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By tying returns on retirement savings to capital market performance, dc 
pensions in particular can be expected to raise cohort-to-cohort differences, 
particularly if many savers fail to follow the advice of shifting towards less 
volatile assets in their preretirement years (see Burtless [2003] for an in-
structive calculation of how identical portfolio choices can produce widely 
differing rates of return depending on a worker’s year of birth). Another 
hypothesis to be tested in the empirical analysis therefore is:
hvr 11: Variability of income changes across retirement cohorts is greater 
in the us than in Germany.5
Group differences in income changes
Whereas hypotheses hvr 7 to hvr 11 refer to overall levels of variability, 
I now formulate a f inal set of hypotheses that refer to systematic differ-
ences across socio-economic groups. I focus on two aspects: education 
and retirement age. I will also conduct all analyses separately by gender. A 
major reason for differentiating by gender is that key institutional trends 
differ by gender. In particular, trends in employer pension coverage have 
been very different for American men and women: While both groups were 
affected by the shift toward dc pensions, during recent decades women 
caught up substantially in terms of overall pension coverage rates even 
though a noticeable gap remained in the late 2000s (Copeland 2011). Com-
positional trends likely also differ between men and women. For example, 
women’s educational attainment has risen faster than men’s (Buchmann 
and DiPrete 2006; Helbig 2012), although trends in retiree composition may 
differ somewhat from trends for women as a whole because women who 
work in their later years are a selective subgroup. In addition, women’s 
labor force participation has risen and their employment biographies 
have become more continuous (see Isaacs [2010, Ch. 1] for a discussion of 
American trends in the context of retirement income security). Because of 
the close linkages between pension income and lifetime earnings, these 
compositional changes may have counteracted broader trends toward lower 
pension generosity, suggesting that income trajectories around retirement 
have developed more favorably for women.
5 One would also expect between-cohort variability to have risen as a consequence of the 
shift toward dc plans. However, ascertaining trends in cross-cohort variability would require a 
substantially longer observation window because between-cohort variability is itself an attribute 
of extended periods of time.
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Differences by level of education. As for differences by retirees’ level of educa-
tion, I posit the following expectations:
hvr 12: Less-educated workers are more likely to enter poverty at 
retirement.
hvr 13: Educational inequalities in the risk of entering poverty are greater 
in the us than in Germany.
hvr 14: Educational inequalities in the risk of entering poverty at retire-
ment have grown over time, particularly in the us.
How can hypotheses hvr 12 to hvr 14 be justif ied? To some extent, educa-
tion plays the role of a proxy for lifetime earnings in these hypotheses.6 
On average, low-educated workers will have had lower earnings over their 
working lives and their public retirement benefits will therefore typically 
be lower as well. Provided that they have not been poor already before 
retirement, low-educated workers can thus be expected to face greater 
risks of entering poverty after leaving work. Expectations are less clear for 
relative income changes which may be limited for less-educated workers 
due to progressive elements in public retirement benefits and because of 
minimum income floors provided by means-tested benefits. I therefore do 
not formulate hypotheses concerning educational differentials in relative 
income changes or the prevalence of large losses.
Turning to German-American differences (hvr 13), the progressivity of 
the American public pension scheme should reduce educational inequali-
ties compared to Germany. The much greater salience of complementary 
pensions, however, likely more than neutralizes this equalizing effect of 
public benefits (O’Rand and Henretta 1999). As for changes over time, there 
are several reasons why the shift from db to dc pensions has presumably 
led to growing educational inequalities in the us (e.g., greater salience of 
individual retirement planning under a dc regime). Available empirical 
evidence on the distribution of retirement wealth supports this expectation, 
particularly for men (e.g., Wolff 2011).
Another important factor influencing inequalities in retirement income 
is the overall wage structure during retirees’ working lives: Because of the 
close linkages between lifetime earnings and pension income, working life 
6 More f ine-grained differentiations on the basis of class/occupation or other measures are 
precluded by the relatively small sample sizes.
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inequalities can be expected to persist beyond retirement. In particular, if 
more recent retirement cohorts encountered greater educational earnings 
differentials during their working lives, we should expect them to exhibit 
greater educational differentials in poverty risks after retirement. In most 
Western economies, earnings inequality has indeed risen considerably 
during recent decades and this development has usually gone hand in hand 
with growing wage/earnings gaps among educational groups (oecd 2008). 
However, the timing and magnitude of changes varies considerably across 
countries.
The United States are among the countries with the most marked and 
earliest increases in earnings inequality: Earnings inequality began to 
rise in the 1970s, sky-rocketed during the 1980s, and continued to increase, 
albeit at a slower pace, during the 1990s (see, for example, Juhn et al. 1993; 
Katz and Autor 1999; Morris and Western 1999; Autor et al. 2008). In the 
1970s and 1980s inequality increased across the whole wage distribution, 
with low-earning workers even seeing their real earnings decline, while 
in the 1990s inequality grew mostly in the upper part of the distribution 
(Juhn et al. 1993; Autor et al. 2008). By contrast, in Germany earnings/
wage inequality rose markedly from the mid-1990s onward (Giesecke and 
Verwiebe 2008). Studies differ with respect to inequality trends during 
the 1980s and early 1990s, with some (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009) f inding a 
modest increase, at least for men, and others suggesting little change (e.g., 
Prasad 2004). However, the unemployment rate of low-skilled men clearly 
began to surge already in the early 1980s (Solga 2005: 20). The deterioration 
of less-educated workers’ (lifetime) earnings and employment prospects 
is thus another reason for expecting their risk of entering poverty to have 
risen over time. The impact of this factor should be larger in the us, where 
the increase in inequality occurred relatively early and where it has been 
particularly steep.
Differences by retirement age. As discussed above, research on judgment 
and decision making in behavioral economics and psychology as well as 
sociological arguments about the salience of age norms suggest that retire-
ment behavior may adapt rather sluggishly to changes in the f inancial 
incentives for (early) retirement (e.g., through the increase of full retirement 
age in the us and through the closing of group-specif ic early exit options 
in Germany). Many people may continue to follow established patterns of 
early retirement even when these have become considerably more costly 
due to changed regulations. The decision to retire (too) early may be most 
consequential in the long run when individuals have consumed potential 
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further resources such as savings and assets (Knoll 2011). Yet, it should also 
result in heightened immediate income losses around retirement for early 
retirees. Overall, changes in early retirement options appear to have been 
more substantial in Germany (cf. Chapter 3), suggesting the following f inal 
hypothesis:
hvr 15: Particularly in Germany, early voluntary retirement has been as-
sociated with greater f inancial losses for more recent retirement cohorts, 
both in terms of losses relative to preretirement income and in terms of 
poverty risks.
5.3 Previous research on income change at retirement
I conclude this chapter with a review of previous empirical studies that have 
investigated the impact of retirement on (disposable) income in Germany 
and/or the United States. I will mostly concentrate on the relatively few 
studies that use longitudinal data to compare income before and after 
retirement, as they are most closely related to the approach I will take in 
this study.
Burkhauser et al. (2001) provide what seems to be the only study of income 
changes around retirement that directly compares Germany and the United 
States (as well as two further countries, Canada and Great Britain). Consist-
ent with the approach taken in this study, Burkhauser et al. (2001) consider 
changes around ‘long-term labor force exit’. Their analysis is based on workers 
retiring in the early to mid-1990s and restricted to men whom they differenti-
ate according to their age at the time of exit. Their f indings confirm that 
public pensions are more important for postretirement income in Germany, 
while private pensions play a bigger role in the us.7 Estimated median changes 
in post-government income are -38% for American men exiting at ages 50 
to 61, and -48% for those exiting at ages 62 and above. The corresponding 
estimates for German men are -23% for both age-at-exit groups.
7 The median public pension replacement rate (postretirement public pension benef its as a 
percentage of preretirement labor earnings) is 29% for German men retiring at ages 50 to 61 and 
56% for those retiring at ages 62 and above. The corresponding American values are 0% and 
35%. Conversely, the proportion of preretirement earnings replaced by private pension income 
is greater in the us. Reflecting low coverage rates, estimated private pension replacement rates 
are actually zero for the median German retiree in both age groups in Germany. By contrast, the 
median American worker sees 29% (ages 50 to 61) and 25% (ages 52+) of preretirement earnings 
replaced by private pension income.
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The estimated income losses for American men appear large. However, 
due to a lack of comparable studies on the us, their plausibility is diff icult 
to assess. In a rather dated study, Grad (1990) uses the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (sipp) to study income dynamics around retirement 
among Americans aged 55 or older. Her results, however, are diff icult to 
compare with those of Burkhauser et al. (2001), as she partly uses different 
retirement def initions, does not differentiate between men and women, 
and, exploiting the sipp ’s shorter interview intervals, examines changes 
in income from one three-month period to the next (rather than annual 
changes). Many respondents in her sample undergo a gradual transition 
to retirement that may be ‘aggregated away’ in annual surveys such as 
the psid. However, even in her sample, roughly one fourth of transitions 
follow the stereotypical pattern of a transition from full-time employment 
without pension receipt to non-employment with receipt of retirement 
benefits. Grad (1990) estimates that the median decline in family income 
is 26% for workers collecting two types of retirement benefits (i.e., usually 
public as well as complementary benefits) and 38% for those collecting only 
one benefit. These results underscore the importance of complementary 
benef its for retirement income in the us. They also suggest somewhat 
smaller income losses than the study by Burkhauser and his colleagues.
A longitudinal analysis of income changes around retirement in Germany 
is provided by Motel-Klingebiel and Engstler (2008). Using the panel compo-
nent of the 1996 and 2002 waves of the German Ageing Survey, they examine 
the relationship between six-year changes in needs-adjusted disposable 
income and different ‘pathways to retirement’. Consistent with American 
research on the detrimental effects of involuntary early retirement, one 
of their main results is that workers who move from employment in 1996 
to unemployment or other forms of early benef it receipt before age 60 
(e.g., disability benefits) experienced greater income losses than workers 
transitioning from employment into regular public pension receipt. In fact, 
they f ind that average income of those transitioning directly remained 
almost stable between 1996 and 2002, but it seems that their income meas-
ure is not adjusted for inflation. A second measure that accounts for real 
income growth in the population by expressing income as multiples of the 
(year-specif ic) population average declines by 34% for the former and by 
20% for the latter group.
Changes over time. Motivated by similar concerns as this study, a few studies 
have examined recent trends in income changes at retirement. Gosselin and 
Zimmerman (2008) use the psid to examine period differences in the risk 
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of experiencing an income drop of 50% or more after various life events, 
among them a ‘reduction in head’s hours due to retirement or disability’ 
(Gosselin and Zimmerman 2008: 34, Table 3). Their analysis is based on all 
households with heads between ages 25 and 65 and is thus not restricted 
to older workers (in particular, they include younger workers who leave 
employment because of a disability). However, older workers presumably 
account for the majority of retirement/disability events. Consistent with 
the notion of growing economic insecurity, they f ind that the proportion 
of households whose needs-adjusted disposable income drops by 50% or 
more at the time of retirement or disability-related reductions in labor 
supply rose from 25% in the 1974-83 period, to 31% for the 1984-93 period, 
to a maximum of 35% in the 1994-2003 period (cf. Table 3 in Gosselin and 
Zimmerman 2008).
Further evidence on recent trends in Germany and the United States 
comes from the chapters by Rinklake and Buchholz (2011) and O’Rand and 
Hamil-Luker (2011) in a recent comparative volume on ‘Aging Populations, 
Globalization and the Labor Market’ (Blossfeld et al. 2011). Rinklake and 
Buchholz (2011) use soep waves 1984-2007 and f ind that the negative rela-
tionship between having been unemployed at age 58 and absolute (inflation-
adjusted) pension income is substantially stronger for birth cohorts 1946-51 
than for birth cohorts 1934-1945. Overall, however, retirees from younger 
birth cohorts enjoyed higher absolute levels of pension income. The authors 
caution against over-interpreting these results because they are not able 
to control for cohort differences in employment biographies and pension 
contributions. One should add that rising (real) absolute pension levels 
are logically compatible with declining generosity in terms of replacement 
rates and with growing relative income losses at retirement. Unfortunately, 
the authors do not compare pension benefits to preretirement earnings or 
income.
O’Rand and Hamil-Luker’s chapter (2011) on the us shows that younger 
American cohorts were more likely to experience unemployment after age 
50, and that this increase is particularly strong for men without a high school 
degree. Differences and trends in public and private pension income are 
examined via growth curve models with random intercepts and a random 
quadratic growth rate. Unfortunately, results are somewhat diff icult to 
interpret because of the complexity of the model, which is only presented 
in tabular form. Results for public pension income seem to suggest that 
the youngest cohort (1937-41) received substantially lower public benefits 
initially, yet estimates also suggest that this cohort enjoyed more rapid ben-
ef it growth afterward. At least at the individual (as opposed to household) 
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level, it is somewhat unclear, however, why public benefits should change 
after retirement (except through indexation). O’Rand and Hamil-Luker also 
f ind that average levels of private pension income were higher for younger 
cohorts. Cohort-specif ic (postretirement) trends in private pension income 
are not presented.
These previous studies have generated important insights. Yet, not only are 
some of them rather dated, they also leave open many of the questions raised 
above. Only the study by Burkhauser et al. (2001) is genuinely comparative 
in applying the same design and maximally comparable def initions across 
countries. In general, there is little attention to the variability of income 
changes (as opposed to their central tendency) and the relative importance 
of different types of income is rarely explored. Finally, evidence on changes 
over time remains very limited. Gosselin and Zimmerman’s (2008) analysis 
provides some f irst evidence that retirement entails increasing economic 
risks in the us, yet their focus is on a much broader set of life events and 
on a much wider age range. The studies by Rinklake and Buchholz (2011) 
and O’Rand and Hamil-Luker (2011) likewise contain several interesting 
results (e.g., the f inding that unemployment at age 58 is associated with 
lower pension income for younger German cohorts), yet they do not provide 
def initive answers to the hypotheses and research questions raised above. 
While using panel data, they do not analyze income trajectories around 
retirement in a before-after fashion, but instead focus on the absolute level 
of different types of postretirement (pension) income. To provide more 
conclusive evidence on the income trajectories experienced by German 
and American retirees, and on how these trajectories have changed over 
time, I therefore now turn to my own empirical analysis.

6 The changing economic consequences 
of retirement
In this chapter, I begin with the empirical analysis of the income trajecto-
ries experienced by older Germans and Americans. My main focus is on 
income changes among voluntary retirees whose exit from employment 
is not preceded by job loss or a decline in health. Part III will complement 
the present analysis by exploring the consequences of late-career job loss.
As discussed in Chapter 4, I define retirement in terms of exit from work 
(rather than from the labor force which includes the unemployed). In the 
interest of readability, I will nevertheless occasionally use the term ‘labor 
force exit’ as a synonym for ‘retirement’ and ‘exit from work’.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents some 
straightforward results on gender and cohort-specif ic retirement patterns 
and briefly examines the economic situation of people without substantial 
employment after age 50. Section 6.2 describes the sample for the main 
analysis and discusses a few methodological details that were not covered in 
Chapter 4. Section 6.3 contains the analysis of income dynamics around exit 
from work. It is divided into three parts: The first focuses on average changes 
relative to preretirement income and on the risk of entering poverty, the 
second on overall variability of income changes, and the f inal part explores 
differences by level of education and retirement age. The chapter ends with 
a summary and conclusions in Section 6.4.
6.1 Retirement patterns and economic situation of non-
working individuals
In Chapter 2, I highlighted key country differences and trends in gender-
specif ic employment and retirement patterns and Figure 6.1 shows that 
these can also be found in the data used here. Separately by country and 
gender, it depicts the proportion of workers who are (still) at risk of leaving 
employment at different points after age 50. To remain at risk at a given 
age, a worker must have been employed relatively continuously since age 
50 or since entry into the panel if the latter occurred after age 50 (see 
Chapter 4 for further details). I  include cohort-specif ic estimates to il-
luminate changes over time. The curves in Figure 6.1 differ from standard 
survivor curves in that they are not conditioned on employment at age 50. 
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Differences at age 51 capture initial differences in employment rates at the 
beginning of the late career. These differences arise from differences in 
the prevalence of long-term unemployment and inactivity states such as 
long-term sickness or being a homemaker. Differences at higher ages reflect 
a combination of these differences in initial conditions and differences in 
retirement patterns among those who meet the criterion of substantial 
late-life employment.
The upper part of Figure 6.1 shows that employment rates of German and 
American men are similar at age 51, but that German men leave employment 
much more quickly thereafter. Based on all birth cohorts, 79% of American 
men, but only 56% of their German counterparts remain at risk of labor 
force exit at age 60. Differences are even more pronounced at age 65 when 
about 50% of American, but only 16% of German men remain at risk. At 
age 70, only 3% of German men have not yet left employment, compared 
to 25% of their American counterparts. Comparisons across birth cohorts 
confirm previous f indings that retirement ages have recently increased in 
both countries, with differences being strongest at age 60 in Germany and 
at age 65 in the United States (cf. Chapter 3).
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Results for women are displayed in the lower pair of graphs and yield 
three main f indings. First, at any given age women in both countries are 
less likely than men to still be at risk of labor force exit. This is due to gender 
differences in initial employment levels and women’s earlier retirement. 
Second, at any given age, American women are more likely than German 
women to still be working and, again, this can be attributed to differences 
in initial employment levels as well as differences in retirement timing 
conditional on being at risk. Third, the trend toward increased late-life 
labor force participation and later exit is substantially stronger than for 
men in both the us and Germany. Financial incentives for later retirement 
and other changes affecting both sexes have apparently been reinforced 
by well-known and interrelated secular trends that are specif ic to women 
such as changing gender roles and women’s faster growth in educational 
attainment.
As expected, these results show that, by focusing on income trajectories 
around labor force exit, I exclude a sizable female-dominated group of 
individuals with weak labor force attachment who have never worked or 
who are no longer working at age 50. Fasang (2012) therefore cautions against 
equating retirement with labor force exit and suggests that researchers 
use more flexible def initions to accommodate workers with limited labor 
force attachment. I do not fully take up this suggestion because the loss of 
earnings associated with exit from work is so central to the present analysis. 
However, to alleviate concerns that I may be missing an important part 
of the picture when confining my attention to workers with substantial 
late-life employment, Table 6.1 provides some basic information on the 
f inancial situation of individuals who do not work a substantial number 
of hours at age 50 (more precisely: who do not meet the criterion for being 
at risk which requires that a person worked at least 15 hours per week on 
average at ages 48 to 50). For simplicity, I will from now on refer to these 
workers as ‘not employed at age 50’.
The f irst column in Table 6.1 reports the proportion of men/women in 
the given gender/partnership category who are not employed at age 50. It 
confirms that this proportion is considerably higher for women than for 
men. Among women, it is higher for those living with a partner reflecting 
the persistence of traditional earnings arrangements with a single male 
breadwinner. German women are more likely than American women not 
to be employed around age 50, irrespective of their partnership status. 
Among men, non-employment is more common among singles, which is 
consistent with research showing that partnered men are more successful 
on the labor market (Chun and Lee 2001).
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Table 6.1  Financial situation of individuals with no or marginal employment at age 50
% with no/ 
marginal 






























no partner 15 15.6 (12) 52 (-27) 58
has partner 7 18.7 2 35 5 198
Germany, women
no partner 24 16.1 10 49 15 128
has partner 39 26.2 -3 12 9 1049
United States, men
no partner 16 13.7 (4) 85 (-2) 48
has partner
United States, women
no partner 18 11.7 -2 78 10 171
has partner 30 35.4 -7 21 11 500
n (final column) refers to the number of men/women who are not or marginally employed at 
age 50. estimated changes in household income/poverty rate based on fewer cases. estimates in 
parentheses are based on fewer than 30 cases. poverty rate is defined as relative income poverty 
with the poverty threshold set to 60% of median needs-adjusted post-government income for 
the whole adult population. poverty thresholds are calculated separately by country and year. 
post-gov. = post-government. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
In both countries, women living with a partner are not only the group that 
is most likely not to work at age 50: They are also by far the largest group 
(cf. the unweighted case numbers in the f inal column) and the one that 
is best-off in economic terms. At age 50, their average disposable income 
is higher and their poverty rate1 is lower than for any of the other three 
(gender/partnership) groups. This primarily reflects the fact that most of 
these women (86% in the us, 83% in Germany; results not shown) live with a 
working partner. Over the course of the next ten years, the typical partnered 
woman sees her disposable income fall slightly while the proportion with 
incomes below the poverty line rises noticeably, by 9 percentage points in 
1 Poverty is def ined as relative income poverty using a threshold of 60% of median disposable 
income for the adult population. See notes to Table 6.1 and Chapter 4 for further details.
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Germany and by 11 percentage points in the us. Spousal (early) retirement 
likely is a primary driver of these changes, although other processes such as 
partner loss through widowhood or separation may also play a role. These 
results suggest that, even though I will not explicitly analyze the income 
trajectories experienced by these women in greater detail, the ensuing 
analysis of the consequences of men’s labor force exit is directly relevant 
to their economic situation: The majority of non-employed women live 
together with a partner who is at risk of experiencing retirement as defined 
in this study.
I briefly summarize key f indings for the other three gender-partnership 
groups: The economic situation of non-working partnered men is noticeably 
worse than that of partnered women. This is because their spouses are less 
likely to work and even conditional on working have much lower earnings 
than non-working women’s spouses (results not shown). Interestingly, the 
well-being of partnered German men seems to change little between ages 
50 and 60, while their American counterparts see their situation deteriorate 
as they live through the next decade of their lives. Single men and women 
who do not work at age 50 live in very precarious economic circumstances 
in both countries. At age 50, the estimated poverty rates for German and 
American men in this group are 52% and 85%, respectively. Perhaps due to 
survivor benefits, estimated poverty rates for women are somewhat lower 
at 49% and 78%. Given the small number of cases, changes between ages 50 
and 60 must be viewed with caution, but except perhaps for German men 
there is little evidence that singles see their dire situation change for the 
better. If anything, estimated changes in poverty rates suggest that many 
experience further declines in economic well-being. These findings confirm 
previous f indings that the economic situation of single older women is 
precarious, particularly in the us (e.g., Gornick et al. 2009). Single older men 
with weak labor market attachment, though fewer in number, also seem to 
be a vulnerable group, again especially in the us.
6.2 Sample characteristics and details of estimation approach
I now turn to the main subject of this chapter: The income trajectories 
experienced by older workers and their families as they leave work and 
retire. As described in more detail in Chapter 4, I def ine labor force exit 
as having occurred in year t when the following conditions hold: A person 
worked a substantial number of hours (on average 15 or more per week) at 
ages 48-50 or during her f irst three years in the panel if she entered it at a 
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higher age, worked less than 10 hours per week in t and worked less than ten 
hours per week two years later, that is, in t+2. I ignore information at t+1 to 
ensure consistency of the indicator across periods with annual and biannual 
survey intervals. I exclude a small number of (predominantly American) 
workers who retire after age 75. Finally, I differentiate between voluntary 
and involuntary retirees based on whether retirement was preceded by 
involuntary job loss or a decline in health. In this chapter, I will concentrate 
on income changes among voluntary retirees, yet I will provide core results 
for involuntary retirees as well.
As discussed in Chapter 4, I focus on four- and six-year income changes 
around retirement. Let t represent a given worker’s year of retirement. For 
workers retiring in odd-numbered (e.g., 1995) years, four-year changes are 
calculated from t−1 to t+3 and six-year changes are calculated from t−1 
to t+5. For workers retiring in even-numbered years (e.g., 1996), four-year 
changes are calculated from t−2 to t+2 and six-year changes from t−2 to t+4. 
This somewhat unusual approach alleviates comparability problems arising 
from the psid’s switch to biennial interviewing in 1997 (see. Chapter 4). 
I do not consider income in t because many retirees still worked on their 
preretirement jobs during the f irst months of the year (and because from 
1997 onwards I do not observe income in t for American workers retiring in 
odd-numbered years). Estimated four- and six-year changes tend to be very 
similar. In other words, there is little evidence of systematic postretirement 
income trends at least until  t + 4 / t + 5 . This is consistent with the results 
of Hungerford (2003), who studies income dynamics after retirement in 
Germany and the us and f inds no clear trends until about four years after 
retirement.2 To simplify the presentation, I therefore generally present the 
average of four- and six-year income changes rather than separate results. 
Throughout, standard errors are clustered on the person-level to account 
for intertemporal correlation.
A potential concern is that income just before retirement may be unrep-
resentatively low: Workers might have already reduced their work hours or 
work in (lower-paying) ‘bridge jobs’ (Ruhm 1990) that are not representative 
2 However, Hungerford (2003), who analyzes changes relative to income in the f irst year after 
retirement rather than relative to preretirement income, also f inds that American retirees of both 
sexes experience a steady decline of real income after their fourth or f ifth year in retirement, 
while German retirees, and especially German men, even see their real income increase. He 
argues that these divergent trends are attributable to the greater relative importance of public 
benef its in Germany: While public retirement benef its are typically indexed to inflation or real 
wage growth, the complementary pensions are often not adjusted for changes in the cost of living 
and their real value therefore erodes over time. I return to these issues at the end of this chapter. 
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of their earnings during most of their working lives. Fachinger and Küne-
mund (2009) use German administrative data to explore the sensitivity of 
empirical pension replacement rate estimates to various choices including 
the reference period used to determine preretirement income. Their calcula-
tions do suggest that using income just before retirement as the baseline 
may result in inflated estimates of replacement rates. As a robustness check, 
I examined the sensitivity of key results to calculating income changes 
with respect to average income at t−4/t−3 rather than income at t−2/t−1. 
Estimated replacement rates indeed were slightly lower when postretire-
ment income was compared to income in t−4/t−3 rather than income in t−2/
t−1, but differences were much smaller than those found by Fachinger and 
Künemund (2009).3 More importantly, there was no indication that qualita-
tive conclusions concerning country and period differences in relative 
income changes would be affected. To maximize sample sizes, I therefore 
use income at t−2/t−1 as the reference.
Table 6.2 characterizes voluntary and involuntary retirees with respect to 
key variables. For voluntary retirees, Tables 6.A.1 and 6.A.2 in the appendix 
to this chapter provide additional information on compositional changes 
over time. All time-varying retiree characteristics were measured before 
retirement, in the same year as the preretirement income measure. The 
bottom rows of Table 6.2 report the number of cases with valid information 
on four- and six-year changes. In the us, the numbers are quite modest, 
especially when taking into account that observations for four- and six-year 
changes are not independent because of the panel character of the data.
A clear result emerging from Table 6.2 is that involuntary retirees 
not only retire earlier than voluntary retirees, but that they are also 
disadvantaged in several respects: In particular, they have lower levels 
of education and preretirement earnings and are more likely to be poor 
3 There are several likely reasons why my estimates are less responsive to the choice of the 
reference period. First, two years before retirement, which is the reference year for approximately 
50% of my cases, may already be ‘early enough’: Fachinger and Künemund (2009) indeed f ind 
that upward bias of replacement rate estimates is most extreme when estimates are based on 
income in the year of retirement and the year prior to retirement (cf. Table 6 in their article). 
Further helpful features of my analysis are the trimming of the change measure at +100% (which 
limits the influence of outliers with low preretirement incomes) and the fact that my def inition 
of retirement is based on exit from work, whereas Fachinger and Künemund’s is based on pension 
entrance. Thus, some retirees in their sample have presumably already left employment (and 
thus experienced a decline in income) in the years before their retirement event. Finally, I focus 
on changes in pre- and post-government household income, whereas Fachinger and Künemund 
examine the fraction of preretirement earnings that is replaced by individual public pension 
income.
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or near poor (def ined as having an income between 100 and 150% of the 
poverty line) before retirement. Workers with minority status (migration 
background in Germany, black in us) are also overrepresented among 
involuntary retirees. These results conf irm previous f indings that in-
voluntary retirement is concentrated among more vulnerable groups 
(e.g., Szinovacz and Davey 2005; Lachance and Seligman 2010; Radl 2010, 
2012a). They also caution against direct, unadjusted comparisons of the 
income trajectories experienced by the two groups and underline the 
need to employ a matching approach or some other technique to identify 
appropriate comparison cases for involuntary retirees, for example, via 
did matching.
The lower part of Table 6.2 provides information on partner charac-
teristics and changes in the partner’s employment status for workers 
who were living with a partner prior to their retirement. It highlights an 
important fact about retirement processes at the household level: Workers’ 
retirement is often accompanied by the retirement of their partner or 
spouse. For example, 11.8% of German men who retire voluntarily and were 
living with a partner at t−2/t−1 have a partner who worked part-time (i.e., 
between 10 and 30 hours) at t−2/t−1 and did no longer work a substantial 
number of hours (i.e., less than 10) in the year when the postretirement 
income measure was taken. Retirees in the other groups likewise often 
had partners who left employment at roughly the same time as they did. 
Regardless of what is driving this phenomenon of ‘coretirement’, it does 
complicate the task of identifying the economic impact of individual retire-
ment on household income. This is also stressed by Bardasi et al. (2002: 
145), who study income dynamics around men’s and women’s retirement 
in Britain:
Since we summarise each individual’s economic wellbeing in terms of 
the total income of the household to which he or she belongs, individual 
wellbeing is affected not only by direct changes in each person’s own sta-
tus, but also by what happens to other individuals inside the household. 
In particular, there are reasons to believe that the retirement decisions 
of marital partners are linked.
There is no easy solution to this problem. One approach would be to 
focus only on types of income that accrue directly to the individual (e.g., 
by comparing individual public and private retirement income with 
preretirement earnings). However, this would clearly result in a very 
incomplete picture of changes in economic well-being. Not only would 
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this approach neglect the often important role of income components 
that f low to (or from) the household as a whole rather than to individual 
members such as most means-tested public transfers or direct taxes. 
It would also disregard the crucial importance of income pooling for 
individual well-being (cf. Chapter 2). Another possibility would be to dif-
ferentiate between single and couple households and to further subdivide 
the latter with respect to their joint employment/retirement trajectories. 
However, such an approach is hardly feasible in the present context, 
where I want to compare the effect of retirement across countries and 
time periods, as it would likely run into sample size problems and lead 
to overwhelmingly complex and fragmented results. In addition, such 
an analysis would be complicated by the fact that households are often 
not stable over time.
While the phenomenon of coretirement thus complicates the interpreta-
tion of results, this issue should not be exaggerated. All of the (unadjusted) 
f indings presented in this chapter have perfectly straightforward and 
interesting interpretations: The (hypothetical) f inding that newly retired 
women’s needs-adjusted household income is, on average, 20% lower than 
shortly before retirement would mean just that, even though some of the 
decline may be attributable to the retirement of partnered women’s spouses 
rather than to the retirement of women themselves.
In addition, period differences in coretirement patterns (whether they 
reflect secular trends or sampling variability) can also be accounted for 
by the compositional adjustment procedure outlined in Chapter 4. As 
elaborated there, I use Hainmueller’s (2012) entropy balancing method to 
purge my estimates of the impact of changes in retiree composition. By 
including appropriate variables in this procedure, I am able to assess the 
possibility that observed trends are driven by period differences in couples’ 
joint retirement trajectories.
Table 6.3 lists and provides some detail on the retiree and partner char-
acteristics included in the adjustment procedure. Most of the included vari-
ables are straightforward. I do not adjust retiree composition for retirement 
age because the latter is likely endogenous to institutional changes that 
affect the overall level of retirement benefits or the costs of early retirement. 
Adjusting for retirement age would therefore arguably introduce ‘posttreat-
ment bias’, that is, bias arising from controlling for the consequences of a 
causal variable (Ho et al. [2007]; see also Wooldridge [2005]). For similar 
reasons, I also include only a crude measure of work experience (35+ vs. 
fewer than 35 years) because work experience is correlated rather strongly 
with age, especially for men.
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It is worth noting that I do not include a dummy for East German retir-
ees in the compositional adjustments. Doing so would run into technical 
problems because the f irst subperiod ends in (retirement) year 1991 and 
includes practically no East German retirees. Alternatives would be to 
analyze East Germans separately or to exclude East German retirees 
from the analysis. The f irst approach, however, would further raise the 
complexity of results and run into sample size problems. The latter ap-
proach is unappealing because a substantial fraction of the population 
would be excluded from the analysis. I will therefore analyze East and 
West German retirees together and occasionally provide further detail 
on differences between the two groups. The eb procedure also helps to 
account for compositional trends that are related to the entry of East 
German retirees into the sample. Perhaps the most important trend is 
that the inclusion of East German women noticeably raised the proportion 
of women with long careers (as captured by the dummy for having 35 
or more years of work experience). However, a somewhat weaker trend 
toward longer careers can also be found for West German women (i.e., 
women who lived in the Federal Republic of Germany before November 9, 
1989).
As noted above, identif ication of individual retirement effects is 
complicated by the phenomenon of coretirement. Controlling for period 
differences in partner’s labor supply and retirement behavior may help 
to rule out the possibility that observed period differences reflect differ-
ences in coretirement patterns rather than institutional change. At the 
same time, spousal retirement patterns may be subject to the same type 
of endogeneity issues that lead me to not control for period differences 
in retirement ages. I therefore present two sets of composition-adjusted 
estimates. The f irst set is adjusted with respect to covariate sets I and II in 
Table 6.3, that is, with respect to a rich set of retiree characteristics and 
a few basic partner/couple characteristics, including the age difference 
between the retiree and his/her partner, the partner’s work experience and 
level of education, and an indicator for losing a partner due to separation 
or death. I will refer to this adjustment as ‘Adjustment 1’. The second set of 
adjusted estimates (‘Adjustment 2’) is additionally adjusted for covariate 
set III, which includes measures of the partner’s employment status at 
t−2/t−1 and dummy variables indicating whether the partner left full-time 
or part-time work between the preretirement and the postretirement 
observation.
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Table 6.3  Characteristics included in compositional adjustment (entropy balancing)
Characteristic Details
I. Retiree characteristics
Civil servant status de only
migration background/race de: migration background vs. no migration 
background us: black vs. non-black
education de: no degree/general schooling only (low) 
vs. vocational degree (intermediate) vs. 
tertiary degree (high)
us: Less than high school (low) vs. high 
school/some college (intermediate) vs. 
college degree (high)
presence of partner in t − 2/t − 1 yes vs. no
total work experience (years), t − 2/t − 1 35 or more vs. less than 35 years
Work hours in t − 2/t − 1 10-30 vs. 30+ (full-time)
household income in t − 2 below poverty line (excluded from analysis of 
poverty entries) vs. 100-150% of poverty line 
(near poor) vs. more than 150% of poverty line
Labor earnings in t − 2/t − 1 earnings terciles
II. Basic set of partner/couple characteristics (if partner present in t − 2/t − 1)
age difference age difference in years
partner’s education See above (retiree characteristics)
partner’s work experience See above (retiree characteristics)
Loss of partner due to separation
or death
dummy variable indicating loss of partner 
since t − 2/t − 1, time-varying (i.e., may 
take different values for first and second 
postretirement observation)
III. Additional characteristics included in full set of partner/couple characteristics
partner’s work hours in t − 2/t − 1 Less than 10 vs. 10-30 (part-time) vs. 30+ 
(full-time)
partner leaves employment no exit vs. leaves part-time work vs. leaves 
full-time work; time-varying (i.e., may 
take different values for first and second 
postretirement observation)
6.3 Income changes around exit from work
I now address the main questions of this chapter: How do income trajecto-
ries around voluntary labor force exit differ between the us and Germany? 
How have they changed over time? And to what extent can welfare state 
arrangements account for observed country and period differences? I begin 
with relative income changes and the risk of entering poverty upon retire-
ment. I then explore the variability of income changes around labor force 
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exit by looking at the proportion of workers who experience large drops of 
income and at the standard deviation of income changes. I conclude with an 
analysis of differences by level of education and retirement age. The focus 
is on voluntary retirees, but for the sake of completeness and comparison, 
I also present the main results for involuntary retirees. Throughout the 
chapter, the discussion refers to voluntary retirees unless explicitly stated 
otherwise.
Average changes
Figure 6.2 depicts average relative income changes around men’s retire-
ment. Changes before taxes and transfers are displayed in the upper row and 
changes after taxes and transfers in the lower pair of graphs. I show three sets 
of estimates for voluntary retirees: The leftmost triplet depicts unadjusted 
period-specific estimates. The second triplet is adjusted for period differences 
in retiree composition and for basic differences in partner/couple characteris-
tics (Adjustment 1). The third triplet depicts estimated income changes under 
Adjustment 2, which additionally accounts for period differences in spousal 
labor supply and retirement behavior. Finally, the rightmost triplet shows 
unadjusted results for involuntary retirees. Results for voluntary retirees are 
accompanied by two-sided 90% confidence intervals.
The lower pair of graphs summarize changes in needs-adjusted income after 
government taxes and transfers, that is, in disposable income. Again focusing 
on results for voluntary retirees, the most striking finding is that average losses 
appear to have risen in both countries. Based on unadjusted estimates, the 
average decline experienced by German men rose from -12% in the first, to -14% 
in the second, and to -18% in the latest period: Formal tests show that the differ-
ence between the first and the last period is statistically significant (p < 0.05).4 
Results are very similar when compositional differences are controlled. Separate 
analysis of East and West German retirees (based on their country of residence 
in 1989) does not lead to qualitatively different conclusions concerning the 
overall trend. However, results suggest that for West German men most of the 
increase in relative losses occurred from the first to the second period (with 
little additional change from the second to the third period).5
4 Throughout the study, I mainly convey statistical uncertainty using two-sided 90% conf i-
dence intervals that are based on cluster-robust standard errors (with clustering at the person 
level). However, I occasionally report the statistical signif icance of period or country contrasts. 
The p-values underlying these statements were generally obtained using the suest routine in 
Stata 12 (using the vce(cluster) option).
5 The fact that average estimates for West and East German men in Figure 6.2 suggest a more 
gradual decline is due to the relatively small losses of East German men in the second period (i.e., 
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For American men, estimated losses increased from -12% in the f irst 
to -20% in the second and third periods. Composition-adjusted estimates 
lead to similar conclusions. Due to smaller sample sizes (see Table 6.2), 
these estimates are considerably more uncertain than for German men, yet 
unadjusted as well as adjusted differences between the f irst and the two 
subsequent periods generally reach or approach statistical signif icance at 
the 5% level.6 These results support hypothesis hvr 6 according to which 
average income losses have increased over time in both countries.
retirement years 1992-97). This is likely attributable to particularly generous (early) retirement 
opportunities for East German workers in the f irst years after German reunif ication (Jochem 
2009: 224).
6 More precisely p < 0.05 for the difference between the f irst and the second period and p < 
0.13 for the difference between the f irst and the third period.
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Results for involuntary retirees, depicted by the rightmost triplets of dots, 
do not suggest that they suffer greater losses than their voluntary counter-
parts. Two things have to be kept in mind, however. First, the estimates in 
Figure 6.2 do not account for the fact that the decline in income associated 
with labor force exit occurs earlier for involuntary retirees which implies 
greater losses in terms of lifetime income. Second, as shown in Table 6.2, 
involuntary retirees have a rather different socioeconomic prof ile than 
voluntary retirees, so unadjusted comparisons must be viewed with caution. 
That said, Figure 6.2 shows a marked increase in pre- and especially post-
government losses for German men. This provides some initial support for 
the idea that recent welfare state reforms have disproportionately affected 
older workers with unstable late careers, a possibility that I will explore in 
more detail in Part III.
Before examining income changes around women’s retirement, I probe 
a little deeper into possible explanations for the observed pattern of men’s 
income changes. Table 6.4 explores the role of private non-labor income 
and public taxes and transfers in buffering the decline in labor income 
associated with exit from work. Composition-adjusted estimates are pro-
vided in Tables 6.A.3 and 6.A.4 in the appendix to this chapter. Separately 
by country, gender, and period, Table 6.4 f irst reports the proportion of 
voluntary retirees experiencing a decline of individual and total household 
labor earnings around labor force exit. Not surprisingly, these proportions 
are generally close to 100%.7 For those who did experience a decline in 
household earnings, I then investigate whether and to what extent losses 
were offset by simultaneous increases in private non-labor income (pnli; 
income from assets, private pensions, and private transfers), public pension 
and transfer income (ppti; income from public pensions and all other public 
transfers such as unemployment benefits), or a decline in household direct 
taxes (hht). For each of these income components, I report both the propor-
tion of workers with increased income of the given type and the average 
and median ‘replacement rate’ for workers with an increase. Individual 
replacement rates are simply the gain in pnli, ppti, or hht expressed in 
percent of the household earnings loss.8 To reduce the impact of measure-
ment error and random fluctuations, I ignore earnings losses and income 
7 They may be less than 100% because the retirement indicator is compatible with fewer than 
ten hours of work per week in  t + 2 / t + 3 and any number of work hours in  t + 4 / t + 5 . In addition, 
whether total household earnings decline also depends on the labor supply of other household 
members.
8 I calculate replacement rates on the basis of household rather than individual earnings 
because the other income components are also household-level aggregates.
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gains of less than 5% (relative to income of the given type at t−2/t−1). I again 
average estimates for four- and six-year changes because there is little 
evidence of systematic differences.
Table 6.4  Changes in income components around retirement – voluntary retirees only
(a) Men
Germany United States
85‑ 92‑ 98‑ 81‑ 88‑ 95‑
91 97 07 87 94 02
% with individual earnings loss (IEL) 99 99 98 96 97 96
% with household earnings loss (HEL) 95 95 98 96 95 95
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given heL 64 54 52 81 61 70
average replacement rate 18 12 16 37 46 47
median replacement rate 7 5 7 32 29 33
Change in public pension and transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased ppti given heL 94 91 91 82 79 63
average replacement rate 60 56 51 37 35 34
median replacement rate 51 47 44 27 27 22
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given heL 92 96 93 98 93 95
average replacement rate 26 26 30 27 29 28
median replacement rate 27 27 29 26 26 26
(b) Women
Germany United States
85‑ 92‑ 98‑ 81‑ 88‑ 95‑
91 97 07 87 94 02
% with individual earnings loss (IEL) 97 98 95 98 94 99
% with household earnings loss (HEL) 96 95 94 93 93 92
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given heL 59 38 58 58 58 67
average replacement rate 24 18 19 37 46 52
median replacement rate 12 6 8 28 29 33
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(b) Women
Germany United States
Change in public pension and transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased ppti given heL 89 87 90 72 70 63
average replacement rate 54 63 52 31 36 54
median replacement rate 45 49 44 25 25 32
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given heL 92 92 93 96 92 89
average replacement rate 28 26 31 31 26 31
median replacement rate 28 25 32 27 23 26
Replacement rates are expressed in percentage terms and calculated as the increase in pnLi/
ppti or decrease in hht divided by the absolute value of the decline in household labor earnings. 
Replacement rates capped at +200 per cent. average and median replacement rates calculated 
over observations with nonzero replacement rates (i.e., over observations with an increase in the 
given income component). 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
Results for male voluntary retirees are presented in panel (a) of Table 6.4. To 
what extent are earnings losses around men’s retirement counterbalanced 
by increasing income from other private and public sources, or by a declin-
ing tax burden? Considering country differences f irst, estimates clearly 
show that public pension and transfer income is more important for German 
than for American retirees and that the opposite holds for income from 
private sources. These results provide strong support for hypotheses hvr 
1 and hvr 2. Lower income taxes also play a crucial role in cushioning the 
loss of earnings associated with retirement and their importance appears 
to be broadly similar across the two countries.
Turning to changes over time, results for Germany suggest declines in the 
cushioning effect of private and public income sources. For private non-labor 
income, this trend is visible in the proportion of workers with increasing 
pnli (rather than in replacement rates conditional on an increase). Further 
analysis shows that this is partly, but not completely, attributable to the 
presence of East German retirees in the second and third periods who tend 
to have low levels of private retirement income. As for public transfers, all 
three indicators declined from the f irst to the third period, with changes in 
average and median replacement rates being quite substantial: According to 
my estimates the former declined from 60% to 51% and the latter from 51% 
to 44% from the f irst to the f inal period. Again, the entry of East German 
retirees into the sample plays a role, but in this case it has slightly dampened 
rather than reinforced the negative trend (further calculations show that 
public replacement rates were somewhat higher for East German retirees, 
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especially in the middle period). On the whole, these results support hvr 
3, which predicts that the buffering effect of public transfers has declined. 
Finally, the extent of cushioning through direct taxes appears more or less 
stable over time, with perhaps a slight hint of a growing buffering effect.
Turning to American men, results suggest that the share of workers whose 
earnings losses are buffered by increasing private non-labor income fell 
noticeably between the 1980s and the early 2000s. The trend, however, is not 
monotone: The share of workers who saw at least part of the earnings loss 
offset by higher pnli starts out at 81% in the f irst period, dips to 61% in the 
second period and recovers to 70% during the final period. For those who did 
see their pnli rise, median replacement rates seem to have remained largely 
unchanged, whereas average replacement rates have increased, pointing to 
a growing influence of positive outliers who enjoy high replacement rates. 
These results provide initial support for the idea that the shift from db to 
dc pensions has spawned greater inequalities in private pension income. As 
in the German case, results for public transfers again support hvr 3 which 
states that buffering through public transfers has declined. The striking 
drop in the share of retirees with increasing transfers must be interpreted 
with caution, as it is driven by trends among very late retirees who have 
begun drawing public pension benef its before leaving employment and 
therefore experience no marked increases in public transfer income when 
they f inally exit from work. However, both average and especially median 
public replacement rates declined noticeably for those who did see their 
public transfer income rise. As in Germany, cushioning through changes 
in household taxes private taxes shows no strong trend.
Figure 6.3 depicts changes in needs-adjusted household income around 
women’s retirement. Comparing results across countries, two f indings 
are especially noteworthy: First, as with men, pre-government losses are 
substantially greater in the German case. Second, post-government losses 
are substantially greater for American women, except in the last period. 
This partly ref lects differences in household composition: A somewhat 
larger share of American women lives without a partner and these women 
tend to experience larger income losses (results not shown). However, 
American women’s retirement is also associated with greater income losses 
conditional on living with a partner.
As for changes over time, pre-government losses for German women 
who retire voluntarily follow no clear pattern. Unadjusted results for post-
government income are suggestive of a slight downward trend, but the 
period differences are far from statistical signif icance. The trend is ampli-
f ied, however, when retiree composition is held constant, mainly because 
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adjusted losses are much smaller in the f irst period. This suggests that 
compositional changes among female retirees have dampened the trend 
towards increased income losses found for German men. Period differences 
in coretirement patterns do not seem to be a major compositional factor, 
as the two sets of adjusted estimates are quite similar. As can be seen in 
Appendix Table 6.A.2, the most noteworthy compositional trends among 
female retirees are a clear educational upgrading, a (related) increase in 
preretirement earnings, and the growing share of women with 35 or more 
years of work experience. Further analysis suggests that women’s gains in 
experience are the single most important factor.9 Given the close relation-
ship between lifetime earnings and public pension benefits in Germany, 
9 Estimated average income losses after taxes and transfers for the f irst period are reduced 
from 7.7% to 3.9% under Adjustment 1 (cf. the bottom left graph in Figure 6.3.). The impact of the 
compositional adjustment is substantially smaller, the reduction now being from 7.7% to 6.1%, 
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this is not surprising. As noted above, this compositional trend is partly 
attributable to the entry of East German women into the sample.
These results are underscored by estimated replacement rates for female 
voluntary retirees. In contrast to German men, public replacement rates 
in panel (b) of Table 6.4 do not appear to have declined over time, while 
there is some trend toward lower private income replacement rates. By 
contrast, adjusted estimates in Appendix Tables 6.A.3 and 6.A.4 do show 
declines in public replacement rates that are similar in magnitude to those 
for German men. This further supports the conclusion that compositional 
changes among female retirees – and in particular their longer work careers 
(in terms of actual experience) – have cushioned the impact of declining 
public pension generosity on women’s retirement incomes.10
Among American women retiring voluntarily, there is a clear trend 
toward smaller pre-government losses: According to my estimates, whereas 
the average recently retired woman’s pre-government income was 51% lower 
than before retirement in the early to mid-1980s, this difference was only 
39% for women who retired between 1995 and 2002. This period difference 
is almost statistically signif icant (p < 0.07). It seems likely that this trend 
is at least partly attributable to the narrowing of the gender gap in private 
pension coverage (Copeland 2011). Consistent with this interpretation, panel 
(b) of Table 6.4 shows that the proportion of women whose (household) 
earnings losses are partly offset by rising pnli has grown over time. As 
with men, there is also evidence of growing inequalities in private pen-
sion income, as indicated by the divergence of the average and median 
replacement rates for women with rising pnli. Results in the bottom right 
graph in Figure 6.3 suggest that these favorable trends in pre-government 
income changes before taxes and transfers have translated into smaller 
losses after taxes and transfers, although the unadjusted difference between 
the f irst and the last period does not even begin to approach conventional 
signif icance levels. Unadjusted and adjusted estimates are broadly similar 
for both pre-and post-government losses. Unlike with German women, 
compositional changes (with respect to variables included in the eb proce-
dure) thus seem to have played a minor role, despite broadly similar, albeit 
when the measure of having 35 or more years of work experience is excluded from the adjustment 
procedure. Omitting the education and/or earnings measures has no comparably large effect.
10 Another potential, though apparently less important source of observed gender differences 
is that, especially for women, cutbacks in overall pension generosity have been partly offset by 
other legislative changes. Possible factors are the introduction of default pension sharing after 
divorce in 1976 (Fasang 2008) or the introduction of child care credits in the 1990s, although 
relatively few women in my sample will have benef itted from the latter.
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somewhat weaker, trends in educational attainment and work experience 
(cf. Appendix Table 6.A.2).
So far, I have analyzed relative income changes for the average retiree. 
For men, I found rather clear evidence that income losses relative to pre-
retirement income have risen over time in both Germany and the United 
States. Detailed analysis of changes in income components suggests that 
declining public replacement rates are the main force behind these trends. 
Results for women’s retirement were more complex, with some indication 
of growing losses in Germany, especially when compositional changes are 
controlled. For American women, by contrast, losses seem to have declined, 
with rising private retirement income apparently accounting for the lion’s 
share of the change.
While illuminating, average changes relative to preretirement income 
cannot capture all interesting features of the trajectories experienced by 
retirees. I therefore now begin to address a few other crucial aspects of 
income changes at retirement. I start with poverty entries after retirement 
and then turn to the variability of relative income changes.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 depict country and period differences in the risk 
of entering poverty around men’s and women’s retirement. As noted in 
Chapter 4, these analyses are restricted to workers with preretirement 
(post-government) incomes above the poverty line. As can be seen in 
Table 6.2, preretirement poverty rates are quite low for voluntary retirees, 
ranging between 3.3% for German men and 6.4% for American men. Higher 
preretirement poverty rates of Americans are consistent with well-known 
country differences in the prevalence of in-work poverty (see, for example, 
Brady et al. 2010). It is also worth noting that preretirement poverty rates 
are considerably higher for involuntary retirees, particularly in the us.
Turning to Figure 6.4, results again conf irm that private retirement 
income is much more important for Americans. While approximately 70% 
of voluntarily retired German men would be poor if they had to live on 
private income alone, the corresponding estimates for American men are in 
the neighborhood of 40%. Unadjusted estimates suggest that the proportion 
of Americans with low pre-government income was higher in the f inal than 
in the f irst two periods, which might be taken as another piece of evidence 
for growing inequalities in private retirement income. However, not only 
do period differences in unadjusted estimates miss statistical signif icance 
by a substantial margin, the trend also turns out not to be robust in the 
compositional adjustments.
With regard to retirees’ economic well-being, the crucial question of 
course is whether their post-government income is suff icient to avoid 
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poverty. Clearly, public pensions and transfers lift many of those with 
insuff icient private income above the poverty line, especially in Germany. 
Nevertheless a substantial proportion of men who were not poor before 
exiting employment become poor after retirement. At least during the f irst 
two periods, German and American men who retired voluntarily faced 
broadly similar risks of entering poverty upon retirement, with entry rates 
oscillating between 8% and 15%. If anything, estimates are slightly lower for 
American men. However, the share of American men falling into poverty 
surged to almost 20% in the f inal period, with the difference to the f irst 
period barely missing conventional standards of statistical signif icance (p 
< 0.06). The increase in the proportion of men entering poverty is mitigated, 
but still quite substantial when compositional changes are controlled.
Trends for German men are strikingly different. While the trend toward 
greater relative income losses was similar in magnitude to that found 
for American men (cf. Figure 6.2), there is not the slightest indication in 
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Figure 6.4 that German men retiring voluntarily have become more likely to 
fall into poverty after retirement. Growing relative income losses have thus 
not (yet) resulted in more men entering poverty, suggesting that increases 
in relative losses are concentrated among higher-income workers. This 
could be the case because public pension replacement rates have declined 
disproportionately for workers with higher incomes (recall the phasing 
out of pension credits for full-time education). A second (and compatible) 
explanation might be that higher-earning workers are more likely to retire 
early despite the growing f inancial penalties for doing so – simply because 
they are the ones who can afford to. This second possibility would not be at 
odds with research showing that the prevalence of early pension take-up is 
highest among workers who are unemployed prior to retirement (Brussig 
2010), as such ‘involuntary retirees’ are treated as a separate group in the 
present analysis. In this context, it is also important to note that German 
men who retired involuntarily do seem to have faced substantially greater 
risks of entering poverty in the f inal period (cf. Figure 6.4).
Overall, results in Figure 6.4 provide only modest support for hypothesis 
hvr 4, which predicts that Americans are more likely to enter poverty 
because greater emphasis on complementary pensions results in more 
workers being inadequately prepared for retirement. A noticeable difference 
in the expected direction emerges only in the f inal period. Importantly, 
however, this is when the us had arguably become more American (in terms 
of corresponding more closely to the ideal type of a liberal/residual) welfare 
state, primarily because of the increasing individualization of employer-
provided pension coverage. The hypothesis that rates of poverty entry have 
risen over time (hvr 5) is only supported for the us.
Figure 6.5 displays estimated rates of poverty entry after women’s retire-
ment. Country differences show the by now familiar result that Americans 
have higher pre-government incomes after retirement and are therefore 
less likely to fall below the poverty threshold before public transfers are 
factored in. After taxes and transfers, however, American women are more 
likely to enter poverty, with their entry rates being in the neighborhood of 
20% and German women’s being closer to 10%.
As for trends over time, results for American women largely mirror those 
for relative income changes. Just as American women’s relative income 
losses have declined, so has their risk of entering poverty upon retirement. 
Changes in pre-government poverty are small, but this need not imply that 
this trend is solely attributable to changes in public taxes and transfers, 
as there is plenty of room for improvements in private retirement income 
below (and/or above) the poverty line. The decline in the post-government 
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entry rate is also noticeably stronger when compositional changes are 
controlled. Trends in the poverty entry rate of German women are less 
readily reconciled with results for relative income changes. According 
to my estimates, the proportion of women entering (post-government) 
poverty was between 10 and 15% during the f irst two periods and dropped 
to approximately 5% in the f inal period, despite the slight trend toward 
greater relative income losses visible in Figure 6.3. Apparently, just as for 
German men, increases in relative income losses must have been concen-
trated among workers who either were poor already before retirement or 
among relatively well-off workers who could afford greater losses without 
falling below the poverty line. While their impact is much smaller than in 
the case of relative income losses, compositional adjustments somewhat 
attenuate the trend towards lower poverty risks. Finally, results for German 
women retiring involuntarily once more suggest that their situation has 
deteriorated compared to voluntary retirees. Overall, results for women, 
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thus support hvr 4 which predicts higher rates of poverty entry among 
American retirees, while the increase in poverty risks stipulated by hvr 5 
is not borne out by these f indings.
Variability of income changes
I now examine country and period differences in the variability of income 
changes. The variability of income changes, and in particular the proportion 
of retirees experiencing large income losses, provides important additional 
information for assessing the consequences of retirement for economic 
well-being. For example, Figure 6.2 showed that, consistent with hypothesis 
hvr 6, average income losses around men’s retirement have risen in both 
countries. This trend would be especially discomforting if it were due to an 
increasing number of retirees suffering very large income losses. It would 
give less cause for concern if it primarily reflected changes in the upper 
part of the distribution of income changes such as a decline in the fraction 
of retirees with very small income losses or even gains.
Table 6.5 focuses on country differences in the variability of income 
changes around retirement (see Appendix Tables 6.A.5 and 6.A.6 for 
composition-adjusted estimates). The f irst two columns show that the 
proportion of retiring men and women who experience large reductions 
in post-government income is substantially greater in the United States. 
28% of retiring German men see their post-government income drop by 
more than a third (‘large drop’) and 10% even experience losses of more 
than a half (‘very large drop’). For American men, these f igures are higher, 
at 35% and 16%, respectively. The country difference for women is in the 
same direction and even larger in size. These results provide clear support 
for hypothesis hvr 9 according to which American retirees are more likely 
to experience large losses.
The remaining columns of Table 6.5 provide further evidence on the 
variability of income changes. The measures presented capture two dis-
tinct aspects of variability: within-cohort and cross-cohort differences. To 
measure within-cohort variability, I f irst calculated the standard deviation 
of income changes for all workers retiring in a given year11 – a ‘retirement 
cohort’ – and then computed the average of these cohort-specif ic standard 
deviations. To measure cross-cohort variability, I f irst estimated median 
income changes for each of these cohorts and then computed the standard 
deviation of these medians across retirement cohorts. This measure thus 
11 Or, more precisely, in the same two-year period because I pool observations from odd- and 
even-numbered years to ensure comparability of results across space and time.
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indicates how much income changes for the typical worker differ across 
retirement cohorts. In contrast to the share of workers with large losses, 
the standard deviation is also sensitive to differences in the upper tail of 
the distribution of income changes. I provide results for both pre- and 
post-government income.
Table 6.5  Variability of income changes – voluntary retirees only










































men 28 10 36.1 -0.34* 3.1 (2.6) 30.8 -0.13 5.2 (3.8)
Women 20 7 39.0 -0.18 6.6 (6.6) 30.6 -0.45+ 6.5 (5.7)
United States
men 35 16 39.8 0.75** 6.4 (5.9) 35.2 0.87** 8.0 (7.6)
Women 36 15 45.0 0.39 12.0 (11.2) 37.6 0.08 10.1 (10.1)
estimates in parentheses based on detrended estimates (i.e., residuals from a regression with a 
linear time trend). Sd = Standard deviation. +: p < .1; *: p < .05; **: p < .01. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
In Chapter 5, I conjectured that greater reliance on private income sources 
in the us boosts intra- (hvr 7) and inter-cohort (hvr 11) variability of 
income changes. Results in Table 6.5 largely confirm these expectations. 
As shown in the third to last column, the average within-cohort standard 
deviation of relative changes in post-government income is estimated at 
30.8 percentage points for German men and 30.6 percentage points for Ger-
man women. The corresponding f igures for American retirees are 35.2 and 
37.6 percentage points, respectively. Results for pre-government income 
are qualitatively similar. Cohort-to-cohort variability of post-government 
changes is also greater in the us. According to the f inal column of Table 6.5, 
the standard deviation of the median change in post-government income 
is 5.2 percentage points for German men and 6.5 percentage points for 
German women. The corresponding estimates for American retirees are 
8.0 and 7.6 percentage points, respectively. The f igures in parentheses 
show that the country difference is amplif ied further when estimated 
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cohort-specif ic changes are purged of secular trends via a simple linear 
regression.12
I also predicted (hvr 8) that variability of income changes has grown 
over time, particularly in the United States, where more heterogeneous and 
volatile dc plans have increasingly replaced db plans as the predominant 
form of complementary retirement saving. As a straightforward check of 
this possibility, I regressed the estimated within-year standard deviations 
on a linear time trend. For German men and women, the trend estimates 
in Table 6.5 are uniformly negative, suggesting declining heterogeneity of 
income changes around retirement. By contrast, hypothesis hvr 8 is clearly 
supported for American men, the group where the strongest trend was 
expected. According to my estimates, the standard deviation of income 
changes among American workers retiring in the same year grew by 0.75 
percentage points per year before taxes and transfers and by 0.87 percentage 
points per year after taxes and transfers, with both trend estimates being 
statistically signif icant.13 Estimates also suggest that variability increased 
for American women, especially before taxes and transfers, but the trends 
are weaker and not statistically signif icant.
Table 6.5 shows that American retirees are more likely to experience large 
income losses at retirement, but how has their incidence changed over time? 
The top pair of graphs in Figure 6.6 show that for retiring men ‘large’ income 
losses of more than a third have become more common in both countries. 
12 Given the smaller number of observations for the us, one might be worried that the country 
difference is partly attributable to greater sampling variability of American estimates. As a 
simple robustness check, I randomly deleted observations from the German (male and female) 
samples so that the average number of observations per retirement cohort matched that of the 
corresponding American samples. I took the panel character of the data into account by applying 
this procedure separately to persons with only one postretirement observation (the vast majority 
of which are from t+2/t+3) and to persons with two postretirement observations. I repeated this 
procedure 250 times for each gender. On average, cross-cohort standard deviations of median 
income changes for the trimmed German samples were higher than the corresponding estimates 
in Table 6.5, yet remained substantially below the corresponding American estimates: For 
German men, the average standard deviation across the 250 trimmed samples is 5.7 percentage 
points for post-government and 5.6 percentage points for pre-government income, compared to 
untrimmed estimates of 5.2 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively (see Table 6.5). For German 
women, the trimmed samples yield average standard deviations of 6.6 (post-government) and 
8.9 (pre-government) percentage points. The corresponding estimates for the untrimmed sample 
are 6.5 and 6.6 percentage points. One can therefore safely conclude that the f inding of higher 
cross-cohort variability in the us is not merely a statistical artifact.
13 Following recommendations by Lewis and Linzer (2005), I obtained HC3 heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors to account for the fact that the dependent variable in these regressions 
is estimated and therefore subject to sampling variability.
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The increase, however, is much stronger in the us, where the fraction of men 
whose disposable income drops by more than a third rose from 23% in the 
f irst to 43% in the last period, an increase that is statistically signif icant 
at the 1% level. The corresponding increase for German men, from 23% 
to 30%, appears almost negligible in comparison, although it, too, almost 
reaches conventional signif icance levels (p < 0.11) and is substantively 
meaningful. Country differences are even more pronounced for the share 
of men whose disposable income drops by more than half. For German 
men retiring voluntarily, such very large drops seem to have occurred at 
most slightly more frequently toward the end of the period, implying that 
the increasing number of workers with large drops is driven by workers 
losing between a third and half of their income. By contrast, for American 
men, the trend in the proportion of workers losing more than half of their 
preretirement income is no less dramatic than for large losses of more than 
a third. In fact, the increase from 7% in the f irst to 25% in the last period 










































































Period 1: 85−91 (DE) / 81−87 (US) Period 2: 92−97 (DE) / 88−94 (US)
Period 3: 98−07 (DE) / 95−02 (US) 90%−CI
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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(p < 0.01) is almost as large (in terms of percentage points) as the increase 
in the share of workers losing more than a third. None of these f indings for 
men are changed substantively by the compositional adjustments.
Figure 6.7 displays period differences in the prevalence of large and 
very large income drops around women’s retirement. Consistent with 
the more favorable trends found so far, there is no clear evidence that 
women’s retirement is increasingly associated with substantial income 
losses. For American women, there is even some hint that large (though 
not very large) income losses occurred less frequently toward the end of the 
observation period, especially when retiree composition is held constant. 
Results for German women likewise echo earlier f indings: While unadjusted 
estimates do not exhibit a clear tendency, there is some evidence for a 
growing prevalence of large (but not of very large) losses in the composition-
adjusted scenarios. Again, this is an indication that compositional changes, 










































































Period 1: 85−91 (DE) / 81−87 (US) Period 2: 92−97 (DE) / 88−94 (US)
Period 3: 98−07 (DE) / 95−02 (US) 90%−CI
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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in particular women’s longer/more continuous work careers, curbed an 
otherwise stronger trend towards increased downward income mobility 
at retirement.
Differences by level of education and retirement age
In a f inal step, I now explore systematic differences in income trajectories 
by level of education and retirement age. Hypothesis hvr 12 predicts that 
low-educated workers are more likely to enter poverty upon retirement, 
hypothesis hvr 13 expects that educational differences in the risk of poverty 
entry are greater in the us, and hvr 14 posits that educational differentials 
have grown over time, particularly in the us.
Figure 6.8 addresses these hypotheses by grouping voluntary retirees ac-
cording to their level of education (for details on the educational categories, 
see Table 6.3 above). As before, retirees are also differentiated with respect 
to country, gender, and year/period of retirement. Due to small sample sizes, 
I now only differentiate between two periods, an early period comprising 
all workers who retired until 1992 in the us and until 1996 in Germany, 
and a late period comprising all workers who retired later. I do not present 
composition-adjusted estimates because the entropy balancing procedure 
often runs into convergence problems with small samples.
Figure 6.8 contains a large number of f indings. To keep the discussion 
compact, I will focus on the results for poverty entries, which are displayed 
in Subgraph III at the bottom left of the f igure, and only briefly highlight 
the most noteworthy results for the other outcomes. Estimates for men 
are represented by dots and estimates for women by triangles, with black 
markers representing estimates for the early and white markers those for 
the late period.
Focusing f irst on results for men, Figure 6.8 demonstrates that male 
retirees with a low education face much higher risks of entering poverty 
than their better-educated counterparts. Differences between workers 
with an intermediate level of education (de: vocational degree; us: high 
school degree and no more than two years of post-secondary education) and 
those with a tertiary degree are rather small compared to the gap between 
low- and better-educated workers. These f indings are consistent with 
hypothesis hvr 12. Support for hvr 13, which predicts greater educational 
inequalities in the us, is not unambiguous. In the early period, poverty risks 
were somewhat higher for all educational groups in Germany, with absolute 
educational differentials (i.e., in percentage point terms) being broadly 
similar across the two countries and relative differentials (i.e., in terms of 
relative risks or odds ratios) being smaller in Germany. In the late period, 
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educational differentials appear to have been somewhat larger in the us, 
especially in absolute terms, though it must be noted that the uncertainty 
of American estimates is considerable.
This complex pattern of country differences is directly related to dif-
ferences in changes over time. While for German men education-specif ic 
rates of poverty are virtually identical across the two periods, American 
men of all educational levels faced greater risks of poverty entry in the late 
period. In absolute terms, the estimated increase was largest for low-skilled 
men, with the rate of poverty entry almost doubling, from 25% to 45%. 
The confidence bands, however, indicate that the late-period estimate in 
particular is very imprecise. Poverty risks also rose for American men with 
higher levels of education: from 4 to 13% for those with an intermediate and 
from 0 to 7% for those with a high level of education. Taken at face value, 
these estimates imply an increase in absolute educational differentials 
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IV − % with post-gov. loss > 50%
Early − Men Late − Men Early − Women Late − Women 90%−CI
periods defined in terms of the year of retirement. early period: 1981-92 (us)/1985-96 (de). Late 
period: 1993-2002 (us)/1997-2007 (de). ‘Low’, ‘int.’, and high refer to low, intermediate, and high 
level of education, respectively (for details on the educational categories, see table 6.3 above). 
dashed branches of confidence intervals were cut to avoid unnecessary extensions of the scale. all 
confidence intervals are symmetric about the corresponding point estimate. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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and a decline in relative educational differentials, thus providing partial 
support for hypothesis hvr 14.
Turning briefly to f indings for the other outcome variables, conclusions 
from the analysis of poverty risks are generally confirmed. For example, 
the increase in average relative income losses after taxes and transfers for 
German men seems to have occurred in all educational groups (cf. Subgraph 
II). In the us, by contrast, relative post-government losses have risen clearly 
only for those with a low level of education. The increase in the proportion of 
retirees with very large income losses has also been strongest for this group 
(cf. Subgraph IV). Finally, low-educated American men also experienced 
greater reductions in pre-government income in the late period, while losses 
appear to have declined for the other educational groups (cf. Subgraph III). 
This is consistent with the view that, in addition to growing inequalities 
in (lifetime) earnings, growing inequalities in complementary pension 
wealth are threatening the economic well-being of less-educated American 
retirees.
Table 6.6  Income changes at retirement by education and private non-labor income 







Early Late Early Late Early Late
% of retirees with no/low 
private non‑labor income (PNLI) 33 47 5 22 4 6
Avg. % change in post‑gov. income
Substantial pnLi -10 (-16) -20 -15 -13 -16
no/low pnLi -22 (-43) (-26) -16 (-32) (-57)
% entering poverty
Substantial pnLi 11 (22) 2 5 0 6
no/low pnLi 69 (83) (27) (52) (0) (24)
% with post‑gov. loss > 50%
Substantial pnLi 4 (19) 13 19 5 16
no/low pnLi 21 (45) (24) 14 (17) (74)
Substantial private pension income defined as private pension income accounting for at least 10% 
of household pre-tax post-transfer income. estimates in parentheses are based on fewer than 30 
observations. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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Table 6.6 further explores the role of private retirement income for growing 
educational inequalities among American men. The f irst row of the Table 
reports the period-specif ic proportion of workers within each educational 
category who have no or only low private non-labor income (pnli) after 
retirement. More specif ically, a retiree is classif ied as having no/low pnli 
if it accounts for less than 10% of total household pre-tax post-transfer 
income.14 Subsequent rows then compare the income trajectories of retirees 
with and without substantial private pension income, again differentiating 
by level of education and retirement period (in the interest of brevity, I omit 
results for pre-government income).
Table 6.6 confirms that there is a steep educational gradient in access to 
pnli among American men and that educational differentials have grown 
over time (cf. Wolff 2011). From the f irst to the second period, the proportion 
of newly retired men who had no or very low private non-labor income rose 
from 33% to 47% among those with low education and from 5% to 22% 
for those in the intermediate category, while remaining near 5% for those 
with a tertiary degree. Subsequent rows in Table 6.6 show that access to 
private non-labor income is crucial for the economic well-being of American 
retirees. The majority of men with low education cannot avoid poverty 
if they do not have access to complementary pensions or other types of 
pnli. Workers with intermediate or high levels of education appear to be 
practically immune to poverty if they have substantial pnli. Given the small 
number of observations f indings must be viewed as tentative, but several 
of the results in Table 6.6 suggest that the link between access to pnli and 
economic well-being has become stronger over time, at least if gaps between 
workers with and without substantial pnli are considered in absolute (i.e., 
percentage point) rather than relative terms. This is what one would expect 
given a gradual decline of public benefit levels and the trend toward less 
favorable earnings histories for workers with lower levels of education.
After this excursus on the role of pnli for American men, I briefly return 
to the results displayed in Figure 6.8, now focusing on educational dif-
ferentials among retiring women. Findings for German women are readily 
summarized: Just as for German men, there is no evidence for growing 
educational differentials in income trajectories around retirement. If 
anything, differences across educational groups have slightly narrowed, 
as high-educated women faced somewhat greater income losses and poverty 
14 Results are qualitatively similar when I consider only private pension income. I use all 
pnli because private pensions and asset income may be partial substitutes (cf. also Figure 3.3 
in Chapter 3).
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risks in the second period. For American women, there is again evidence of 
growing educational differentials, although – as consistently found in this 
chapter – this has occurred in the context of more favorable overall trends 
than for men. While noting that estimates are often very uncertain, im-
provements from the f irst to the second period seem to have been confined 
to better-educated women and especially to women with a tertiary degree.
In Chapter 5, based on insights from behavioral economics, psychology, 
and sociological literature on age norms, I suggested that many workers 
retire too early even if their choices are not constrained by career interrup-
tions or declining health. I also speculated that the prevalence of premature 
retirement might rise when early retirement becomes more costly because 
retirement behavior adapts only sluggishly to changing financial incentives. 
In view of growing f inancial penalties for early retirement, Hypothesis hvr 
15 therefore predicts that early retirement was associated with greater in-
come losses toward the end of the observation period. Figure 6.9 provides a 


















































































































































IV − % with post-gov. loss > 50%
Early − Men Late − Men Early − Women Late − Women 90%−CI
periods defined in terms of the year of retirement. early period: 1981-92 (us)/1985-96 (de). Late 
period: 1993-2002 (us)/1997-2007 (de). dashed branches of confidence intervals were cut to avoid 
unnecessary extensions of the scale. all confidence intervals are symmetric about the correspond-
ing point estimate. rat = Retirement age tercile. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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straightforward test of this hypothesis by differentiating voluntary retirees 
with respect to their retirement age. More specif ically, separately by gender 
country and period, retirees are grouped into terciles of the retirement 
age distribution. I compare the income trajectories of workers in the f irst 
retirement age tercile (rat), that is, the third of workers with the lowest 
retirement ages, to those of workers in the second and third rats.15
Inspection of Figure 6.9 reveals no clear support for hvr 15. Period dif-
ferences for workers in the different rats are mostly quite similar and 
when they do differ in the expected direction (e.g., for very large income 
drops among German men) differences are generally quite small compared 
to the level of statistical uncertainty. I also investigated whether using 
different quantiles or allowing for non-monotonic relationships between 
retirement age and trends in income changes leads to different f indings, 
but this was not the case. I therefore draw the preliminary conclusion that 
recent institutional changes have not led to a noticeable divergence of the 
income trajectories of early- and late-retiring voluntary retirees, although 
further research should devise more sophisticated tests of this possibility. 
This includes paying greater attention to worker heterogeneity and com-
positional changes among early and late-retiring workers than I can afford 
to do here. It also bears repeating that these results are based on voluntary 
retirees and that the picture may well look different for involuntary retirees.
6.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, I have provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of 
income changes around men’s and women’s exit from work in Germany 
and the United States. Throughout the chapter, I have focused on voluntary 
retirees who were not exposed to job loss or the onset of health problems 
in their preretirement years and whose retirement decisions will therefore 
mostly have been relatively unconstrained. Table 6.7 provides a stylized 
summary and assessment of the main hypotheses proposed in Chapter 5. 
Instead of recounting the detailed f indings, I now provide a condensed 
summary as well as some preliminary conclusions.
15 The maximum retirement ages for workers belonging to the f irst tercile are as follows: 
German men: 60; American men: 62; German women: 59; American women: 60. More accurate 
timing (e.g., age in months) is diff icult because the retirement indicator is based on annual work 
hours.
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For German men, there are signs of growing income losses at the time of 
retirement and there is considerable evidence that this trend is primarily 
attributable to a gradual decline in the generosity of public retirement 
benef its. Declining generosity of public pensions seems to have been 
broadly shared across educational subgroups and across different types 
of workers more generally and partly for this reason has not (yet?) led to 
greater numbers of men facing economic marginalization or very large 
declines in their income at the time of retirement, though there is some 
evidence that income drops of more than a third occurred more frequently 
in recent years. However, this does not mean that all is well in Germany: 
The economic situation of low-skilled workers was precarious throughout 
the observation period. Almost a third of low-educated men with preretire-
ment incomes above the poverty line fell below this threshold during the 
f irst years of retirement. This proportion is similar to the entry rate of 
low-skilled Americans during the 1980s and early 1990s and attests to the 
lack of redistribution in the German public pension pillar.
Results for American men are very different: Average post-government 
losses have also increased for this group and there is also evidence that 
declining public replacement rates have been one factor behind this trend. 
The main story, however, is one of growing inequalities in the income tra-
jectories experienced by retirees. This is indicated by a dramatic increase 
of the proportion of men suffering precipitous declines in their income and 
by a growing share of workers ending up below the poverty line. Disag-
gregated results by retirees’ level of education show that no educational 
group has been immune to these trends. Several f indings, however, suggest 
that the most vulnerable group, workers with a low level of education, 
were hit hardest. I have also presented considerable evidence that grow-
ing inequalities in complementary pension income were a major force 
behind this trend. As discussed in Chapter 5, these changes in the realm 
of complementary pensions were likely reinforced by cohort differences in 
working-life inequalities.
Overall, these results square well with other recent f indings, in particular 
the growth of inequalities in pension wealth documented by Edward Wolff’s 
(2011) comprehensive analysis based on the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Ironically, America’s system of complementary pensions thus became more 
holey at a time when – due to declining public pension generosity and 
growing inequality of lifetime earnings – American men and especially 
low-skilled American men needed it all the more.
One possibility that future research should investigate is that the trends 
for American men are partly driven by a tendency to consume retirement 
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savings in non-annuitized form (which may be more common with dc than 
db plans). It seems unlikely that such a trend explains all of the increase 
in relative losses and the prevalence of large losses, especially among less-
educated workers, who generally have very little wealth in dc accounts 
(Munnell and Sunden 2004; Wolff 2011). Nevertheless, taking a closer look 
at trends in household wealth and their association with income changes at 
retirement can arguably provide a more complete picture of the American 
situation and in particular of changes over time.16
Trends for women look more favorable than for men. In Germany, 
women’s longer work careers and therefore higher lifetime earnings (partly 
attributable to the entry of East German women) seem to have been a 
crucial factor. When changes in women’s employment biographies are taken 
into account, trends in German women’s income trajectories become more 
similar to men’s. In the us, women’s improved access to employer-provided 
pensions seems to be more important.
For reasons outlined in Section 6.2 and Chapter 2, I have followed the 
standard approach of mobility research and focused on individual-level 
trajectories. Relatedly, and due to a concern for conciseness and sample size 
restrictions, I have not attempted to differentiate individuals with respect 
to household type. Hence, the estimates presented in this chapter are 
(weighted) averages of the income changes experienced by men and women 
(as well as potential family members) in different types of households. More 
concretely, ignoring the complication of household instability (and a few 
relatively uncommon household types), the estimates for men reflect the 
experiences of men in three principal types of households: single house-
holds, male-breadwinner couple households, and dual-earner households. 
By contrast, estimates for women are primarily based on income changes of 
single women and of women in dual-earner households, as female breadwin-
ner households were a rare phenomenon in the cohorts studied here.
Given that the above analysis has consistently documented more fa-
vorable trends for income changes around women’s retirement, natural 
next steps would be to examine differences in the impact of retirement 
across household types and to investigate whether more favorable trends 
for women have offset the trend toward larger income losses for men in 
dual-earner couples, particularly in the us. Such an investigation would 
16 The psid collected information on household wealth in 1984, 1989, 1994, and in every wave 
since 1999, which could be used for such an analysis. Unfortunately, however, information on 
savings in employer-sponsored def ined-contribution and individual retirement accounts is not 
available before 1999.
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not be a trivial one, because the joint retirement trajectories of dual-earner 
couples will often be complex and occur over extended periods of time, thus 
substantially increasing data requirements, in particular concerning the 
length of individual panels (which complicates investigation of changes over 
time). Nevertheless, such an analysis could presumably shed further light on 
recent trends in the impact of retirement on economic well-being. It should 
also address the possibility that educational homogamy, in combination 
with the trend toward greater educational differentials documented above 
(see Figure 6.8), may have exacerbated inequalities within the group of 
dual-earner couples.
As for country differences, most expectations were confirmed, but with 
a crucial twist: Consistent with previous research, complementary pensions 
and other types of private income were found to account for a much larger 
share of retirement income in the us. I also conjectured that greater reliance 
on private savings would result in greater inequalities within and across 
retirement cohorts and that vulnerable groups, in particular low-skilled 
and low-wage workers, would fare worse under the American regime. 
The twist is that these expectations received much stronger support for 
more recent retirement cohorts than for workers retiring in the 1980s. In 
comparison to the 1970s or 1980s, the fundamental transformation of the 
complementary pension landscape has turned the us into a much more 
‘American’ country – in terms of the stereotypical depictions pervading 
public and academic discourse.
American trends underline the need for political reform addressing 
retirement income security, especially, though not only, for low-skilled 
and low-wage workers (see, for example, Halperin and Munnell [2005] and 
Ghilarducci [2008]). It is also worth repeating that the consequences of the 
shift toward dc pensions were in some sense examined under best-case 
conditions in this study, as the 1990s were characterized by strong labor 
and f inancial market performance. Future work will have to show how the 
experiences of American retirees evolve under less favorable conditions (for 
a review of research on the impact of the stock market decline between 
2007 and 2009, see Wolff 2011: 70ff.).
The American results may seem to bode ill for the future of retirement 
income security in Germany. As brief ly discussed in Chapter 3, future 
retirement cohorts will be facing lower public replacement rates and are 
encouraged – but not legally required – to close the growing gap between 
preretirement earnings and public benefits by participating in second- and 
(subsidized) third-pillar pensions. In addition, educational inequalities 
in employment chances and earnings have risen during recent decades, 
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particularly since the mid-1990s (Giesecke and Verwiebe 2008; Dustmann 
et al. 2009; Giesecke et al. 2015). Against this background, avoiding a us-
style trend toward growing inequalities will require careful and ongoing 
attention by current and future generations of policymakers.
Some aspects of the German situation are mildly encouraging: As dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, German second- and third-pillar pensions are typically 
either pure db plans or feature a strong db component. In addition, empiri-
cal data suggest that, compared with participation in third-pillar pensions 
in many other countries, participation in Riester-type plans is somewhat 
more equally distributed across the income distribution (oecd 2012: 119-121). 
Nevertheless, it is imperative to closely monitor and (re)evaluate these 
trends. And, of course, the fact that participation in Riester-type pension 
plans is slightly less skewed does not imply that there are no more effective 
and equitable approaches for achieving retirement income security and 
preventing old-age poverty (for a critical perspective, see Himmelreicher 
and Viebrok 2004). Finally, as emphasized above, current educational 
inequalities in Germany are by no means small to begin with.
The above analysis has focused on the short- to mid-term changes in 
income around retirement. An important question is how the income of 
retirees evolve in the longer run. Hungerford’s (2003) analysis follows Ger-
man and American retirees until twelve years after retirement. He finds that 
in the us, but not in Germany, inflation-adjusted income gradually declines 
after the fourth or f ifth year after retirement. His primary explanation is 
that complementary retirement benef its account for a larger portion of 
retirement income in the us. Whereas public retirement benefits in the us 
and Germany, as well as in most other economically developed countries, 
have historically been tied to inflation or wage growth, complementary 
benefits are often nominally constant or grow more slowly than inflation. 
As complementary pensions are becoming more important in Germany, so 
is the issue of how these benefits evolve over the retirement period (Küne-
mund et al. 2010; Schmähl 2010; Künemund et al. 2013). Another important 
question concerning longer-term trends in economic well-being is how the 
f inancial needs of retirees change over the course of retirement. A common 
view is that needs are more likely to increase than to fall, mainly due to 
increasing health- and care-related expenses (e.g., Schmähl 2010). Finally, as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, public retirement benefits are generally paid 
as lifetime annuities (including provisions covering potential survivors), 
thus providing protection against the ‘risk’ of longevity (Diamond 2004; 
Burkhauser et al. 2009). By contrast, complementary pension wealth is often 
at least partly consumed in the form of lump-sum payments or via so-called 
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‘installment options’ (Blostin 2003) that provide benefits for a f ixed period 
of time rather than until the beneficiary’s death.
As discussed at some length in Chapter 2, the primary outcome vari-
able examined in this chapter, needs-adjusted disposable income, is only 
a proxy for economic well-being. It is conceivable or even likely that for 
many workers modest declines in disposable income at retirement do not 
lead to a decline in economic well-being. In particular, retirees may be able 
to draw on savings to f inance their consumption and retirement may be 
associated with a reduction in income needs. For example, retirees no longer 
incur work-related expenses and no longer need to save for retirement. 
However, as just noted, other types of expenses such as health care costs 
may go up, especially in the longer run. In addition, the above f indings show 
that, particularly in the us, a sizable (and growing) proportion of workers 
see their income drop by more than a third or even more than half at the 
time of retirement. It seems unlikely that these substantial drops should 
not involve a decline in economic well-being for many of these workers.
Importantly, such large drops in disposable income appear to be quite 
common even among workers whose retirement is not preceded by invol-
untary job loss or negative health shocks. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
country differences and recent changes in welfare state arrangements may 
have been (even) more consequential for workers whose late careers are 
interrupted by unexpected adverse events such as job displacement. The 
f indings for involuntary retirees presented in this chapter, though not the 
main focus, provide initial evidence for this view, particularly in the case 
of Germany. Regardless of the outcome considered, trends for German men 
retiring involuntarily practically always turned out less favorable than for 
men whose retirement was not preceded by job loss or a decline in health. 
By and large, this also holds for German women. The following part of the 
study will take a closer look at these trends by exploring the consequences 
of late-career job loss.
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6.5 Additional results
Table 6.A.1  Period differences in retiree composition – male voluntary retirees
Germany United States
85‑91 92‑97 98‑07 81‑87 88‑94 95‑02
Retiree characteristics
age at exit (mean) 61.3 60.6 62.1 63.4 63.3 63.5
% east germany 8.5 20.6 15.4
% civil servant (t − 2/t − 1) 12.8 11.0 14.5
% migration background/ 
black
12.2 18.0 14.0 7.3 5.6 10.3
% intermediate 
education
69.3 68.2 62.2 39.6 53.7 50.0
% high education 15.6 12.4 26.0 21.0 26.2 33.6
% living with partner 
(t − 2/t − 1)
92.7 86.4 87.7 91.5 90.1 87.5
% with work exp. ≥ 35 yrs 
(t − 2/t − 1)
82.8 76.2 72.7 78.9 84.7 76.9
% working full-time 
(t − 2/t − 1)
79.7 69.3 69.7 68.1 61.5 60.4
% poor (t − 2/t − 1) 4.7 2.7 2.9 7.5 4.3 6.7
% near poor (t − 2/t − 1) 21.9 14.3 15.8 7.4 7.9 13.9
% middle earnings tercile 
(t − 2/t − 1)
37.4 31.2 32.6 27.1 23.8 27.3
% top earnings tercile 
(t − 2/t − 1)
40.6 42.5 46.7 59.6 52.2 43.0
Partner characteristics (if partner present at t − 2/t − 1)
age (mean) 56.5 55.5 56.9 58.6 57.8 58.8
% intermediate 
education
42.0 53.8 59.0 52.3 49.8 46.1
% high education 5.5 8.1 11.8 20.9 38.2 36.2
% works part-time 15.1 18.9 20.6 15.2 22.5 9.8
% works full-time 17.7 21.2 17.8 24.2 36.1 37.9
Change in presence/employment of partner (if partner present at t − 2/t − 1)
% whose partner leaves 
pt work
8.3 9.2 14.2 12.6 14.2 5.8
% whose partner leaves 
ft work
9.3 10.4 6.6 13.1 17.6 18.7
% losing partner 3.9 2 4.5 2.8 4.2 4.3
n four-year change 239 239 466 161 122 142
n six-year change 210 229 282 146 111 93
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
the Changing eConomiC ConSequenCeS of RetiRement 211
Table 6.A.2  Period differences in retiree composition – female voluntary 
Germany United States
85‑91 92‑97 98‑07 81‑87 88‑94 95‑02
Retiree characteristics
age at exit (mean) 59.8 59.3 60.6 62.0 63.4 61.6
% east germany 0.6 24.9 28.6
% civil servant (t − 2/t − 1) 2.2 2.9 5.8
% migration background/ 
black
10.5 12.5 6.6 10.5 11.5 12.0
% intermediate 
education
44.8 50.8 66.6 56.8 57.4 65.2
% high education 10.8 13.2 17.3 16.5 25.0 25.0
% living with partner 
(t − 2/t − 1)
70.0 68.4 72.4 68.7 66.8 69.3
% with work exp. ≥ 35 yrs 
(t − 2/t − 1)
35.5 45.4 49.0 21.4 32.6 31.1
% working full-time 
(t − 2/t − 1)
55.5 46.0 51.0 42.1 49.4 47.9
% poor (t − 2/t − 1) 5.9 7.1 3.0 5.9 5.9 6.5
% near poor (t − 2/t − 1) 17.7 17.7 15.5 17.1 14.8 15.2
% middle earnings tercile 
(t − 2/t − 1)
18.8 30.1 36.6 30.5 33.1 25.2
% top earnings tercile 
(t − 2/t − 1)
13.3 9.8 18.9 12.8 20.6 21.4
Partner characteristics (if partner present at t − 2/t − 1)
age (mean) 59.8 60.4 60.5 61.4 63.8 61.6
% intermediate 
education
67.2 71.8 68.4 33.8 32.5 30.3
% high education 13.5 12.3 22.1 35.2 42.6 51.6
% works part-time 11.2 7.7 9.4 16.6 17.3 11.8
% works full-time 43.7 40.4 42.2 55.1 41.7 46.5
Change in presence/employment of partner (if partner present at t − 2/t − 1)
% whose partner leaves 
pt work
8.4 6.1 7.4 12.9 14.2 5.0
% whose partner leaves 
ft work
24.1 22.6 26.9 26.3 26.0 17.3
% losing partner 6 5.3 4.1 9.1 19 5
n four-year change 107 149 331 129 110 127
n six-year change 1047 136 184 126 84 88
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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Table 6.A.3  Changes in income components around retirement – voluntary 
retirees only – composition-adjusted estimates (excluding partner’s 
employment status and retirement)
(a) Men
Germany United States
85‑91 92‑97 98‑07 81‑87 88‑94 95‑02
% with individual earnings loss (IEL) 98 99 98 95 97 97
% with household earnings loss (HEL) 95 95 98 95 96 97
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given heL 64 56 52 77 60 73
average replacement rate 20 13 14 38 47 47
median replacement rate 8 5 7 33 29 35
Change in public pension and transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased ppti given heL 94 90 92 80 81 63
average replacement rate 59 56 53 37 34 31
median replacement rate 51 49 45 26 26 22
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given heL 91 96 92 98 93 95
average replacement rate 27 26 29 27 28 29
median replacement rate 28 27 29 26 26 26
(b) Women
Germany United States
85‑91 92‑97 98‑07 81‑87 88‑94 95‑02
% with individual earnings loss (IEL) 98 97 94 98 95 99
% with household earnings loss (HEL) 96 96 93 95 93 90
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given heL 65 40 56 58 57 68
average replacement rate 25 18 17 39 50 49
median replacement rate 16 6 8 30 29 27
Change in public pension and transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased ppti given heL 92 86 89 74 71 59
average replacement rate 61 61 53 30 37 53
median replacement rate 49 47 43 25 26 32
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(b) Women
Germany United States
85‑91 92‑97 98‑07 81‑87 88‑94 95‑02
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given heL 95 92 92 96 92 90
average replacement rate 28 26 29 30 26 30
median replacement rate 28 25 30 27 23 25
Replacement rates are expressed in percentage terms and calculated as the increase in pnLi/
ppti or decrease in hht divided by the absolute value of the decline in household labor earnings. 
Replacement rates capped at +200 per cent. average and median replacement rates calculated 
over observations with non-zero replacement rates (i.e., over observations with an increase in the 
given income component). 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
Table 6.A.4  Changes in income components around retirement – voluntary 
retirees only – composition-adjusted estimates (including partner’s 
employment status and retirement)
(a) Men
Germany United States
85‑91 92‑97 98‑07 81‑87 88‑94 95‑02
% with individual earnings loss (IEL) 98 99 97 95 97 97
% with household earnings loss (HEL) 95 95 98 95 95 96
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given heL 63 55 52 76 60 73
average replacement rate 20 13 15 37 45 47
median replacement rate 8 5 6 32 29 35
Change in public pension and transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased ppti given heL 94 91 92 80 79 65
average replacement rate 58 56 53 37 35 31
median replacement rate 51 49 45 26 27 22
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given heL 92 96 92 98 93 95
average replacement rate 26 26 30 27 28 29
median replacement rate 28 27 29 26 25 26
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(b) Women
Germany United States
85‑91 92‑97 98‑07 81‑87 88‑94 95‑02
% with individual earnings loss (IEL) 98 97 94 98 94 99
% with household earnings loss (HEL) 96 96 93 94 92 91
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given heL 63 39 56 55 55 68
average replacement rate 24 18 17 40 48 50
median replacement rate 14 6 8 30 29 28
Change in public pension and transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased ppti given heL 91 87 89 72 70 61
average replacement rate 59 61 52 31 37 53
median replacement rate 48 47 43 26 25 32
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given heL 94 92 92 95 91 89
average replacement rate 28 26 29 30 26 30
median replacement rate 28 25 30 26 23 25
Replacement rates are expressed in percentage terms and calculated as the increase in pnLi/
ppti or decrease in hht divided by the absolute value of the decline in household labor earnings. 
Replacement rates capped at +200 per cent. average and median replacement rates calculated 
over observations with non-zero replacement rates (i.e., over observations with an increase in the 
given income component). 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Economic consequences of late-career job loss

7 Literature review and research 
questions
In the previous two chapters, I have examined income trajectories around 
labor force exit, focusing on voluntary retirees whose retirement choices 
are not constrained by job displacement or declines in health. This part of 
the study complements this analysis by taking a closer look at employment 
and income trajectories around late-career job loss. Consistent with the 
counterfactual conceptualization of causality articulated in Chapter 4, I will 
not only examine the trajectories of displaced workers, but also compare 
them to a control group of observationally similar non-displaced workers. 
This did matching strategy identif ies the additional employment/income 
effects of late-career job loss, that is, beyond those attributable to volun-
tary retirement dynamics. This chapter prepares the empirical analysis 
by providing some additional conceptual and theoretical background, by 
formulating a set of research questions and hypotheses, and by reviewing 
previous empirical research.
Unlike with planned or voluntary retirement, there can be little doubt 
that job loss often has serious negative effects on well-being. A sizable 
literature documents that the unemployed are disadvantaged in numerous 
respects, including their f inancial situation and psychological well-being, 
and longitudinal studies provide compelling evidence that a large por-
tion of these differences is attributable to the causal effect of job loss or 
unemployment rather than to other differences between the employed and 
the unemployed (e.g., in personality or baseline levels of happiness). Some 
studies have looked at the consequences of job loss for disposable house-
hold income (DiPrete and McManus 2000; Ehlert 2012) and several studies 
have analyzed its impact on subsequent earnings, that is, after reentering 
employment.1 These latter studies show that reemployed displaced workers 
have lower earnings than similar non-displaced workers even several years 
after job loss (e.g., Arulampalam 2001; Gangl 2004b, 2006; Farber 2005). The 
consequences of job loss may thus extend beyond the ensuing period of 
unemployment, and research suggests that these longer-term ‘scar’ effects, 
too, are not confined to earnings (see, for example, Young’s [2012] analysis of 
1 In addition, job loss has been found to be a major trigger of poverty entries in research on 
poverty dynamics (McKernan and Ratcliffe 2002).
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long-term changes in psychological well-being). In addition, some workers 
of course remain unemployed for very long periods of time.
Previous research on the consequences of job loss has mostly studied 
prime-age workers, but there is also some work on older workers in their 50s 
and 60s, which I will review below. In Chapter 3, I already discussed several 
reasons why the labor market situation of older workers is special and how 
this is related to labor market and welfare state institutions. This chapter 
further extends these ideas in order to prepare the empirical analysis in the 
next chapter. The next section provides a brief discussion of the employment 
and earnings/income effects of job loss, with a special focus on the situation 
of older workers. Against this background, Section 7.2 then draws on the 
institutional information provided in Chapter 3 to formulate a number of 
research questions and hypotheses. Section 7.3 concludes with an overview 
of related empirical research.
7.1 Employment, earnings and household income after late-
career job loss
To get an analytical grip on the economic consequences of job loss it is 
useful to make a stylized distinction between workers who eventually 
return to work and those for whom displacement triggers a long-term or 
even permanent exit from employment.2 Permanent exits occur at all ages, 
but previous research shows that older workers are considerably more likely 
not to return to work (Farber 2005; Frosch 2006; Johnson and Mommaerts 
2011). This is consistent with the f inding that job displacement is a primary 
trigger of involuntary early retirement (Lachance and Seligman 2010).
In this section, I f irst provide a brief general discussion of the f inancial 
risks associated with these two pathways (return to work vs. permanent 
exit). In a second step, I then address a crucial related question: How do 
contextual/institutional factors affect the likelihood that a displaced older 
worker will end up on one of these pathways rather than the other?
2 The stylized distinction between long-term/permanent leavers and returners is of course 
a simplif ication. For example, returners could be usefully differentiated with respect to the 
length of the intermittent non-employment spell, the change in work hours, or the stability 
of their postdisplacement jobs. Nevertheless, the distinction between long-term leavers and 
returners is a useful one, particularly in the present context, because it captures the crucial 
decision displaced older workers are facing: Whether to seek reemployment or leave the labor 
market permanently and retire earlier than planned.
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By definition, workers who do not return to work after losing their job will 
no longer have access to earnings from their own employment. The impact 
of this decline in earnings for economic well-being will depend on what 
other sources of income they can tap into. While workers can be expected 
to rely on a large and heterogeneous array of income sources – including 
spousal earnings, asset income, and severance payments – public support 
programs for the unemployed as well as complementary and public retire-
ment benefits will often be of primary importance. As noted in Chapter 3, 
research also suggests that job loss may induce some workers to apply 
for disability benefits, a group whom Autor and Duggan (2003) refer to as 
‘conditional applicants’ because their application is conditional on having 
experienced job displacement.
For workers who eventually return to work, the economic consequences 
of job loss accrue in two broad phases. During the f irst phase, workers 
are not employed, but many will be actively searching for a new job. The 
length of this episode may differ considerably across workers and some may 
transition more or less seamlessly to a new position. The majority, however, 
will spend some time out of employment. During this phase, earnings drop 
to zero and, just as for long-term leavers, public benefits and alternative pri-
vate income sources become crucial for maintaining economic well-being. 
Returners enter a second phase after becoming reemployed. While the 
loss of labor income during unemployment may be the most conspicuous 
economic consequence of job displacement, research on long-term scar 
effects shows that for the typical displaced worker negative economic effects 
persist long beyond eventual reemployment (e.g., Farber 2005).
Job loss affects earnings beyond eventual reemployment because post-
displacement earnings are usually lower than they would have been in the 
absence of displacement. The most obvious reason is that postdisplacement 
earnings tend to be lower than before displacement. Earnings declines 
tend to be particularly large for older workers because the latter have often 
been long-tenured on their prior jobs and because employer/job tenure is 
positively related to earnings (Couch 2011).3 Importantly, however, the 
3 The empirical regularity that earnings rise with employer tenure is well-established, but 
some debate remains concerning the sources of this relationship. Human capital theory empha-
sizes the acquisition of employer-specif ic skills. By def inition, these skills are not transferable 
across employers and will therefore no longer be remunerated after job loss (Becker 1962; Mincer 
1962). Another explanation for ascending wage-tenure prof iles comes from eff iciency wage 
theory, which argues that employers will devise labor contracts with deferred compensation 
to promote employee loyalty (Lazear 1981): Workers will be paid a wage below their marginal 
productivity in younger years and receive a wage exceeding their marginal productivity in 
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statement that earnings are lower ‘than they would have been in the absence 
of displacement’ highlights that the total scar effect of losing a job may 
be larger than suggested by a simple comparison of reemployed workers’ 
pre- and postdisplacement earnings. More specif ically, the potential out-
comes framework outlined in Chapter 4 suggests that any earnings (and 
associated income) increases that did not occur because of displacement 
(but would have occurred in its absence) must be included in the overall 
effect of job loss. In other words, the ‘earnings decline’ component must be 
augmented by a ‘foregone earnings increase’ component (see, for example, 
Farber 2005). did designs provide a straightforward way of including losses 
due to foregone earnings increases in the estimated effect of job loss. In 
one exemplary study using a did approach, Farber (2005) examines the 
earnings effects of job loss among American workers aged 20 to 64 from 
the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. He f inds that foregone increases account 
for a substantial portion of the total effect of job loss on earnings, for more 
than a third on average (Farber 2005: Figure 12).4
As in the part on retirement, the empirical analysis in the next chapter 
will focus on the impact of job loss two/three and four/f ive years after 
displacement. These effects are longer-term in the sense that displaced 
workers will have had plenty of time to search for a new job. In addition to 
the benefits available to older workers, the consequences of late-career job 
loss will therefore crucially depend on whether displaced workers return 
to work and on how their postdisplacement earnings differ from those of 
non-displaced workers.
How does the likelihood of returning to work differ across workers and 
how is it related to contextual factors? A straightforward expectation is that 
the probability of returning to work will depend on the availability of reem-
ployment opportunities, and on their attractiveness compared to permanent 
exit/retirement. In other words, it will depend on the relative attractiveness 
and accessibility of the ‘work path’ compared to the ‘non-employment/early 
retirement path’ (see Burkhauser and Daly [2002] for similar arguments 
in the context of disability onset/health shocks). While various kinds of 
non-pecuniary considerations influence the relative attractiveness of work 
later years. Finally, the earnings-tenure relationship could result from a job matching process 
whereby workers’ wages depend on the quality of the worker-job match (Jovanovic 1979). Ir-
respective of their relative importance, all of these explanations suggest that earnings losses 
due to displacement rise with employer tenure (Couch 2011; Johnson and Mommaerts 2011).
4 Farber’s f indings also suggest that the ‘foregone earnings increase’ component was relatively 
more important in the 1990s than in the 1980s, perhaps due to procyclicality.
LiteRatuRe RevieW and ReSeaRCh queStionS 223
vis-à-vis retirement, the expected f inancial implications of choosing one 
option over the other can be expected to be a crucial factor.
Economic models of job search provide a somewhat more elaborate 
justif ication for these expectations. Search models assume that workers 
influence their chances of (and time until) f inding reemployment through 
their level of search effort (cf. Maestas and Li [2006], on which the following 
summary is based). Yet, while highlighting the role of individual effort, 
economic search models also emphasize that the optimal level of search 
effort is itself dependent on (demand side) factors beyond the worker’s 
immediate control: There is no point in searching for a new job if there are 
no good jobs out there. And there is little (economic) need to search for a 
job if public benefits make up for most of the earnings loss.
More generally, standard search models assume that workers face a 
(known) wage offer distribution  F(w) , that is, a distribution of potential 
wage offers. The wage offer distribution essentially captures the demand 
side of the labor market. For example, if older workers are subject to (statisti-
cal) discrimination their wage offer distribution will be less favorable than 
for comparable younger workers. A worker’s search effort positively influ-
ences the arrival rate, that is, the rate at which a worker receives (random) 
offers from the wage offer distribution. A worker will accept a job offer if 
the expected utility from working at the offered wage is greater than the 
expected utility from remaining unemployed. The wage above which this is 
the case is usually referred to as the reservation wage. A worker’s reservation 
wage will be higher when the wage offer distribution is more favorable 
(because a given wage offer will then compare less favorably with potential 
future job offers) and when utility during non-employment is greater, for 
example, because of higher public benefits or private non-labor income.5
Search models assume that workers take these relationships into account 
when deciding on their level of search effort. As search effort entails (direct 
and opportunity) costs, workers will choose a limited amount of search ef-
fort. Other things being equal, they will exert greater search effort when the 
wage offer distribution is more favorable and when their level of well-being 
during non-employment is lower, because in both cases the expected gains 
from intensified job search will be greater. Again, this essentially means that 
search intensity will depend on the relative attractiveness of reemployment 
5 As noted by Maestas and Li (2006), while the terms ‘wage offer distribution’ and ‘reservation 
wage’ suggest a narrow focus on remuneration, the model is general enough to accommodate 
richer def initions of job quality and their possible interaction with worker characteristics such 
as health (Blau 1991).
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opportunities compared to remaining non-employed and retiring earlier 
than planned. It also bears repeating that, despite emphasizing the (supply-
side) search decision of the worker, search models do incorporate the 
demand side of the labor market via the wage offer distribution and the 
relationship between search intensity and the arrival rate. Both the wage 
offer distribution and the arrival rate likely differ according to individual 
characteristics, including age, and contextual factors. Importantly, one 
American study suggests that demand-side constraints may prevent older 
workers from becoming reemployed even if they exert considerable search 
effort (Maestas and Li 2006).
Chapter 3 identif ied several factors – (perceived) obsolescence of skills, 
age discrimination, and labor market boundaries – that may limit the 
demand for older workers. On the supply side, public and complementary 
(early) retirement and other benefits may often provide a f inancially viable 
long-term alternative to reemployment that younger workers are lacking. 
Importantly, the discussion in Chapter 3 also suggests that the salience 
of these factors differs between Germany and the us as well as over time. 
In the next section, I recapitulate the most important insights from that 
discussion to arrive at a set of research questions and hypotheses for the 
empirical analysis in the next chapter.
7.2 Institutional context and the impact of late-career job 
loss on employment and income: research questions and 
hypotheses
Chapter 3 identif ied various institutional differences between the us and 
Germany that are likely to result in very different employment trajectories 
after late-career job loss. In particular, displaced German workers should be 
less likely to return to work than their American counterparts. On the de-
mand side, while displaced older workers presumably are in a more diff icult 
situation than their younger counterparts in both countries, the German 
labor market appears especially unaccommodating. Important reasons 
for expecting displaced older German workers to face very limited job 
opportunities are a low participation in continuing training, pronounced 
labor market boundaries that limit opportunities for occupational mobility, 
strict employment protection legislation, and a ‘culture’ of early retirement 
that may foster ageist stereotypes and (statistical) age discrimination. On 
the supply side, Germany’s generous ‘welfare-sustaining early exit policies’ 
(DiPrete et al. 1997) can be expected to pull displaced older workers toward 
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retirement. This suggests the following expectation, with the label hjl 
denoting that the hypothesis refers to the consequences of job loss:
hjl 1: German workers are more likely to leave employment after late-
career displacement. Americans are more likely to return to work.
hjl 1 also has obvious implications for the relative importance of different 
types of income among displaced older workers, suggesting the following 
hypothesis:
hjl 2: German workers receive a larger portion of their postdisplacement 
income from public sources. American workers receive a larger portion 
of their income from their own earnings.
As discussed in Chapter 2, recent literature on household income mobility 
has highlighted the insurance function of income pooling within the fam-
ily. The greater prevalence of two-earner families in the us (cf. Chapter 3) 
suggests that, on average, American workers see a greater portion of their 
earnings losses offset by this ‘family buffer’, as has already been shown to be 
the case among prime-age workers (Ehlert 2012). In the following empirical 
chapter, I will approach the role of family buffering in two principal ways. 
The f irst is to analyze changes in spousal labor supply, or so-called ‘added 
worker effects’, around late-career job loss. I will discuss this issue shortly. 
The second is to adopt Ehlert’s (2012) approach and compare the relative 
decline in displaced workers’ own earnings to the relative decline in pre-
government income, that is, income after all types of private or market 
income, including the private incomes of other household members, have 
been included.
It should be noted, however, that this difference (the reduction in average 
relative losses through including all types of market income) is a relatively 
rough indicator of family buffering, particularly among older workers. This 
is because pre-government income includes private income that accrues 
to the displaced worker herself rather than to other household members. 
Complementary pension income presumably is the most important income 
of this sort, but other forms of market income (e.g., from assets) may also be 
crucial. Among prime-age workers, the importance of market incomes other 
than earnings may be quite limited, but among older workers it presumably 
is not, especially in the us where complementary pensions likely are an 
important resource for cushioning the impact of job loss. To acknowledge 
this fact, I will refer to the difference between individual earnings losses and 
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losses in household pre-government income as ‘private income buffering’, 
while noting that ‘family buffering’ through the market incomes of other 
household members is an important factor contributing to the overall extent 
of private income buffering.
A second reason why the difference between individual earnings losses 
and pre-government household income losses is an imperfect measure of 
family buffering is slightly more subtle. To grasp this issue, note that the 
most compelling conceptualization of family buffering would arguably 
def ine it in terms of a comparison of two states of the world: the actual 
state of the world where some (displaced) workers coreside, and pool their 
income with, additional household members, and the counterfactual state 
of the world where the same workers live on their own. This suggests that 
the most compelling measures of family buffering income would be based 
on comparing actual income changes with hypothetical income changes 
under the relevant counterfactual. The simplest strategy for obtaining a f irst 
approximation to the relevant counterfactual would be to exclude all income 
that flows to the household only because of the presence of other household 
members from the calculation of income changes.6 Importantly, this ag-
gregate (i.e., income flowing to the household by virtue of other household 
members’ presence) should also include public pension and transfer income 
that accrues to household members other than the focal (displaced) worker. 
This differs from Ehlert’s (2012) approach to gauging family buffering which 
treats it as restricted to the sphere of market income.7 I considered construct-
ing a more compelling measure of family buffering along the lines sketched 
above, but this was not feasible using the data at hand.8
These issues make it diff icult to pin down the precise extent of family 
buffering. However, with respect to the extent of private income buffering 
(as def ined above), the greater salience of complementary pension income 
and greater prevalence of dual-earner couples in the us suggest the follow-
ing expectation:
6 Such an approach would of course rest on the implicit assumption that the focal workers’ 
income is independent of the incomes of other family members, which is unlikely to hold in 
practice (e.g., because the labor supply decisions of household members are interdependent).
7 Again, such an approach is more readily defensible in the case of younger workers, but the 
importance of public transfers such as unemployment or disability benef its for at least some 
younger households suggests that the more rigorous conceptualization of family buffering might 
lead to different conclusions even for this age group.
8 In particular, labor earnings are the only income component that is provided at the indi-
vidual level by the cnef. All other income components, including private and public pension 
income, are only provided as household-level aggregates.
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hjl 3: Compared to their German counterparts, displaced workers in 
the us see a larger portion of their earnings losses cushioned by other 
types of market income, that is, by their own private non-labor income 
and the earnings and private non-labor income of other family members.
An analysis of changes in spousal labor supply around late-career job 
loss, that is, of an ‘added worker effect’ (awe), can provide less ambiguous 
evidence on the role of the family in buffering income losses. As noted in 
Chapter 3, a generic form that the awe might take among older couples is 
that of delayed retirement (cf. Coile’s [2004] study of added worker effects 
after late-career health shocks). Research on prime-age workers has focused 
on transitions from non-employment to work and on increases in work 
hours (see, for example, Stephens 2002; McGinnity 2004; Cullen and Gruber 
2000; Ehlert 2012). Among older ‘added’ workers, delaying retirement may 
turn out to be more important than hours increases or entries into employ-
ment, as opportunities for the latter may be limited by the very factors that 
depress the employment prospects of displaced older workers themselves.
On closer inspection, the economic rationale for an awe seems par-
ticularly compelling for older workers. As noted above, displaced older 
workers may be facing especially large wage scars: The wage of a working 
non-displaced spouse may thus often exceed the wage a displaced older 
worker could expect to earn after reemployment. This simple economic 
incentive for an added worker effect may be further reinforced by certain 
features of the earnings replacement benefits available to displaced older 
workers. Often these will be individualized insurance-type benefits that 
do not involve household means-testing, but have no or very limited earn-
ings disregards (i.e., do not allow recipients to combine transfer income 
with earned income). For a displaced worker drawing such benefits, the 
effective marginal tax rate will often be much higher – that is, the net 
gain from earning another Dollar or Euro will be much smaller – than for 
his/her partner or spouse. Of course, this also applies to younger workers 
who receive similar benefits; yet younger workers typically have a much 
longer career horizon. When comparing a wage offer with the alternative 
of remaining unemployed, younger workers should therefore factor in 
that they will work in the prospective job (or in subsequent jobs that may 
only become available if they do not stay unemployed for too long9) for 
many years after their earnings-related benefits would be exhausted. The 
9 This could, for example, be because long unemployment leads to depreciation of human 
capital or sends a negative ‘signal’ to prospective employers (Spence 1973).
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shorter career horizon of older workers, by contrast, may often not extend 
far beyond the time when their benefits would expire.
While there may thus be compelling economic reasons for an awe, sev-
eral factors may limit its empirical relevance. A f irst obvious (supply-side) 
factor is the alleged preference for joint leisure that is often invoked to 
explain the phenomenon of coretirement discussed in Chapter 6 (cf. Coile 
2004). The role of public and complementary earnings replacement benefits 
may also be more ambiguous than suggested in the previous paragraph. In 
particular, economic literature on the awe suggests that public benefits may 
reduce the need for, and thus ‘crowd out’, spousal labor supply responses 
(Cullen and Gruber 2000). On the demand side, the very factors that depress 
older displaced workers’ reemployment prospects (e.g., skill obsolescence or 
discrimination) may also limit the scope for added-worker-type processes. 
As for country differences, this suggests that, if they exist at all, added 
worker effects should be stronger in the us (where replacement rates are 
lower and where the employment prospects of older workers are arguably 
better):
hjl 4: Increases in spousal labor supply after late-career job loss are larger 
in the us than in Germany.
Hypotheses hjl 1 to hjl 4 address German-American differences in the 
employment/retirement trajectories of displaced older workers and their 
spouses and in the relative importance of different income sources. It is 
more diff icult to predict how changes in disposable income or poverty 
status differ between the two countries. This is because demand-side fac-
tors and the generosity of earnings replacement benefits work in different 
directions. As noted repeatedly, there are several reasons to expect that the 
reemployment prospects of displaced workers are better in the us, whereas 
earnings replacement benefits, including early retirement options, are more 
generous in Germany. While this leads to clear predictions concerning the 
reemployment rates and ‘income packages’ of displaced older workers, the 
net effect on disposable income is ambiguous.
The pessimistic perspective on the American context is that displaced 
older workers are in a diff icult situation in any country and that late-career 
job loss therefore often is a devastating event that the American welfare 
state does little to cushion. Older workers would then be left with a choice 
between retiring on rather unfavorable terms and returning to work at the 
cost of suffering considerable wage scars. In a stylized description of the 
American life course regime, Mayer (2005: 37) expresses this pessimistic 
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view when he writes that ‘older workers can be f ired easily, and on the other 
hand, older workers continue to work even at lower wages because of the 
low level of expected pension income’. The optimistic perspective is that 
the flexible American labor market offers reasonably good reemployment 
opportunities for displaced older workers and that the American approach 
has therefore been well-balanced, at least during the observation period of 
this study when the American economy was mostly strong.
The pessimistic perspective on the German context would be that 
welfare-sustaining policies, while being generous, have presumably not 
eliminated the consequences of late-career job loss altogether and are 
therefore at most a ‘second best’ (and costly) solution in a country whose 
rigid labor market provides little opportunities for displaced older workers. 
The optimistic perspective would be that the German approach, albeit 
only a ‘second best’, is much more attractive than the harsh American 
model of ‘market-induced employment maintenance’ (Buchholz et al. 2011) 
which pushes workers back into work at the cost of substantial earnings 
scars.
The upshot of this discussion is that it is quite diff icult to formulate clear 
expectations concerning country differences in the impact of job loss on 
disposable income and I will therefore leave this issue as an open, though 
very important, question.
One might be tempted to hypothesize that displaced German workers 
are better off conditional on leaving employment after late-career job loss, as 
they can rely on a broader and more generous set of benefits. The rationale 
behind such a prediction would again be that Germany sustained much 
more generous programs facilitating early exit from work throughout the 
observation period. However, the discussion of search models in the previ-
ous section highlights the likely selectivity of the older workers’ retirement/
reemployment trajectories with respect to expected retirement income. 
Particularly if job opportunities for displaced older workers are good, those 
who leave work after late-career job loss may be a selective subgroup who 
can expect comparatively high levels of income conditional on taking the 
‘retirement path’.10 More specif ically, if the reemployment opportunities 
of displaced older Americans really are much better than those of their 
German counterparts, Americans who retire after late-career job loss might 
be a selective subgroup with good access to alternative income sources. 
10 In a related vein, Schils (2008) argues that early retirement in general (i.e., regardless of 
whether related to employment interruptions) is more selective in countries with a less generous 
public pillar.
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This would work against the seemingly straightforward prediction that 
involuntary retirees suffer smaller losses in Germany. By a similar argu-
ment, even assuming that the reemployment prospects of older workers 
are much more favorable in the us, workers who actually return to work 
after late-career job loss might well be better off in Germany: Given that 
retiring likely is a more attractive alternative for the average displaced 
worker in Germany, those German workers who actually return to work 
may be a selective group of workers who received exceptionally good job 
offers. As in the case of displaced workers as a whole, it therefore seems 
diff icult to formulate clear expectations concerning country differences in 
income changes by postdisplacement employment/retirement trajectory. 
Nevertheless, separate analysis of ‘involuntary retirees’ who leave employ-
ment and ‘returners’ who become reemployed after late-career job loss will 
provide interesting additional detail on the processes shaping the income 
trajectories of displaced older workers.
A major goal of this study is to ascertain whether recent welfare state 
change has led to greater economic insecurity. Chapter 3 identif ied several 
changes in welfare state programs that are directly relevant to the economic 
situation of displaced older workers. In Germany, f inancial penalties for 
drawing public pension benefits early rose noticeably over the course of the 
observation period. In the us, the shift from defined-benefit plans (which 
often provide generous early retirement options) to def ined-contribution 
benefits (which are actuarially neutral by construction) has presumably 
raised the costs of retiring early. Finally, alternative public transfer pro-
grams such as long-term unemployment or disability benef its were also 
cut back, especially in Germany. These policy changes were accompanied 
by other reforms intended to raise work incentives (not only, but also for 
older workers): Prominent examples are expansions the Earned Income Tax 
Credit in the us (which is, however, of greater importance for households 
that include dependent children) and of in-work benefits in Germany.
Germany has thus clearly begun to shed its tradition of providing gener-
ous options for early retirement, thereby raising the importance of income 
from (re)employment for the economic well-being of displaced older work-
ers. Institutional changes in the us, including those in the complementary 
pension pillars, likewise seem to have further heightened the importance 
of reemployment for maintaining economic well-being.
How have these changes affected the employment and income trajec-
tories of displaced older workers? A straightforward expectation is that 
increased emphasis on the (re)activation of displaced older workers has 
actually raised their probability of returning to work:
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hjl 5: Over time, German and American workers have become less likely 
to leave employment after late-career job loss.
Turning to period differences in the impact of late-career job loss on eco-
nomic well-being, the pessimistic perspective on the German case would 
be that generous early retirement in Chapter 5 options are functional 
requirements of a system that is characterized by marked labor market 
boundaries and other features that depress the reemployment prospects 
of displaced older workers (cf. Chapter 3). This perspective would suggest 
that displaced older workers in Germany f ind it very diff icult to conform to 
the new paradigm of late retirement. It receives additional credibility from 
the fact that overall labor market conditions in Germany were relatively 
unfavorable during the 1990s and early 2000s. Against this background, it 
seems likely that the economic consequences of late-career job loss have 
become more severe for German workers.
Recent discussions about an increase in economic insecurity suggest a 
similar trend for displaced older workers in the us. However, there are at 
least three reasons why such a prediction is less obvious in the American 
case: First, retrenchment of public policies cushioning the impact of late-
career job loss was not as marked as in Germany, even though changes 
in complementary pensions have presumably raised the costs of retiring 
early. Second, as noted repeatedly, weaker labor market boundaries and 
other institutional differences arguably make the American labor market 
more accommodating to displaced older workers. In other words, displaced 
American workers should f ind it easier to conform to increased pressures 
to return to work. Third, overall labor market conditions were relatively 
benign during the 1990s and early 2000s and better, on average, than in 
the 1980s.
On the whole, these considerations suggest that the effectiveness of 
welfare state buffering has declined over time and that – partly because of 
this trend – the economic consequences of late-career job loss have become 
more severe, particularly in Germany:
hjl 6: Over time, public taxes and transfers (including pensions) have 
become less effective in buffering the economic consequences of late-
career job loss, especially in Germany.
hjl 7: The impact of late-career job loss on disposable income and poverty 
status has become more severe over time, especially in Germany.
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7.3 Previous empirical research
I will now review previous research on the consequences of late-career 
job loss in Germany and the United States. As in my review of research 
on income dynamics around retirement, I will mostly limit the discussion 
to longitudinal studies. In addition to research on income changes, I will 
also summarize studies on the consequences of late-career job loss for 
subsequent employment/retirement. I will also discuss a few studies of 
changes in spousal labor supply around job loss, even though none of them 
has explicitly looked at older workers.
Employment effects. Chan and Stevens (2001) study the impact of late-career 
displacement (at ages 50 and older) on subsequent employment in the us. 
They analyze men and women separately, but broad patterns are similar 
for both genders. Chan and Stevens f ind that displacement has a marked 
and long-lasting negative effect on employment rates. Displaced older 
workers have much lower employment rates than non-displaced workers 
for many years after job loss, even though the gap declines over time as 
some displaced workers become reemployed and as non-displaced workers 
retire. Nevertheless, for workers displaced at age 55, a noticeable gap persists 
until the early to mid-60s (Chan and Stevens 2001: 510, Figure 4). Chan and 
Stevens (2001) also analyze a subgroup of displaced workers who become 
reemployed quickly after displacement. These quickly reemployed displaced 
workers initially have lower employment rates than nondisplaced workers. 
Interestingly, however, their employment rates begin to exceed those of 
nondisplaced workers when they reach their early 60s (for workers displaced 
at age 55) or their mid-60s (for workers displaced at age 60). This suggests 
that late-career displacement induces some American workers to postpone 
retirement, perhaps to compensate for wage scars, foregone earnings, or 
lower pension claims.
In another American study, Johnson and Mommaerts (2011) compare 
the incidence of, and employment patterns after, job loss across age groups. 
They show that older workers in their 50s and 60s are less likely to experi-
ence job displacement than younger workers, yet this difference is fully 
accounted for by age differences in job tenure. This f inding is extended 
by a recent study (Zhivan et al. 2012) which f inds that age differentials in 
displacement risks have narrowed between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s 
and that declining age differences in employer tenure are an important 
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reason for this convergence.11 Johnson and Mommaerts (2011: 18-19) also 
f ind that reemployment rates after job loss are considerably lower for older 
workers. For example, they estimate that six (twelve) months after job loss 
69 (87) % of workers aged 25-34, but only 58 (79) % of those aged 50 to 61 
and 48 (63) % of those aged 62 and above were reemployed.
Mauer and Mosley (2009) use social insurance records to study employ-
ment and benefit trajectories of German workers who entered (registered) 
unemployment at ages 50 to 64 in the early 2000s. One year after entering 
unemployment only 21% of workers in their sample were working in un-
subsidized employment relationships (Mauer and Mosley 2009: 33). Frosch 
(2006) uses the same data to study age differences in reemployment rates. 
She f inds that 79% of workers aged 35 to 49, but only 67% of workers aged 
50-54 and a mere 29% of workers aged 55-59 became reemployed within 
two years after job loss. She also f inds that reemployment rates decline 
more steeply with age for engineers than for other occupations. Her primary 
explanation for this result is that, due to different rates of technological 
innovation, skills become outdated more quickly in engineering than in 
most other occupations.
Using the soep, Rinklake and Buchholz (2011) calculate the proportion of 
older workers who become reemployed following the f irst unemployment 
spell after age 50. They also compare reemployment rates across birth 
cohorts. They f ind that 23 (20) % of the oldest male (female) birth cohorts 
(1934-39) were eventually reemployed. For the youngest cohorts (1946-51) 
these proportions are 51 (52) %, which constitutes a rather dramatic increase 
in the propensity of displaced older workers to return to work (Rinklake and 
Buchholz 2011: 42, Table 2.1). However, they do not control for differences 
in the age at unemployment, which may partly account for these cohort 
differences (their observation window ends in 2007, when workers from the 
1946-51 cohorts were aged 56 to 61). Again using the soep, Giesecke and Kind 
(2012) also f ind that reemployment rates of displaced older workers have 
increased in recent years. They conclude that this trend is at least partly 
due to changes in early retirement options.
Spousal labor supply. There seem to be no studies of spousal labor supply 
responses to job loss that have looked specif ically at older workers. In one 
influential American study, Stephens (2002) investigates wives’ responses to 
husbands’ job loss. His sample is restricted to couples where both partners 
11 However, in terms of absolute rates, convergence is driven by declining displacement risks 
for younger rather than increasing risks for older workers.
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are between ages 25 and 65 and he does not differentiate by age of husband 
and/or wife. Stephens f inds modest increases in labor supply among the 
wives of displaced workers, which partly occur already before the displace-
ment event. In another American study, Cullen and Gruber (2000) focus on 
the possibility that unemployment benefits crowd out spousal labor supply. 
Their sample comprises couples where both partners are between ages 25 
and 54. Consistent with the crowd out hypothesis, they f ind that the wives 
of unemployed husbands work less when the husband’s potential unemploy-
ment benefits are higher. In additional analyses, they split their sample into 
older and younger couples (where both spouses are under 40). Their estimates 
suggest that the wife’s labor supply response is weaker in older couples. 
Cullen and Gruber tentatively attribute this result to the greater savings 
of older couples, which would allow them to smooth consumption without 
drawing on increased earnings by the wife. These two American studies 
have thus documented a limited awe after displacement, with one study 
suggesting that it may be weaker for older workers. A systematic analysis of 
awe-type processes among older couples, however, remains yet to be done.
Recent evidence on the awe after job displacement in Germany (and 
the us) comes from Ehlert’s (2012) German-American comparison of the 
consequences of becoming unemployed. He shows that women who did 
not work prior to their partner’s job loss increase their (absolute) work 
hours in both countries, with the effect being larger in the us. Increases in 
hours are smaller for women working part-time before their partner’s job 
loss – in Germany they are essentially zero. A further study documenting 
a limited awe after job loss in Germany is McGinnity (2004), who does not 
f ind an awe in Great Britain, a result that she attributes to British earn-
ings replacement benefits being means-tested at the household level (both 
displaced worker and spouse thus face similar effective marginal tax rates). 
Prieto-Rodriguez and Rodriguez-Gutierrez (2003) provide a comparative 
study of added worker effects in 11 European countries. In the German case, 
they f ind an awe for wives of inactive men, but not for wives of unemployed 
men (perhaps because transitions to inactivity are more likely to be longer-
term exits, a possibility that they do not examine more closely). Their results 
also suggest that the strength of the awe declines with the age of the wife, 
but this f inding is based on a simple linear interaction of the husband’s 
employment status with the wife’s age.
Earnings and income effects. Research on the financial consequences of late-
career displacement has primarily focused on its impact on earnings. For 
American men (women) displaced at ages 50 to 61, Johnson and Mommaerts 
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(2011: 50, Tables 10 and 11) estimate that median monthly earnings after 
reemployment are 21 (17) % lower than before job loss, with practically all 
of the change being attributable to changes in hourly earnings (as opposed 
to changes in the number of hours worked per month). At least among men, 
these losses are considerably greater than for younger workers. Regression 
results show that longer predisplacement job tenure is associated with 
greater earnings losses for both men and women, but age differences in 
tenure do not seem to account for a large portion of the observed age dif-
ferences in wage losses. The f inding that older workers suffer particularly 
large earnings losses confirms earlier studies such as Farber (1997), who 
also shows that this pattern is robust across different levels of education.
Couch et al. (2009) use administrative data to study earnings changes 
among workers in Connecticut who were displaced in the course of ‘mass 
layoffs’ during 1999-2004 and who were aged 40 and above at the time of 
displacement. Their results are diff icult to compare with those of Johnson 
and Mommaerts (2011) because of the regionally specif ic sample and dif-
ferences in study design. In particular, the approach of Couch et al. (2009) 
differs from Johnson and Mommaert’s in that they compare the earnings 
trajectories of displaced workers with a control group of nondisplaced 
workers. Their most important results are that relative earnings losses are 
very persistent, remaining considerable six years after job loss, are broadly 
similar for men and women12, tend to rise with age at displacement, and are 
larger for workers who change industry (presumably because these workers 
no longer see their industry-specif ic skills rewarded).
Turning to household income, Couch (1998) calculates that workers 
displaced at ages 51 to 60 in 1990 had an average annual household income 
of approximately $45,000 in 1991, which was 24% lower than for current 
workers as a whole. However, his data do not contain information on pre-
displacement income, so this difference may partly reflect the fact that 
displacement is concentrated among low-income households. O’Rand and 
Hamil-Luker (2011) f ind that the number of times a worker is unemployed 
after age 50 is associated with significantly lower public and private pension 
income. Johnson et al. (2005) study a sample of Americans aged 51 to 61 in 
1992 and investigate how exposure to adverse events affects the probability 
of having low income in 2001. One of their measures is an indicator variable 
for having been laid off after 1992. In group-specif ic probit regressions, 
the estimated effects of this variable on the risk of having low income are 
generally positive, but mostly small and statistically insignif icant. The one 
12 In absolute terms, losses are greater for men due to their higher predisplacement earnings.
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exception are single men for whom the estimated marginal effect is around 
14 percentage points and highly signif icant.
Compared to the us, evidence on the f inancial consequences of job loss 
for older workers in Germany is even more scant. There is some work on 
the consequences of job loss for wages or earnings (e.g., Burda and Mertens 
[2001]; Gangl [2004b]; Strauß and Hillmert [2011]) and a smaller literature 
on changes in household income and poverty dynamics (McGinnity 2004; 
Ehlert 2012). However, most of these studies are restricted to prime-age 
workers, and even when they are not, age differences are usually not 
explored systematically.
One noteworthy exception is Strauß and Hillmert’s (2011) recent study 
of earnings losses after unemployment using administrative data. They 
exclude workers aged 50 and older, but provide age-specif ic results for 
workers below this threshold. Results for men confirm that older workers 
(ages 45-49) experience greater earnings losses than younger age groups. Age 
differences are noticeably larger when they include spells with zero earnings 
in the outcome measure rather than comparing earnings conditional on 
employment. This suggests that there are important age differences in the 
length of unemployment and/or in the stability of post-unemployment 
jobs. Perhaps some workers who are displaced at ages 45-49 even leave 
employment permanently. For women, earnings losses are found to be 
largest in the youngest (age 30-34) and the oldest age group (45-49).
As discussed already in Chapter 5, Rinklake and Buchholz (2011) analyze 
soep waves 1984-2007 and f ind that the negative relationship between late-
career unemployment at age 58 and absolute (inflation-adjusted) pension 
income is substantially stronger for the youngest birth cohort (1946-51) than 
for those born between 1934 and 1945.
In summary, previous research on the consequences of job loss for older 
workers, while not including direct German-American comparisons, does 
suggest that reemployment rates are substantially higher in the United 
States. Studies also show that even within the group of older workers, age at 
job loss has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of returning to work. 
This is not surprising because older workers have a shorter career horizon. 
Further, age directly influences access to early retirement benefits or the 
possibilities for using other resources (e.g., unemployment benefits or pri-
vate savings) to bridge the time until retirement benefits become available. 
In my implementation of the did matching approach in the next chapter, 
I will therefore match displaced workers to comparison workers with the 
same age, that is, I will perform exact matching on age. For Germany, there 
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is also some preliminary evidence that displaced older workers have become 
more likely to return to work in recent years.
Research on spousal labor supply responses to job displacement has 
documented a limited awe for both countries. So far, no study has explicitly 
focused on older workers, even though some f indings suggest that added 
worker effects may be smaller among older couples. In general, research 
on the awe has focused on the labor supply responses of ‘wives’ to the 
unemployment of their ‘husband’. This is natural given their focus on 
prime-age workers: Because most prime-age men already work full-time, 
the potential for a ‘male’ awe is very limited. Among older workers, there 
may be greater scope for labor supply responses by husbands: Some men 
might already have reduced their work hours and the awe could also take 
the generic form of delayed retirement. In the next chapter, I will therefore 
explore the existence of added-worker-type processes for both genders.
As for previous research on the earnings and income effects of late-career 
job loss, one clear f inding of German as well as American studies is that 
older workers who do become reemployed tend to suffer greater earnings 
losses than younger workers. Given the lack of genuinely comparative 
studies, it is more diff icult to draw conclusions about German-American 
differences in the impact of late-career job loss on earnings or even on 
household income. In addition, there is practically no evidence on how the 
f inancial consequences of late-career job loss have changed over time. To 
provide such explicit comparisons across space and time is the main goal 
of the next chapter.

8 The changing economic consequences 
of late-career job loss
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of employment and income 
trajectories around late-career job loss. It is structured as follows. The next 
section discusses a few essential details of the analysis sample and the 
implementation of the did matching approach. Section 8.2 contains the 
empirical f indings. I f irst analyze the impact of late-career job loss on sub-
sequent employment and retirement (Section 8.2.1). I then examine income 
and poverty dynamics among displaced workers as a whole (Section 8.2.2). 
Section 8.2.3 analyzes changes in spousal labor supply. As a f inal step, 
Section 8.2.4 presents additional analyses that differentiate between men 
who return to work and men who retire after late-career job loss (results for 
women are not discussed due to small sample sizes). Section 8.3 concludes 
by summarizing the main f indings of the chapter.
8.1 Sample characteristics and details of estimation approach
In this chapter, late-career job loss is def ined as an involuntary separa-
tion from an employer between ages 51 and 65. Separations are treated as 
involuntary if they occurred for one of the following reasons: closure of a 
business or establishment, being f ired, or the end of a f ixed-term contract 
if the latter was accompanied by at least one month of unemployment (cf. 
Chapter 4). I exclude self-employed workers from the analysis because the 
event is not well-def ined for them (wage and salary workers who become 
self-employed after job loss are included). I also restrict the analysis to 
workers who worked at least ten hours per week (annual average) before 
losing their job.
As in the analysis of income trajectories around voluntary retirement in 
Chapter 6, I will analyze four-year changes from  t − 2 / t − 1 to  t + 2 / t + 3 and 
six-year changes from  t − 2 / t − 1 to  t + 4 / t + 5 , with  t denoting the year of job 
loss. The reference year used (i.e.,  t − 2 or  t − 1 ) depends on the year of job 
loss. I use  t − 2 for workers displaced in even-numbered and  t − 1 for workers 
displaced in odd-numbered years. This somewhat unconventional approach 
is necessitated by the psid ’s adoption of two-year interview intervals in 1997 
(cf. Chapter 4). In my analysis of income dynamics around retirement, there 
were no systematic differences between four-year and six-year changes 
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and I therefore did not report separate estimates. Here, I will often do so 
because the differences tend to be larger.
Identifying the effect of late-career job loss requires estimation of the 
counterfactual trajectories displaced workers would have experienced 
if they had not lost their job. As set out in Chapter 4, I use Coarsened 
Exact Matching (cem; Iacus et al. 2012) with additional regression-based 
adjustments to improve the comparability of displaced and non-displaced 
workers. As in Chapter 6, I also apply entropy balancing (eb) to obtain 
composition-adjusted estimates, that is, estimates that are purged of period 
differences in the composition of displaced workers (cf. Chapter 4).1
Table  8.1 provides further information on the variables included in 
cem, eb, and/or the additional regression-based adjustment. The ticks in 
the three rightmost columns indicate where a given variable enters the 
analysis. Age is listed f irst because it presumably plays a crucial role for 
the consequences of late-career displacement: Most importantly, age is 
directly related to eligibility for (early) retirement and some other types of 
earnings replacement benefits and it may also crucially influence available 
reemployment opportunities. I therefore perform exact matching on age 
measured in years.2 I include the following additional characteristics in 
the cem procedure: civil servant status (Germany only), residence in East 
or West Germany (Germany only), race/migration background, education, 
presence of a partner, work hours, household income (poverty or near-
poverty), and sector/industry. All time-varying characteristics are measured 
in the predisplacement reference year (i.e., in  t − 2 or  t − 1 , depending on 
the year of displacement).
The set of variables included in the eb procedure is almost identical to 
that used in cem. There are only two differences. First, civil servant status, 
which is only def ined for German workers, is not included in eb because 
cem effectively leads to the exclusion of civil servants from the analysis. 
This is because there are practically no civil servants who experience 
displacement, which is consistent with most of these workers enjoying 
lifetime employment contracts (see Tables 8.2 and 8.3 below). Second, 
I include a measure of whether a worker had accumulated at least 30 years 
of work experience in the predisplacement reference year. I do not include 
1 As in Chapter 6, the reference distribution used in the eb procedure is given by the average 
country-specif ic composition of displaced workers over the whole observation period.
2 For example, to estimate the impact of displacement at age  a on the four-year income change 
from  t − 2 to  t + 2 , I compare income changes from age  a − 2 to  a + 2 between workers who were 
displaced at age  a and similar workers who were not displaced between ages  a − 2 and  a + 2 .
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this variable in cem to limit the number of displaced workers that cannot 
be matched (see below). However, f indings in Chapter 6 suggest that it is 
important to account for period differences in the length of work careers, 
particularly among women.
Another decision that deserves brief discussion is to adjust the composi-
tion of displaced workers with respect to age at the time of job loss (more 
specif ically, to adjust the composition with respect to three 5-year age 
groups; cf. Table 8.1). I did not include (retirement) age in the eb procedure 
for voluntary retirees because retirement age is arguably endogenous to the 
institutional changes that I am interested in (cf. Chapter 6). In the case of job 
loss, the situation is less clear. It seems plausible that changes in social policy 
have no strong influence on the risk of experiencing job loss conditional 
on working. However, the likelihood of (still) working at a given age and 
thus of being ‘at risk’ of losing one’s job presumably is influenced by these 
changes. The rationale for adjusting the composition of displaced workers 
with respect to age is therefore ambiguous, and I will return to this issue 
when discussing the f indings for German men, the one group where the 
inclusion of age has a clear influence on the impact of the compositional 
adjustment.
The covariate set used in cem is rather restricted and may not be suf-
f icient for meeting the unconfoundedness assumption required for unbi-
ased estimation of the causal effect of job loss (cf. Chapter 4). Employing 
a richer set of covariates and/or f iner coarsenings unfortunately results 
in prohibitively small sample sizes (and compromises representativeness) 
because many displaced workers can no longer be matched. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, I therefore follow the recommendations of Iacus et al. (2012) 
and use (weighted) linear regression and linear probability models (for 
dichotomous outcomes) to control for remaining differences in key variables 
after cem. The f inal column in Table 8.1 indicates the variables included in 
these regressions: household income quintile, health status, work experi-
ence, employer tenure, and earnings tercile as well as a number of key 
partner/couple characteristics for workers living with a partner at t−1/t−2. 
This combined matching-plus-regression approach can be expected to 
be less sensitive to specif ication choices than traditional applications of 
regression analysis which do not ‘preprocess’ the data via matching. See 
Ho et al. (2007), Iacus et al. (2012), and Chapter 4 for further discussion.
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Table 8.1  Characteristics included in coarsened exact matching (cem), entropy 
balancing (eb), and additional regression-based adjustment
Included in…




age at time of job loss exact matching on age in Cem; 
eb applied with respect to age 
groups (51-55, 56-60, 61-65) and 
average age
✔ ✔
Civil servant status de only ✔
east/West germany de only ✔ ✔
migration background/race de: migration background vs. no 
migration background; us: black 
vs. non-black
✔ ✔
education de: no degree/general schooling 
only vs. vocational degree vs. 
tertiary degree; us: Less than 
high school vs. high school/
some college vs. college degree
✔ ✔
presence of partner t − 2/t − 1 yes vs. no ✔ ✔
Work hours in t − 2/t − 1 10-30 vs. 30+ (full-time) ✔ ✔
household income in 
t − 2/t − 1
below 150% of poverty line 
(poor or near poor) vs. at least 
150% of poverty line
✔ ✔
industry/sector in t − 2/t − 1 primary/manufacturing vs. private 
service sector vs. public sector
✔ ✔
Work experience in t − 2/t − 1 fewer than 30 years vs. 30+years ✔ ✔
health problems in t − 2/t − 1 presence of health problems ✔
household income in 
t − 2/t − 1
income quintile ✔
Labor earnings in t − 2/t − 1 earnings tercile ✔
employer tenure (et) in 
t − 2/t − 1
et < 5 vs. 5 ≤ et ≤ 15 vs. 15 < et ✔
partner’s age in years Linear, squared, and cubic term ✔
age difference (ad) between 
worker and partner
ad < -5 vs. -5 ≤ ad ≤ 5 vs. 5 < ad ✔
partner’s education as for focal worker ✔
partner’s work experience in 
t − 2/t − 1
as for focal worker ✔
partner’s work hours (Wh) in 
t − 2/t − 1
Wh < 10 vs. 10 ≤ Wh < 30 vs. 30 
≤ Wh
✔
year of job loss full set of dummies for year of 
job loss
✔
Cem = Coarsened exact matching; eb = entropy balancing. Civil servant status not included in eb 
because only six workers with civil servant status experience job loss.
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8.2 Empirical results
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 provide details on the male and female samples used in the 
analysis. I differentiate German and American workers – or, more precisely, 
episodes3 – with respect to their treatment and matching status (with 
vs. without job loss and matched vs. unmatched). Information on period 
differences in the composition of matched displaced workers is provided 
in Tables 8.A.1 and 8.A.2 in the appendix to this chapter.
The f inal rows of Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show that the number of matched 
displaced workers is quite small. The number of 4-year panels ranges from 
387 for German men to a mere 156 for American women. Numbers are 
even smaller for 6-year changes. Unfortunately, these small sample sizes 
leave little possibility for disaggregating beyond year/period of job loss 
and postdisplacement work status (involuntary retirement vs. returning 
to work).
The primary comparison of interest in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 is that between 
matched workers with and without job loss, that is, between matched 
treated and comparison/control workers. By construction, the two groups 
are perfectly balanced with respect to the coarsened matching variables, 
as can be seen by inspecting the f irst block of variables in the tables. In 
addition, cem ensures that the two groups are comparable with respect 
to all possible interactions between these variables (cf. Chapter 4). I will 
discuss remaining differences with respect to other characteristics shortly. 
Before doing so, I briefly compare the matched to the unmatched episodes.
Clearly, unmatched workers who did not experience job loss, differ 
considerably from matched displaced workers. By excluding these workers 
from the analysis, cem considerably reduces imbalances between treated 
and control units (Iacus et al. 2012). For example, compared to unmatched 
non-displaced workers, displaced workers have lower levels of education 
and are more likely to have worked in the primary sector or manufacturing 
prior to job loss. As noted above, they are also much less likely to have civil 
servant status.
Another interesting comparison is between matched and unmatched dis-
placed workers (i.e., displaced workers who are discarded because the data 
contain no reasonably similar non-displaced workers). The bottom rows of 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show that less than a tenth of displaced men cannot be 
3 One and the same worker may contribute multiple episodes to the analysis sample (cf. 
Chapter 4). As throughout the study, standard errors are clustered on the personal level to 
account for the resulting dependencies among observations.
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matched. For women, this proportion is somewhat higher in both countries. 
Given the small number of unmatched displaced workers any conclusions 
concerning their socioeconomic prof ile are tentative, but it seems that 
they are more likely to have been single, to have worked part-time and to 
have been poor/near poor before job loss. It is reassuring that this general 
pattern is stable across the two countries and across men and women. This 
suggests that any differences between the Average Treatment Effect for all 
displaced workers (i.e., including unmatched displaced workers) and the 
Feasible Average Treatment Effect for matched displaced workers, which is 
the quantity estimated in this chapter, will be broadly in the same direction.
The lower parts of Tables 8.2 and 8.3 characterize workers with respect 
to the covariates included in the additional regression-based adjustment 
after cem. I distinguish between worker characteristics and couple/partner 
characteristics. Controlling for the partner’s work hours in the predisplace-
ment reference year might be suspect because previous research suggests 
that anticipation of job displacement may trigger increases in spousal work 
hours already before its actual occurrence (Stephens 2002). My own analysis 
of changes in spousal labor supply, however, does not suggest that such 
anticipation is common in the sample of older workers analyzed here (see 
Section 8.2.3 below).
Comparing matched displaced and comparison workers with respect 
to these characteristics reveals that some differences remain after match-
ing, suggesting that there is a certain need for additional regression-based 
adjustments. At the same time, matching considerably reduces differences 
between displaced and non-displaced workers for at least some of the vari-
ables that were not included in the matching procedure (i.e., differences 
between matched displaced and matched non-displaced workers are smaller 
than differences between matched displaced workers and unmatched non-
displaced workers). Examples are the proportion of workers with bad health 
or the partner’s level of education. Only very rarely are differences for the 
matched sample greater than between displaced and non-displaced workers 
as a whole. Overall, Tables 8.2 and 8.3 thus suggest that cem as applied here 
effectively reduces dissimilarities between displaced and non-displaced 
workers while avoiding massive pruning of treated workers.
8.2.1 Employment patterns after late-career displacement
Figure 8.1 explores the impact of late-career job loss on subsequent employ-
ment. I focus on the proportion of workers who are not or only marginally 
employed (annual average of < 10 hours per week) four and six years after 
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the predisplacement reference year  t  r which, depending on the year of 
displacement  t , is either  t − 2 or  t − 1 .4 For simplicity, I will refer to these 
two postdisplacement measurements as  t  r  + 4 and  t  r  + 6 . I will also refer 
to workers as ‘not working’ or ‘not employed’ even though the 10-hour 
threshold is compatible with working a small number of hours.5
Results for men are depicted in the upper and results for women in 
the lower row of Figure 8.1. I use circles to represent results for  t  r  + 4 and 
triangles to represent results for  t  r  + 6 . For both men and women, the left 
pair of graphs depict the proportion of matched displaced workers who work 
less than 10 hours per week. I will refer to these results as ‘non-differenced 
estimates’. The right pair of graphs depict did matching estimates based 
on comparisons with a matched control group and additional regression-
based adjustments. In each case, I report results based on actual worker 
composition (black markers) and composition-adjusted results (white 
markers). Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, the discussion refers to 
the unadjusted results.
Looking at men f irst, a comparison of the non-differenced estimates 
in Subgraphs I and II shows that German men are much more likely than 
American men to leave employment after late-career job loss. This dif-
ference could simply reflect the fact that German workers retire earlier 
anyway, but did estimates in Subgraphs III and IV show that this is not 
the case. There are clear country differences in the effect of job loss on 
subsequent employment.
In both periods, and both four and six years after the predisplacement 
reference year, German men who have lost their job are considerably more 
likely not to be working than similar non-displaced workers. For example, 
in the f irst period, the proportion of German men with no/marginal em-
ployment is 34 percentage points higher than for similar non-displaced 
workers at  t  r  + 4 . The difference declines somewhat from  t  r  + 4 to  t  r  + 6 , but it 
remains substantial at 29 percentage points. Inspection of non-differenced 
estimates (Subgraph I) shows that this decline is not due to displaced work-
ers returning to work, but to retirement dynamics among non-displaced 
workers. did estimates for American men are strikingly different in that 
4 Because the sample is restricted to workers who worked at least 10 hours per week in  t  r and 
because the majority works 30+ hours at this point (cf. Table 8.2 and Table 8.3), persons working 
less than 10 hours after displacement will usually have reduced their work hours substantially.
5 Results are very similar when I use the retirement indicator from Chapter 6. I report results 
for work hours in the given postdisplacement year, as they would reveal if a large number of 
displaced workers returned to working longer hours after an intermittent spell of no/marginal 
employment. Figure 8.1 suggest that this is not a widespread phenomenon.
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they do not indicate any (!) positive effect of displacement on the likelihood 
of not being employed. This result holds for both subperiods and for both 
postdisplacement measurements (i.e., for  t  r  + 4 and  t  r  + 6 ). These results 
provide compelling evidence for hypothesis hjl 1 which predicts that Ger-
man workers are less likely to return to work after losing their job.
Before turning to changes over time within the two countries, I dwell 
a little longer on the absence of a clear displacement effect for American 
men, as this result appears to be at odds with previous research on the 
employment effects of late-career job loss (Chan and Stevens 2001; John-
son and Mommaerts 2011) and its role as a trigger of involuntary early 
retirement (Lachance and Seligman 2010). It is beyond the scope of the 
present analysis to fully explore potential explanations for this seeming 
divergence, but a few points are worth noting. First, the changes analyzed 
here are relatively long-term compared to the postdisplacement observa-
tion window of Johnson and Mommaerts (2011: cf. Figure 3 on p. 35 of 
the paper). Further analysis of American men (results not shown) indeed 
reveals the expected effect of displacement on employment two years 
after the predisplacement reference year, that is, in  t + 0 or  t + 1 . Second, 
Johnson and Mommaerts (2011) simply describe the postdisplacement 
employment trajectories of displaced workers. They do not compare them 
to the trajectories of non-displaced workers and their estimates should 
therefore be compared to my non-differenced estimates which do show 
that a considerable share of displaced workers is not working at the two 
postdisplacement observations. Chan and Stevens (2001) provide differ-
enced estimates at various points in their paper, yet they do not control 
for heterogeneity between displaced and non-displaced workers during 
most of their analysis. The one exception is a hazard rate model presented 
toward the end of their paper. That model, too, indicates a positive effect of 
late-career job loss on exit from work. However, it is diff icult to compare 
these estimates to my own results.6
As for the relationship between job loss and involuntary retirement, my 
f indings are compatible with job loss triggering involuntary early retire-
ment for some older men if other workers respond by retiring later than 
6 Another possible explanation is that Chan and Stevens (2001) model monthly employment 
rates whereas my outcome measure is based on the total number of hours worked in a given 
calendar year. In principle, displaced workers could be substantially more likely not to be 
working in any given month (e.g., because their postdisplacement jobs are unstable), yet mostly 
meet the threshold of 520 hours (i.e., 10 per wek) underlying the measure used here. Further 
analysis of the work hours variable or the number of weeks worked in a calendar year does not 
provide strong support for this explanation, however.
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planned (e.g., to compensate for displacement-induced earnings losses). As 
noted in Chapter 7, some of the results reported in Chan and Stevens (2001) 
suggest such a pattern and the disaggregated analysis by postdisplacement 
employment status in Section 8.2.4 below will provide further evidence for 
this interpretation.
How have men’s postdisplacement employment trajectories changed 
over time? Hypothesis hjl 5 predicts that older displaced workers in both 
Germany and the us have become more likely to return to work, as institu-
tional changes made early retirement increasingly unattractive. Looking at 
non-differenced estimates first (Subgraph I), results for German men indeed 
suggest a limited trend in this direction: Among German men who suffered 
job loss between 1985 and 1996 (Period 1), 64% were no longer working 
a substantial number of hours at  t  r  + 4 and this proportion increased to 
74% until  t  r  + 6 . The corresponding estimates for German men displaced 
between 1997 and 2007 are 58% and 64%, respectively. The period difference 
in the non-employment rate at  t  r  + 6 approaches statistical signif icance 
Figure 8.1  Proportion of displaced workers with no/marginal employment and 
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Actual / adjusted composition: 4 years after reference year (tr+4)
Actual / adjusted composition: 6 years after reference year (tr+6) 90%−CI
period 1 – year of job loss: 1985-1996 (de); 1981-1992 (us). period 2 – year of job loss: 1997-2007 (de); 
1993-2002 (us). 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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(p < 0.1).7 Period differences are noticeably larger and reach conventional 
signif icance levels (p < 0.05) when worker composition is held constant. 
However, as noted above, the impact of the compositional adjustment must 
be viewed with caution in this particular case: It is partly attributable to 
differences in the age composition of displaced workers, which likely is 
partly endogenous to institutional changes.8
These results provide some initial support for hjl 5, which predicts that 
workers have become more likely to return to work over time. However, 
the decline in displaced German men’s propensity to leave employment 
is clearly far from enormous. This is underlined by the did estimates in 
Subgraph III: Job loss clearly remained an important trigger of early retire-
ment for German men in the later period, that is, in the late 1990s and 
2000s. The percentage point difference in non-employment rates between 
displaced men and comparison workers declined from the f irst to the 
second period, from 34 to 30 percentage points in  t  r  + 4 and from 29 to 22 
percentage points in  t  r  + 6 . These period differences are smaller than for 
non-differenced estimates, suggesting that trends in the latter estimates 
partly reflect the broader trend toward later retirement (that is also found 
among non-displaced comparison workers) rather than a weakening of the 
impact of late-career job loss (cf. Chapter 3). Unadjusted period differences 
in the did estimates also fail to reach statistical signif icance. As in the 
non-differenced case, period differences in did estimates are somewhat 
larger when the composition of displaced workers is held constant.
Non-differenced estimates for American men in Subgraph II indicate no 
period differences in the fraction of displaced workers who are out of work 
in  t  r  + 4 , while showing a substantial decline for  t  r  + 6 . However, even more 
than for German men, this period difference appears to reflect changes in 
broader retirement patterns rather than changes in the impact of late-career 
displacement: The did estimates in Subgraph IV do not suggest a weakening 
impact of job loss (if anything, did estimates suggest a slight negative effect 
7 As in Chapter 6, I mainly use 90% confidence intervals based on person-level cluster-robust 
standard errors to illustrate statistical uncertainty. When I report formal signif icance tests of 
period differences, the underlying p-values were obtained using the suest command in Stata 
12 (with the vce(cluster) option).
8 On average, German workers were older at the time of displacement in the second period, 
which would presumably have resulted in more workers leaving employment after job loss if 
other things had remained equal (cf. Table 8.A.1 in the appendix to this chapter). The impact of 
the compositional adjustments is weaker for the did results in Subgraph III, where differences 
in the age structure are partly already accounted for by the comparison with a control group.
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of late-career job loss on non-employment rates for the early period, whereas 
estimates for the late period are essentially zero).
Subgraphs V to VIII depict results for German and American women. 
Again, country differences in non-differenced estimates are in the expected 
direction: German women are more likely than their American counter-
parts to leave employment after late-career job loss (Subgraphs V and VI). 
Country differences are less clear for the did estimates in Subgraphs VII and 
VIII, implying that retirement trends among comparison workers differ 
considerably across the two countries. While did estimates for the f irst 
period are consistent with the expectation of stronger employment effects 
in Germany, at least in  t  r  + 4 , estimated employment effects for the second 
period are broadly similar across the two countries.
This complex pattern of results is related to country differences in 
changes over time. As with German men, period differences for German 
women are in the direction predicted by hjl 5, which expects declining 
exit rates after job loss. This holds for non-differenced and did estimates, 
but the period differences are modest in size and statistically insignif icant. 
For American women, non-differenced estimates are similar across the two 
periods, whereas did results seem to suggest a stronger exit-accelerating 
effect of late-career job loss in the second period. The lack of a clear trend 
in the non-differenced estimates implies that this is due to later retirement 
of comparison workers in the second period. Period differences in adjusted 
estimates show an even stronger increase, suggesting that this trend was 
mitigated (rather than driven) by compositional changes. Given the small 
number of cases, this apparent trend should not be overinterpreted, 
however.
In sum, this analysis of employment/retirement trajectories after late-
career job loss has shown that German men are much more likely than 
American men to leave employment after a late-career job loss. Averaging 
(unadjusted) estimates across the two periods and across the two postdis-
placement observations, 65% of German men were not or only marginally 
employed after late-career job loss, compared to only 29% of American men. 
The difference is perhaps even more striking when displaced workers are 
compared to observationally similar non-displaced workers via did match-
ing. Averaging estimates as before, the non-employment rate of displaced 
German men is 29 percentage points higher than in the comparison group, 
whereas the difference for American men even is slightly negative, at -4 
percentage points. Country differences for women are somewhat less clear, 
especially when displaced women are compared to a matched control group, 
but overall hypothesis hjl 1 – which predicts that German workers are more 
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likely to leave employment after late-career job loss – is well-supported by 
the above f indings.
Support is weaker for hypothesis hjl 5 which predicts that over time 
workers in both countries have become less likely to leave employment. 
Overall, hjl 5 receives more support for German workers: For both men and 
women, non-differenced and did estimates are in the expected direction. 
However, did estimates in particular are far from reaching conventional 
signif icance levels, and job loss clearly continued to have a strong positive 
effect on the non-employment rates of German workers during the second 
half of the observation period. In the case of American workers, there is no 
clear support for hjl 5. For both men and women, trends in did estimates 
even are in the opposite direction than predicted hjl 5. However, not only 
are these period differences quite small relative to their level of uncertainty, 
it also bears repeating that for American men no positive effect of job loss 
on non-employment rates can be found in either period.
With these f indings in mind, I now turn to the main questions of this 
chapter: How do the f inancial consequences of late-career displacement 
differ between Germany and the us, how have they changed over time, 
and to what extent can changing welfare state provisions account for these 
differences?
8.2.2 Financial consequences of late-career displacement
Figures 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5 present the main results concerning income 
changes around late-career job loss. Figures 8.2 and 8.3 depict non-differ-
enced and did matching estimates of average relative income changes for 
men and women, respectively. I report changes for displaced workers’ own 
labor earnings and for needs-adjusted household pre- and post-government 
income. To facilitate comparisons across countries and between non-differ-
enced and differenced estimates, all graphs pertaining to a given income 
type share the same scale. However, scales vary across the different income 
types, which must be taken into account when comparing, say, losses before 
and after taxes and transfers. Figure 8.4 examines the incidence of poverty 
entries among workers who were not poor in the predisplacement reference 
year and Figure 8.5 depicts the proportion of workers with very large income 
losses of more than 50% after taxes and transfers. Again, I use black markers 
to represent results based on actual worker composition and white markers 
to represent composition-adjusted estimates. As before, I will focus on 
unadjusted results and only discuss composition-adjusted f indings when 
they differ meaningfully from the former.
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Relative income changes
How do individual earnings and household income change when a man loses 
his job? In discussing the relevant results in Figure 8.2, I will concentrate 
on German-American differences f irst and then turn to within-country 
trends later on.
Non-differenced results in Subgraphs I and II show that, compared to 
predisplacement levels, German and American men had considerably 
lower earnings in the years following job loss. For example, in period 1, the 
average 4-year change in earnings was -69% for German men and -42% for 
American men, that is, German (American) men’s earnings in  t + 2 / t + 3 
were on average 69% (42%) lower than four years earlier (with  t denoting 
the year of job loss).
The corresponding did estimates in Subgraphs VII and VIII show that a 
good portion of this decline can be attributed to the impact of job loss, at 
least in Germany: Again focusing on estimated 4-year changes in period 
1, the average decline in labor income among displaced German men is 46 
percentage points larger than for matched non-displaced workers. In stark 
contrast, American men’s losses are only 4 percentage points larger than for 
the comparison group and the difference between matched displaced and 
non-displaced workers is not statistically significant. Importantly, however, 
did estimates for American men indicate larger and statistically significant 
losses for the later period. Non-differenced estimates in Subgraph II are very 
similar across the two periods, implying that the period difference in did 
estimates reflects more positive earnings trends among comparison workers 
in the second period. One likely explanation for this f inding is the trend 
towards later retirement in the comparison group. In addition, these results 
may also reflect the growing contribution of foregone earnings increases 
(as opposed to earnings declines) to the overall impact of job loss that was 
found by Farber (2005) for workers aged 20 to 64.
The much larger earnings losses of German men are consistent with the 
stronger employment effects reported above. However, despite the absence of 
clear employment effects in Figure 8.1, did estimates also indicate substantial 
earnings losses for American men, at least during the second half of the obser-
vation period. Lower postdisplacement wages, foregone earnings increases, 
shorter working hours, and/or declines in job stability result in earnings losses 
for displaced older American men and these losses persist at least until 6 years 
after the predisplacement reference year, that is, until 4 or 5 years after job loss.
Subgraphs III and IV depict changes in displaced workers’ needs-adjusted 
pre-government income. Pre-government income clearly declines less 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the Changing eConomiC ConSequenCeS of Late- CaReeR job LoSS 257
sharply than displaced workers’ own earnings, attesting to the insurance 
effect of income pooling within the household and of other private income 
sources such as complementary pensions. Consistent with their much 
larger earnings losses and probably also due to more limited access to 
private non-labor income and spousal earnings, German men experience 
much larger declines in pre-government income. These country differences 
are also clearly visible in the corresponding did estimates in Subgraphs 
IX and X.
Finally, the rightmost graphs in Figure 8.2 depict average changes in 
needs-adjusted disposable income. Non-differenced and did estimates are 
mostly quite similar, implying that relative changes in disposable income 
follow no strong trends in the comparison groups. Both sets of estimates 
suggest that German men experience somewhat larger losses relative to 
predisplacement disposable income. This holds for both non-differenced 
and differenced estimates and for both periods and postdisplacement 
observations. In general, the losses of German men are larger by 4 to 8 
percentage points. For example, averaging did results for  t  r  + 4 and  t  r  + 6 , 
average relative losses for displaced German men are estimated at -10.5% 
for the f irst and at -15.0% for the second period. The corresponding averages 
for American men are -4.6% and -9.5%, respectively.
Overall, results in Figure 8.2 are an important f irst piece of evidence for 
hypothesis hjl 2, which predicts that German workers are more likely to 
rely on public transfers after job loss, while American workers are more 
likely to rely on their own earnings. Further support for hjl 2 comes from 
Table 8.4. The f irst row of the Table reports the proportion of displaced 
workers whose postdisplacement earnings are at least 10% lower than in 
the predisplacement reference year. Subsequent rows then give (a) the 
proportion of workers with earnings losses of more than 10% whose losses 
are at least partly offset by increases in other types of income and (b) the 
corresponding average and median replacement rates. As in the correspond-
ing Table in Chapter 6 (Table 6.4), I pooled 4- and 6-year changes and only 
counted gains in a given income component if they exceeded 5% (in terms of 
the level of that income component in the predisplacement reference year). 
All results in Table 8.4 are non-differenced, that is, they represent changes 
in the different income components among displaced workers and do not 
involve comparisons with matched non-displaced workers.
Table 8.4 clearly documents that American men rely more on their own 
earnings and on private non-labor income after late-career job loss, whereas 
Germans have a larger portion of earnings losses offset by public transfers. 
Cushioning through a declining tax burden also seems to be more important 
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for German men, which is plausible given that American men draw a larger 
share of their postdisplacement income from earnings which tend to be 
taxed at higher rates than public transfer income.
Table 8.4  Changes in income components around late-career job loss
Men Women
Germany us Germany us
85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02 85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02
% with ind. earnings loss (IEL) 85 86 77 67 84 86 75 64
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given ieL 53 35 60 69 37 48 49 63
average replacement rate 12 10 36 40 14 17 72 81
median replacement rate 4 3 21 23 5 6 40 54
Change in public pension & transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased pt given eL 92 82 59 50 81 78 56 54
average replacement rate 49 50 54 35 77 73 81 (50)
median replacement rate 42 42 40 29 56 51 54 (34)
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given ieL 91 95 92 94 87 89 79 72
average replacement rate 42 52 35 38 61 58 66 44
median replacement rate 35 44 29 29 38 41 36 31
Replacement rates are expressed in percentage terms and calculated as the increase in pnLi/
ppti or decrease in hht divided by the absolute value of the decline in individual labor earnings. 
Replacement rates capped at +200% average and median replacement rates calculated over 
observations with positive replacement rates (i.e., over observations with an increase in the given 
income component). estimates in parentheses based on fewer than 30 observations. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
Some previous studies (e.g., Goodin et al. 1999; DiPrete and McManus 2000; 
Ehlert 2012) have compared average relative income losses before and after 
taxes and transfers to construct alternative measures of the overall extent 
of ‘welfare state buffering’ through public taxes and transfers. In addi-
tion, Ehlert (2012) proposes to treat the difference between changes in 
displaced workers’ own earnings and changes in needs-adjusted household 
pre-government income as a measure of ‘family buffering’. Relative changes 
in household pre-government or market income will typically be smaller 
than changes in worker’s own earnings because of the stabilizing effect of 
other household members’ earnings and private non-labor income, includ-
ing private pension income. The difference between earnings losses and 
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pre-government losses thus partly reflects the ‘insurance function’ of the 
household (cf. Chapter 2) of other household members’ incomes. However, 
especially when dealing with older workers, it is important to acknowledge 
that pre-government income also includes more individualized forms of 
private insurance, for example, from complementary pension plans. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, I will therefore use the label ‘private income buffer’ 
instead of ‘family buffer’.
Table 8.5  Income buffering through private income and the welfare state
Non‑differenced estimates did estimates
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Men, Germany
private income buffer 23 (37) 20 (39) 8 (28) 10 (44)
Welfare state buffer 38 (63) 32 (61) 21 (72) 12 (56)
Men, United States
private income buffer 26 (60) 23 (64) 1 (120) 7 (68)
Welfare state buffer 17 (40) 13 (36) -0 (-20) 3 (32)
Women, Germany
private income buffer 20 (35) 20 (35) 16 (55) 15 (48)
Welfare state buffer 37 (65) 38 (65) 13 (45) 16 (52)
Women, United States
private income buffer 33 (72) 35 (72) 19 (94) 25 (92)
Welfare state buffer 13 (28) 14 (28) 1 (6) 2 (8)
private income buffer (pib) is the percentage point difference between the average change 
in displaced workers’ own earnings and the average change in needs-adjusted household 
pre-government income. Welfare state buffer (WSb) is the percentage point difference between 
average changes in household needs-adjusted pre-government income and needs-adjusted post-
government income. figures in parentheses represent the relative contributions of pib and WSb to 
total buffering, i.e., pib/(pib + WSb) and WSb/(pib +WSb). See text and note 10 for further details. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
Table 8.5 presents two simple measures of private income and welfare 
state buffering that are based on comparing average relative changes in 
individual earnings, pre-government, and post-government income. The 
non-parenthesized measures are simply the percentage point differences 
between average changes in individual earnings and needs-adjusted house-
hold pre-government income (‘private income buffer’; pib) and between 
needs-adjusted household pre-government and post-government income 
(‘welfare state buffer’; wsb). The parenthesized measures are constructed 
using Ehlert’s (2012) approach. They standardize the non-parenthesized 
measures by dividing through the combined buffering effect of family and 
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welfare state buffering.9 I present estimates based on non-differenced and 
did matching estimates of income changes. For simplicity, I again report 
average buffering effects for four-year and six-year changes.
Results for men in the upper part of Table 8.5 confirm that private income 
buffering is more important for American men, while welfare state buffer-
ing plays a larger role in Germany. This is especially clear when considering 
the relative contribution of the family and the state to total buffering, as 
captured by the standardized estimates in parentheses. These f indings 
are consistent with previous studies of prime-age workers (DiPrete and 
McManus 2000; Ehlert 2012) and support hypothesis hjl 3 which predicts 
that private income buffering is more important for older Americans.
How have the economic consequences of late-career job loss changed 
over time? Have the diffusion of dc-type pensions, growing penalties for 
early take-up of public retirement benefits, and the retrenchment of (long-
term) unemployment and disability benef its exacerbated the f inancial 
consequences of late-career job loss, above and beyond the broader trends 
in retirement income dynamics documented in Chapter 6? For brevity’s 
sake, I focus on f indings for post-government or disposable income, which 
is of primary interest because of its direct relevance to workers’ economic 
well-being. I only selectively discuss f indings for the other income variables 
to better understand the underlying processes.
On the whole, results for German men suggest that the economic conse-
quences of late-career job loss have worsened somewhat over the course of 
the observation period, as predicted by hypothesis hjl 7. According to did 
matching estimates for the f irst period, the ‘displacement effect’ was in the 
neighborhood of 10% both 4 and 6 years after the predisplacement reference 
year. In other words, on average, 4- and 6-year changes in disposable income, 
expressed in terms of income in the predisplacement reference year, were 
smaller by approximately 10 percentage points for displaced German men 
than for similar non-displaced workers. The corresponding estimates for 
the second half of the observation period are close to 15 percentage points. 
Non-differenced estimates are very similar.
9 More formally, let  δ  oe ,  δ  pre , and  δ  post denote non-differenced or did estimates of, respectively, 
average percentage changes in workers’ own earnings, pre-government, and post-government 
income. The unstandardized measures of the private income buffer (pib) and the welfare state 
buffer (wsb) are then simply  PIB =  δ  oe  −  δ  pre and  WSB =  δ  pre  −  δ  post . Ehlert’s (2012) standard-
ized versions (reported in parentheses in Table 8.5) are  PI B  s  =   
 δ  oe  −  δ  pre  ______ δ  oe  −  δ  post 
   =    PIB ________ PIB + WSB  and  WS 
B  s  =   
 δ  pre  −  δ  post  ______ δ  oe  −  δ  post 
  =    WSB ________ PIB + WSB .
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Can these changes be attributed to a decline of public income support, 
as suggested by Hypothesis hjl 6? Overall, estimated replacement rates in 
Table 8.4 and buffering measures in Table 8.5 indeed suggest that public 
financial support for displaced older men in Germany has decreased, though 
changes mostly appear relatively modest: More specifically, Table 8.4 shows 
that the share of men whose earnings losses were cushioned by growing 
public pension and transfer income fell noticeably, from 92% to 82%, from 
the f irst to the second period. However, replacement rates for those seeing 
some increase in public transfers remained more or less constant. The 
income-stabilizing effect of progressive household taxation even appears to 
have grown somewhat over time. The increasing role of taxes as opposed to 
public transfers in buffering earnings losses is consistent with more German 
men returning to work (at lower earnings than on their prior job) rather 
than leaving work in the later period. The alternative indicators in Table 8.5 
likewise suggest a limited decline of welfare state buffering for German 
men. For example, according to non-differenced estimates, welfare state 
taxes and transfers reduced relative income losses of displaced German 
men by 38 percentage points on average in the f irst period, compared to a 
reduction of only 32 percentage points in the second period. On the whole, 
these results seem to indicate a weakening, but by no means a massive 
erosion, of public income support for displaced older workers.
How have the income trajectories of displaced American men changed 
over time? Non-differenced estimates in Subgraph VI of Figure 8.2 suggest 
that job loss was associated with larger declines in disposable income in 
the second period. At least for  t  r  + 4 such a trend is also visible in the did 
estimates (Subgraph XII). However, due to smaller sample sizes (and perhaps 
also because of more heterogeneous income trajectories), estimates are 
even more uncertain than in the German case, and period differences are 
therefore nowhere near statistical signif icance. In fact most of the period-
specif ic estimates of income losses are not even signif icantly different from 
zero, as is evident from the 90% confidence bands crossing the zero line.
That said, there is some evidence for a decline of welfare state buffering. 
First, non-differenced estimates in Subgraph VI of Figure 8.2 indicate grow-
ing losses after taxes and transfers, while relative changes in earnings and 
pre-government income are quite similar across the two periods (Subgraph 
IV). Estimated public transfer replacement rates in Table 8.4 likewise sug-
gest that the importance of public income support for maintaining income 
after late-career job loss has declined: The share of American men whose 
earnings losses were mitigated by increasing public transfers was lower in 
the second period, as were replacement rates conditional on experiencing a 
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transfer gain. If constructed on the basis of non-differenced estimates, the 
alternative indicators of welfare state buffering in Table 8.5 also suggest a 
decline of welfare state buffering. The did-based versions of these indica-
tors do not carry much meaningful information in this case, because did 
estimates of earnings and pre-government losses for the f irst period were 
very small to begin with.
In Figure 8.3, I turn to income changes around women’s job loss. As 
with men, American women experience substantially smaller declines 
in labor earnings and household pre-government income than their Ger-
man counterparts (Subgraphs I to IV). In fact, pre-government losses for 
American women are very small (and generally statistically insignificant) in 
the later period. This illustrates that, due to men’s higher personal income, 
private income buffering is more important for women than for men. This 
result, which again resembles f indings for prime-age workers (e.g., DiPrete 
and McManus 2000; Ehlert 2012), is underscored by the buffering measures 
in Table 8.5 which show that private income buffering is more important 
for women than for men, especially in the United States. Non-differenced 
estimates of changes in post-government income show substantial and 
statistically signif icant income losses for German women (Subgraph V). 
Subgraph VI contains no clear evidence that job loss is associated with de-
clines in disposable income for American women.10 Due to the very limited 
number of displacement events for American women, these estimates are 
very uncertain, however.
Turning to did estimates in Subgraphs VII – XII in Figure 8.3, declines 
in earnings and pre-government income are generally attenuated relative 
to the non-differenced estimates, especially for German women. This is 
similar to the f indings for men and presumably attributable to voluntary 
retirement leading to declines in earnings and pre-government income 
among comparison workers. The effect of the did comparison on changes in 
post-government is more ambiguous. Overall, however, German-American 
differences are qualitatively similar to those found for non-differenced 
estimates, that is, losses are smaller for American than for German women 
(estimates for American women in Period 2 are even suggestive of income 
gains, especially for six-year changes).
Turning to trends over time and again concentrating on changes in 
disposable income, there is little to suggest that the impact of women’s 
late-career job loss has become dramatically more severe. As in the case 
10 Estimated median (rather than average) changes are very similar, suggesting that this result 
is not attributable to outliers (results not shown).
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of German men, German women’s job loss was associated with somewhat 
larger declines of disposable income in the later period, but period differ-
ences are miles away from statistical signif icance (Subgraph V). Moreover, 
and in contrast to German men, this trend is not robust to the application 
of the did comparison: The slight negative trend vanishes altogether when 
displaced women’s income trajectories are compared to those of matched 
comparison workers, in fact, it is reversed. Changes in displaced women’s 
own earnings and pre-government income follow no strong trend, either. 
This suggests that the level of public income support has not declined dra-
matically so far, an interpretation that is also supported by direct measures 
of buffering through public transfers and taxes in Tables 8.4 and 8.5.
For American women, there is no evidence whatsoever that the impact 
of job loss on disposable income has become more severe. In fact, neither 
non-differenced (Subgraph VI) nor did estimates (Subgraph XII) suggest a 
clear negative effect of job loss on disposable income in either period and, 
if anything, income trajectories even appear somewhat more favorable in 
the later period.
Trends for women thus look more benign than for men in both countries. 
This corresponds to the patterns found for income trajectories around 
voluntary exit from work in Chapter 6. Unlike for voluntary retirement, 
however, comparisons of composition-adjusted and unadjusted estimates 
do not suggest that compositional changes with respect to the characteris-
tics included in the entropy balancing procedure (cf. Table 8.1 above) are a 
major source of these divergent trends. In particular, there is little evidence 
that increases in women’s work experience have been an important factor.11 
There is, however, some evidence that, as in the case of voluntary retirement, 
American women’s improved coverage by complementary pension plans is 
a factor behind the positive trend found for this group (cf. results for private 
non-labor income replacement rates in Table 8.4).
Poverty entries
I now examine the risk of entering poverty after late-career job loss for 
workers who were not poor in the predisplacement reference year. As 
throughout this study, I def ine poverty as relative income poverty with 
a poverty threshold equal to 60% of median needs-adjusted disposable 
income for the adult population.
11 Table 8.A.2 in the appendix to this chapter in fact shows that average prior work experience 
has only risen for American, but not for German women suffering late-career job loss.
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It is well-known that job loss is concentrated among vulnerable groups 
(less-educated workers, minorities, low-income workers; see, for example, 
Farber [1997]) and Tables 8.2 and 8.3 confirm that this also applies to the 
present sample of older workers. These groups may be quite likely to enter 
poverty upon losing their job. In addition, even a limited trend toward 
greater relative income losses (as was found for men in both countries) may 
make a huge difference for these workers, suggesting that the analysis of 
poverty dynamics may contribute to a more nuanced picture of changes 
over time.
Results of the poverty analysis are displayed in Figure 8.4. I only show 
results for post-government income, as results for pre-government income 
contain very little novel information. Estimates for men in the upper row 
show that broadly similar proportions of men enter poverty in the us and 
Germany (Subgraphs I/II). However, did estimates in Subgraphs III and 
IV imply that late-career job loss has a clear poverty-triggering effect 
only in Germany. American matched comparison workers are almost as 
likely to enter poverty (for reasons other than job loss) as their displaced 
counterparts. For both countries, comparisons across the two periods do 
not provide clear evidence that the risk of entering poverty after job loss 
has risen over time. Point estimates for American men do suggest a slight 
increase that is, however, very small relative to estimation uncertainty.
These f indings are by and large consistent with the analysis of relative 
income changes, while also adding some interesting details: As in the 
analysis of relative income changes, the economic consequences of job 
loss appear to be somewhat more severe for German men, especially if the 
trajectories of displaced workers are compared to similar non-displaced 
men. Concerning trends over time, the limited trend toward larger relative 
income losses found for German men does not (yet?) seem to have led to 
more workers entering poverty after late-career job loss, a pattern that 
resembles f indings for income dynamics around voluntary retirement in 
Chapter 6. Apparently, increases in relative income losses have been con-
centrated among workers whose predisplacement incomes are far enough 
away from the poverty line.12
Estimates for women in Subgraphs V to VIII  likewise do not lead to 
fundamentally different conclusions from earlier results. Non-differenced 
estimates in Subgraphs V and VI show that a non-negligible number of 
12 An exploratory analysis of relative income changes by income quintile in the predisplace-
ment reference year indeed suggests that relative losses increased most strongly for workers in 
the fourth (i.e., second-highest) income quintile.
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women enter poverty after job loss, yet did estimates in Subgraphs VII and 
VIII suggest that many of these entries may not be directly attributable to 
job loss. When taking the uncertainty of estimates into account, no clear 
trends can be identif ied for either country.
Large income losses
Figure 8.5 examines the risk of suffering very large income losses of more 
than 50% after taxes and transfers. Findings for women in Subgraphs 
V-VIII are qualitatively similar to those for relative income changes and 
poverty entries and in the interest of brevity I will therefore concentrate on 
results for men. Here, changes over time are more noteworthy than country 
differences: For both countries, non-differenced as well as did estimates 
suggest that the risk of suffering large income losses around late-career 
job loss has grown over time. Formal tests show that period differences do 
not quite reach conventional signif icance levels. However, when estimates 
for  t  r  + 4 and  t  r  + 6 are pooled (with standard errors again clustered on the 
Figure 8.4  Poverty entries after late-career job loss and differences to matched 
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Actual / adjusted composition: 4 years after reference year (tr+4)
Actual / adjusted composition: 6 years after reference year (tr+6) 90%−CI
period 1 – year of job loss: 1985-1996 (de); 1981-1992 (us). period 2 – year of job loss: 1997-2007 (de); 
1993-2002 (us). 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
the Changing eConomiC ConSequenCeS of Late- CaReeR job LoSS 267
person level), period differences in did matching estimates are signif icant 
at the 10%-level for men from both countries.
For men, within-country trends in the share of workers with very large 
income losses are thus clearer than for average changes in disposable in-
come or poverty entries: A growing number of men experience substantial 
declines in economic well-being around late-career job loss. These trends 
are reminiscent of f indings in Chapter 6, where I found that men’s voluntary 
retirement is increasingly associated with large income losses, particularly 
in the us. In fact, it seems quite likely that these parallel developments 
partly have the same institutional sources, among them the decline in 
public pension replacement rates, growing penalties for early take-up of 
public benef its (especially in German), and the growing prevalence of 
dc-type pension plans in the us. At the same time, many of these changes 
have likely had a disproportionate impact on displaced older workers, as 
they entailed disproportionate increases in the costs of early retirement 
(see Chapters 2, 3, and 7).
Given that broadly similar trends are identif iable for voluntary retirees, 
it is important to note that the trend toward a growing prevalence of large 
losses is not attenuated when displaced workers are compared to similar 
non-displaced workers via did matching. In other words, these f indings 
suggest that at least for some men (and their household members) the 
consequences of late-career job loss have become more severe, above and 
beyond broader trends toward more precarious income trajectories at the 
transition from work to retirement. Given the f indings of Chapter 6, it is 
likely that a growing proportion of comparison workers will experience a 
large income drop when they eventually retire, particularly in the us. In 
other words, the upward trend in the did estimates might be weaker for 
(even) longer-term changes than I analyze here. Yet, even if the situation of 
displaced and non-displaced older men might converge in the longer term, 
there is no such trend until  t  r  + 6 , that is, until 4 or 5 years after job loss, 
which implies a substantial loss of lifetime income.
This f inding that American men have become more likely to experience 
large income losses after late-career job loss echoes results by Gosselin 
and Zimmerman (2008), who f ind that among Americans aged 25 to 64 
unemployment of the household head has increasingly been associated 
with large income losses. Importantly, Gosselin and Zimmermann (2008) 
only present non-differenced estimates. Within the confined focus on older 
workers, my results are thus an important piece of evidence that this trend 
really reflects a growing negative effect of job loss rather than a more general 
trend toward increased income volatility.
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The analysis so far has generated several insights, with results being clearer 
for men than for women. German men are much more likely than their 
American counterparts to leave employment after late-career job loss, both 
in absolute terms and in comparison to similar non-displaced workers (hjl 
1). These differences in employment patterns translate into marked differ-
ences in the composition of household income after late-career job loss. 
German men and their families rely more on income from public sources, 
whereas own earnings from reemployment as well as private income buffer-
ing through private non-labor income and spousal earnings play a greater 
role for their American counterparts (hjl 2 & hjl 3). German-American 
differences in the decline of disposable income relative to predisplacement 
levels are quite small, however, with point estimates suggesting that the 
average decline for German men was larger by about f ive percentage points. 
In addition, did estimates also suggest a stronger poverty-triggering effect of 
displacement for German men. These country differences are certainly not 
negligible, but they are also not large, given that German men consistently 
Figure 8.5  Proportion of workers with very large income losses (> 50%) after late-
















Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2









































Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2











































Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2













































Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2



























Actual / adjusted composition: 4 years after reference year (tr+4)
Actual / adjusted composition: 6 years after reference year (tr+6) 90%−CI
period 1 – year of job loss: 1985-1996 (de); 1981-1992 (us). period 2 – year of job loss: 1997-2007 (de); 
1993-2002 (us). 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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were much less likely than their American counterparts to return to work. 
In this sense, the results confirm that Germany sustained quite generous 
‘welfare-sustaining employment exit policies’ (DiPrete et al. 1997: 328) 
throughout the observation period.
Have the consequences of late-career job loss become more severe over 
time? And to what extent can such trends be attributed to an erosion of 
public income support and other forms of collective insurance, for example, 
via employer-provided pensions? Results for women show no clear trends, 
with parts of the analysis even suggesting a trend toward smaller losses for 
American women. Even though the tight sample size restrictions certainly 
are partly responsible for these ambiguous results, the lack of clear and 
consistent trends in point estimates is noteworthy.
The analysis of income trajectories around men’s job loss yielded some 
clearer findings. For both countries, but more so for Germany, results suggest 
a limited trend toward greater relative income losses. In addition, there is 
relatively clear evidence that in both countries job loss was more frequently 
associated with very large income losses of over 50% in the second half of 
the observation period. For men, hypothesis hjl 7, which suggests that the 
economic consequences of late-career job loss have become more severe, is 
thus reasonably well-supported by the data. More direct measures of welfare 
state buffering also suggest that a decline of public income support indeed 
contributed to this trend in both countries, though changes are clearly not 
dramatic (hjl 6). However, these trends do not (yet?) seem to have resulted 
in more men entering poverty after late-career job loss.
In the remaining parts of the chapter, I extend the analysis in two main 
ways. I f irst take a closer look at the importance of ‘family buffering’ by 
exploring changes in spousal labor supply for displaced workers living with 
a partner. In a f inal step, I will then differentiate displaced men with respect 
to their postdisplacement employment trajectories (for women further 
disaggregation is not feasible due to small sample sizes). In particular, I will 
distinguish ‘involuntary retirees’ who do not return to work from ‘returners’ 
who do.
8.2.3 Changes in spousal labor supply
To better understand the role of the family in buffering income losses, 
I now explore the impact of late-career job loss on spousal labor supply, 
retirement, and earnings. For obvious reasons, I restrict this part of the 
analysis to respondents living with a partner. I also exclude couples that 
dissolved due to separation or death between  t − 4 / t − 3 and  t + 4 / t + 5 . 
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In keeping with the unbalanced panel design employed throughout this 
study, couples that left the study for other reasons (e.g., due to attrition or 
reaching the end of the observation period) are included in the sample. 
Going back to  t − 4 / t − 3 enables me to investigate anticipation effects, 
that is, changes in spousal labor supply prior to the occurrence of job loss 
(Stephens 2002). I f ind no consistent evidence of such anticipation, which 
suggests that choosing  t − 2 / t − 1 as the reference years for the analysis of 
income mobility is not a problem.
Figure  8.6 explores changes in women’s labor supply and earnings 
around men’s late-career job loss.13 I only present results based on actual 
worker composition and I only show did matching estimates (with ad-
ditional regression-based adjustments), that is, I try to answer the following 
question:14 Do changes in spousal labor supply and earnings differ between 
displaced and observationally similar non-displaced workers? I examine 
three outcome variables: the absolute change in the partner’s weekly work 
hours, the proportion of partners with no/marginal employment, and the 
percentage change in the partner’s earnings. All changes are computed 
relative to  t − 2 / t − 1 . When looking at the proportion of partners with no/
marginal employment, I only consider workers whose partner worked 10 
hours or more in  t − 2 / t − 1 . This outcome variable therefore essentially 
captures differences in spousal retirement behavior, with retirement again 
being def ined in terms of leaving or at least substantially reducing one’s 
hours of paid work.
On the whole, Figure 8.6 suggests that men’s late-career job loss has 
sizable added-worker-type effects on spousal labor supply in the United 
States. Evidence for an awe is considerably weaker in the German case, 
though there are hints of an awe emerging in the later period. This pattern 
is consistent with Hypothesis hjl 4 which expects the awe to be stronger in 
the us. More specif ically, results for the f irst period in Germany (Subgraphs 
I, V, and IX) indicate that changes in spousal labor supply and earnings 
were very similar for displaced and non-displaced workers. did estimates 
for the second period (Subgraphs II, VI, and X) are suggestive of a small 
awe, with the ‘wives’ of displaced men working about two additional hours 
per week compared to those of non-displaced men (Subgraph II). There 
is also some evidence that the share of men with ‘retired’ wives who no 
13 The German sample includes a few same-sex couples. For simplicity, I nevertheless refer to 
the partners of men as ‘women’ or ‘wives’ and to the partners of women as ‘men’ or ‘husbands’.
14 In non-differenced estimates, potential added worker effects would be dominated by 
reductions in labor supply associated with retirement dynamics among spouses.
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longer worked a substantial number of hours was lower in the treatment 
group (Subgraph VI). However, not only is the magnitude of these effects 
relatively small, even though they mostly approach or even reach statistical 
signif icance at the 10% level. There is also no evidence that men’s job loss 
had an effect on changes in spousal earnings relative to the predisplacement 
reference year (Subgraph X).
As noted above, there is considerable evidence for a sizable and persistent 
awe in the case of American men’s job loss. In both periods, the ‘wives’ of 
displaced American men worked substantially longer hours and were less 
likely to leave employment than the partners of similar non-displaced 
workers. Graphs in the bottom row show that these different employ-
ment/retirement trajectories also translate into the ‘wives’ of displaced 
men having higher earnings relative to the predisplacement reference 
year (i.e.,  t − 2 / t − 1 ). Effects are larger for  t + 2 / t + 3 and  t + 4 / t + 5 than 
immediately following displacement (i.e., in  t + 0 / t + 1 ). This is because 
the awe often takes the form of delayed retirement rather than increases 
in the number of hours worked, as can be seen in Subgraphs VII and VIII. 
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Differences between the partners of displaced workers and the partners of 
non-displaced comparison workers thus grow as more and more partners 
in the latter group leave employment.
According to estimates in Subgraphs III and IV, the partners of displaced 
American men work an additional 4 to 6 hours per week in  t + 2 / t + 3 and 
t + 4 / t + 5 . This corresponds to approximately 200 to 300 hours per year and 
is in the neighborhood of Ehlert’s (2012) estimates for prime-age workers. 
Importantly, these differences in labor supply translate into economically 
meaningful differences in spousal earnings trajectories: Subgraphs XI and 
XII suggest that, in terms of earnings in  t − 2 / t − 1 , partners of displaced 
workers earn between 20% and 30% more in  t + 2 / t + 3 and  t + 4 / t + 5 than 
they would have earned in the absence of displacement.
Not only has previous research on changes in spousal labor supply around 
job loss mostly focused on younger/prime-age workers, it has also largely 
restricted attention to the partners of unemployed men. The primary reason 
for concentrating on ‘wives’ is that the vast majority of prime-age men work 
full-time, leaving very little room for additional increases in labor supply. As 
noted in Chapter 7, the scope for a ‘male awe’, that is, for labor supply responses 
by the ‘husbands’ of displaced women, may be greater toward the end of 
working life: in particular, older ‘husbands’ might postpone retirement (rather 
than increase the number of hours per week) and some men might have begun 
to work part-time as part of a gradual transition from work to retirement.
However, even though some of the results in Figure 8.7 may be suggestive 
of a ‘male’ awe, overall there is no clear evidence that this is a common 
phenomenon in either Germany or the us. In the German case, there is very 
little evidence for a male awe. Estimates for the second period even suggest 
that the ‘husbands’ of displaced women reduce their hours compared to 
the partners of non-displaced women (Subgraph II). Estimates for the f irst 
period are suggestive of an awe in  t + 0 / t + 1 (Subgraphs I and V), but the 
effects dissipate quickly thereafter or even vanish altogether. Results for the 
work hours of American ‘husbands’ are in the direction of an awe in both 
periods (Subgraphs III and IV). At about two hours per week, the magnitude 
of this effect is quite small, however. More importantly, results for the other 
outcome measures do not provide consistent evidence for an awe – with the 
exception of  t + 4 / t + 5 in the second period, but the uncertainty of these 
estimates is substantial.
My data thus contain no clear evidence for a male awe around older 
women’s job loss. The analysis of changes in women’s labor supply around 
men’s job loss, however, corroborates the result that ‘family buffering’ is 
a more important strategy for coping with the f inancial consequences of 
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late-career job loss in the United States: American women increase their 
labor supply in response to spousal job loss, with the magnitude of the 
estimated effects being sizable and similar to Ehlert’s (2012) estimates 
for prime-age workers. Among older American couples, the income shock 
associated with a man’s job loss appears to quite often trigger a recalibration 
of the wife’s career and retirement plans. German women’s labor supply, by 
contrast, appears unresponsive to spousal job loss.
As discussed in Chapter 3, one possible explanation for the absence of a 
clear awe among German wives would be that they may often be long-term 
‘inactives’ (e.g., homemakers) whose job opportunities may be very limited. 
However, if this was the primary explanation, one would expect to f ind 
clearer evidence for an awe when looking at the retirement behavior of 
German wives who worked in the predisplacement reference year (i.e., in 
Subgraphs V and VI of Figure 8.6).
Another possibility is that public income support ‘crowds out’ private 
responses to the income shock associated with late-career job loss (Cul-
len and Gruber 2000). Yet, while unambiguously conf irming that public 
Figure 8.7  did matching estimates of changes in partner’s labor supply and earnings 
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income support is more important for displaced German men, the above 
analysis of income trajectories also shows that they suffer substantial 
and persistent declines in disposable income – declines that, if anything, 
are larger than for American workers (cf. Figures 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5). Of 
course, these differences already incorporate the labor supply responses 
of American wives. Nevertheless, the noticeable and persistent income 
losses faced by displaced German men and their families might be seen 
as creating considerable incentives for an awe among German couples. 
This suggests that, at least in part, the absence of a clear awe may also 
be attributable to low overall demand for older workers: The diff icult 
labor market situation of older German workers may not only depress 
reemployment prospects of displaced older workers themselves – it may 
also restrict the scope for labor supply responses by partners or spouses. 
Thus, employers’ reluctance to hire older workers may limit possibilities 
for increasing work hours if this requires a change of job and mandatory 
retirement clauses may make it diff icult to respond to a partner’s job loss 
by delaying retirement. Further research is needed to clarify whether the 
absence of an awe in Germany primarily reflects the absence of (f inancial) 
need or a lack of opportunities.
8.2.4 Financial consequences for involuntary retirees and returners
In a f inal step, I now differentiate workers with respect to their employ-
ment/retirement trajectories after job loss. I restrict this part of the analysis 
to men, because the female samples are too small for further disaggregation 
(for completeness, I report results for women in Table 8.A.5 in the appendix 
to this chapter). As for men, the f indings so far provide modest support for 
the idea that the f inancial consequences of late-career displacement have 
become more severe and that a decline of public insurance mechanisms 
has been a factor behind this trend.
Perhaps, however, the aggregates examined above are hiding growing 
inequalities within the group of displaced older workers and in particular 
the deteriorating situation of those who do not become reemployed after 
late-career displacement. It seems plausible that, by strengthening the link 
between employment and economic well-being, reforms promoting later 
retirement and ‘activation policies’ more generally have had this effect 
– even though clear predictions are diff icult because these reforms have 
presumably also affected the selectivity of retirement after late-career job 
loss. Therefore, I now take a closer look at how income trajectories differ 
by postdisplacement retirement status.
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Standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
Table 8.6 differentiates men with respect to their level of employment after 
late-career job loss. I classify workers as having retired if they worked less 
than 10 hours per week in  t  r  + 4 and  t  r  + 6 where, as before,  t  r is the predis-
placement reference year (either  t − 2 or  t − 1 ). Workers who worked 10 or 
more hours in at least one of these years are treated as ‘returners’.15 To obtain 
15 For some workers, information is only available for one of the two postdisplacement years 
(i.e.,  t  r  + 4 or  t  r  + 6 ). These cases were classif ied on the basis of work hours in that year.
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did matching estimates of the consequences of involuntary retirement and 
job loss followed by return-to-work, I again apply cem using the covariate 
set in Table 8.1. I account for the likely selectivity of work status with respect 
to the matching variables by applying cem separately by postdisplacement 
work status.
The disaggregated analysis of ‘involuntary retirees’ and ‘returners’ is 
based on rather small samples, particularly in the us. This necessitates 
two changes compared to the analysis above. First, I do not apply the ad-
ditional regression-based adjustment when constructing did estimates, as 
comparisons of did estimates with and without additional control variables 
suggest that the regressions suffer from substantial overf itting.16 Second, 
I do not present composition-adjusted estimates, because the entropy 
balancing procedure produces unreliable results with small sample sizes. 
For simplicity, I also present average effects for 4-year and 6-year changes.
Table 8.6 contains the results of the disaggregated analysis. Results for 
involuntary retirees are presented in the upper and results for returners 
in the lower part of the table. I f irst discuss period differences for each of 
the two countries and then turn to German-American differences later on.
Strikingly, results for German men suggest that the trend toward larger 
income losses observed above has largely been conf ined to involuntary 
retirees who did not return to work after losing their job. According to the 
estimates in Table 8.6, risks of entering poverty have not changed much for 
either ‘leavers’ or ‘returners’, which is consistent with the absence of a clear 
trend in Figure 8.4. However, leavers seem to have experienced substantially 
larger relative income losses in the second period. Thus, the estimated average 
decline in needs-adjusted households income among German men leaving 
employment grew from 14% to 24% from the f irst to the second period. 
did matching estimates are qualitatively similar, although the increase is 
somewhat smaller (from 14% to 20%). The proportion of retiring workers with 
very large income losses likewise appears to have increased, from 11% to 17%. 
Again, did estimates suggest a similar and in this case even slightly stronger 
trend (from 6% to 13%). By contrast, there are no clear trends toward greater 
income losses for returners. Both non-differenced and did estimates suggest 
that average relative losses in post-government income were if anything 
smaller in the second period. The share of returners with very large losses 
grew slightly, by 2 percentage points, according to both non-differenced and 
16 Estimates obtained using additional regression-based adjustments often differed dramati-
cally from those without such adjustments, much more so than for displaced workers as a whole. 
Results were also implausibly sensitive to the precise set of additional covariates included.
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did estimates, an increase that is, however, smaller than for involuntary 
retirees. As throughout the chapter, all of these estimates are quite uncertain 
(as indicated by the standard errors in parentheses) and must therefore be 
considered as preliminary. Only in one case does the period difference reach 
conventional significance levels (p < 0.05): the increase in non-differenced 
average relative losses after taxes and transfers for involuntary retirees.
Table 8.7  Changes in income components for men retiring after late-career job loss
Men
Germany United States
85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02
% with ind. earnings loss (IEL) 100 98 100 97
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given ieL 53 40 66 75
average replacement rate 13 7 29 (24)
median replacement rate 4 2 25 (26)
Change in public pension & transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased pt given eL 98 93 78 78
average replacement rate 52 48 46 (33)
median replacement rate 46 43 30 (29)
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given ieL 92 99 100 99
average replacement rate 38 43 26 (26)
median replacement rate 33 41 27 (23)
Replacement rates are expressed in percentage terms and calculated as the increase in pnLi/
ppti or decrease in hht divided by the absolute value of the decline in household labor earnings. 
Replacement rates capped at +200 percent. average and median replacement rates calculated 
over observations with positive replacement rates (i.e., over observations with an increase in the 
given income component). estimates in parentheses based on fewer than 30 observations. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 quantify the extent of public and private buffering among 
involuntary retirees using the indicators introduced in Section 8.2.2.17 Re-
sults in Table 8.7 suggest that public transfers were indeed somewhat less 
effective in compensating for earnings losses due to involuntary retirement 
in the second period. Buffering through the tax system, however, appears 
to have increased slightly. The alternative buffering indicators are provided 
17 The corresponding estimates for women are available on request.
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in Table 8.8. These measures provide somewhat stronger evidence for a 
decline of welfare state support: Based on non-differenced (did matching) 
estimates, average relative losses after taxes and transfers were 56 (31) per-
centage points smaller than before taxes and transfers in the early period. In 
the second period the reduction amounted only to 46 (21) percentage points.
Turning to American men, estimated income changes for involuntary 
retirees in Table 8.6 are very imprecise, because the sample of displaced 
men is small to begin with and because so few workers actually leave 
employment after late-career job loss. Point estimates do suggest that 
retiring American men faced greater economic risks in the later period. 
In particular, retiring workers were more likely to enter poverty, both in 
absolute terms and compared to matched comparison workers. Standard 
errors are too large to justify f irm conclusions, however. Interestingly, and 
in contrast to results for German men, there is also some evidence that the 
situation of workers returning to work deteriorated from the f irst to the 
second period. In particular, returners seem to have faced somewhat greater 
risks of suffering very large income losses in the later period.
Table 8.8  Income buffering through private income and the welfare state for men 
retiring after late-career job loss
Non‑differenced estimates DID matching estimates
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Men, Germany
private income buffer 28 (33) 26 (36) 12 (28) 14 (41)
Welfare state buffer 56 (67) 47 (64) 31 (72) 21 (59)
Men, United States
private income buffer 47 (58) 37 (52) 18 (72) 17 (53)
Welfare state buffer 35 (42) 35 (48) 7 (28) 15 (47)
private income buffer (pib) is the percentage point difference between the average change 
in displaced workers’ own earnings and the average change in needs-adjusted household 
pre-government income. Welfare state buffer (WSb) is the percentage point difference between 
average changes in household needs-adjusted pre-government income and needs-adjusted post-
government income. figures in parentheses represent the relative contributions of pib and WSb to 
total buffering, i.e., pib/(pib + WSb) and WSb/(pib +WSb). See text and note 9 for further details. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
Comparing the results across countries, there is no clear evidence that invol-
untary retirees who leave employment after late-career job loss are better off 
in Germany where, despite recent cutbacks, they can rely on a broader and 
more generous array of public policies. While buffering measures in Tables 
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8.7 and 8.8 confirm that public transfers cushion a larger portion of income 
losses for German men, more effective ‘private income buffering’ through 
spousal earnings and private non-labor income appear to largely make up 
for any holes in the American public safety net. These f indings suggest that 
retirement after late-career job loss is quite selective in the us. Put bluntly, 
American displaced workers seem to retire primarily if they can afford to. 
This still renders their retirement involuntary in the sense that it would 
presumably have occurred later in the absence of job loss. However, those 
workers who would have been worse off if they had chosen the ‘retirement 
path’ seem to have mostly been able to f ind reemployment. While not being 
logically incompatible with it, this result stands in some tension to Maestas 
and Li’s (2006) f inding that a considerable fraction of older American job 
searchers cannot f ind work and become ‘discouraged workers’.
However, this is not to say that all is well in the us. In particular, it is worth 
considering two additional outcomes reported for returners in Table 8.6: 
the (absolute) change in work hours and the change in the hourly wage. The 
results for hourly wages show that late-career job loss leaves considerable 
wage scars in the us (and also in Germany). Results for the change in work 
hours are perhaps even more noteworthy. Even though non-differenced 
estimates suggest that American returners decrease their work hours on 
average (by 11 hours per week in the f irst and by 4 hours per week in the 
second period), did estimates indicate a positive impact of job loss on the 
change in work hours among returners. This suggests that returners work 
noticeably longer hours (approximately 5 per week) after late-career job 
loss than they would have worked in the absence of displacement. In other 
words, American workers partly pay the price for late-career job loss in the 
form of foregone leisure and later retirement rather than in the form of lower 
disposable income. Results for German returners suggest no such pattern.
8.3 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, I have used longitudinal data to study the impact of job 
loss between ages 51 and 65 on subsequent employment, spousal labor 
supply, and household income. Consistent with the twofold comparative 
perspective taken throughout this study, I  have not only investigated 
German-American differences in the consequences of late-career job loss, 
but also examined within-country changes over time.
As in Chapter 6, I provide a condensed summary of the hypotheses for-
mulated in the previous chapter and of the relevant empirical f indings in 
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Table 8.9. In the following verbal summary, I will aim for a somewhat higher 
level of abstraction and concentrate on the central and most reliable findings 
of this chapter. I will mostly focus on the findings for men, which were gener-
ally clearer and more consistent. This may partly be due to larger samples, but 
likely also reflects the fact that women’s contribution to household income is 
more variable across household types. As in the case of (voluntary) retirement 
that was analyzed in Chapter 6, disaggregated analysis by household type and 
household earnings arrangement might, in principle, be a promising way to 
proceed. However, in the present study the possibilities for such an analysis 
were limited by sample sizes and the need to contain the complexity of results.
Despite noticeable changes over time, which I will summarize below, 
my analysis highlights marked and persistent differences between the us 
and Germany. More specif ically, I have documented striking differences 
in the impact of late-career job loss on subsequent employment. These dif-
ferences result in pronounced differences in the types of income displaced 
older workers rely on, with public benefits playing a much larger role for 
Germans and private income sources, including own and spousal earnings, 
being more important for Americans. The greater importance of the family 
in buffering the economic impact of late-career job loss is underlined by 
the analysis of changes in spousal labor supply. In the us, women increase 
their labor supply noticeably when their partner suffers late-career job 
loss. For German women, no such effect can be detected. Men do not show 
unambiguous responses to spousal job loss in either country. These f indings 
highlight the greater salience of private income buffering and, in particular, 
of buffering through the incomes of other family members in the American 
context (Ehlert 2012; Western et al. 2012).
Changes in disposable income for the average displaced worker do not 
vary as strongly between the two countries. Estimates suggest that men’s job 
loss is associated with somewhat larger relative income losses in Germany 
than in the us, with some evidence suggesting that losses have grown over 
time in both countries (see below). Results also indicate that late-career job 
loss more often leads to poverty entries in Germany than in the us. Whereas 
non-differenced rates of poverty entry are broadly similar for displaced 
men in Germany and the us, did estimates (which help account for overall 
differences in poverty dynamics between the two countries) suggest a clear 
poverty-triggering effect only for German men. Finally, late-career job loss 
also elevated the risk of suffering very large income losses of more than a 
half for men in both countries, at least in the later periods.
At f irst glance, the results in this chapter suggest that, at least during 
recent decades, the American approach of providing limited public support 
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to displaced older workers has been relatively well-balanced in the sense that 
those displaced workers who could not afford to retire have mostly been able 
to f ind reemployment. However, while changes in disposable income are 
superficially consistent with such a favorable interpretation, some f indings 
in this chapter suggest that American workers and their families partly pay 
the price for late-career displacement in ‘currencies’ other than disposable 
income – for example, in terms of foregone leisure and perhaps also lower 
job quality. More specif ically, late-career job loss seems to induce displaced 
workers and/or their spouses to work longer hours and/or retire later than 
planned. This pattern is broadly consistent with Mayer’s (2005: 37) remark 
that in the us ‘older workers continue to work even at lower wages because 
of the low level of expected pension income’ and with Buchholz et al.’s (2011: 
23) related conjecture that older workers in liberal welfare states ‘may even 
be forced to work beyond retirement age in the case that they failed in accu-
mulating enough pension savings’. Future research should further investigate 
these issues by tracking displaced workers for longer periods of time and by 
taking a closer look at outcomes other than earnings and household income.
It is also worth stressing that the reemployment prospects of Americans 
have likely been helped by the strong overall performance of the American 
economy during the observation period, and particularly during its second 
half (cf. Chapter 3). Future research will have to investigate how displaced 
older workers fare when macroeconomic conditions are less benign. For 
recent research on the labor market outcomes and f inancial situation of 
older Americans during the ‘Great Recession’, see Altindag et al. (2012), 
Johnson (2012), and Rutledge et al. (2013).
As for the German context, the f indings of this chapter suggest that the 
employment prospects of older workers, and the reemployment prospects 
of displaced older workers in particular, should (continue to) feature high on 
the agenda of German policymakers. The comparison to the us highlights 
that late-career job loss remained an important trigger of early retirement in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. As noted above, the absence of spousal labor 
supply responses to late-career job loss could be read as further evidence 
that employment opportunities available to older workers are limited. An 
alternative interpretation of course is that high levels of public benef its 
reduce the need for returning to work as well as for spousal labor supply 
responses. While I could not disentangle the relative importance of reem-
ployment prospects and retirement incentives, a two-pronged approach that 
seeks to improve demand for displaced older workers (e.g., by supporting 
continued training) in addition to raising work incentives certainly appears 
more balanced than one that just emphasizes the supply side.
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As for changes over time, the impact of men’s late-career job loss on 
disposable income seems to have become more severe in both countries, 
with attempts to capture the buffering effect of welfare state taxes and 
transfers more directly supporting the notion that a decline of public income 
support at least partly explains this trend. For men, the increase in average 
relative income losses around late-career job loss is in the neighborhood of 
5 percentage points in both the us and Germany, whereas risks of entering 
poverty show no clear trend. Probably the most striking f inding is that 
displaced men’s risk of suffering very large income losses has risen markedly 
in both countries, both in absolute terms and in comparison to similar 
non-displaced workers. Due to small sample sizes, all of these results are 
quite uncertain and must therefore be regarded as preliminary: Only for 
the increase in the proportion of workers with very large income losses do 
period differences come close to reaching conventional signif icance levels.
Even taking period differences at face value, they may perhaps not appear 
as dramatic as suggested by popular claims about increasing economic 
insecurity. It is important to stress, however, that trends are generally robust 
to comparisons with matched non-displaced workers, especially since Chap-
ter 6 documented a broader trend toward larger income losses around men’s 
(voluntary) retirement. In particular, gaps between displaced older workers 
and similar non-displaced comparison workers persist until 4 to 5 years after 
job loss, which implies substantial and growing losses in terms of lifetime 
income. In this sense – and, again, within the constraints implied by the 
relatively small number of cases – the f indings of this chapter are consistent 
with the idea that recent changes in social policy have had a disproportionate 
effect on workers whose late careers are interrupted by involuntary job loss. 
Future research will have to investigate whether these differences persist 
even longer. It should also explore how the impact of declines in health, 
the second major event interrupting late careers, has developed over time.
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the policy changes that have argu-
ably made late-career job loss and involuntary early retirement more costly 
were introduced only gradually (e.g., benefit adjustments for early retirement 
in Germany) and/or toward the very end of the observation period (e.g., the 
abolition of second-tier unemployment benefits in Germany or increases in 
the full retirement age in both countries). The fundamental transformation of 
the American system of complementary pensions likewise has not yet reached 
its endpoint. The results in this chapter should therefore be considered as 
snapshots during an era of transition, snapshots that need to be updated as 
the current reform process and other institutional changes progress.
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8.4 Additional results
Table 8.A.1  Men – period differences in worker composition – matched workers 
experiencing job loss
Germany United States
85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02
Worker characteristics – matching variables
age at job loss (mean) 55.7 57.0 58.1 56.4
age at job loss 51-55 57.2 38.7 32.7 62.2
age at job loss 56-60 36.2 45.8 37.3 12.6
age at job loss 61-65 6.5 15.5 30.0 25.2
% eastern germany 32.0 27.8
% civil servant 0.4 1.9
% migration background/black 24.9 21.3 4.3 8.1
% intermediate education 70.9 70.1 46.5 58.2
% high education 7.1 10.8 20.9 30.6
% living with partner 89.3 91.6 96.3 89.6
% with health problems 15.2 13.0 17.2 6.2
% working full-time 98.8 96.5 94.2 95.0
% poor/near poor 22.1 20.2 26.0 16.8
Worker characteristics – additional variables
avg. work experience (years) 33.1 33.6 34.5 32.3
% middle earnings tercile 50.2 46.7 27.3 33.7
% top earnings tercile 36.3 40.1 53.3 61.3
% primary sec./manufacturing 76.2 66.0 51.5 34.7
% private service sector 14.3 26.7 38.9 57.4
% public sector 9.5 7.3 9.7 7.8
age (mean) 51.0 51.5 52.7 51.1
Partner characteristics (if partner present at t − 2/t − 1)
% intermediate education 54.3 59.6 48.7 45.3
% high education 4.7 14.1 26.0 41.8
% works part-time 13.1 32.9 16.8 11.4
% works full-time 37.7 35.9 39.0 54.1
avg. work experience (years) 18.1 21.5 14.8 19.0
n four-year change 181 204 127 71
n six-year change 169 141 117 45
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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Table 8.A.2  Women – period differences in worker composition – matched workers 
experiencing job loss
Germany United States
85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02
Worker characteristics – matching variables
age at job loss (mean) 55.1 56.2 57.3 56.4
age at job loss 51-55 64.2 52.1 44.8 53.4
age at job loss 56-60 31.3 40.2 31.5 32.7
age at job loss 61-65 4.6 7.7 23.6 13.9
% eastern germany 30.6 26.5
% civil servant 0.0 1.4
% migration background/black 19.6 12.5 10.6 5.1
% intermediate education 57.2 73.3 68.3 61.1
% high education 2.2 7.0 6.4 24.4
% living with partner 77.4 80.8 72.4 68.9
% with health problems 12.9 16.7 13.0 18.7
% working full-time 61.4 57.3 55.6 83.5
% poor/near poor 21.6 20.5 33.6 30.8
Worker characteristics – additional variables
avg. work experience (years) 28.2 27.7 21.6 25.4
% middle earnings tercile 28.1 38.3 37.8 39.7
% top earnings tercile 10.6 9.5 4.3 19.6
% primary sec./manufacturing 49.0 29.5 25.5 21.2
% private service sector 34.6 54.3 69.8 58.6
% public sector 16.4 16.1 4.7 20.2
age (mean) 55.1 57.3 57.3 57.6
Partner characteristics (if partner present at t − 2/t − 1)
% intermediate education 68.3 80.8 42.3 32.8
% high education 10.0 14.9 28.8 48.8
% works part-time 6.4 11.0 11.1 8.6
% works full-time 63.3 53.2 64.9 75.1
avg. work experience (years) 25.8 26.5 24.3 22.9
n four-year change 92 123 104 52
n six-year change 88 88 95 31
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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Table 8.A.3  Changes in income components around late-career job loss – matched 
workers only – composition-adjusted results
Men Women
Germany us Germany us
85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02 85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02
% with ind. earnings loss (IEL) 88 84 76 76 80 84 78 73
Change in private non‑labor income (PNLI)
% with increased pnLi given ieL 53 36 60 65 38 46 53 60
average replacement rate 14 10 36 31 13 18 81 115
median replacement rate 6 3 20 20 3 6 47 115
Change in public pension & transfer income (PPTI)
% with increased pt given eL 95 83 59 40 82 80 58 61
average replacement rate 48 52 48 31 76 70 81 (57)
median replacement rate 44 44 32 31 56 50 65 (26)
Change in household taxes (HHT)
% with decreased hht given ieL 89 95 91 94 89 89 81 68
average replacement rate 42 52 36 30 59 57 62 48
median replacement rate 33 44 29 29 37 41 34 30
Replacement rates are expressed in percentage terms and calculated as the increase in pnLi/
ppti or decrease in hht divided by the absolute value of the decline in individual labor earnings. 
Replacement rates capped at +200 per cent. average and median replacement rates calculated 
over observations with positive replacement rates (i.e., over observations with an increase in the 
given income component). estimates in parentheses based on fewer than 30 observations. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
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Table 8.A.4  Income buffering through private income and the welfare state – 
composition-adjusted results
Non‑differenced estimates did estimates
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Men, Germany
private income buffer 28 (41) 19 (38) 13 (40) 9 (39)
Welfare state buffer 39 (59) 32 (62) 20 (60) 14 (61)
Men, United States
private income buffer 26 (60) 23 (64) 1 (120) 7 (68)
Welfare state buffer 17 (40) 13 (36) -0 (-20) 3 (32)
Women, Germany
private income buffer 19 (35) 20 (35) 17 (67) 14 (47)
Welfare state buffer 35 (65) 38 (65) 8 (33) 15 (53)
Women, United States
private income buffer 33 (67) 37 (77) 20 (80) 35 (105)
Welfare state buffer 16 (33) 11 (23) 5 (20) -2 (-5)
private income buffer (pib) is the percentage point difference between the average change 
in displaced workers’ own earnings and the average change in needs-adjusted household 
pre-government income. Welfare state buffer (WSb) is the percentage point difference between 
average changes in household needs-adjusted pre-government income and needs-adjusted post-
government income. figures in parentheses represent the relative contributions of pib and WSb to 
total buffering, i.e., pib/(pib+WSb) and WSb/(pib+WSb). See text and note 9 for further details. 
Sources: soep, psid, cnef, own calculations
the Changing eConomiC ConSequenCeS of Late- CaReeR job LoSS 289















85‑96 97‑07 85‑96 97‑07 81‑92 93‑02 81‑92 93‑02
Workers retiring/leaving work
















































































Workers returning to work
















































































































Standard errors in parentheses. 






The question how macro-level ‘institutions’ shape the life courses of indi-
viduals has received increasing attention from sociologists during recent 
decades. So far, however, much of this research has analyzed mid-life or 
early-career trajectories such as the transition from school to work. Com-
parative research on the later life course has predominantly focused on the 
timing of retirement and, to a lesser extent, on other types of labor market 
transitions. Few studies have taken a truly comparative perspective on the 
income trajectories of older workers and retirees, even though household 
income mobility undoubtedly is a crucial life course outcome (DiPrete 
2002; Mayer 2005). This study has addressed this research gap by examining 
mobility processes among workers ages 50 and older in Germany and the 
United States – two countries that are important reference points in the 
literatures on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001b) and welfare 
regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990): Germany is usually considered as the 
prime example of a coordinated market economy with a conservative/
corporatist welfare state and the us as a liberal market economy with a 
liberal/residual welfare state.
The present study was also motivated by more immediate concerns about 
the economic well-being of older workers and about the implications of 
recent welfare state change. The idea that welfare state retrenchment has 
led to a growth of economic insecurity is a recurrent theme in German 
and European debates, both inside and outside of academia. The United 
States have long served as a dystopian reference point in these debates, 
with commentators routinely invoking the specter of an ‘Americaniza-
tion’ of the German welfare state (Butterwegge 2006; Starke et al. 2008). 
America, too, has been having its share of debates about a (further) erosion 
of its allegedly residual social safety net and about associated increases in 
economic insecurity. Jacob Hacker’s (2006) widely read book The Great Risk 
Shift is perhaps the best-known and certainly one of the most dramatizing 
statements in that debate. Again, however, relatively little is known about 
how levels of economic insecurity have actually developed during recent 
decades, particularly for older workers, and even fewer studies have tried 
to link economic insecurity to changes in the social safety net.
Against this background, I have combined an in-depth analysis of relevant 
welfare state programs and their employment-based functional equivalents 
with a thorough examination of income mobility around two crucial late-
career trigger events: retirement in the sense of exit from work and late-career 
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job loss. Following DiPrete (2002), I have argued that the trigger events ap-
proach is particularly well-suited for investigating the (changing) impact 
of welfare state arrangements, as it zeroes in on those circumstances when 
the welfare state’s role as an institution that smoothes income streams and 
ensures a minimum level of income becomes most salient. To be sure, modern 
welfare states serve many goals other than income smoothing. There can be 
little doubt, however, that income smoothing and minimum income provi-
sion belong to their core business and that these functions are the primary 
ones emphasized by current debates on growing economic insecurity.
Following an important strand of recent retirement research, I have em-
phasized differences in workers’ level of control over retirement, employing 
a stylized distinction between voluntary and involuntary retirees. For want 
of more direct measures of individual control, I have operationalized this 
distinction by differentiating between a group of retirees who leave work 
after late-career job loss or the onset of health problems – the primary triggers 
of involuntary early retirement according to the literature – and a second 
group of retirees whose retirement is not preceded by either of these events. 
More concretely, I have focused on the latter group of ‘voluntary retirees’ in 
the empirical analysis of income dynamics around exit from work (Part II) 
and then taken a closer look at the impact of job loss as one crucial trigger of 
involuntary early retirement in Part III. A substantive reason for according a 
central role to individual differences in control over retirement is that workers 
with low levels of control may be disproportionately affected by recent changes 
in welfare state arrangements: For example, the scaling back of early retire-
ment options likely has more far-reaching consequences for workers whose late 
careers are interrupted by job loss or disability onset than for workers whose 
careers unfold smoothly and who can therefore readily delay retirement.
In the next section, I summarize key findings of the study and relate them 
to the literature on welfare and life course regimes as well as to current 
debates about rising economic insecurity. I also identify what I take to be 
the key policy challenges highlighted by my analysis and discuss possible 
responses. Section 9.2 concludes with some open questions and promising 
directions for future research.
9.1 Key findings: welfare regimes and the ‘Great Risk Shift’ 
revisited
The empirical chapters of this study have produced a large number of 
interesting results. At this point, I will only recount what I take to be most 
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noteworthy f indings. More detailed summaries were provided at the end of 
the individual chapters and I refer the interested reader to these accounts.
Two obvious questions are whether the f indings conform to stylized 
and stereotypical depictions of the German and American welfare and 
life course regimes and whether they support the view that an erosion of 
collective insurance mechanisms has led to a massive increase in economic 
insecurity. Of course, the answers to these question will always, to some 
extent, be in the eye of the beholder. By how much must the income trajec-
tories of German and American older workers differ to be truly distinctive? 
To what extent must they have changed for the label ‘Great Risk Shift’ to be 
justif ied? Despite these inevitable ambiguities, some positive conclusions 
seem warranted.
The Americanization of America’s system of retirement income 
provision
A common assumption is that the American welfare state, and liberal wel-
fare states more generally, do relatively little to cushion the consequences 
of trigger events and that this results in more volatile and heterogeneous 
income trajectories. With respect to the transition to retirement, it is often 
argued that low public replacement rates in combination with a patchy and 
stratif ied system of private pensions result in very heterogeneous income 
trajectories and high risks of falling below the poverty line. Some authors 
even suspect an amplif ication of working-life inequalities after retirement 
(e.g., Crystal and Shea 1990).
In this regard, one of the more intriguing f indings of my study is that 
the us have become ‘more American’ over the course of the last two or 
three decades, at least as far as the system of retirement income provision 
is concerned. Findings for income trajectories around men’s retirement 
suggest that average relative income losses, as well as rates of poverty entry 
around men’s exit from work were broadly similar in Germany and the us 
during the 1980s. Toward the end of the observation period, the variability of 
income changes and in particular the prevalence of very large income losses 
had risen markedly in the us, as had the risk of entering poverty around 
retirement. From this perspective, the ‘Transformation’ of the American 
pension system has been an ‘Americanization’ in the sense that the current 
system more closely resembles stereotypical portrayals of the American 
mobility regime.
The f indings for men’s retirement support the views of authors such 
as Hacker (2006) and Gosselin (2009) who argue that the increasing 
296 Late- CaReeR RiSkS in Changing WeLfaRe StateS 
prevalence of def ined-contribution plans (and the parallel decline of 
def ined-benef its plans) has spawned greater economic insecurity. They 
also square well with related recent research, in particular with the 
work of Edward Wolff (2011) whose studies on the basis of the Survey of 
Consumer Finances document growing inequalities in complementary 
pension wealth.
It is often claimed that the alleged trend toward greater economic 
insecurity in the us has ‘not just affected the working poor and those 
in the great statistical middle, but has reached households long thought 
immune to dislocation’ (Gosselin 2009: 8), a notion that – as discussed 
in the introductory chapter of this study – is also familiar from German 
debates (e.g., about a ‘shrinking’ of the middle class; cf. Grabka and Frick 
2008). On this issue, my f indings are more ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the analysis of income trajectories around retirement in the us does suggest 
that workers with intermediate and high levels of education have not been 
completely sheltered from the trend toward greater income losses and 
increased risks of large declines. On the other hand, trends for workers 
with low levels of education appear as unfavorable or even worse than 
for the higher-educated, a f inding that is again consistent with Wolff ’s 
(2003; 2011) analysis, which documents growing educational inequalities in 
complementary pension wealth. The overall picture is thus one of a broad 
upward trend in economic insecurity that is accompanied by persistent 
or even increasing differences among social strata, which is an important 
f inding when it comes to formulating priorities for political action. In 
particular, reform proposals should take seriously the challenge of provid-
ing adequate retirement income to low-income workers (for examples of 
such proposals, see Halperin and Munnell [2005], Ghilarducci [2008], and 
Wolff [2011]).
Another consistent f inding for the us is that period differences in 
income dynamics around women’s retirement look quite different, often 
indicating a trend toward smaller losses that seems to be related to women’s 
improved access to complementary pension income. As noted in Chapter 6, 
these gender differences suggest that women’s declining losses have offset 
growing losses for men in dual-earner couples. More generally, recent 
trends in economic well-being after retirement may vary systematically 
by household/earnings type. A longitudinal analysis of this possibility is 
complicated by household instability and by the fact that partners in dual-
earner couples often retire several years apart. Nevertheless, future research 
should investigate this issue, a point to which I return below.
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Rising insecurity in Germany?
For German men, and to a lesser extent also for women, relative income 
losses at the time of retirement have grown noticeably from the mid-1980s 
onward and there is considerable evidence that this trend is primarily attrib-
utable to a gradual decline in the generosity of public retirement benefits. 
The decline in replacement rates seems to have been broadly shared across 
educational subgroups and across different types of workers more generally 
and partly for this reason has not (yet?) led to greater numbers of voluntary 
retirees facing economic marginalization (in the sense of entering poverty) 
or very large declines in their income at the time of retirement, though there 
is some evidence that income drops of more than a third occurred more 
frequently toward the end of the observation period.
However, this does not mean that all is well in Germany: First, my findings 
suggest that the consequences of late-career job loss and involuntary early 
retirement more generally have risen disproportionately, a point to which 
I return below. Second, almost a third of low-educated men with preretire-
ment incomes above the poverty line fell below this threshold during the 
first years of retirement, even if their retirement was voluntary in the sense of 
not being triggered by job loss or declining health. This proportion is similar 
to the entry rate of low-skilled Americans during the 1980s and early 1990s 
and attests to the lack of redistribution in the German public pension pillar. 
Given scheduled declines in public replacement rates for future retirement 
cohorts (cf. Chapter 3), these findings strongly suggest that retirement income 
security and prevention of old-age poverty will become key policy challenges 
during the next decades (Motel-Klingebiel and Vogel 2013). Increasing labor 
market inequalities, especially since the mid-1990s (Giesecke and Verwiebe 
2008; Dustmann et al. 2009), are likely to exacerbate this problem.
Against this background, the American trends documented in this study, 
and in particular those for less-educated workers, raise concerns about recent 
reforms that have strengthened second- and third-pillar pensions without 
expanding redistributive elements in the public pension pillar. The current 
landscape of complementary pensions in Germany certainly differs from 
the American: As discussed in Chapter 3, German second- and third-pillar 
pensions are typically either pure defined-benefit plans or have a strong 
defined-benefit component. Empirical data also suggest that participation 
in Riester-type third-pillar pension plans is somewhat more equally distrib-
uted than complementary pension participation in many other advanced 
economies (oecd 2012: 119-121). At the same time, participation in Riester 
plans remains highly stratif ied by earnings and there certainly may be 
298 Late- CaReeR RiSkS in Changing WeLfaRe StateS 
more effective and equitable approaches for achieving retirement income 
security and preventing old-age poverty (Himmelreicher and Viebrok 2004).
Chapter 5 discussed several reasons why vulnerable groups are less likely 
to invest in complementary pensions even conditional on being eligible, 
among them issues of f inancial literacy and motivational eff icacy. At the 
very least, voluntary complementary pension schemes should thus be 
implemented in such a way as to maximize levels of participation (e.g., by 
implementing opt-out rather than opt-in designs; Madrian and Shea 2001, 
Chetty et al. 2012). However, as noted by Wolff (2011: 267) in the Ameri-
can context, ‘one problem [...] is that a lot of low-income workers simply 
cannot afford a 401(k) or even an ira [i.e., the most important types of 
complementary pension plans in the us, J.P.H.]’. More redistributive public 
or employer-provided subsidies to complementary pensions may alleviate 
this problem, especially if combined with opt-out designs and/or if employer 
contributions are made even if employees themselves do not save (Wolff 
2011). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask whether redistribution cannot 
be more eff iciently organized within the framework of the public system. 
As noted by Himmelreicher and Viebrok (2004), a key advantage of public 
payg schemes is that redistribution can be exceptionally well-targeted. 
This is because public benefits can be based on actually realized lifetime 
earnings (rather than income in a given year, as is the case with subsidies for 
private retirement savings). In the German context, the case for increased 
redistribution within the public tier appears particularly compelling, as 
the current system may actually be regressive (Breyer and Hupfeld 2009).1
A related challenge is coverage of disability risks: Because of close 
linkages between public disability benefits and the overall level of public 
retirement benefits, changes affecting the latter tend to affect the former as 
well (Bäcker et al. 2011). In addition, recent reforms have enacted additional 
cuts in the level of public disability benefits in order to reduce incentives 
for early retirement via the disability pathway. These changes raise the 
importance of complementary disability insurance for protection against 
the economic consequences of health problems, yet such insurance is often 
outright unaffordable for low-income workers who typically face above-
average risks of actually becoming disabled (which drives up premia for 
individualized insurance). Köhler-Rama et al. (2010) provide an insightful 
1 More specif ically, the relationship between lifetime benef its and lifetime contributions 
is regressive because of the interaction of two facts: Monthly benef its are approximately pro-
portional to lifetime contributions (cf. Chapter 3), while the average number of months that a 
worker receives benef its rises with income (because of stratif ied mortality risks).
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discussion of this problem and evaluate different reform options. Finally, 
it is important to acknowledge the close linkages between working-life 
earnings and retirement income (Allmendinger et al. 1991). Policies that 
tackle working-life inequalities such as minimum wage policies or training 
measures for low-wage workers can therefore play a crucial role in contain-
ing trends toward greater inequalities and poverty risks among future 
retirement cohorts (Wolff 2011; Motel-Klingebiel and Vogel 2013).
Employment exit and employment maintenance after late-career job loss
My analysis of employment trajectories after late-career job loss high-
lighted striking German-American differences in the propensity of older 
workers to return to work after late-career job loss. Again, f indings were 
more consistent for men. In Germany, despite some evidence of increasing 
reemployment rates, late-career job loss clearly remained an important 
trigger of involuntary early retirement throughout the observation period 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. Averaging estimates from the different 
subperiods, the proportion of older men who no longer worked a substantial 
number of hours a few (i.e., between 2 to 5) years after late-career job loss 
was around two thirds in Germany, with the corresponding American 
share being closer to one third. Even more strikingly, comparisons with a 
matched control group indicate that the postdisplacement non-employment 
rate of German men was about 30 percentage points higher than for simi-
lar non-displaced men. Similar estimates for American men indicate no 
unambiguous exit-accelerating effect of late-career job loss. Some results 
for the us also suggest an interesting bifurcated pattern: Job loss seems to 
induce some men to retire earlier than planned, while other workers appear 
to delay their retirement in response to late-career job loss, presumably in 
order make up for the associated f inancial losses. My analysis of changes in 
spousal labor supply around late-career job loss underscores this f inding: 
The ‘wives’ of displaced American men work substantially longer hours and 
delay their retirement compared to the ‘wives’ of similar non-displaced men.
These markedly different employment trajectories are accompanied 
by pronounced differences in the income packages of older workers after 
job loss. They do not, however, translate into equally clear differences in 
needs-adjusted disposable income. Taking estimates at face value, displaced 
German men’s disposable income was between 4 to 8 percentage points 
lower relative to predisplacement income than for American men. In this 
sense, Germany’s generous early retirement policies have been a relatively 
effective, albeit costly, means of cushioning the impact of late-career job loss.
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These f indings are consistent with characterizations of Germany as 
an ‘employment exit regime’ and of the us as a regime of ‘market-induced 
employment maintenance’ (e.g., Hofäcker 2010; Buchholz et al. 2011). While 
this distinction usually refers to different approaches to older workers and 
early retirement more generally, my analysis of employment trajectories 
after late-career job loss impressively confirms that these labels capture 
real differences between the German and American regimes.
In Chapter 3, I discussed the more elementary institutional differences 
underlying the distinction between ‘employment exit’ and ‘market-induced 
employment maintenance’. Building on previous research, I emphasized 
German-American differences in the following dimensions: skill specificity 
and the strength of labor market boundaries, labor market regulation in the 
form dismissal protection, continuing training participation, and – last, but 
by no means least – retirement income provision and social policy more 
broadly. I also hinted at the ways in which these more elementary differences 
depend on, and likely reinforce, one another. Not only do these differences 
generally work in the same direction: For example, Germany’s specific skills 
regime arguably results in marked labor market boundaries that limit the 
opportunities for reemployment, while more generous public benefits pull 
displaced older workers toward retirement. It is also often suggested that 
these institutional elements are interrelated in a deeper sense: Thus, Estevez-
Abe et al. (2001) suggest that more generous, welfare-sustaining social policies 
help to overcome workers’ reluctance to invest in specif ic skills.
Regardless of how convincing such explanations are, the empirical fact of 
institutional covariation (or clustering) makes it difficult to attribute overall 
differences in life course outcomes to more elementary institutional factors 
(and their interaction). On a somewhat higher level of abstraction, however, 
the f indings of this study provide compelling evidence that ‘institutions 
matter’: The institutional ‘packages’ captured by the distinction between 
employment exit and employment maintenance have clearly shaped the 
employment/retirement trajectories of displaced older workers and their 
families in distinctive and expectable ways, at least during the last three 
decades.
Have recent reforms raised the costs of career interruptions and 
involuntary early retirement?
A common and plausible assumption is that the retrenchment of early 
retirement options and other recent changes in social policy have dispro-
portionately affected workers whose late careers are interrupted by job loss 
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or the onset of health problems – and that such workers may fall further 
behind as social policy continues to emphasize later retirement (Bäcker 
et al. 2009; Köhler-Rama et al. 2010; Johnson 2011; Kingson and Morrissey 
2012). There are also reasons to suspect that such changes have been (and 
will be) particularly consequential in the German context where various 
factors depress the reemployment prospects of displaced older workers. 
In other words, the very reasoning that suggests institutional aff inities 
between, say, an emphasis on specif ic skills and generous early exit policies 
also suggests that retrenchment of the latter may be more consequential 
in the presence of the former.
To address this issue, I have followed other recent studies (e.g., Szinovacz 
and Davey 2005; Lachance and Seligman 2010; Barrett and Brzozowski 
2010) and adopted a basic distinction between involuntary retirees who 
retire after a late-career job loss or the onset of severe health problems 
and voluntary retirees whose retirement is not preceded by either of these 
events.
Def initive conclusions were hampered by small sample sizes, but es-
pecially for German men there is relatively clear evidence that the gap 
between involuntary and voluntary retirees has widened and that the effect 
of late-career job loss on economic well-being has become more severe in 
recent years. More specif ically, the analysis of income changes around exit 
from work in Chapter 6 consistently revealed more unfavorable trends for 
German men who retired involuntarily (i.e., after job loss or a decline in 
health) than for German men classif ied as voluntary retirees. The analysis 
of the consequences of job loss in Chapter 8 corroborated this result. Here, 
I  found that differences in relative income changes between displaced 
German men and similar non-displaced workers were larger in the second 
half of the observation period, even though period differences did not quite 
attain statistical signif icance. For both German and American men, I also 
found that the risk of suffering very large declines of more than half of 
disposable income rose over time, both in absolute terms and compared 
to similar non-displaced workers – and that these growing gaps persist at 
least until 4 to 5 years after late-career job loss.
These f indings, while somewhat preliminary, suggest that, especially in 
Germany, workers whose late-careers were interrupted by job loss or declin-
ing health have indeed fallen behind as early retirement options have been 
scaled back. Closely tracking the situation of these workers thus appears 
imperative, especially since many of the policy changes that have arguably 
made late-career job loss and involuntary early retirement more costly were 
introduced only gradually (e.g., benef it adjustments for early retirement 
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in Germany) and/or toward the very end of the observation period (e.g., 
the abolition of second-tier earnings-related unemployment benef its in 
Germany or increases in the full retirement age in both countries).
In general, as noted by Richard Johnson (2011), a key challenge facing 
policymakers who wish to ‘Raise the Retirement Age’ is to ‘Protect those 
Who Can’t Work’. One should add that another crucial task is to help older 
workers, who can work, but are so unlucky as to lose their job, f ind decent 
reemployment. The American results suggest that at least some older work-
ers and their families have to go to considerable lengths to limit the extent 
of downward mobility after late-career job loss – despite facing a labor 
market that arguably offers relatively good opportunities for older workers 
and despite macroeconomic conditions being quite favorable during the 
observation period.
9.2 Implications and directions for future research
This study has addressed a large number of questions, yet some interesting 
issues had to be excluded from the outset, due to lack of suitable data and/
or limits of scope. The analysis also generated several f indings that call for 
further research, but could not be pursued within the confines of this study. 
In this concluding section, I discuss what I consider the most important 
issues to be subjected to further scrutiny.
Investigating retirement income dynamics by household/earnings type
A general result of my analysis of income changes around retirement is that 
trends over time have been more favorable for women, especially in the us. 
Borrowing a phrase from Blau and Kahn (1997), women have been ‘swim-
ming upstream’. For simplicity and conciseness, I have focused on average 
effects of men’s and women’s retirement across different household types. 
In view of the gender-specif ic trends, one might expect improvements for 
women to have at least partly offset the trend toward larger income losses 
for men in dual-earner couples where both partners have substantial labor 
force attachment and therefore belong to the population that is at risk of 
retirement (as def ined in this study). By the same token, one would expect 
to f ind the clearest negative trends for single men (a relatively small group) 
and male-breadwinner couples.
Unfortunately, a full-f ledged analysis that differentiates retirees 
with respect to household earnings arrangements and joint retirement 
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trajectories was beyond the scope of this study. Exploring the net effect 
of gender-specif ic trends for dual-earner couples is particularly vexing, 
not only because of the general problem of household instability, but 
also because the two partners may often retire several years apart. The 
most compelling longitudinal approach to retirement-related income 
dynamics in dual-earner couples would thus require tracking households 
for rather long periods of time. Analyzing the full retirement trajectory 
appears crucial because couples’ retirement decisions are interdependent 
and because educational homogamy and assortative mating may result in 
strong correlations between spouses’ retirement outcomes. For example, the 
trend toward greater educational inequalities in complementary retirement 
wealth suggests that the extent to which women’s gains have offset the 
losses of men may be very limited in couples where both partners have 
low levels of education. To the extent that such comprehensive analyses 
are not feasible, longitudinal analyses of individual retirement events that 
differentiate by household type or even cross-sectional analyses of ‘fully 
retired’ couples may be useful f irst steps.
Using alternative measures of (economic) well-being
At the beginning of Chapter 2, I discussed a number of factors that render 
income a less-than-perfect proxy for individual economic well-being. In 
particular, a decline in income around retirement need not imply lower 
economic well-being, as individuals may also experience a decline in work-
related expenses, no longer need to save for retirement, and may be able to 
draw on non-annuitized savings to f inance consumption.
A popular alternative to using income measures, especially in economics, 
therefore is to look at changes in expenditure which are often believed 
to provide a better approximation to consumption levels. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the case for focusing on changes in expenditure may be 
less compelling than is often suggested. In particular, income may better 
capture individuals’ access to resources in the longer run, particularly if 
they are ‘underannuitized’ or overconsume in their early retirement years. 
In addition, relating changes in expenditure/consumption to changes in 
economic well-being requires strong assumptions concerning changes 
in household needs. For example, one would expect non-discretionary 
expenses on (work-related) travel or clothing to fall at retirement. Yet one 
would not expect expenditure on these commodities to drop to zero and 
few data sets contain enough information to credibly differentiate between 
necessary and discretionary expenses. Often, data restrictions even force 
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researchers to focus on expenditure for a narrow set of commodities such 
as food (Smith 2006; Barrett and Brzozowski 2010). However, there may be 
ample room for declines in expenditure on goods that are ‘less essential’ 
than food.
In short, other approaches to measuring changes in economic well-being 
tend to have their own set of limitations. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth 
trying to triangulate the f indings of this study using other outcome meas-
ures. More generally, surveys should seek to collect alternative measures 
of individuals’ economic situation. Respondents’ own evaluation of their 
economic situation or indicators of f inancial hardship or diff iculties to 
‘make ends meet’ might provide useful additional information, as might 
more direct measures of standard of living (e.g., in the spirit of the relative 
deprivation approach of Townsend [1979]).
Another valuable extension of the analysis would be to incorporate 
information on retirees’ non-annuitized wealth, including housing wealth. 
For many households, wealth undoubtedly plays a crucial role in maintain-
ing economic well-being during retirement, and clearly growing income 
losses will be of less concern to workers who can rely on a sizable amount 
of assets. At the same time, it seems unlikely that wealth is distributed in 
such a way as to effectively cushion recent and projected trends toward 
greater economic insecurity and poverty risks for vulnerable groups such 
as less-educated workers (Motel-Klingebiel and Vogel 2013).
Some of the f indings concerning the consequences late-career job loss 
also suggest that displaced American workers and their families may often 
sacrif ice leisure time in order to limit the impact of job loss on economic 
well-being. The positive reading of this f inding is that the American labor 
market provides suff icient opportunities for older workers. The negative 
reading is that limited public insurance forces displaced workers and their 
families to make sacrif ices in other domains such as leisure time and job 
quality in order to contain declines in economic well-being. Against this 
background, it would be interesting to investigate this trade-off between 
economic well-being and other relevant domains more directly. Analyses 
of the impact of job loss on overall subjective well-being or life satisfaction, 
which at least until recently was unfortunately not collected by the psid, 
might add important details to the picture.
Studying longer-term changes
A related question is how the income situation of retirees and displaced 
older workers changes in the longer run. Given my focus on within-country 
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trends, it was not feasible to look at changes beyond the fourth or f ifth year 
after the event in question. The study by Hungerford (2003) suggests that 
long-term changes are more favorable for German retirees, as they draw a 
larger portion of their retirement income from public sources, which tends 
to be indexed at higher rates than private retirement income. By the same 
token, as complementary pension income is becoming more important in 
Germany, so will be the question how these benefits evolve in the longer 
run (Künemund et al. 2010, 2013).
Another interesting issue is to what extent the income scars associated 
with late-career job loss persist beyond my individual-level observation 
window which ends 4 to 5 years after late-career job loss. Findings for 
the average displaced man do not suggest that the disposable income 
gap narrows substantially between 2 to 3 and 4 to 5 years after job loss. 
However, it does seem likely that the gap eventually declines as more and 
more comparison workers leave employment. When and to what extent this 
is the case, and if the gap eventually vanishes completely or perhaps even 
reverses (as some displaced workers seek to make up for foregone earnings), 
are interesting questions for future research.
It also seems worthwhile to apply the trigger events approach to income 
dynamics after retirement age. The work of Zaidi and his colleagues (Zaidi 
et al. 2005; Zaidi 2008) makes f irst steps in this direction. A related question 
is how the f inancial needs of retirees change over the course of retirement. 
A common view is that needs are more likely to increase than to fall, mainly 
due to increasing health- and care-related expenses (e.g., Schmähl 2010).
Using a holistic approach to the late career
The clear differences in the propensity of German and American workers 
to return to work after late-career job loss suggest that involuntary retire-
ment, as it is commonly operationalized, has quite different meanings 
in different contexts. In particular, as noted above, my results suggest a 
bifurcated pattern for the us, with job loss inducing earlier-than-planned 
retirement for one group, and later-than-planned retirement for a second 
group of workers.
A promising approach for capturing these and other complexities of late 
career patterns would be to take a more holistic perspective that neverthe-
less emphasizes the role of unexpected events. Arguably, a distinction 
between fragile late careers that are interrupted by job loss or declining 
health (and perhaps a few other events) and smooth careers that are not 
should be central to this approach. Building on this basic distinction, a 
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limited number of ideal typical career trajectories could then be identif ied, 
either on the basis of theoretical considerations or using a more inductive 
approach such as a combination of cluster and sequence analysis (Fasang 
2008). While the prevalence of different career patterns would be interest-
ing in itself, this approach could be fruitfully combined with an analysis 
of income trajectories within the trigger events framework. An obvious 
practical impediment to such an approach, and a major reason why it was 
not pursued in this study, is that its compelling application would require 
considerably longer individual panels than could be used in this study, 
where investigation of changes over time was an important priority.
Better understanding the job search of displaced older workers
Given the growing emphasis on late retirement, it is crucial to better under-
stand the reemployment/retirement decisions of displaced older workers as 
well as their job search process. What factors determine whether a displaced 
older worker decides to look for work and how good are the chances that 
he/she eventually succeeds? What kinds of jobs are displaced older workers 
offered, both in terms of wages and in terms of non-monetary aspects of 
job quality, and how do these offers compare to their expectations and 
preferences?
Studies such as Maestas and Li (2006) which take a closer look at the job 
search process of older workers can shed light on these questions and help 
to design effective measures for improving the reemployment prospects 
of displaced older workers. However, Maestas and Li’s analysis, which is 
based on the Health and Retirement Study, also highlights a problem with 
conventional panel data sets: Interview intervals are too long – two years in 
their case – to enable a thorough understanding of the job search process. 
Better data are therefore urgently needed. High frequency longitudinal sur-
veys that conduct monthly or even weekly interviews with job searchers (cf. 
Krueger and Mueller 2011), though admittedly costly, would be an extremely 
valuable resource for obtaining a more detailed and useful picture of the 
job search process of displaced older workers.
 List of acronyms
algII Arbeitslosengeld II
afdc Aid to Families with Dependent Children
aime Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
ate Average Treatment Effect
atn Average Treatment Effect on the Non-treated
att Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
awe Added-Worker Effect
ba Bundesagentur für Arbeit
cem Coarsened Exact Matching
cme Coordinated Market Economy









eitc Earned Income Tax Credit
epl Employment Protection Legislation




fpatt Feasible Population Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
fsatt Feasible Sample Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
ft Full-Time
gae Grundsicherung im Alter und bei Erwerbsminderung
gdp Gross Domestic Product
hel Household Earnings Loss
hh Household
hht Household Taxes
hjl Hypothesis – Job Loss
hrs Health and Retirement Study
hvr Hypothesis – Voluntary Retirement
iel Individual Earnings Loss
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ira Individual Retirement Account
jl Job Loss
lme Liberal Market Economy
oap Old-Age Pension
oecd Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
pate Population Average Treatment Effect
patn Population Average Treatment Effect on the Non-treated
patt Population Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
payg Pay-As-You-Go
pia Primary Insurance Amount
pib Private Income Buffer
pnli Private Non-Labor Income
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pt Part-Time
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rat Retirement Age Tercile
sate Sample Average Treatment Effect
satn Sample Average Treatment Effect on the Non-treated
satt Sample Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
sd Standard Deviation
sga Substantial Gainful Activity
sh Sozialhilfe
sipp Survey of Income and Program Participation
soep Socio-Economic Panel
ssa Social Security Administration
ssi Supplemental Security Income
ssw Social Security Wealth




usd United States Dollars
usdol United States Department of Labor
ushor United States House of Representatives
voc Varieties of Capitalism
wsb Welfare State Buffer
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